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Abstract 
 
Workplace discrimination against workers with caring responsibilities is a pervasive and 
a serious barrier to the social and economic equality and well-being of workers and their 
families.  Since 2001 Part 4B of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)(‘AD Act’) 
provides that it is unlawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of their 
carers’ responsibilities in work.  Part 4B has received limited attention in the literature. 
This thesis will fill in these gaps by explaining and evaluating how effective the 
legislation has been during its first decade.   
 
In NSW the Anti-Discrimination Board (‘ADB’) is responsible for the administration of 
the AD Act and together with the relevant Tribunal is responsible for the two-stage 
enforcement process.  During the decade more than 550 carers’ complaints were lodged 
with the ADB but only 12 reached a hearing.  This thesis looks beyond a purely 
positivist analysis of the operation of the law based on Tribunal jurisprudence alone.  
Instead it uses a realist ‘law in action’ theoretical lens including empirical research of 
carers’ complaints to explain how Part 4B has been given meaning and been applied in 
practice by other key actors: the ADB, worker–carers and employers. Two research 
questions will be answered. The first, asks how the ADB and the Tribunal interpret and 
apply Part 4B and does this give effect to the objectives of Part 4B?  The second looks 
to the accessibility and effectiveness of the two stage enforcement process, and asks is it 
capable of providing ‘good’ outcomes? Such outcomes include not only compensation, 
but other remedies such as reasonable accommodation for the individual complainant of 
their responsibilities and/or potentially broader normative outcomes which may 
challenge discriminatory employment practices based on deeply entrenched ‘ideal 
worker’ norms at the workplace level.  
 
The Tribunal decisions during the decade are considered first.  In a time of judicial 
conservatism in Australia it is argued that the Tribunal has operated in a policy vacuum, 
interpreting Part 4B technically and narrowly. The outcomes have been generally poor, 
with only two complaints upheld and inadequate compensation the only remedy. The 
decisions emphasise a hostile adversarial process where accommodation is an unlikely 
and impractical remedy.  They provide limited normative, precedential and educative 
vi 
 
value. Turning to the ADB, and its education and complaint functions, it is argued that 
free of the constraints of an adjudicative role, it has taken a less technical and a more 
purposive holistic policy-driven approach than the Tribunal.  Its education publications 
interpret Part 4B as implying a duty of reasonable accommodation on employers which 
is likely to have had an important normative effect among employers and workers in 
NSW. The findings of the review of complaints made to the ADB during the decade 
demonstrate that when compared with the Tribunal the ADB provides a relatively 
informal and timely dispute-resolution process. It therefore offers the better option for 
an early resolution. Complainants achieved accommodations, and also potentially 
broader systemic outcomes.  
 
This thesis makes an original contribution by helping to fill in the significant gaps in our 
knowledge about the operation of Part 4B; the ADB and Tribunal responses to it; and 
how effective these responses have been in meeting the objectives of the law.  It 
concludes that discrimination agencies, if they are adequately funded, exercise a crucial 
role through their education and complaint functions to encourage compliance with the 
law; to prevent discrimination; achieve reasonable accommodation; and to provide an 
accessible complaint mechanism.  Law reform and other recommendation are also 
suggested in relation to both the Tribunal and the ADB to ensure a purposive 
application of Part 4B and to make the enforcement process more accessible, and 
effective.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background and Context 
 
It is well recognised that workplace discrimination against ‘worker–carers’—defined by 
Adams as ‘those who hold simultaneous responsibilities of paid market labour and 
unpaid caring obligations in the home’1—is a pervasive and a serious barrier to social 
and economic equality.
2
 Despite the decline of the male breadwinner and the 
‘feminisation of labour’,3 with increasing levels of women participating in the 
workforce, assumptions that this male breadwinner represents the ‘ideal worker’ remain 
a deeply entrenched cultural and social norm.
4
 Workplaces continue to depend upon 
him: he has few domestic responsibilities and can work full-time, and he does not take 
time off to have babies, to raise children or to provide unpaid care for members of the 
family or other people in the community. These norms in turn underpin gendered 
assumptions about who is responsible for paid work and unpaid care work and, 
                                                 
1
 K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and the Worker-Carer: It’s Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law 
in Context 18, 19 (‘Indirect Discrimination’). This term is used throughout this thesis. 
2
 See generally Natalie Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Work, Life and 
Care in 2012—The Australian Work and Life Index (Centre for Work + Life, University of South 
Australia, 2012); Barbara Pocock, The Labour Market Ate My Babies (Federation Press, 2006) ch 3 
(‘Labour’); three Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) reports documenting this 
disadvantage: AHRC, Accumulating Poverty: Women’s Experiences of Inequality over the Life Cycle 
(2009) (‘Poverty’); AHRC, Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who Care (2013) 
(‘Investing’); AHRC, Supporting Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review 
Report (2014) (‘Supporting’). In the context of the discrimination law literature in Australia, see, for 
example, Anna Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper 
No 51, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of 
Melbourne, 2012) (‘Working Paper’); Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and 
the Case of Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’); K Lee Adams, ‘Defining 
Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263 (‘Defining’); K Lee Adams, 
‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 1; Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) 
Sydney Law Review 689 (‘Bathwater’); Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” 
of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 88 (‘Shadow’). 
3
 Pocock, Labour, above n 2, 48–50, 46–77. Pocock explains the ‘feminisation of labour’ over the past 
decades, whereby women with caring responsibilities, whether for children or for other people, have 
taken up paid employment: at 46–77. See also Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 2, 7. 
4
 Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 2, 689–97; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 2; Chapman, Working Paper, 
above n 2; Sara Charlesworth, ‘The Sex Discrimination Act: Advancing Gender Equality and Decent 
Work’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), Sex Discrimination in Uncertain Times (ANU E Book, 2010) 133 
(‘Advancing’); Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Legal Production of Precarious Work’ in Judy Fudge and 
Rosemary Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Hart, 2006) 283. 
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importantly, the value attributed to each in society.
5
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock 
have recently noted that, in the 21
st
 century, the ideal worker is indeed still ‘alive and 
well’ in Australia.6 
 
Discrimination against worker–carers causes serious detrimental short and long-term 
consequences that go beyond economic effects, to affect the social and personal well-
being of worker–carers and their families.7 These worker–carers face a double struggle: 
first, balancing work and family commitments at work in the face of ‘inflexible work, 
work intensification and unsupportive workplace cultures’,8 and then managing the 
negative effects on them and their families at home.
9
 Because women still shoulder the 
burden for the majority of unpaid care work, these negative effects are highly gendered 
and affect women most.
10
 
 
Across Australia, discrimination laws have introduced protections for workers with 
family or caring responsibilities in an attempt to address the seemingly intractable 
conflict between work and care, and the gender inequalities and the negative effects 
arising from it. Very often, discrimination legislation does not expressly articulate its 
objectives.
11
 It has been suggested that the policy objectives of legislation seeking to 
eradicate discrimination against worker–carers include a better work and family 
balance, gender equality and ensuring better job quality for carers,
12
 access to ‘decent 
                                                 
5
 Rosemary Hunter, Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace (Federation, 1992) 4–5; Margaret 
Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1990) 1–
24, 244, 261; Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 2, 689–90. 
6 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 2, 8; Pocock, Labour, above n 2. 
7
 See generally the literature in n 2 above.  
8
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 2, 7. 
9
 See generally Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 2; Pocock, Labour, above n 2; the three AHRC 
Reports: AHRC, ‘Poverty’, above n 2; AHRC, ‘Investing’ above n 2; AHRC, ‘Supporting’ above n 2; 
Australian Council of Trade Unions, Australians Want Time to Care: A Summary Report of Views 
Regarding Support Required to Balance Work and Care (2013); Lyndall Strazdins, Megan Shipley and 
Dorothy Broom, ‘What Does Family-Friendly Really Mean? Wellbeing, Time, and the Quality of 
Parents’ Jobs’ (2007) 33(2) Australian Bulletin of Labour 202; Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, 
‘Right to Request Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 116; 
Charlesworth, ‘Advancing’, above n 4; Jenny Chalmers and Trish Hill, ‘Marginalising Women in the 
Labour Market: “Wage Scarring” Effects of Part-time Work’ (2007) 33(2) Australian Bulletin of Labour 
180; Jill Murray, ‘Work and Care: New Legal Mechanisms for Adaptation’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and 
Industry 67 (‘Work and Care’).  
10
 Above n 9. 
11
 Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 11–12. Compare, for example, ss 3 and 14 of the Victorian 
Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (‘EO Act’) and s 3 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’). 
12
 Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 9. 120, 128 noted the common policy goals, including the three 
aims of better work and family balance, job quality and gender equality. 
3 
 
work’,13 and greater ‘social inclusion’14 and ‘well-being’,15 as well as encouraging 
employers to accommodate their workers’ caring and family responsibilities.16 The 
effectiveness of discrimination laws to meet these objectives is difficult to measure and 
is often unclear. However, it has been noted that the anti-discrimination law framework 
has played a critical role in protecting individual workers with care and family 
responsibilities and in providing a context within which conflict about work and family 
is negotiated in the workplace,
 
as well as providing a complaints mechanism and 
dispute-resolution process if a dispute cannot be resolved.
17
  
 
Generally, all anti-discrimination legislation in Australia
18
 has followed a similar or 
what can be termed a ‘standard’ template, providing enforceable civil rights and 
obligations.
19
 Discrimination laws are based on a duty of restraint framework, and they 
grant rights to people not to be discriminated against on certain protected grounds (such 
as sex, race or disability) and impose obligations on certain people and organisations, 
including employers, not to discriminate.
20
 The laws set up a statutory agency that is 
responsible for the administration of the legislation and the enforcement process 
provided under legislation. Generally, the enforcement of discrimination law is based 
upon a statutory two-stage enforcement process,
21
 whereby an individual must first 
lodge a complaint with the relevant agency; conciliation is then attempted, and only if 
this first stage fails to resolve a complaint can a complaint proceed to be adjudicated 
publicly by a court or tribunal.
22
 In practice, very few complaints ever reach a hearing at 
a court or tribunal.
23
 
 
                                                 
13
 Charlesworth, ‘Advancing’ above  n 4. 
14
 Hugh Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16; 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 2, 43–4. 
15
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 2; Strazdins, Shipley and Broom, above n 9. 
16
 Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 2. 
17
 Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’ above n 2, 88. 
18
 For an overview of the Australian discrimination jurisdictions at federal, state and territory levels and 
the standard template that has been used, see generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 11. See Chris 
Ronalds and Elizabeth Raper, Discrimination Law and Practice (Federation Press, 4
th
 ed, 2012) 247–55, 
for a summary of the main legislation and provisions across Australian jurisdictions. See also Belinda 
Smith and Dominique Allen, ‘Whose Fault Is It? Asking the Right Questions When Trying to Address 
Discrimination’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 31. Note that exceptions to the standard template 
are explained in more detail in Chapter 1. 
19
 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 11, 1–10.  
20
 Ibid 1–10, 197. 
21
 Ibid 8, and for a general overview of the processes across Australian jurisdictions, see 725–99.  
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid 8. 
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There have been few empirical studies of carer or family responsibility complaints made 
at the first stage.
24
 Instead, the academic discrimination law literature on family and 
carers’ responsibilities in Australia has often focused on an analysis of the operation of 
the various statutory provisions and how they have been interpreted and applied by 
courts and tribunals at the second stage of the process.
25
 The literature highlights the 
inadequacy of both the substantive provisions and the enforcement mechanisms 
provided in the standard template. Generally, the literature suggests that it is very 
difficult for individual workers to engage with and enforce their rights successfully and 
effectively, given, for example, the complexity of the legislation, an onerous burden of 
proof, and the conservatism of the courts and tribunals in their strict and narrow 
application of the laws that has often favoured high levels of managerial prerogative 
over complainants’ claims.26 There are also concerns that the standard model of 
discrimination law based on duties of restraint enforced by an individual worker will 
have very little effect on the broader structural and societal aspects of discrimination for 
worker–carers, such as those embodied in ideal worker norms.27 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’ above n 2, and Sara Charlesworth, Claiming Discrimination: Complaints of 
Sex and Gender Discrimination in Employment under the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (The 
Centre for Applied Social Research, RMIT University, 2008), both of which relate to an empirical study 
of discrimination complaints made over a three-month period in 2004 under the Equal Opportunity Act 
1995 (Vic) as it was then, prior to the enactment of the EO Act. See also Rosemary Hunter and Alice 
Leonard, ‘The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases’ (Working Paper No 8, Centre for 
Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, 1995) 
(‘Working Paper’), which involved sex discrimination complaints in the period 1989–1993 in several 
jurisdictions in Australia, Victoria, South Australia and the federal Human Right and Equal Opportunity 
Commission but did not include the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (‘AD Act’) jurisdiction. 
25
 See, for example, Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 
Melbourne University Law Review 325, 334–353 (‘Context’); Chapman, Working Paper, above n 2; 
Belinda Smith, ‘From Wardley to Purvis—How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law Come in 30 
Years?’ (2008) 21 Australian Journal of Labour Law 3 (‘Purvis’); Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, 
‘Family Friendly Work Practices and the Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 395; K Lee Adams, 
‘Defining’ above n 2; K Lee Adams, ‘The Problem of Voluntariness: Parents and the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle’ (2003); Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 1; Dominique Allen, ‘Reducing the Burden 
of Proof in Australia’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 579. 
26
 See generally Chapman, ‘Working Paper’ above n 2; Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 25; Smith, ‘It’s About 
Time—For a New Regulatory Approach to Equality’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 117; Smith, 
‘Bathwater’ above n 2; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’ above n 2; K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, 
above n 1; K Lee Adams, ‘Defining’, above n 2.  
27
 Above n 25.  
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Carers’ Responsibility Discrimination under the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977 (NSW) (‘AD Act’) 
 
The Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW (‘ADB’) is the relevant agency under the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (‘AD Act’) responsible for the administration of the 
legislation in NSW. It has broad public policy functions, including education and 
awareness raising in NSW.
28
 In addition, the ADB and the relevant statutory tribunal 
(‘Tribunal’) under the AD Act 29 are together responsible for overseeing the two-stage 
enforcement process. It is in this statutory context that the NSW Parliament, on 31 May 
2000, passed the Anti-Discrimination (Carers’ Responsibilities) Act 2000, which added 
a new ground of carers’ responsibility discrimination into the AD Act at Part 4B. This 
provided that it is unlawful to discriminate against a person on the grounds of his or her 
responsibilities as a ‘carer’ for a defined family member who is in need of ‘care or 
support’30 in the area of work.31 The legislation commenced on 1 March 2001. Part 4B 
was intended to give effect to Australia’s ratification in 1990 of International Labour 
Organization, Convention (No 156) Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal 
Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 1981 
(entered into force 11 August 1983). This convention seeks both to proscribe 
discrimination against workers with family responsibilities and to require state parties to 
take positive steps to enable such workers to engage in employment with minimum 
conflict between paid work and care.
32
 
 
Attorney Attorney-General Shaw noted in the second reading speech that: 
The purpose of the bill is to … provide protection for the many carers who are 
unfairly treated in the workplace when they try to balance work and family 
commitments ... The amendment will impose an obligation on employers to 
accommodate employees’ caring responsibilities, ensuring that employers 
                                                 
28
 Section 119. 
29
 Prior to 2014, the statutory tribunal with jurisdiction to hear complaints made under the AD Act was the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal (‘ADT’). The Equal Opportunity Division of the ADT performed the 
adjudicative functions under the AD Act. Since January 2014, this function has been transferred to the 
NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘NCAT’). NCAT is the state’s new ‘mega’ tribunal, with 
jurisdiction to determine complaints of discrimination under the AD Act. 
30
 Section 49S.  
31
Sections 49V–49ZC. The working relationships covered are much broader than traditional employer–
employee relationships. 
32
 The second reading of the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Carers’ Responsibilities) Bill: New South 
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw). 
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proactively consider whether existing or new workplace policies have a 
discriminatory impact on employees with caring responsibilities.
33
 
In recommending the enactment of the new ground, the NSW Law Reform Commission 
was also firm in its belief that ‘this ground will have little effect in practice if it does not 
include an obligation to make reasonable accommodation … to achieve the underlying 
social policy’.34 
 
Such an obligation of accommodation in practice requires an employer to take 
reasonable steps or make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the caring 
responsibilities of a worker–carer in relation to how, when or where work is undertaken, 
for example, by providing part-time work or other flexibility. What is reasonable will 
depend on the circumstances of each case.
35
 However, the statutory provisions enacted 
under Part 4B do not in fact provide for an express obligation upon employers to 
‘accommodate’. Instead, Part 4B is framed in the standard duty of restraint format 
whereby it is unlawful to discriminate against a person because of his or her caring 
responsibilities.
36
  
 
Research Questions and the Methodological and Theoretical 
Framework 
 
In spite of the burgeoning discrimination law literature about work and family in the 
past decade in Australia—which has both explained the nature and effects of workplace 
discrimination against carers and critiqued the operation of the traditional discrimination 
model to tackle this discrimination effectively—the operation of carers’ responsibility 
provisions under Part 4B of the AD Act has received very little attention in the 
literature.
37
 In particular, the operation of the first stage of the process at the ADB in the 
context of carers’ complaints has never been considered and the Tribunal decisions have 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Law Reform Commission of NSW, Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Report No 92 
(1999) 305 [5.212]. 
35
 See, for example, Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 2, explaining the duty of reasonable accommodation 
under the Victorian EO Act. 
36
 See ss 49T, 49V. 
37
 Juliet Bourke, ‘Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian Experience’ (2004) 12 
American Journal of Society and the Law 19; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 2; Chapman, ‘Schou’, 
above n 2; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 1.  
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received only limited attention in the context of broader discussions about work and 
family discrimination law.
38
 
 
To address these gaps in our knowledge, this thesis presents the results of a research 
project that examined the operation of the carers’ responsibility provisions under Part 
4B during its first decade of operation, between 2001 and 2011. In particular, it analyses 
how Part 4B has been interpreted and applied, and with what effect with reference to the 
ADB’s education and complaint-handling function and the Tribunal’s adjudicative 
function. There are two research questions that will be answered in this thesis. The first 
is in two parts and asks, how have the ADB and the Tribunal interpreted and applied 
Part 4B through their respective statutory functions, and does this give effect to the 
policy objectives of Part 4B? The second asks, has the two-stage enforcement process 
provided an accessible and effective enforcement mechanism for worker–carers in 
NSW? Both questions aim not only to describe how the legislation has been interpreted 
and applied but also to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation in the first decade of 
the operation of Part 4B. 
 
The writer has formulated a four-step methodological framework and research design to 
answer the two broad research questions. The formulation of this framework has been 
heavily influenced by Gaze’s 2002 work that considered the context, interpretation and 
effectiveness of anti-discrimination laws in Australia.
39
 A realist ‘law in action’ 
theoretical lens is used,
40
 which looks beyond a purely positivist and doctrinal analysis 
of statutes, Tribunal decisions and litigated outcomes. It seeks to understand how the 
law works ‘in action’—how Part 4B has been understood, given meaning and applied in 
practice by other key actors: the ADB, worker–carers and their employers. By focusing 
on both the ADB and the Tribunal’s functions, a more complete picture of the operation 
of Part 4B is provided. The main research method used to answer the research questions 
is a quantitative and qualitative analysis of four categories of documents: Tribunal 
carers’ decisions, ADB annual reports, ADB education publications and the complaint 
files held by the ADB over the first decade after Part 4B’s enactment. Only 12 
complaints were decided by the Tribunal during the decade; in contrast, the empirical 
                                                 
38
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 2; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 2; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, 
above n 1. 
39
 Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 25. 
40
 See Chapter 2, at 2.4. 
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review of the carers’ complaints at the ADB was extensive and involved a review of 
520 carers’ complaint files representing over 99.2% of all carers’ complaints lodged 
with the ADB over the same period.
41
 Relevant documentary sources are analysed in 
more detail in later parts of the thesis, including ADB annual reports (Part II), Tribunal 
carers’ decisions (Part IV), ADB education publications (Part V) and ADB complaint 
files (Part V). 
 
This thesis is primarily intended to provide an analysis and evaluation of the operation 
of Part 4B between 2001 and 2011. Options for statutory reform or other 
recommendations to improve the operation of the legislation are noted throughout the 
thesis. However, in particular, a detailed analysis of future statutory reform options 
requires further in-depth research, including an investigation of different legislative 
approaches in Australia and overseas. This is outside the scope of the current research 
project and is a separate aspect of the law that requires further investigation. 
 
Scope of the Thesis, Structure, Overview and Arguments 
 
The thesis is in four parts. Part I consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 provides an 
explanation of the statutory context. It explains the typical Australian discrimination law 
model and provides a more detailed overview of the AD Act statutory scheme, including 
the equality objectives of the legislation, the substantive provisions (grounds, areas, and 
direct and indirect discrimination), the statutory functions of the ADB and Tribunal, and 
the two-stage enforcement process under the AD Act. It briefly introduces the policy 
context for the enactment of Part 4B and provides an overview of the substantive 
provisions. It also outlines how the ADB and the Tribunal have approached the 
interpretation of Part 4B. In particular, whether Part 4B operates to imply a duty of 
reasonable accommodation on employers is flagged.  
 
Chapter 2 then outlines the theoretical and methodological framework of the research 
project. It begins by outlining what is known about the operation of Part 4B in terms of 
primary and secondary sources. This identifies significant gaps in our knowledge, which 
helped to inform and articulate both the research questions and the proposed theoretical 
                                                 
41
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.4 for an explanation of the data set.  
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and methodological framework. It explains how this research project will contribute to 
the broader contemporary debates in the existing discrimination law literature. It also 
explains the dual role of the writer as researcher and as a supplementary source of 
experiential observations, having worked at the ADB for a decade. Finally, it outlines 
the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approval process, which was an 
important methodological step in the research design process.  
 
In particular, Chapter 2 explains in detail the realist ‘law in action’ theoretical 
framework, the four-step methodological framework and the research methods 
employed to answer the research questions. In summary, the four steps are:  
 Step 1: Identify the objectives of the legislation: identify and analyse the 
contemporary policy sources leading up to the enactment of Part 4B. 
 Step 2: Statutory analysis: determine whether Part 4B on its face gives effect to 
the identified policy objectives and whether substantive law reform is required 
to make the law more effective.  
 Step 3: Assess how the Tribunal and the ADB have applied the law and whether 
their interpretation gives effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B. 
 Step 4: Assess the effectiveness of the enforcement process.  
 
In the context of Step 4 and the evaluation of the two-stage enforcement process, it is 
suggested that whether the ADB and Tribunal have interpreted and applied the law to 
further the stated policy objectives can be assessed in relation to three criteria: 
accessibility of the process, nature of the outcomes and normative value. First, how 
accessible for complainants is each stage of the process? Factors such as procedural 
formalities, informalism versus adversarialism, timeliness, a requirement for legal 
representation and the financial cost of the respective processes for the parties are 
considered. Second, do the respective stages of the enforcement process provide ‘good’ 
outcomes for worker–carers by providing outcomes that facilitate reasonable 
accommodations and systemic improvements in workplace practices?  It is suggested 
that what makes a ‘good’ outcome can be assessed quantitatively, in terms of complaint 
resolution rates, and qualitatively, in terms of the nature of the remedies that may be 
achieved. In particular, when a worker–carer wants an accommodation, it is necessary 
to evaluate which stage of the complaint process, at the ADB or the Tribunal, will offer 
10 
 
the best hope of achieving this outcome. Also considered is whether either stage of the 
process has provided the opportunity for a broader or systemic remedy such as policy 
change. Such systemic remedies may have great potential to provide greater substantive 
equality for other worker–carers more broadly. Third, what is the normative value of the 
ADB and Tribunal approaches to Part 4B ‘in action’? As noted, a ‘law in action’ lens 
focuses on how law is understood and applied beyond litigated decisions of courts and 
tribunals. This last criterion seeks to crystallise the key messages in lay terms that come 
from the ADB and Tribunal, as they are likely to be understood by employers and 
worker–carers, and their lawyers and representatives, who are involved in the day-to-
day interactions under Part 4B. It identifies and considers the key messages from the 
ADB and Tribunal from the perspective of whether they are likely to encourage 
employers to implement their obligations fully, especially in relation to reasonable 
accommodation, and deter them from breaching the law; and whether they are likely to 
encourage (or deter) worker–carers to exercise and enforce their rights under Part 4B. 
 
Before considering the structure and overview of the main arguments in the thesis, it 
should be noted that, although the ADB complaint process represents the first stage of 
the enforcement regime under the AD Act, how the Tribunal interpreted and applied the 
law is considered first in this thesis. This is because a ‘law in action’ approach aims to 
move beyond a positivist black-letter analysis of the Tribunal’s decisions, to see how 
the law works ‘in action’. However, as a starting point, it is helpful for this black-letter 
analysis to be undertaken first. This then enables a comparative assessment to be made 
of the effectiveness of the two institutions’ approaches to Part 4B.  
 
Part II provides an overview of the academic literature and other relevant reports, and 
the main issues identified about the nature of carers’ discrimination and the adequacy of 
the discrimination law response to it. It has two chapters. Chapter 3 presents an 
examination of the nature, extent, causes and effects of workplace discrimination 
against worker–carers, which helps to explain the policy rationale underpinning 
discrimination law approaches to it. It considers the public/private demarcations around 
care and paid work that are reflected in discrimination laws, the gendered nature of ideal 
worker norms, and the gendered negative effects of carers’ discrimination. It then goes 
on to consider how to tackle employer hostility to workplace flexibility to ensure more 
effective implementation of the law. Once the nature of the problems to be tackled are 
11 
 
identified, Chapter 4 explains the role of discrimination law—both its limitations and its 
potential—to address inequality and disadvantage faced by worker–carers. It examines 
both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law. The literature has critiqued the 
substantive provisions (based on duties of restraint and complex definitions of 
discrimination, with an onerous burden of proof on the complainant) and the approaches 
of the courts and tribunals in work and family cases in an era of marked ‘judicial 
conservatism’.42 The negative critiques in the literature in relation to the confidential 
conciliation process at the first stage of the process
43
 and the adversarial litigation 
process at the second are also explained.  
 
In light of this discussion—and the generally negative assessment of both the 
substantive and the procedural aspects of discrimination laws to address work and 
family discrimination—consideration is given to whether, and if so how, discrimination 
laws can have a meaningful role in helping to meet the policy objectives of work and 
family discrimination. In particular, the works of Fredman,
44
 Sturm,
45
 and Chapman
46
 
are explored. The focus is on what role positive obligations and a legislative duty of 
reasonable accommodation can play to assist worker–carers within the existing 
discrimination law framework. Also considered is how conciliation can provide what 
Sturm has called a ‘problem-solving’47 focus on local context based dispute resolution, 
to avoid after-the-fact enforcement at courts and tribunals. Building on the themes 
identified in the work of these three academics, the writer argues that, substantively, 
while a duty of reasonable accommodation is not a panacea, it may have significant 
potential to provide individual accommodations and to challenge deeply entrenched and 
systemic discrimination against worker–carers. In addition, it is argued that the process 
of conciliation can provide an important informal ‘problem-solving’48 mechanism in 
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 Murray, ‘Work and Care’, above n 9, 74. 
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circumstances in which reasonable accommodation and maintenance of the employment 
relationship is a key goal.  
 
It is intended that this broad literature review will provide a deeper understanding of the 
contemporary Australian context in which Part 4B operates, where issues such as 
carers’ discrimination, work and family, and work–life balance are the subject of a wide 
variety of legal and policy approaches. Part II concludes that discrimination laws do 
have an important role to play as part of this multifaceted response to work and care 
discrimination. 
 
Part III provides an overview and analysis of the policy context (Steps 1 and 2). The 
contemporary policy sources are identified, and three key interdependent objectives 
underpinning Part 4B are articulated: first, gender equality in paid work and more 
equitable sharing of the burden of unpaid care work; second, work–life balance for 
worker–carers; and third, a duty of reasonable accommodation on employers to 
accommodate the caring responsibilities of their workers, which it is argued is both an 
objective and a key strategy to achieve the objectives. It is argued that the legislation 
that was enacted falls far short of the intended social policy objectives for two main 
reasons: it restricts the definition of caring responsibilities to a defined list of family 
members and it does not contain an express duty of reasonable accommodation. 
Substantive law reform recommendations to Part 4B are suggested to remedy these 
deficiencies, which could significantly strengthen the legislation.  
 
Part IV turns to the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of Part 4B (Steps 3 and 4) 
with reference to its adjudicative function. It is in two parts. Chapter 6 provides a 
doctrinal analysis of the Tribunal’s approaches to the interpretation and application of 
Part 4B. It is argued that, even taking into account the only two instances when the 
Tribunal found for the complainants, in Reddy v International Cargo Express and Tleyji 
v The Travelspirit Group,
49
 the Tribunal decisions suggest that the current Part 4B 
(based on the standard discrimination law model of duties of restraint and an onerous 
burden of proof on the complainant) cannot adequately give effect to the policy aims of 
                                                 
49
 See Table of Complaints heard at the Tribunal, in Appendix B, for a summary of all the cases. In Reddy 
v International Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218 [93]–[103] (‘Reddy’), Ms Reddy was awarded 
$16,385. In Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group [2005] NSWADT 294 [138]–[142] (‘Tleyji’), Ms Tleyji 
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the legislation. It is acknowledged that, unlike the ADB, which has no adjudicative 
functions, the Tribunal in exercising its statutory adjudicative powers is subject to the 
hierarchical court and precedent system. Reflecting many of the arguments raised in the 
literature, the Tribunal has often applied a strict black-letter law approach
50
 to Part 4B, 
in what the writer describes as an effective policy vacuum. It has rarely considered the 
social policy objectives of Part 4B expressly or in a purposive or meaningful manner.
51
 
 
Chapter 7 then considers the effectiveness of the enforcement process, the outcomes 
achieved and the normative impact of the Tribunal’s decisions. It is argued that far from 
encountering a relatively informal and timely process, which was intended to ‘serve the 
public interest in social harmony’,52 a complainant proceeding to a hearing at the 
Tribunal is likely to become embroiled in complex and lengthy litigation, often against a 
well-resourced employer. The likelihood of a an outcome for an individual complainant, 
in which the Tribunal makes a finding of discrimination and orders an adequate or 
appropriate remedy, is extremely limited. The outcomes for carers’ complaints at the 
Tribunal have been generally poor, both quantitatively, with only two  Tribunal 
decisions finding that carers’ discrimination had occured, and qualitatively, in terms of 
the inadequate compensatory remedies.
53
 In practice, there is little or no scope for an 
accommodation of a worker–carer’s responsibilities given the nature of the adversarial 
process. By the time a complaint reaches a hearing, the employment relationship will 
probably already be irreparably damaged. Most employees will have left employment, 
and therefore, accommodation is probably unlikely to be either desired by the 
                                                 
50
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complainant or a realistic option.
54
 Historically, and generally, compensation is the 
usual remedy in the AD Act jurisdiction, and quantum tends to be very low.
55
  
 
In terms of crystallising the key normative messages, it is argued that the Tribunal 
decisions provide only limited normative, precedential or education value. Even 
acknowledging the limited number of decided cases, the Tribunal decisions do nothing 
to provide a comprehensive blueprint for good work–family policy and practice that 
would assist employers and employees to understand clearly their rights and obligations 
and how to implement them. In addition, litigation at the Tribunal is often lengthy, 
costly and stressful for the complainant. Even if the complainant wins, the result is 
likely to be limited to compensation without any ongoing obligation for the employer to 
remedy institutional ideal worker norms and structures that give rise to discrimination.
56
 
The message to employers is that any obligation upon them to accommodate is 
equivocal, and that even if they do discriminate, it is unlikely that a complainant will be 
able to prove it. The Tribunal decisions emphasise the nature of a hostile adversarial 
litigated process. Perversely, the decisions are therefore more likely to act as a deterrent 
to worker–carers by discouraging them from enforcing their rights under Part 4B.57 
 
In conclusion, it is argued that the Tribunal had a unique and important opportunity to 
interpret and apply the new carers’ law, based firmly on a commitment to the policy 
objectives. This valuable opportunity to bed down a broad and beneficial interpretation 
of Part 4B in those crucial first years after the legislation was introduced was 
squandered. The Tribunal missed the opportunity to provide unequivocal guidance to 
employers and worker–carers about their rights and obligations, and how to implement 
them in practice. It has also failed to provide an accessible enforcement process capable 
of delivering ‘good’ outcomes. 
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In terms of improving effectiveness, some recommendations made include that Part 4B 
be amended to provide for an express duty of accommodation, which would avoid the 
uncertainty of an implied duty which is dependent upon a beneficial interpretation of the 
legislation by the Tribunal; and that the current damages limit of $100,000 be raised 
because it is too low to compensate complainants for their loss adequately and is 
significantly out of step with other jurisdictions.
58
 Other than statutory reform, a number 
of recommendations are made as to how the Tribunal could, in the future, take a more 
purposive approach to the interpretation of Part 4B. It is argued that the Tribunal could 
take a more inquisitorial role and be more willing to make evidentiary inferences to 
assist the complainant in relation to the substantive complaint, and in relation to the 
quantification of damages, to ensure that complainants receive adequate compensation 
for their loss. This may greatly assist the complainant to overcome the onerous burden 
of proof. It is argued that to do this, the Tribunal must take a more proactive role to 
identify and properly understand the nature, causes and extent of workplace 
discrimination against carers and the resultant detriments that worker–carers suffer. It 
must then integrate this knowledge and understanding into its decision-making. A 
number of options are suggested to facilitate a greater purposive approach in practice, 
including that the Tribunal be more willing to utilise ‘extrinsic’ policy sources,59 the 
contemporary academic literature,
60
 and other reports relating to work and family.
61
 
These sources could help the Tribunal to interpret the legislation purposively, thereby 
avoiding a technical and narrow approach. 
 
Part V then turns to the operation of the ADB’s functions (Steps 3 and 4). It contains 
three chapters that are interconnected, reflecting that the operation of the ADB’s 
education and complaint functions do overlap in practice. For example, the ADB has 
stated that the aims of conciliation are to attempt to resolve the complaint, to ‘educate 
                                                 
58
 Compare, for example, complaints made in the federal discrimination jurisdiction, and complaints 
made under the general protection provisions under s 351 of the FW Act, where the compensation limit is 
uncapped. See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 11, 819, 880. 
59
 See ss 33–34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), discussed in Chapter 5, explaining the use of 
‘extrinsic’ policy sources and the relevant policy sources underpinning Part 4B. 
60
 See, for example, the works at n 2 above. See also generally Chapters 3 and 4, which outline the 
contemporary literature about the nature, causes and effects of discrimination against worker–carers. 
61
 See, for example, the three AHRC Reports, which provide methodologically rigorous and reliable 
quantitative and qualitative data: AHRC, ‘Poverty’ above n 2; AHRC, ‘Investing’ above n 2; AHRC, 
‘Supporting’, above n 2.  
16 
 
both sides about their rights and responsibilities under anti-discrimination law’ and to 
‘advise respondents on how to prevent discrimination in the future’.62 Chapter 8 outlines 
how the ADB interpreted and applied Part 4B through its education function and 
assesses its normative impact.  
 
Chapter 9 then presents and analyses the complaints data. First, a general overview of 
the context of the complaints (the gender of the complainants, their caring 
responsibilities, their work and workplaces, and the type of conduct they complained 
about) is provided. Second, the chapter focuses specifically on the second research 
question in relation to the accessibility of the complaints process and the outcomes and 
remedies that were achieved. To supplement this analysis Chapter 10 provides some 
qualitative insights with reference to complaint summaries and case studies. These case 
studies illustrate some ‘good’ individual and potentially systemic outcomes that were 
achieved by complainants at the ADB. It also provides examples of some ‘poor’ 
outcomes to illustrate regulatory weaknesses of an enforcement mechanism based solely 
on individual complaints that gives the ADB little power to enforce the law. Chapter 10 
concludes by acknowledging the deficiencies in the ADB process and suggesting ways 
in which the operation of the ADB’s function in relation to Part 4B could be improved.  
 
In Chapters 9 and 10 it is argued that the empirical study demonstrates that the 
complaint process at the ADB provides a free, relatively informal and timely dispute-
resolution process when compared with a litigated hearing at the Tribunal. For example, 
complainants are not required to prove that discrimination occurred, the majority of 
complainants (80%) and respondents (75%) proceed without any legal or other 
representation, and the ADB utilises a ‘triage’63 system to allocate complaints for 
investigation and/or conciliation quickly. The process therefore offers worker–carers an 
opportunity to negotiate a resolution to maintain their employment relationship and 
achieve an accommodation, without irreparably damaging the employment relationship. 
The operation of this triage approach is demonstrated with reference to qualitative and 
quantitative data.  
 
                                                 
62
 ADB, Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board ADB Factsheet (Revised June 2009) (2009). 
63
 See Chapter 1, at 1.4.  
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It is argued therefore that Tribunal decisions provide only a limited insight into how 
Part 4B is interpreted and applied, how the enforcement process works in practice, and 
what outcomes and remedies complainants have achieved. Therefore, it is unwise to 
base any assessment of effectiveness of the enforcement process or of Part 4B more 
generally on Tribunal decisions alone.
64
 To provide a more complete understanding of 
how the complaint process works ‘in action’ and how worker–carers and their 
employers are engaging with their rights and obligations under Part 4B, and with what 
success on a day-to-day basis, it is necessary to also look to education and complaint-
handling functions of the ADB.   
 
The majority of all 520 carers’ complaints made at the ADB during the decade were 
finalised with a 54% settlement rate, which is much higher than the average settlement 
rate of 30% for complaints lodged with the ADB on all grounds over the same period.
65 
Thirty one per cent of all complainants achieved some form of accommodation (and 
sometimes another remedy); 23% settled on the basis of some other remedy, primarily 
compensation; 58% who wanted an accommodation achieved some form of 
accommodation to enable them to stay in work; and 11% involved a systemic outcome 
such as a policy change or training at work. For those complainants seeking an 
accommodation of their responsibilities, the ADB process offers a better option for an 
early resolution to achieve this outcome, than litigation at the Tribunal. 
 
Part V demonstrates that the ADB, which is free of the constraints of an adjudicative 
role and the strict rules of statutory interpretation and precedent, has, in practice through 
its statutory education and complaint-handling functions, consistently interpreted Part 
4B broadly and beneficially. It has taken both a less technical and a more holistic 
policy-driven approach than the Tribunal, based clearly on furthering the social policy 
objectives, rather than a strict black-letter interpretation of the law. In particular, it is 
argued in Chapter 8 that the ADB has consistently advocated that Part 4B operates to 
provide a general duty of reasonable accommodation. This purposive approach evident 
in its publications aims at achieving greater equality for worker–carers by enabling them 
to remain in work, to manage work and care conflicts, and to give effect to the social 
                                                 
64 See Table of Complaints heard at the Tribunal, in Appendix B. 
65 See Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 at 2.3.3 
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policy and equality goals underpinning Part 4B.
66
 In a decade when the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Part 4B was limited to a few decisions, and was equivocal and 
sometimes inconsistent, the ADB’s consistent and beneficial interpretation is likely to 
have had a strong normative effect among parties to complaints at the ADB, as well as 
more broadly among employers and workers in NSW.  
 
A number of recommendations are made to improve the application of the ADB’s 
education function. In light of the sometimes overlapping discrimination law and 
industrial relations jurisdictions, the rights and obligations in relation to work and care 
are increasingly complex for worker–carers and employers to navigate and comply 
with.
67
 It is recommended that the ADB and other agencies in the discrimination law 
and industrial relations sphere collaborate to provide more comprehensive education 
materials in relation to rights and obligations in the different but overlapping spheres.
68
 
It is also recommended that the ADB routinely and consistently collate and publish 
complaints and conciliation data by the ground of complaint (including, as a minimum, 
the gender of the complainants, their caring responsibilities, the nature of the alleged 
discriminatory conduct, and the outcomes of complaints and remedies achieved). 
Without this information, it is not possible to know who is using the legislation and who 
is not using it, what type of discrimination they face, or how helpful the law is in 
providing protection or an accessible enforcement mechanism to achieve greater 
equality for women and men with caring responsibilities.
69
 
 
In terms of improving the operation of the ADB’s education and complaint-handling 
function, chronic underfunding of the ADB over the past decade is identified as a major 
barrier to the effective operation of the ADB’s statutory functions. It is clear that greater 
funding and commitment from the NSW State Government is urgently required.  In 
relation to specific law reform recommendations several statutory reforms are suggested 
that may give the ADB a more proactive enforcement role. For example, being able to 
                                                 
66
 See, for example, ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, Preventing Discrimination and 
Harassment (2009) 11. 
67
 See Chapter 4, at 4.5.3, in relation to this issue.  
68
 This recommendation is echoed in the recent AHRC report ‘Supporting’, above n 2, 10.  
69
 Charlesworth, Sara, Paula McDonald, Anthea Worley, Tina Graham and Alissa Lykinna, Formal 
Complaints of Workplace Sexual Harassment Lodged with the Australian Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commissions 1 July 2009–31 December 2009 (Centre for Work + Life, University of South 
Australia, 2012) 35, making a similar point. 
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make complaints to the Tribunal or having a right to intervene in proceedings may 
strengthen the enforcement provisions.  
 
In addition, echoing concerns in the literature, a significant problem is identified from 
the empirical study of complaints arising from the apparently conflicting roles of the 
ADB as both guardian and advocate of the legislation and impartial facilitator of 
complaints.
70
 It is argued that often during the complaint process the ADB has become 
overly preoccupied with the issue of impartiality, and as a result, has missed 
opportunities to proactively address systemic discrimination brought to its attention 
during the complaint process. The writer makes several recommendations for the ADB 
to reconcile this apparent conflict that will result in a much more proactive complaint-
handling role for the ADB to help root out deeply entrenched workplace practices and 
behaviours that come to its attention in the complaint process.  
 
Conclusions  
 
This thesis provides a realist theoretical understanding of how the ‘standard’ 
discrimination law framework in Australia is given meaning and understood ‘in action’ 
by looking to empirical legal research beyond judicial and tribunal decisions. The 
research also contributes to the broader contemporary debate about the potential of 
discrimination laws and in particular the role of positive duties and reasonable 
accommodation to prevent discrimination against worker–carers, and the utility of the 
standard two stage enforcement process.  
  
It makes an original contribution by helping to fill in the significant gaps in our 
knowledge about the operation of Part 4B and how effective the ADB and Tribunal 
responses to it have been in meeting its objectives.  It therefore offers a more complete 
picture of the operation of Part 4B by evaluating not just how it was applied by the 
Tribunal but also how it was applied by the ADB through its education and complaint 
handling functions; and by considering the effect of this for complainants, respondents, 
workers and employers in NSW.  
 
                                                 
70
 See generally Anna Chapman, ‘Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The Paradox of Informal 
Dispute Resolution’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 321. 
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It concludes that adequately funded discrimination agencies such as the ADB, through 
their education and complaint functions,  have a crucial role to encourage employers to 
comply with the law and to prevent discrimination; to empower worker–carers to 
achieve reasonable accommodation; and to provide a relatively informal, accessible 
‘problem-solving’ complaint mechanism.71  All of which may have a broader normative 
impact in preventing carers’ discrimination, challenging ideal worker norms, and 
normalising flexibility at the workplace level, thereby meeting the social policy 
objectives, and contributing to greater social and economic equality and well-being for 
carers, especially women, and their families.  Law reform and other recommendation 
are also suggested in relation to both the Tribunal and the ADB in order to ensure a 
more purposive application of Part 4B and to make the enforcement process more 
accessible for worker–carers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 Sturm, above n 45. 
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PART I: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT  
 
Chapter 1: The Statutory Context: 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is intended to provide the broad foundational statutory context for the 
following chapters of this thesis. It outlines the statutory context of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (‘AD Act’), including both the substantive provisions 
and the two-stage enforcement process provided for under the AD Act. This includes an 
overview of the functions and powers of the Anti-Discrimination Board (‘ADB’) and the 
relevant statutory tribunal (‘Tribunal’) with power to hear complaints of discrimination 
under the AD Act.
1
 It then summarises the legal and policy background to the enactment 
of the carers’ discrimination provisions found under Part 4B of the AD Act, and outlines 
these substantive provisions.  
 
In summary, Section 1.2 explains the standard discrimination law model found in 
Australia, including NSW. Section 1.3 outlines the statutory functions of the ADB; 1.4 
concentrates on its statutory complaint-handling role at the first stage of the 
enforcement process; and 1.5 outlines the adjudicative function of the Tribunal under 
the AD Act. The chapter then looks to the substantive carers’ discrimination provisions 
under Part 4B of the AD Act. Section 1.6 explains the policy impetus leading to the 
enactment of Part 4B and the objectives underpinning it. Section 1.7 then turns to the 
substantive provisions under Part 4B. The approaches of the ADB and the Tribunal to 
statutory interpretation and the practical application of Part 4B are also outlined briefly. 
                                                 
1
 Sections 95–109 of the AD Act.  Prior to 2014, the statutory tribunal with jurisdiction to hear complaints 
made under the AD Act was the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (‘ADT’). The Equal Opportunity 
Division of the ADT performed the adjudicative functions under the AD Act. Since January 2014, this 
function has been transferred to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘NCAT’). NCAT is the 
state’s new ‘mega’ tribunal, with jurisdiction to determine complaints of discrimination under the AD Act. 
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Other provisions under the AD Act that may be relevant to a complaint of carers’ 
discrimination are also noted. 
 
 
1.2 The Standard Australian Discrimination Law Template and the 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) 
1.2.1 Duties of Restraint, Grounds and Areas 
 
Generally, all anti-discrimination legislation in Australia at Commonwealth and state 
and territory levels,
2
 including the AD Act, has followed a similar or standard template, 
providing enforceable civil rights and obligations, which have a similar legal effect as 
the rights and obligations created by the law of torts, and statutory schemes evolving 
from these torts.
3
 Discrimination laws grant rights to people not to be discriminated 
against and impose obligations on people and organisations not to discriminate.
4
 
                                                 
2
 For an overview of the Australian discrimination jurisdictions and the standard template that has been 
used, see generally Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) and Chris Ronalds and Elizabeth Raper, 
Discrimination Law and Practice (Federation Press, 4
th
 ed, 2012). Australia is a federation with six states 
and two mainland territories. Each has its discrimination legislation. The federal Commonwealth 
Parliament has enacted four anti-discrimination acts: the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (‘DD Act’) and the Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). Each of the states and territories have also enacted anti-discrimination 
legislation, contained in one piece of legislation each, but covering many more grounds than the four 
Commonwealth Acts. The AD Act is the relevant legislation for NSW. See Ronalds and Raper at 247–55 
for a summary of the main legislation and provisions across Australian jurisdictions. The concurrent laws 
overlap considerably and have many inconsistencies in terms of coverage and process; see Rees, Rice and 
Allen, above n 2, 44–67.  Note that Victoria has enacted more progressive legislation in recent years in 
relation to both substantive and enforcement provisions: see n 5, and n 44 below 
3
 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 1–10; Belinda Smith and Dominique Allen, ‘Whose 
Fault Is It? Asking the Right Questions When Trying to Address Discrimination’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative 
Law Journal 31. Australia shares many aspects of its standard model with the legislative schemes in other 
countries such as the UK and US. See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 3–4. See also Sandra Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2011) (‘Discrimination’) for an overview of the UK 
discrimination legislation outlining the UK model found in the Equality Act 2010 (UK). 
4
 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 1–10. Note that there has been considerable 
contemporary debate in Australia in recent years in relation to the proposals to modernise and consolidate 
the Commonwealth discrimination laws. Although the debate has been in the context of the 
Commonwealth legislation, the arguments apply to other discrimination laws and state jurisdictions, 
including NSW. The Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 (Cth) (‘HRAD Bill’), in effect, 
sought to consolidate and overhaul all of the Commonwealth legislation into a single statute. Although 
the HRAD reform process appears to have faltered, the consultation process provided a broad insight into 
the contemporary debate about the limitations of the standard template and legislative model used in 
Australia, relating to substantive definitional issues as well as procedural and enforcement provisions. 
See, for example, Simon Rice, ‘And Which “Equality Act” Would that Be?’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), 
Sex Discrimination in Uncertain Times (ANU E Book, 2010) 197; and Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 
21–3.  The Bill and accompanying explanatory documents are available at 
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Therefore, rather than providing for positive statutory obligations to eradicate 
discrimination, anti-discrimination legislation is founded upon a duty of restraint 
framework.
5
 It is unlawful to discriminate against a person on certain prescribed 
‘grounds’6 but only in certain ‘areas’ of what can be termed ‘public’ life. These areas 
generally include work, accommodation, education and the provision of goods and 
services.
7
  The AD Act was enacted in 1977, initially covering just three grounds which 
have been expanded over the years, often in response to Australia’s international 
obligations or in response to community pressures or contemporary social policy issues. 
Table 1.1 sets out the chronology of the key provisions under the AD Act. The inclusion 
of new areas and grounds over the years is the NSW’s incremental, and sometimes very 
tardy, response to eradicate inequality and disadvantage among certain identified groups 
in society.
8
 The AD Act follows the standard duties of restraint framework,
9
 and 
currently covers eight grounds—sex (including sexual harassment, pregnancy and 
breastfeeding), disability, race, age, marital or domestic status, homosexuality, 
                                                                                                                                               
<http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/ConsolidationofCommonwealthanti-
discriminationlaws.aspx>.  
5
 Note that some jurisdictions in the past decade, in particular, the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (‘EO 
Act’) have provided a more reformist agenda in relation to substantive definitional issues and also in the 
enforcement process. See below at n 28 and n 44. 
6
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 179–406 set out the main protected attributes in Australian 
discrimination laws.  The ground of carers’ and family responsibilities including in NSW are considered 
at 378–404. See also Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, summarising all grounds at 15–30 with carers’ 
responsibilities considered at 19–20.  
7
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 454–516; Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 53–73. Note that the proposed 
HRAD Bill applied to areas of public life, which are not defined and so could encompass wider areas of 
public life than those usually provided for in Australian discrimination laws. 
8
 For example, see Section 1.6 below explaining the impetus and social policy objective for the enactment 
of the carers’ provisions under Part 4B. This is expanded upon further in Part III of this thesis. 
9
 There are no positive obligations provided on duty holders such as employers under the AD Act.  There 
is however limited scope for actions of a positive nature. For example, the AD Act does permit special 
measures to be taken to achieve greater substantive equality in two ways. The first is through special 
needs provisions which would for example allow for benefits or programs to be provided to persons with 
a protected attribute.  Such provisions are included for certain grounds such as age (s 49ZYR) and race (s 
21), but there are no such provisions for carers or sex. Second, ss 126 and 126A of the AD Act also 
provide for a process to apply for temporary exemptions from the AD Act (for example, to provide 
services to specific groups to redress disadvantage). There have been no exemptions granted in respect of 
carers under Part 4B. For an explanation of the objectives of s 126 exemptions and the process, see the 
ADB Guidelines for Exemptions to the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act (July 2012). See Rees, Rice and 
Allen, above n 2, 534–60, for discussion of the operation of special measures provisions across Australia, 
and at 567–72 for a discussion of statutory individual exemptions.  Finally, Part 9A of the AD Act which 
was repealed in 2014 by the Government Sector Employment Act 2014 (NSW) (the ‘GSE Act’) but was in 
operation for the decade of this study also provided that the public sector in NSW were required to have 
in place Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) management plans to achieve EEO outcomes.  The 
objects of Part 9A were to eliminate and ensure the absence of discrimination in employment on the 
grounds of race, sex, marital or domestic status and disability, and to promote equal employment 
opportunity for women, members of racial minorities and persons who have a disability.  Part 9A did not 
specifically cover workers with caring responsibilities.  Section 63 of the GSE Act now relates to 
workplace diversity in the public sector.  See Chapter 4, at 4.4.1 for a discussion of positive duties.  
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transgender status and carers’ responsibility10—and five areas—work, accommodation, 
education, the provision of good and services, and registered clubs.  
 
 
Table 1.1: History of Key NSW Anti-Discrimination Act Provisions 1977–2014 
Year  Anti-Discrimination Act Provision 
 
1977  unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of sex, race and marital status in the 
areas of work, accommodation, goods and services and education (race only) 
1980   Sex and marital status discrimination unlawful in the area of education 
1981  Physical disability added  
 Registered clubs added to list of areas 
1982  Homosexuality and intellectual impairment added  
 Maximum amount of compensation increased from $20,000 to $40,000 
 Advertisements indicating an intention to discriminate unlawful 
1989  Racial vilification unlawful 
1991  Compulsory retirement unlawful 
1994  Age discrimination unlawful 
 Discrimination by association because of the sex, race, marital status or 
homosexuality of an associate added 
 ‘Disability’ replaces ‘physical and intellectual impairment’ 
 HIV/AIDs vilification unlawful 
 Definition of race extended to include ‘ethno-religion’ and ‘descent’ 
 Discrimination based on a ‘genuine occupational qualification’ allowed on 
ground of sex 
 Marital status discrimination extended to cover goods and services 
 Act extended to cover industrial awards and agreements 
 Minister enabled to grant exemptions for special needs programmes 
1996  Discrimination and vilification on the ground of transgender status unlawful 
1997  Sexual harassment unlawful 
2001  Discrimination on the ground of carers’ responsibilities unlawful but unlike 
the other grounds applies only in the area of work  
2005   Time limit for complaints extended from six months to 12 months. Other 
mainly procedural complaint-handling provisions amended. 
2007  Discrimination on the ground of breastfeeding added to existing sex 
discrimination provisions 
2009  Maximum amount of compensation increased from $40,000 to $100,000  
 Definition of marital status extended to include ‘domestic status’ and 
definition of de facto broadened, covering same-sex relationships 
 Power to grant exemptions under s 126 of AD Act transferred from Minister 
to ADB president 
 Academic research amendment allowing disclosure of information for 
academic research 
2014   From January 2014, the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(the ‘NCAT’) replaced the Administrative Decisions Tribunal as the relevant 
Tribunal with jurisdiction to determine complaints of discrimination. 
                                                 
10
 In addition, the AD Act covers vilification and serious vilification (racial, homosexual and HIV/AIDS). 
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The area of work is defined very broadly to cover paid work and not simply common 
law employment relationships.
11
 Discrimination against a person on the ground of his or 
her carers’ responsibilities was a relatively late substantive addition, under Part 4B, and, 
unlike the other grounds, only applies in the area of work.
12
  
 
1.2.2 Formal and Substantive Equality: Direct, Indirect and Systemic 
Discrimination  
 
Under the standard format found in Australian discrimination jurisdictions, there are 
two types of discrimination protection under discrimination legislation: direct 
discrimination (when a person is treated less favourably) and indirect discrimination 
(when a policy or practice looks neutral on its face and applies to everyone, but it is 
unreasonable, and its effect disadvantages members of a particular protected group). 
The High Court of Australia has considered the interpretation and application of direct 
and indirect discrimination provisions in sex and disability provisions in only six 
cases.
13
  Courts and Tribunals across Australia have looked to these cases to guide their 
interpretation of discrimination laws generally in their jurisdictions.  The two types of 
discrimination protection have been broadly canvassed and critiqued in the academic 
literature,
14 
including in relation to work and family discrimination in Australia, and 
                                                 
11
 See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 455, noting that the area of work under anti-discrimination laws is 
defined very broadly and is ‘considered to be a broader concept than employment’ and the common law 
relationship of employer and employee; and that the aim is to ‘ensure that all relationships in which one 
person performs paid work for another person are covered by the prohibitions against discrimination’. In 
practice, in NSW, around 60% of all complaints made each year relate to work matters; see, for example, 
ADB, Annual Report 2010–11, 14–15. 
12
 All of the other grounds under the AD Act apply to all five areas. The explanation as to why the carers’ 
provisions apply only to employment and work can be found in the Law Reform Commission of NSW, 
Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Report No 92 (1999) (‘LRC Report’) 298–9 [5.190], 
and 308 [5.220]. The LRC sought to give effect to Australia’s obligations under the International Labour 
Organization, Convention (No 156) Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and 
Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 1981 (‘ILO Convention 156’). It also saw no 
evidence of a ‘broader social problem in this area’ outside the employment context..  
13
 Two involved sex discrimination in employment under the AD Act: Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v 
Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165; New South Wales v Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174 (‘Amery’). Four related to 
disability discrimination: Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 (‘Waters’); IW v 
City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR; X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177; Purvis v New South Wales 
(2003) 217 CLR 92 (‘Purvis’).   
14
 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 74–117, for an explanation of direct discrimination; and 
at 117–42 for indirect discrimination. See also Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 31–52; Rosemary Hunter, 
Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace (Federation, 1992) (‘Indirect’); Margaret Thornton, The Liberal 
Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1990) (‘Promise’). Fredman 
Discrimination (2011), above n 3, 153–205 outlined similar definitional issues in the UK.  Note that the 
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NSW.
15
 The literature in this regard is outlined further in Chapter 4. The direct and 
indirect discrimination provisions under Part 4B are summarised in Section 1.7.3. 
 
The difference between direct and indirect discrimination is often conceptualised, not 
just in terms of the type of conduct that is targeted, but also in terms of the policy goals 
of the legislation and the ‘type’ of equality, either formal or substantive, that the direct 
and indirect discrimination provisions respectively aim to achieve.
16
 The direct 
discrimination approach to inequality is based on a formal equal treatment principle of 
not being treated less favourably because of a protected attribute. In relation to work, 
the protected attribute should be an irrelevant consideration when making decisions. For 
example, it would be unlawful to refuse to give a person a job because he or she had 
caring responsibilities for young children. Direct discrimination has been a useful tool 
to challenge overt stereotypes, assumptions and overt exclusionary practices.
17
 
However, the equal treatment model has long been critiqued in the literature because it 
does not seek to address the underlying causes of inequality. Rather it addresses its 
                                                                                                                                               
proposed HRAD Bill does not use the terms direct or indirect discrimination but the concepts are still 
central to the Bill, and in effect reflect the definitions contained under ss 8–9 of the Victorian EO Act. It is 
also noteworthy that in the industrial relations sphere the General Protection contained in s 351 of the 
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)(‘FW Act’), also provide discrimination protections in relation to employment 
which avoids all reference to direct and indirect discrimination. Instead it is provided that an employer 
take ‘no adverse action’ because of a protected ground, including on the ground of family or carers’ 
responsibilities. Further, under s 361, the intention or reason for taking action in contravention of the FW 
Act is presumed, unless otherwise proved, thereby placing the burden of proof with the employer. 
15
 See, for example, Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 378–404; Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and 
Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 88 (‘Shadow’); Anna 
Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre 
for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) 
(‘Working Paper’); Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and the Case of 
Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’); Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, ‘Family 
Friendly Work Practices and the Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 395; Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal 
in the World of Work: Two Significant Developments in Australian Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 199 (‘Fair and Equal’); Belinda Smith, ‘From Wardley to Purvis—
How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law Come in 30 years?’ (2008) 21 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 3 (‘Purvis’); Belinda Smith, ‘What Kind of Equality Can We Expect from the Fair Work 
Act?’ (2011) 35(2) Melbourne University Law Review 545; K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and 
the Worker-Carer: It’s Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 18 (‘Indirect Discrimination’); K 
Lee Adams, ‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263 
(‘Defining’); Carolyn Sutherland, ‘Applying Victoria v Schou: The Approach of VCAT and the Federal 
Magistrates Court’ (2007) 29(1) Australian Bar Review. 
16
 See generally Hunter, Indirect, above n 14, 3–8; Fredman, Discrimination (2011), above n 3, 1–16; 
Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 1–24; Smith, Belinda ‘How Might Information Bolster Anti-
Discrimination Laws to Promote More Family-Friendly Workplaces?’ (2014), 56(4) Journal of Industrial 
Relations 547, 549-553 ('Bolster’); Smith, Purvis, above n 15, 5–7, 23–7; Rice, above n 4; Sandra 
Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 
2008) (‘Human Rights’) 175. 
17
 See, for example, the High Court decision in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v 
Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237, in which a woman pilot successfully challenged her rejection for 
employment as a pilot because of her sex. See generally Smith, Purvis, above n 15.  
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manifestations and does not seek to challenge the dominant norms underpinning that 
inequality unless they make overt distinctions between a protected group and another 
group.
18
 Indirect discrimination legislative protections were introduced with the 
intention of addressing these root causes of disadvantage by stripping back seemingly 
neutral conditions and practices. Indirect discrimination focuses on achieving 
substantive equality because it:  
requires differences to be acknowledged and accommodated rather than 
ignored. Substantive equality is about equality of outcome or equality of 
opportunity not merely same treatment. When there are relevant differences, 
simply ignoring them will not promote equality of opportunity or outcome.
19
 
 
Some early indirect discrimination complaints ‘have been of a path breaking nature’,20 
in this regard, such as the High Court decision in Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v 
Banovic (1989).
21
  
 
In theory, indirect discrimination provisions promised the potential to tackle structural 
discrimination in the workplace that is based on deeply entrenched gendered ‘ideal 
worker’ norms about when, where and how work is undertaken.22 Smith has explained 
how these norms underpin assumptions about both paid public work and private care 
work representing: 
cultural rules about what women and men should do in respect of paid work 
and unpaid family care work. These norms are embedded in workplace 
practices and cultures. Despite the substantial increases in women’s workforce 
participation, the ‘ideal worker’ norm—long hours, availability for overtime 
and work travel, unbroken tenure—continues to reflect a traditional male role 
of breadwinner, unencumbered by the often unpredictable and time consuming 
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 Smith, Purvis, above n 15, 6–8. For a critique of the formal direct discrimination model see, for 
example, Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 6, 24; Fredman, Discrimination (2011), above n 3, 1–16; 
Hunter, Indirect, above n 14, 5–6; Reg Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of the Law 
(Federation Press, 2002) 28–30. 
19
 Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 15, 6.See also Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 17.  
20
. Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 108. 
21
 In Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165, a group of women successfully 
claimed under the sex discrimination provisions of the AD Act that their former employer discriminated 
against them when they were retrenched on a ‘first on first off’ policy relating to the ostensibly neutral 
employment practice that could disproportionately affect women. In contrast, in New South Wales v 
Amery (2006) 20 CLR 174, the High Court dismissed an indirect sex complaint. Note that the High Court 
also considered indirect discrimination in Waters (1991) 173 CLR 349, in which it upheld a complaint of 
disability discrimination in relation to a goods and service complaint relating to access to transport.  
22
 See generally Charlesworth ‘Shadow’, above n 15; Hunter, Indirect, above n 14, 4–13; Thornton, 
Promise, above n 14, 17; Smith, Purvis, above n 15, 6–8; Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the 
Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) Sydney Law Review 68 (‘Bathwater’), 689–90. The ‘ideal worker’ norms are 
explained in more detail in Chapter 3 at 3.2  
28 
 
demands of family caring responsibilities. In this way much work-family 
conflict reflects gender discrimination in the workplace.
23
 
For example, in the context of an ideal worker norm of full-time work, many worker–
carers are unable to work full-time.  Indirect discrimination protections which focus on 
equality of outcome or result in these circumstances would require either the offending 
norm to be changed (for example by introducing a flexible work policy) or would 
require steps to be taken to accommodate the needs of the worker who is unable to work 
full-time (for example allowing part-time work). Other accommodations which may be 
provided are outlined below at 1.2.3. 
 
In recent years, it has been argued in the literature that both the direct and the indirect 
discrimination legislative provisions, as they have been interpreted and applied by 
courts and tribunals across Australia, have proved wholly inadequate mechanisms to 
challenge the gendered and deeply entrenched workplace discrimination against 
worker–carers.24 The literature is outlined in Chapter 4. 
 
In addition to direct and indirect discrimination, systemic discrimination is a term that is 
also often used in the literature and in this thesis. It is not, however, a separate statutory 
discrimination protection under the standard discrimination law model found under the 
AD Act. It has been defined by Hunter in relation to employment as ‘a complex of 
directly and/or indirectly discriminatory … practices’ which operate to produce 
employment disadvantage for a particular group.
25
 More recently, the Victorian Equal 
Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (‘VEOHRC’) noted that systemic 
discrimination reflects institutional or organisational discrimination when processes and 
practices become so entrenched in organisations, communities or society that they are 
viewed as neutral and acceptable, but it ‘is not just the sum total of direct and indirect 
discriminatory practices—it goes beyond this to attitudes and cultures’.26 Systemic 
discrimination is a term encapsulating the nature and causes of workplace 
discrimination against carers, which as noted is often based upon deeply entrenched 
‘ideal worker’ norms, and assumptions about the value that is attributed to paid and 
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 Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 22, 689–90. 
24
 The literature is outlined generally in Chapter 4.  Part IV of this thesis analyses the carers’ decisions at 
the Tribunal between 2001 and 2011, illustrating the legal complexity of the provisions under Part 4B. 
25
 Hunter, Indirect, above n 14, 13. 
26
 VEOHRC, Submission to Equal Opportunity Review Discussion Paper 2007 (2008) 17–18. 
29 
 
unpaid care work. The nature, causes and effects of this systemic discrimination are 
explored further in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2.3 Discrimination Law Duties of Reasonable Accommodation or Adjustment 
 
Some Australian discrimination laws in recent years have also provided for express 
statutory duties of reasonable accommodation or adjustment. Rees, Rice and Allen note 
that the ‘duty to make reasonable adjustments is part of what has been described as a 
new phase of equality laws, which brings with it a movement from negative prohibitions 
on discrimination to positive duties to promote equality.’27  For example, the Equal 
Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (‘EO Act’) provides for a duty of reasonable 
accommodation in the area of disability and to accommodate carer and family 
responsibilities in the area of work, and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), 
(‘DD Act’) was amended in 2009 to include a duty to provide reasonable adjustment.28 
The Law Reform Commission of NSW (‘LRC’), in its 1999 report reviewing the AD 
Act, recommended providing for express duties of reasonable accommodation in 
relation to the grounds of carers’ responsibilities, disability, breastfeeding and 
pregnancy.
29
 The recommendations have not been acted upon, and the AD Act contains 
no such express duties of reasonable accommodation or adjustment in relation to any of 
its grounds. 
 
The aim of an obligation of reasonable accommodation or adjustment in these 
circumstances is to ‘correct the discriminatory effects of a norm either by exempting the 
                                                 
27
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 298. See also Fredman, Discrimination (2011), above n 3, 8.  
Fredman’s work in this regard is discussed further in Chapter 4, at 4.4.2. 
28
 See ss 17 and 19 of the EO Act, which provides that an employer must not ‘unreasonably refuse to 
accommodate the responsibilities that a person has as a parent or carer’ while s 20 relates to disability.  
For a discussion of the Victorian legislation, see Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Right to Request 
Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 116; Chapman, Working 
Paper, above n 15; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 15; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 15.  See, also Rees, 
Rice and Allen, above n 2, 20, 176–8, considering the enactment of a statutory duty to take positive steps 
to eliminate discrimination at s 15. Victoria is the only state to have introduced such a duty, although it 
should be noted that the positive duty is backed by only a limited enforcement process. In particular, 
individual complainants cannot enforce it.  See also ss 4, 11 of the DD Act which is discussed by Belinda 
Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15.  Note that the draft HRAD Bill did not include a duty of reasonable 
accommodation or adjustment for family or caring responsibilities; see s 17 HRAD Bill. 
29
 See LRC Report above n 12, 305 [5.212]. The LRC recommended that an obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation on these grounds subject to a defence of unjustifiable hardship. See at xxv, 
297–308, Recommendation 8 at 108 and Recommendation 40 at 308.  Chapter 5 outlines these 
recommendations in greater detail.   
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individual concerned from its application, or by adapting the norm itself’.30 What is 
reasonable will obviously depend on the circumstance of the particular workplace. In 
practice, it will require balancing the needs of the business with the caring 
responsibilities of a worker–carer. In terms of ‘exempting the individual’, such 
accommodation could include an employer agreeing to allow part-time work; job 
sharing; teleworking from home; compressed working hours, for example, working five 
days over four; flexibility with start/finish times, rostering or shifts; access to paid and 
unpaid leave; and ensuring access to benefits such as promotion, training, career 
development opportunities, or other benefits.
31
 In terms of ‘adapting the norm itself’, 
policy changes, such as the introduction of flexible work policies, could lead to the 
dismantling of ideal worker norms in relation to full-time work and working hours, and 
could lead to greater flexibility at the workplace.
32
  
 
However, even without an express statutory duty, discrimination laws in practice may 
imply a duty of reasonable accommodation—for example, from the operation of the 
indirect discrimination provisions on the basis of whether a condition or requirement is 
reasonable,
33
 or through the operation of inherent requirements and unjustifiable 
hardship provisions as they have been interpreted in disability discrimination cases.
34
  
Whether a duty of accommodation can, or has been implied in the context of Part 4B is 
considered below at 1.7. 
 
1.2.4 Carers’ Discrimination under Part 4B and the Standard Template 
 
The substantive provisions of Part 4B are explained in detail in Section 1.7. In 
summary, Part 4B closely follows the standard template based on negative duties of 
restraint. It is unlawful to discriminate against a person because of his or her carers’ 
responsibilities for a family member or relatives specified under s 49S of the AD Act. 
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 Council of Europe, Institutional Accommodation and the Citizen: Legal and Political Interaction in a 
Pluralist Society (2009).  
31
 As suggested by the ADB, in its Guidelines for Employers, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination 
(2000) 14 (‘Carers’ Employer Guidelines’). 
32
 See Elizabeth Emmens, ‘Integrating Accommodation’ (2008) 156(4) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 839, 883–4, in which it is argued, in the context of disability discrimination in the US, that it is 
necessary to focus on the need to integrate accommodations, to replace exclusion with full participation. 
33
 Smith noted that indirect discrimination laws have provided an, albeit vague and implicit, obligation of 
reasonable accommodation: Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15, 203–4, 206–7. 
34
 See, for example, X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177. See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above 
n 2, 302–14 for a discussion of the cases. 
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Unlike the family responsibilities provisions under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth) (‘SD Act’), which until 2011 had applied only to women and only in relation to 
complaints of direct discrimination arising from dismissal,
 35
 Part 4B applies to men and 
women and covers direct and indirect discrimination,
36
 on the ground of a person’s 
current, past, future or presumed caring responsibilities.
37
 Part 4B applies very broadly 
to work relationships including employees, contractor workers, commission agents, 
independent contractors and partners, but does not generally cover Commonwealth 
employees.
38
  There are only two specific exceptions for ‘private households’ and small 
businesses which employ five or less people.
39
 There are no ‘special measures’ 
provisions which would allow steps to be taken for the purposes of achieving equality 
for workers with caring responsibilities.
 40
 As noted above, an express duty of 
reasonable accommodation on employers is not provided for. Part 4B also provides a 
potential defence of unjustifiable hardship, but only in relation to hiring and firing 
decisions.
41
 Worker–carers who are discriminated against can enforce their rights 
through the two-stage complaints mechanism provided for under the AD Act, which is 
now set out.   
 
1.2.5 The Two-Stage Enforcement Mechanism 
 
Australian discrimination laws set up a statutory agency, such as the ADB, which is 
responsible for the administration of the legislation and the complaint-handling function 
provided under the AD Act. However, they do not establish an enforcement agency that 
has the task of pursuing or prosecuting people or organisations that break the law.
42
 
Generally, the enforcement of discrimination law is wholly dependent upon individual 
complainants enforcing their rights against perpetrators who have breached the duties of 
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 See SD Act, ss4A, 7A. Since 2011 discrimination is now prohibited in all areas of employment. Prior to 
2011 the relevant provisions were found in the SD Act s 14(3A).See Chapman, Working Paper, above  
n15, 27–31. See also Rees, Rice and Allen above n 2, 400.  
36
 Section 49T(1)(a)(b). 
37
 Section 49T(2). 
38
 Sections 49V–49ZC. See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 454-66 for an overview of the 
coverage in relation to work in the Commonwealth and states and territories; and at 54-61 in relation to 
inconsistencies between concurrent Commonwealth, state and territory laws.  
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 Section 49V(3). 
40
 See n 9 above. 
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 Sections 49U and 49V(4) replicate the provisions found in the disability discrimination provisions in pt 
4A. See ss
 
49C, 49D(4). The only two grounds under the AD Act to contain this defence of carers’ 
responsibility and disability. 
42
 Compare, for example, the powers of the Fair Work Ombudsman under Part 5.2 of the FW Act .See 
Smith ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15. 
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restraint.
43
 All Australian discrimination jurisdictions other than Victoria follow a 
similar statutory two-stage enforcement model:
 
 
[w]hich must be complied with if a person wishes to avail him or herself of 
legal rights granted by anti-discrimination statutes. There is no right of direct 
access to a court or tribunal in order to enforce these laws. The first stage of 
the enforcement model involves lodging a complaint with a government 
agency … Most of the agencies have evidence gathering powers, and they 
have been given the responsibility to attempt to resolve complaints privately 
by the use of primary dispute resolution mechanisms such as conciliation and 
mediation. If a complaint cannot be resolved by the agency, the person who 
lodged the complaint of discrimination may elect to proceed to a court or 
tribunal for adjudication.
44
 
If a matter proceeds to a hearing at a court or tribunal, the person alleging 
discrimination—the ‘complainant’—will have the burden of proving that the alleged 
discriminator—the ‘respondent’—discriminated against him or her.45 In practice, very 
few complaints ever reach a hearing at a court or tribunal.
46
 
 
When discrimination laws were enacted, it was intended that the two-stage enforcement 
model would provide an alternative to traditional litigation through the courts.
47
 If 
complaints could not be resolved by private and confidential conciliation at the first 
stage, the discrimination tribunals were intended to provide informal, low-cost access to 
justice for victims of discrimination. Thornton explained that these ‘specialist tribunals’ 
were ‘established to hear cases expeditiously and cheaply, in what is intended to be a 
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 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 799–800. 
44
 Ibid 8, and for a general overview of the processes in Australia, see at 725–99. See also Thornton, 
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‘The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases’ (Working Paper No 8, Centre for 
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Journal of Labour Law 31, 33. See Anna Chapman, ‘Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The 
Paradox of Informal Dispute Resolution’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 321, 322 (‘Complaint-
Handling’); Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 15, 89. 
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 Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime 
(Themis, 2010) 9 (‘Enforcing’). 
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non-threatening environment relatively free of the trappings of a formal court’48 for 
example, she noted that they are not expressly bound by the rules of evidence.
49
 The 
intention was to provide ‘[l]ow cost, speedy, informal and specialist decision-making … 
[as] an effective remedy to individuals with limited means, reduce adversarialism and 
serve the public interest in social harmony’.50 However, in practice, it has been argued 
that the ‘two stage enforcement model has traditionally been slow and arduous’ for 
many complainants and has become increasingly adversarial.
51
   
 
In NSW the ADB is the relevant agency responsible for overseeing the first stage in 
NSW, and s 95 provides for a statutory tribunal to adjudicate complaints referred to it 
by the ADB.
52
 In this thesis, the term ‘Tribunal’ is used to refer to the statutory tribunal 
defined under s 95 of the AD Act. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal (‘ADT’) was 
the relevant statutory tribunal under the AD Act for the period of the first decade of the 
operation of Part 4B, and up until 2013. However, since January 2014, the New South 
Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘NCAT’), the State’s new ‘mega’ tribunal, 
has been the relevant tribunal with jurisdiction to determine complaints of 
discrimination under the AD Act.
53
 
 
Section 1.3 now outlines the ADB’s broad statutory functions and powers, Section 1.4 
concentrates upon the complaint-handling function and Section 1.5 explains the relevant 
powers of the Tribunal.  
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 See generally Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 173, ch VI.  
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powers of the Tribunal are found under pt 9 div 2 ss 95–116. 
53
 The NCAT has consolidated the work of 22 NSW tribunals into four divisions, with the intention of 
retaining specialist services. One of the divisions is the Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division, 
which performs the work of the former Administrative Decisions Tribunal, including its jurisdiction 
under the AD Act. See the NCAT website (http://www.ncat.nsw.gov.au/ncat/about_us.html). The new 
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1.3 The Functions of the ADB under the AD Act  
1.3.1 An Overview 
 
Generally the ADB is responsible for administering and overseeing the operation of the 
AD Act. In summary, the AD Act does not have a specific objects clause, but the title of 
the Act describes it as ‘[a]n Act to render unlawful racial, sex and other types of 
discrimination … and to promote equality of opportunity between all persons’. Its 
functions are to be used ‘for the purpose of eliminating discrimination and promoting 
equality and equal treatment of all human beings’.54 In addition to being responsible for 
the first stage of the statutory enforcement process, which is discussed in Section 1.4, 
the ADB has very broad public policy functions under s 119.
55
 They relate to research, 
educative and advisory functions in order to ‘acquire and disseminate knowledge on all 
matters relating to the elimination of discrimination and achievement of equal rights’;56 
to hold public enquiries, consultations, conferences and seminars;
57
 to develop human 
rights policies and programmes;
58
 and to ‘consult with governmental, business, 
industrial and community groups and organisations in order to ascertain means of 
improving services and conditions affecting minority groups and other groups which are 
the subject of discrimination and inequality’.59 
 
In particular, the ADB educates and raises awareness of the legislation through a 
number of methods,
60
 including complaint handling,
61
 providing a telephone enquiries 
line, and publishing material aimed specifically at workers and employers 
respectively.
62
 Factsheets aimed at complainants explain rights and how to enforce 
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62
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Employer Guidelines, above n 31, 8, published in 2000 in preparation for the legislation coming into 
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them. Guidelines aimed at employers explain how to prevent discrimination and also 
include recommendations for compliance. Many of these publications are available on 
the ADB website. The website appears to have been very well used by the people of 
NSW as a source of information and advice in recent years. For example, the ADB 
reports that it received 838,148 hits, an average of 69,846 per month, in the year 2010–
2011.
63
 The ADB also provides training to businesses and organisations for a fee, as 
well as free, albeit limited, community education training and information sessions.
64
  
 
In terms of organisational structure, the ADB has two main branches—
enquiries/complaint resolution, and education services—to discharge its functions.65  
The statutory functions quite clearly emphasise the ADB’s role as an advocate for, and 
guardian of, the AD Act.
66
 In summary, the ADB therefore has a well-established and 
broadly recognised statutory role to interpret and apply the AD Act to give effect to its 
human rights objectives, and to disseminate this interpretation through its various 
statutory functions.
67
 In this thesis, it is argued that, free of an adjudicative function, the 
ADB’s approach to statutory interpretation tends to avoid a technical black-letter law 
approach. In particular, the ADB has consistently taken a purposive, broad and 
beneficial approach to the operation of Part 4B, interpreting and applying the law to 
give effect to the objectives of the legislation.
68
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68
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1.3.2 Political Will, Funding and Rationalising Core Functions 
 
While the ADB’s functions are broad, in practical terms its capacity to discharge them 
has been impacted by a concurrent lack of political support for, and chronic 
underfunding of, the ADB in the past decade. For example, more than 15 years after the 
LRC delivered its report in 1999 (which had taken 8 years to complete), the new 
legislation that it recommended has still not been enacted by any NSW government;
69
 
and the ADB’s capacity for effective education, policy, research and law reform work 
has been seriously stymied by continuous funding cuts by successive NSW 
governments. The ADB has reported that its funding for the financial year 2013–2014 
was just under $3.8 million, a figure which has only increased slightly since a major 
organisational restructure in 2003–2004, when its budget was reduced from $4.3 million 
to just under $3.5 million.
70
 As a result, in 2003–2004 the ADB lost 11 staff positions—
notably, the entire legal and policy branch was abolished, and, generally, funding for 
community education was reduced to one part-time position. Since that date, the ADB 
has had one legal officer for the entire State of NSW. Rees, Rice and Allen have noted 
that, although agencies such as the ADB ‘perform important educational and reform 
activities, they lack the resources to have a broad impact in the community’.71 Over the 
past decade, agencies such as the Australian Human Rights Commission (the ‘AHRC’) 
have undertaken broad public consultations and published several ground-breaking 
reports, including in relation to work and care discrimination.
72
 In contrast, the last 
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public enquiry that the ADB held was in 2001.
73
 Significant staffing cuts and reduced 
funding have not only affected the ADB’s capacity to implement its statutory functions, 
but have also exacerbated negative perceptions in the broader community about the 
ADB’s capacity to adequately carry out its functions and properly discharge its role as 
advocate for and guardian of the AD Act.
74
 
 
In practice, although s 119 of the AD Act provides for multiple statutory functions, the 
ADB considers that its two ‘core’ functions are complaint handling and education. Out 
of necessity, the ADB has increasingly prioritised these ‘core’ functions, at the expense 
of its other functions, to deliver its legislative objectives better.
75
 
 
 
1.4 The ADB and the First Stage  
 
The two-stage enforcement process is illustrated in Figure 1.1. This chart comes was 
used in ADB publications throughout the period 2001-2011 outlining the role of the 
ADB and the complaints process, and provides a useful summary of the key stages of 
the enforcement process.
76
 Complaints must be lodged with the ADB
77
 for investigation 
and attempted conciliation, and generally, complaints will only be referred to the 
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very significantly reduced after the restructure, in part because of the funding cuts and restructure: Annual 
Report 2003–04, 11–12. In relation to its enquiries service, it was noted that:  
during 2003–2004 we answered 8,977 enquiries … This is a significant reduction from 2002–2003 
(12,608 enquiries). It reflects the reduction in staff allocated to enquiries in 2003–2004 as a result of 
the Board restructure. 
In relation to complaints, it was noted that:  
[w]e received 944 complaints in 2003–2004, which is less than expected on the basis of recent years 
(1,659 complaints were received in 2002–2003). The Board is not able to fully explain the drop in 
complaint numbers this year. [However] [t]he loss of some of the Board’s staff and resources may 
have been another factor, as some of our services were reduced to accommodate the loss.  
75
 The ADB, Annual Report 2002–03, 6 noted that the ADB was to undergo a review of activities to 
‘focus on developing the most effective structures and procedures for the Board’s core functions of 
handling complaints and educating the community’.  A version which includes reference to the NCAT but 
contains the same steps is still available at the ADB in 2014. See  
http://www.antidiscrimination.justice.nsw.gov.au/adb/adb1_makingacomplaint/adb1_process_flowchart.h
tml 
76
 From ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61 dated (2009), and see for example ADB, Annual 
Report 2001–02, 26. 
77
 See Sections 87–94 relate to the complaint-handling function of the ADB, with powers vested in the 
President of the ADB. 
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Tribunal
78
 if the complaint cannot be conciliated or is declined by the ADB on certain 
grounds and the complainant asks for the matter to be referred.
79
  
                                                 
78
 Sections 95–115 relate to the functions and powers of the Tribunal. 
79
 See s 92(1) for the grounds upon which a complaint may be declined. Sections 93A(1)–(2), 93B, 93C 
explain the process to refer a complaint to the Tribunal. See Figure A1 in Appendix A for a summary of 
the key statutory complaint-handling provisions.  
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Figure 1.1: The Anti-Discrimination Board Complaint Process (2001-2011) 
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1.4.1 AD Act Complaint-Handling Provisions: An Overview 
 
The complaint-handling powers under the AD Act are vested in the president of the 
ADB.
80
 Figure A1, in Appendix A, sets out a summary of the ADB’s key complaint-
handling provisions.81 Although the ADB has no adjudicative powers to determine 
whether discrimination has occurred, it does have a number of important powers in 
relation to accepting and declining complaints during the first stage of the enforcement 
process. For example, when the ADB receives a complaint, it must first determine 
whether to accept the complaint for investigation under s 89B. This is an important 
power, because a decision to decline a complaint at this stage—for example, because it 
is lodged outside the 12-month time limit or does not disclose a contravention of the AD 
Act—cannot be appealed or reviewed at the Tribunal,82 and nor can the Tribunal hear 
the complaint.
83
 Once a complaint is accepted, the ADB also has powers to decline a 
complaint at any stage thereafter, but the complainant will then have the right to request 
that their complaint be referred to the Tribunal for a hearing.
84
  If a complaint is 
accepted under s 89B, it must be investigated and conciliation may be attempted.
85
 The 
ADB has no power to make determinations about whether discrimination has occurred; 
or take direct action for breaches of the substantive provisions of the AD Act, such as 
issuing fines or penalties for non-compliance. 
 
The ADB’s enforcement capacity, other than this investigation and conciliation role, is, 
in practice, very limited.
86
  It has no power to initiate a complaint, or pursue a matter to 
                                                 
80
 In practice, under s 94, the President delegates the exercise of his or her functions in relation to the 
investigation and conciliation of complaints to an individual ADB staff member. 
81
 See also above n 69. 
82 A decision not to accept or to decline a complaint under s 89B(2) may not be reviewed at the Tribunal; 
see s 89B(4). The only option to have such a decision reviewed would be an action for judicial review 
under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). See, for example, Shrayer v Anti-Discrimination ADB of 
NSW [2008] NSWSC 1036 (‘Shrayer’), in which the Court considered the application of s 89B, [18]–[25]. 
83
 Confirmed in Wecker v The Delegate (the decision maker) to the President (Mr S Kerkyashrian) of the 
NSW Anti-Discrimination Board [2014] NSWSC 386, citing Shrayer [2008] NSWSC 1036 [25], that ‘the 
Legislature plainly intended to make a decision declining a complaint under s 89B final and beyond 
challenge’.  
84
 See generally the summary of the key complaint handling provisions Figure A1 in Appendix A.  
85
 Sections 90–93. 
86
 See Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 22, and ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15, 217, in which she contrasted the 
enforcement provisions under the FW Act providing for ‘agency enforcement, with possible inspections, 
investigations and prosecutions and a range of orders that include punitive measures’, noting that ‘the 
absence of a pyramid or range of sanctions for discrimination has arguably undermined the effectiveness 
of anti-discrimination laws in the past’. 
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a hearing at the Tribunal.  It may be asked to appear to assist the Tribunal,
87
 but it has 
no right to intervene in a case before it.
88
 It may also apply to the Tribunal for an 
interim order to preserve the status quo, to preserve the rights of the parties, or to return 
the parties to the circumstances they were in before the contravention alleged in the 
complaint occurred, pending determination of a complaint.
89
 The ADB may also 
enforce an order of the Tribunal if it is in the public interest.
90
  Finally, penalties are 
also available for non-production of documents and for failing to comply with a notice 
to attend a conciliation conference.
91
 None of these powers were used in relation to the 
carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB in the decade period of this research project.  
 
1.4.2 Investigation, Conciliation and Outcomes at the ADB 
 
Chapman succinctly explained the purpose of the first stage of the complaint model 
under the AD Act as follows: 
[The ADB’s] complaint handling procedures focus on the processing of 
complaints through the confidential mechanisms of ‘investigation’ and 
‘conciliation’ rather than adjudication. As Astor and Chinkin note ‘[t]he aim 
… is to challenge discrimination by an informal and consensual process 
involving negotiation and agreement wherever it is possible to do so.
92
 
The ADB has the power to ‘investigate’ and ‘conciliate’ complaints of discrimination.93 
‘Investigation’ and ‘conciliation’ are not defined in the AD Act, but in practice, the 
boundaries between the two are fluid, representing sometimes overlapping stages of 
what can be called the complaint-handling process.
94
 For example, the same complaint 
                                                 
87
 Section 99. It does not appear that the ADB has ever been asked to appear in this capacity in the decade 
period of this study, between 2001 and 2011, in relation to either carers’ complaints or complaints of 
discrimination on other grounds. 
88
 See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 802–3, providing an overview of amicus curiae provisions or 
rights to intervene in other Australian discrimination jurisdictions. 
89
 Section 105. This power was not used in the context of any carers’ complaints made under Part 4B in 
the period 2001–2011.  Chapter 9 considers how the ADB approaches s 105 in practice.  
90
 Section 113.  This provision has never been used by the ADB to date. 
91
 Sections 90B, 91A.  In practice, the President must initiate proceedings for non-compliance, and, in the 
writer’s experience working at the ADB, this was not done because of the resources that would be 
involved in pursuing respondents who had not complied. Instead, if the complainants agreed, a complaint 
would be referred to the Tribunal if a respondent did not comply. As outlined in Chapter 2, at 2.2.5, the 
writer worked at the ADB between 2000 and 2010.  
92 Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 46, 321, citing Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute 
Resolution in Australia (Lexis, Butterworths 1992) 261. Although Chapman’s study is dated 2000, these 
aspects of the complaint process have changed little since then, notwithstanding the amendments to the 
AD Act in 2005 in relation to complaint handling noted above at n 69.  
93
 Sections 90–91C. 
94
 See generally the summary of the key complaint handling provisions at Figure A1 in Appendix A. 
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handler at the ADB will usually have conduct of both stages.
95
 ADB publications also 
help explain how the complaint process is administered, how the statutory provisions 
operate in practice and how the ADB views the objectives of investigation and 
conciliation and its role as an impartial facilitator in this process.
96
  
 
Investigation takes a very limited form of first checking that the allegations come within 
the jurisdiction of the ADB and then writing to the parties, seeking their comments and 
facilitating an exchange of information and responses, rather than any true inquisitorial 
investigative role. The ADB usually takes a ‘hands off’ approach to investigation, and 
does not, for instance, as part of the investigation, make any findings as to whether 
discrimination occurred.  Even if the ADB wanted to pursue a more aggressive 
investigative role, lack of resources would obviously affect its capacity to do so,
97
 and 
would no doubt be ‘perceived by the respondents as being partisan in favour of the 
complainant’.98 
 
In relation to conciliation, Thornton noted its broad scope as a ‘process of settling 
conflict in which a third party oversees the negotiation between two parties but does not 
impose an agreement’ and ‘apart from these requirements a wide range of interventions 
fall within the rubric of “conciliation”’.99  Conciliation refers to the process of trying to 
resolve the dispute,
 
which may, but will not always, involve calling a conciliation 
conference.
 100
  The ADB notes that conciliation is intended to enable the parties to 
discuss the options to resolve the complaint, and those issues are usually discussed in a 
non-legalistic way.
101
  Complaints to the ADB are often settled without a conference 
                                                 
95 
The LRC Report noted the following particular concerns raised in submissions to it in relation to 
investigation and conciliation: ‘the procedures for handling complaints are not clear’ and ‘the ADB is 
perceived to be biased in favour of complainants’: LRC Report, above n 12, 587 [8.9]. It recommended 
that separating the investigation and conciliation functions would ameliorate concerns about bias: at 623 
[8.96]. This recommendation has not been acted upon and the same ADB staff are usually responsible for 
handling both investigation and conciliation stages. 
96
 See especially two ADB factsheets: ADB, Complaining Factsheet above n 61; and ADB, 
Discrimination and the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW (2012). 
97
 Chapman was critical of the ADB for investigating complaints only to the extent of ensuring that the 
allegations fall within the jurisdiction, and that there are no obvious exemptions: She noted that while 
there is nothing in the AD Act that would prevent the ADB from taking an active inquisitorial fact-finding 
and evidence-gathering role, a lack of resources would certainly prevent such a role: Chapman, 
‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 46, 335. 
98
 Ibid 340. 
99
 Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 143–4. See also Margaret Thornton, ‘Equivocations of Conciliation: 
The Resolution of Discrimination Complaints in Australia’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 733, 733–4. 
100
 A compulsory conciliation conference can be called under s 91A(1).  
101
 ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61. 
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being held.
102
  In practice, conciliation officers may attempt to negotiate a resolution of 
a complaint at any stage once the complaint has been formally accepted for 
investigation; it is not necessary to wait for the notional investigation stage to be 
completed.
103
  Figure 1.2, taken from an ADB publication about complaints sets out 
how the ADB views it role in the process,
104
 as an impartial facilitator
105
 but at the same 
time, an advocate for the legislation; to educate about rights and responsibilities, and 
how to prevent discrimination and encourage compliance.
106
  
 
The complaint process has a clear access-to-justice aim: it is free and is intended as an 
informal and confidential way ‘to sort the matter out as quickly and cheaply as possible 
instead of having to go to the … Tribunal’.107 A complaint must be in writing but ‘as 
made, need not demonstrate a prima facie case’ and the ADB may provide assistance to 
make a complaint.
108
 There are no formal pleadings or documents, and the complainant 
need not: particularise in any great detail his or her allegations; state whether the 
conduct amounts to direct or indirect discrimination; or produce evidence in support. 
Put simply, the parties do not have to prove anything. Legal representation for any stage 
of the process is not required.  There is no automatic right to legal representation at a 
conciliation conference,
109
 instead leave must be sought and such applications are not 
‘rubberstamped’, and, in practice, leave is often refused.110  
 
  
                                                 
102
 As outlined in the empirical study of complaints in Chapter 9: out of the 281 complaints that were 
resolved at the ADB between 2001 and 2011, 145—almost 52 %of all settled complaints—were resolved 
either at or after a statutory conciliation conference was held s 91A, and 136, or 48 %, were resolved 
without a conference. 
103
 Section 89B. 
104 
ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61. 
105 
See also Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 46. 
106
 ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Section 89(2). 
109
 Section 91B. 
110
 The ADB’s approach to leave applications under s 91B is considered in Chapter 9, where it is noted 
that leave is frequently refused.  
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The Conciliation Conference  
A conciliation conference is a meeting where you and the respondent meet to talk about the complaint 
and ways to sort it out, usually with the assistance an officer from the Board. The complainant and 
respondent(s) can meet directly or through their representatives if the President allows this. It is a free 
service provided by the Board.  
 
Do I have to attend?  
The President of the Board can tell people that they must attend a conciliation conference. If 
complainants or respondents refuse to attend, the person who refuses to attend can be fined by the courts. 
It is in the interest of both sides to attend the conciliation conference in order to sort out the matter as 
quickly and cheaply as possible instead of having to go to the … Tribunal. 
 
What are the aims of a conciliation conference?  
The aims of a conciliation conference are: to allow both sides to discuss the alleged discrimination and 
the issues around it; to attempt to resolve the complaint; to educate both sides about their rights and 
responsibilities under anti-discrimination law; and to advise respondents on how to prevent 
discrimination in the future.  
 
Who should come to a conciliation conference?  
Complainants should attend the conference themselves. You can ask permission to bring along a support 
person such as a friend or work colleague—you should talk to your complaint handler about this.  
 
Can I bring a lawyer to the conciliation conference? 
You must get permission from the President of the Board if you want to have a lawyer present at a 
conciliation conference. So that you can be prepared, it is best to discuss this with your complaint 
handler when you are notified of the conciliation conference.  If you aren’t allowed to bring a lawyer, you 
should get the advice you need about settling the matter before you attend the conciliation conference so 
that you are ready to discuss a solution on the day of the conference. You can negotiate through your 
lawyer outside the conference itself, but ultimately the President must decide if solicitors can attend the 
conference or not.  
 
What is the complaint handler’s role at the conciliation conference?  
The complaint handler’s role is to:  
*help everyone remain calm and polite; be fair to both sides—the complaint handler is not allowed to 
take sides;  
*ensure that each side can put forward their point of view without being interrupted;  
*make sure the conference deals with the main issues and not irrelevant matters; and  
*assist the complainant and respondent(s) to resolve the complaint in a way that is satisfactory for 
everyone.  
 
Complaint handlers may meet separately with either side at any time during the conference. Either of you 
has the right to ask the complaint handler for a break at any time to help you gather your thoughts and 
consider your position.  
 
Resolving your complaint  
You should bring a proposal for settling your complaint to the conciliation conference … The Board aims 
to resolve the complaint at the conference, but if necessary, both sides can have a period of time after the 
conciliation conference to consider the settlement proposal.  The complaint handler cannot tell either side 
what to settle on. If you have no idea about what would be a fair or reasonable resolution, we can give 
you information about how to get advice on this. Usually when the complaint is finalised there will be a 
deed of release or a conciliation agreement. These documents set out the outcome that both parties have 
agreed to. A deed of release is generally provided by the respondent and is legally binding. A conciliation 
agreement is not legally binding and the Board cannot enforce it, but you can register the agreement with 
the Administrative Decisions Tribunal and have it enforced.  
 
*Excerpt from the ADB Factsheet Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board (2009) 
 
Figure 1.2 The Conciliation Conference 
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In terms of the availability of remedies a complainant can ask for any remedy he or she 
wants because this is not restricted in any way by the AD Act. As well as individual 
remedies such as compensation, reasonable accommodation, apologies, references and 
statements of service, the ADB also notifies complainants that they can ask for remedies 
with potentially broader systemic effects for their workplace, such as a change to a 
workplace policy or process, or the respondent undertaking training.
 111
   
 
As outlined in Figure A1, in Appendix A, in terms of outcomes there are four broad 
potential ‘outcomes’ to a complaint at the ADB. The complaint: 
i. Is not accepted for investigation at lodgement, or declined by the ADB at any 
stage: s 89B;  
ii. Does not proceed because the complaint could not be conciliated, was withdrawn 
or abandoned during the complaint process at the ADB: s 92B-92C;   
iii. Is settled at any stage after lodgement, either at a conciliation conference, prior to 
a conference or post conference, or between the parties: s 92A;   
iv. Is referred to the Tribunal for a hearing in certain circumstances: ss 92(1), 
93A(1)–(2), 93B and 93.  
 
1.4.3 The Deficiencies and Potential of the First Stage for Carers’ Complaints 
 
The deficiencies and critiques of the first stage of the typical discrimination 
enforcement process are well canvassed in the literature and are outlined in Chapter 4 in 
detail.
112
 In particular, there are concerns that the first stage represents second-rate 
justice for complainants, especially if complaint-handling agencies see the goals of 
conciliation as to keep cases out of tribunals, or to resolve disputes as quickly as 
possible.
113
  Neither the processes nor the outcomes of conciliation are open to public 
scrutiny
114
 and consequently, it is argued that conciliation neither empowers others to 
                                                 
111
See ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61, informs complainants of the type of remedies that 
complainants can ask for. Compare with the powers of the Tribunal to order a remedy, which are limited 
to those powers set out under s 108, outlined below at 1.5. 
112
 See Chapter 4, at 4.3 and especially Thornton, Promise, above n 14, ch 5; Hunter and Leonard, 
Working Paper, above n 46; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 15; Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, 
above n 46; Dominique Allen, ‘Behind the Conciliation Doors: Settling Discrimination Complaints in 
Victoria’ (2009) 18(3) Griffith Law Review 778. 
113
 Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 46, 1.  
114
 See generally ibid 1; Thornton, Promise, above n 14, ch 5. 
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complain nor creates precedents for future cases.
115
 There are also concerns that the 
complaint-handling agencies such as the ADB treat the parties as ‘formally equal 
disputants’116 even though there is obviously an ‘inherent inequality between the 
parties’.117 Discrimination agencies have been criticised for doing little to address 
unequal bargaining positions, for staying neutral and impartial, and for providing little 
substantive assistance to the complainant.
118
  
 
Notwithstanding this generally negative assessment of conciliation found in the 
literature, Part V of this thesis provides an empirical review of carers’ complaints 
lodged with the ADB during 2001–2011, and it is argued that the first stage of the 
complaint-handling process has provided an important opportunity for a responsive, free 
and timely mechanism and an alternative dispute-resolution forum for carers’ 
complainants to negotiate a resolution so that they can stay in their jobs.  For example, 
at the lodgement of a complaint, the ADB in effect utilises a ‘triage’119 system to 
allocate and deal with carers’ complaints quickly, particularly if the complainant is 
seeking an accommodation and/or there is a danger that the complainant could lose his 
or her job. It is argued in this thesis that, in particular, timely intervention to achieve an 
accommodation is crucial to avoid the employment relationship being irreparably 
damaged by the dispute.  In addition, as well as individual remedies such as 
compensation, reasonable accommodation, apologies, references and statements of 
service, carers’ complainants to the ADB have achieved remedies with potentially 
broader effects for their workplace, such as a change to a policy or process.
120
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115
 Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 46, 1.  
116
 Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 46, 345; Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47, 9. 
117
 Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 175. See also Astor and Chinkin, above n 93, 262, acknowledging that 
‘[d]iscrimination cases … almost always involve respondents who are more powerful than complainants 
by virtue of status and access to financial and other resources’.  
118
 See especially Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 46.  
119 See Chapters 9 and 10 which explain how the ‘triage’ process operates in practice.  See also 
Charlesworth, Sara, Paula McDonald, Anthea Worley, Tina Graham and Alissa Lykinna, Formal 
Complaints of Workplace Sexual Harassment Lodged with the Australian Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commissions 1 July 2009–31 December 2009 (Centre for Work + Life, University of South 
Australia, 2012) 2, in which it was noted that many of the complaint-handling bodies in Australia had 
moved to a faster ‘triage’ system of complaint handling.   
120
 See Chapters 9 and 10.  
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1.5 The Tribunal and the Second Stage  
 
If a complaint is not resolved at the ADB, it may in certain circumstances
121
 be referred 
to the Tribunal under the AD Act.
122
  In practice, very few carers’ complaints that were 
referred to the Tribunal ever reached a hearing.
123
  In addition, since 2005, if the 
complaint was referred to the Tribunal after it was declined by the ADB under s 92,
124
 
the complainant is required to overcome a preliminary hurdle, of seeking leave of the 
Tribunal under s 96 before a matter can proceed to a hearing. Although this has not been 
relevant in the carers’ decisions heard by the Tribunal, it should be noted that the 
Tribunal has taken a stringent approach and has refused leave in complaints brought on 
other grounds.
125
 
 
During the decade 2001–2011 once a matter was referred for a hearing, the Tribunal 
would first attempt to resolve the matter via voluntary mediation. If this was not 
successful, then, the matter would be heard by a three-member panel, of which one 
member was a lawyer and the other two had specialist knowledge in the relevant area of 
discrimination.
126
 An order or decision of the Tribunal could also be appealed by a party 
to the proceedings to its Appeal Panel, and a number of carers’ cases made during the 
decade did proceed to the Appeal Panel.
127
   
 
                                                 
121
 See ss 92(1), 93A(1)–(2), 93B, 93C. 
122
 Sections 95–114. 
123
 See Section 2.4.4, which sets out what is known about the carers’ complaints that were referred to the 
Tribunal between 2001 and 2011.  
124
 Because, for example, it was frivolous, vexatious or lacked substance. 
125
 In practice, under s 96, a ‘mini-hearing’ in effect takes place where the parties appear before the 
Tribunal to argue the merits of the application in an adversarial manner. The complainant must satisfy the 
Tribunal as to why leave should be granted. See, for example, Xu v Sydney West Area Health Service 
[2006] NSWADT 3. In 2009, the NSW Supreme Court and Court of Appeal considered the application of 
s 96, finding the correct test was a more general one requiring the complainant to show that it is fair and 
just that leave should be granted see Ekermawi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal of NSW [2009] 
NSWSC 143 and Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 
126
 See ADT website: 
http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/adt/ll_adt.nsf/pages/adt_equal_opportunity_division#EOD2  
127
 Under AD Act s 115 now repealed. See Gardiner v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2004] 
NSWADTAP 1 (‘Gardiner No 2’); St Joseph’s Hospital v Correy [2008] NSWADTAP 4 (‘Correy No 
2’); ACE v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2011] NSWADTAP 23 (‘ACE No 
2’).  CAT Act ss 80–1 regulates appeals.   
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Similarly, since January 2014 the new NCAT also actively promotes alternative dispute 
resolution,
128
 and its adjudicative powers under the AD Act remain largely the same as 
those of the ADT.
129
 It hears complaints of discrimination referred to it, a binding 
decision will be made as to whether discrimination has occurred, and an appropriate 
remedy may be ordered. Its practice and procedures in relation to the determination of 
discrimination complaints are now regulated by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
Act 2013 (NSW) (‘CAT Act’).130 Under the NCAT, a single member who is a lawyer 
can now hear cases alone.
131
 The appeals process is now provided for under the CAT 
Act.
132
  
 
Only the Tribunal, like a court, can make a legally binding determination of a 
complaint. From an access-to-justice perspective, the AD Act is generally a no-costs 
jurisdiction, with the general rule that each party is to pay his or her own costs.
133
 
Section 108 of the AD Act does provide for a broad array of remedies,
134
 including 
compensation ‘for any loss suffered by reason of the respondent’s conduct’,135 
injunctive style orders to compel the ‘respondent to perform an act or course of conduct 
to redress the loss or damage suffered by the complainant’136 or to prohibit conduct,137 
orders for apologies and retractions,
138
 and orders to set aside or vary a contract.
139
 In 
                                                 
128
 See s 37 of the CAT Act.  See Chapter 7, at 7.5 considering the policy objectives of the new NCAT 
regime in this regard.  
129
 Certain powers have been transferred to the CAT Act relating to costs, enforcement and right of appeal: 
 Section 110 of the AD Act relating to the power to award costs has been repealed, and is now 
dealt with under s 60 of the CAT Act, which similarly provides that each party will meet its own 
costs.  
 Section 111 of the AD Act has been repealed, which provided for civil penalties when an order of 
the Tribunal was not complied with. This is now covered under the enforcement provisions 
under pt 5 of the CAT Act.  
 Section 115 of the AD Act, now repealed, had provided that in some circumstances a party to a 
complaint could appeal to the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal on a point of law or with leave. 
Instead, the appeals process is provided for under ss 80–1 of the CAT Act. 
130
 The NCAT is also regulated by the Administrative Decisions Review Act (1997) NSW (‘ADR Act’).  
131
 Note that under CAT Act sch 3, the NCAT may consist of one member who is a lawyer, or two or more 
members, one of whom must be a lawyer. 
132
 See CAT Act ss 80–1.  
133
 AD Act s 110; CAT Act s 60; see Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47, 222–32, considering the 
serious negative effects on access to justice for discrimination complainants since the federal 
discrimination jurisdiction moved to a costs jurisdiction in 2000.  
134
 Section 108 has been in operation since the amendments to the AD Act in 2005.  See n 69 above. See 
Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 211–23, and Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 808–37, for an overview of 
typical remedies which have been ordered in discrimination cases in Australia generally.  
135
 AD Act s 108(2)(a). 
136 
Ibid s 108(2)(c). 
137
 Ibid s 108(2)(b). 
138
 Ibid s 108(2)(d). 
139
 Ibid s 108(2)(f). 
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addition, since 2005, an order ‘may extend to conduct of the respondent that affects 
persons other than the complainant or complainants’.140 This provision could provide a 
powerful tool to pursue the policy objectives of the AD Act in relation to systemic or 
structural discrimination. The Tribunal could in theory make orders for an employer to 
remove, or change, discriminatory workplace practices, conditions or policies at the 
workplace, or conceivably across an industry or profession. However, the Tribunal has 
not yet, to date, made an order under this provision in the carers’ cases that have come 
before it, nor on any other ground of discrimination. 
 
Historically, the Tribunal in NSW has awarded low-level compensation in 
discrimination complaints under the AD Act, which is unsurprising, given the very low 
compensation limits capped at $100,000 since 2007.
141
 For the 25 years prior to this, the 
cap had been only $40,000, indicating that law and policy makers did not consider that 
discrimination law wrongs qualified for any substantial financial damages.
 
This 
contrasts with uncapped compensation limits in relation to both the federal 
discrimination jurisdiction and complaints made under the general protection provisions 
of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)(‘FW Act’).142 
 
In spite of the Tribunal’s ‘express legislative commitment to informalism’143 in practice, 
this second stage has become increasingly adversarial and litigious. Echoing the 
critiques in the literature, individual complaints of discrimination are fought in an 
adversarial forum, where the complainant has a high burden to prove the complex and 
often technical elements of discrimination, claims are fiercely resisted by employers, 
and a fundamental power imbalance exists because employers are likely to be better 
resourced than individual employees to run litigation.
144
 Further, the past decade has 
been marked by a period of ‘judicial conservatism’145 from the High Court down across 
Australia, where the discrimination law decisions are characterised by ‘narrow and 
                                                 
140
 Ibid s 108(3). See n 69 above 
141
 Ibid s 108(2). 
142
 See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 819 in relation to the federal jurisdiction; and at 880-82 in 
relation to the FW Act. However, note that the federal discrimination jurisdiction is a cost jurisdiction. See 
generally Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47, 220-32 in relation to the negative effects of the costs 
implications for complainants in terms of access to justice.  
143 
Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 174; Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47. 
144
 See generally Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47, 9; Allen, Burden, above n 45. 
145
 Jill Murray, ‘Work and Care: New Legal Mechanisms for Adaptation’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and 
Industry 67, 74 (‘Work and Care’).  See the literature review at 4.3. 
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conservative interpretations’ while ‘sidestepping the underlying human rights issues’ 
raised in the complaints of discrimination.
146
  Part IV of this thesis examines these 
themes and presents a detailed analysis of the carers’ cases that came before the 
Tribunal under the AD Act.  
 
Although the ADB has reported that more than 550 carers’ discrimination complaints 
were lodged at the ADB during its first decade of operation, between 2001 and 2011,
147
 
only 12 carers’ complaints reached a hearing.148 Only two complaints in the entire 
decade—Reddy v International Cargo Express and Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group—
were upheld.
149
 In both complaints, the women lost the jobs they had held for more than 
five years after their requests for part-time work were denied after a return from 
maternity leave. In only one of these, Reddy, did the complainant receive a remedy for 
carers’ responsibility discrimination, by way of compensation (in the sum of 
$16,385).
150
 Therefore, even if the complainant can overcome the adversarial litigious 
process and the significant evidentiary burdens of proving discrimination to the 
satisfaction of the Tribunal, financial compensation is the most likely remedy. Any 
award of damages is likely to be inadequate given the nature of the loss suffered by the 
complainant, and because, as noted above, historically, and generally, awards of 
damages are low in the AD Act jurisdiction.  
 
The litigious process can be costly, is slow,
151
 and obviously the adversarial focus is not 
conducive to maintaining the employment relationship. The Tribunal has never made an 
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 Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15, 203. See also Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 15; Margaret Thornton, 
‘Disabling Discrimination Legislation: The High Court and Judicial Activism’ (2009) 15 Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 1; Adams, ‘Defining’, above n 15, 19, for her pessimistic assessment of Amery 
(2006) 230 CLR 174. 
147
 See Table 2.2 in Chapter 2, which provides a statistical breakdown of carers’ complaints lodged with 
the ADB as reported in its annual reports for the period 2000–01 to 2010–11. 
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 See Part IV of this thesis. In particular, Table B, in Appendix B, provides a summary of cases heard by 
the Tribunal, as well as an analysis of key decisions. 
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 Reddy v International Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218 (‘Reddy’) and Tleyji v The Travelspirit 
Group [2005] NSWADT 294 (‘Tleyji’). 
150
 Ms Reddy received $15,000 general damages and $1385 for lost income: Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 
[93]–[103]. Ms Tleyji received damages of $5000 for general damages for race discrimination but nothing 
for her carers’ complaint, seemingly because her legal representatives had not claimed a remedy for the 
carers’ component of the complaint: Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [138]–[142]. For a critique of the 
Tribunal’s approach to the quantification of damages in Reddy and Tleyji, see Chapter 7.2.  Note that in 
two cases—Spencer v Greater Murray Area Health Service [2005] NSWADT 138 (‘Spencer’) and 
Monroe v Moore [2010] NSWADT 179 (‘Monroe’)—the complainants were awarded damages for 
victimisation even though the primary carers’ discrimination complaint was dismissed. 
151
 See Chapter 7, at 7.2.1.1 which analyses the duration of the carers’ decisions at the Tribunal, where 
complaints are often heard years after the alleged discriminatory conduct. 
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order that a worker’s caring responsibilities should be accommodated—largely because 
it dismissed 10 out of 12 complaints and it appears that, other than in the case of 
Gardiner v New South Wales WorkCover Authority,
152
 accommodation was never 
sought as an option by a complainant. Most complainants had generally left 
employment and were not seeking reinstatement.
153
 This probably reflects the fact that 
by the time a complaint reaches a hearing, the employment relationship will probably 
already be irreparably damaged, and accommodation is probably neither desired by the 
complainant nor a realistic option.  
 
Further, although the AD Act is generally a no-costs jurisdiction which provides some 
protection for complainants from being ordered to pay a respondent’s costs,154 as a 
result of this increasing adversarialism, the complexity of the legislation and the fact 
that employers are generally legally represented,
155
 many complainants also opt for 
legal representation that may be financially costly to them.
156
 The carers’ cases 
discussed in Part IV of this thesis illustrate that, far from encountering a relatively 
informal and timely process, to reduce adversarialism,
157
 a complainant proceeding to 
the Tribunal is likely to become embroiled in complex and perhaps lengthy litigation 
against a well-resourced employer.  
 
                                                 
152
 [2003] NSWADT 184 (‘Gardiner No 1’). 
153
 In the majority of complaints, nine out of 12 cases, it was clear that the complainant was a former 
employee who was not seeking reinstatement. It appears that in Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184, the 
complainant was still employed at the time of the proceedings and was seeking an accommodation. It was 
not clear whether the complainants in Dubow v Attorney-General’s Department [2005] NSWADT 231 
(‘Dubow’) and Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 were still employed by the time of the hearing or whether 
they were seeking accommodation.  
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 AD Act s 110; CAT Act s 60; Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 848–55; Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, 
above n 47, 222–32; Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 220–2. 
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 In relation to the 12 carers’ complaints heard at the Tribunal, in five complaints, the complainants did 
not have legal representation: Stokes v Serco Sodexho Defence Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWADT 295 
(‘Stokes’); Merrick v Wallace Bishop Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADT 89 (‘Merrick’); Dubow [2005] NSWADT 
231; Chacon v Rondo Building Services Pty Ltd [2011] NSWADT 72 (‘Chacon’); Harms v Sydney South 
West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 183 (‘Harms’). In contrast, in only one complaint, Monroe 
[2010] NSWADT 179, was the employer respondent self-represented. In 11 out of the 12 cases, the 
respondent had legal representation, most often involving representation by both a barrister and solicitor.  
The issue of legal representation in these cases is discussed further in Chapter 7.  See also Gaze and 
Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47, xxvii, 9 noting that it has become usual to have lawyers and barristers 
representing  
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 Ronalds, a senior barrister practising in this area, noted that it is not unusual for the legal costs 
associated with a case to exceed greatly any award of damages, and ‘legal costs of $80,000 for a damages 
award of $15,000 are not unusual’: Chris Ronalds, Discrimination Law and Practice (Federation Press, 
3
rd
 ed, 2008) 220. 
157
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 47, 9.  
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1.6 The Legal and Policy Context: Law Reform to Enactment158 
 
The LRC was asked to review the AD Act by the NSW Attorney-General in 1991. The 
review took eight years and culminated in the LRC Report.
159
 The report recommended 
a complete substantive and procedural overhaul, and the enactment of a new anti-
discrimination Act.
 
 It also recommended that a new ground of carers’ responsibilities 
be included in the new Act to give effect to Australia’s international law obligations 
under ILO Convention 156 Convention Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal 
Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 1981 
(‘ILO Convention 156’).160 The ground of carers’ responsibility discrimination would 
apply in the area of work, and would broadly cover responsibilities to provide care and 
support, either for family members or for non-family members when a significant 
personal relationship existed.
161
 Of particular note, marking a departure from the 
traditional duty of restraint framework, the LRC pre-empted the positive duties of 
reasonable accommodation and reasonable adjustment found in later discrimination 
legislation in other Australian jurisdictions.
162
 It recommended that the new ground also 
include an express obligation on the part of the employer to ‘take reasonable steps to 
accommodate’ an employee’s caring responsibilities subject to a defence of 
unjustifiable hardship.
163 
Such ‘reasonable steps’ could include changes to working 
conditions or practices, and the provision of special services or facilities.
164
 The 
employer would have the burden of proving that it had taken ‘reasonable steps’.165 
 
In order to reduce the conflict between work and family, the LRC identified a number of 
complementary and interdependent key social policy and equality objectives of the 
proposed legislation aimed at achieving substantive equality for workers with caring 
                                                 
158
 Part III of this thesis considers the legal and policy background and impetus for the enactment of Part 
4B.  
159
 LRC Report, above n 12. The report also included a proposed Draft Bill (‘LRC Draft Bill’) at 789–
876. 
160
 See above n 12. 
161
 The LRC Draft Bill ss 17–19 defines caring and family responsibilities. 
162
 See above n 28, referring to ss 17, 19 of the Victorian EO Act and ss 4, 11 of the DD Act.  
163
 LRC Report, above n12, 305 [5.212]. The LRC recommended that an obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation be imposed in relation to the grounds of disability, pregnancy, breastfeeding and carer 
responsibilities, subject to a defence of unjustifiable hardship. See at xxv, 297–308, Recommendation 8 at 
108 and Recommendation 40 at 308. 
164
 Draft Bill s 25 defines ‘reasonable steps’. 
165
 See ibid ss 14, 17–19, 25. 
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responsibilities.
166
 They included: enabling all worker–carers, regardless of gender, to 
better balance work and care; gender equality in terms of a more equitable sharing of 
the burden of paid and unpaid work responsibilities; and third, enabling men and 
women to accommodate their caring responsibilities at work without disadvantage, via 
an express legislative duty of reasonable accommodation on employers.
167
 The LRC 
was firm in its belief that the new ‘ground will have little effect in practice if it does not 
include an obligation to make reasonable accommodation … to achieve the underlying 
social policy’.168 A duty of reasonable accommodation was therefore intended as both a 
key policy objective and a legislative strategy to achieve work–life balance and greater 
substantive equality.
169
 A more detailed discussion of the policy objectives 
underpinning Part 4B and whether the legislative provisions that were enacted give 
effect to them is considered in Part III of this thesis. 
 
The complete overhaul of the AD Act recommended by the LRC never happened; 
instead, Part 4B in its current form was enacted.
170
 In introducing the legislation, the 
NSW Government acknowledged the importance of both the LRC recommendations, 
and Australia’s international commitments under the ILO Convention and the intention 
that Part 4B should give effect to both. Attorney-General Shaw considered that the 
legislation imposes an obligation on employers to accommodate employees’ caring 
responsibilities, and to ensure that employers proactively consider whether existing or 
new workplace policies have a discriminatory impact on employees with caring 
responsibilities.
171
  However, crucially, the express positive duty of accommodation was 
omitted and essentially the carers’ provisions, like all of the other grounds under the AD 
Act, are framed in the traditional terms of a prohibition on direct and indirect 
discriminatory conduct with the complainant having the burden of proving 
discrimination.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
166
 LRC Report, above n 12, 301 [5.201]. 
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 Ibid 297–8 [5.185]–[5.188]. 
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 Ibid 305 [5.212]. 
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 Ibid. 
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 The reasons why the LRC recommendations were not acted upon are considered further in Part III.  
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 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw). 
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1.7 The Substantive Carers’ Provisions under Part 4B 
 
Five key elements of the substantive provisions under Part 4B are now considered: first, 
the definition of caring responsibilities; second, the types of workplace relationships and 
conduct covered; third, the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination; fourth, the 
specific defences and exceptions under Part 4B; and, fifth, whether in the absence of an 
express duty of reasonable accommodation, such a duty can be implied.  
 
In addition, the Tribunal and ADB approaches to the interpretation and application of 
Part 4B  and in particular, to the application of direct and indirect discrimination, and 
the operation of an implied duty of reasonable accommodation– are also flagged. 
Although the ADB complaint process represents the first stage of the enforcement 
regime under the AD Act, how the Tribunal interpreted and applied the law is often 
considered first in this thesis. This is because of the realist ‘law in action’ theoretical 
approach to the research. This theoretical approach is explained in detail in Chapter 2.
172
 
It aims to move beyond black-letter court and tribunal determinations, such as those of 
the Tribunal, to see how the law works ‘in action’, but which, as a starting point, 
requires this analysis to be undertaken. 
 
Finally, other statutory provisions under the AD Act that may be relevant to complaints 
of carers’ discrimination, such as victimisation, are also outlined. 
 
1.7.1 A Family Member ‘in Need of Care or Support’ 
 
Carers’ responsibilities are defined under s 49S of the AD Act and are limited to caring 
for certain specified family members or relatives who are in need of ‘care or support’.  
In practice, the Tribunal has noted that existence of a caring responsibility is a threshold 
issue and the provisions under Part 4B are only ‘enlivened where the alleged victim has 
responsibilities as a carer’.173 Section 49 defines the relationships as: 
                                                 
172
 Chapter 2, at 2.4 
173
 ACE v State of NSW (TAFE Commission and Department of Education and Training) [2010] 
NSWADT 180 [206] (‘ACE No 1’).  
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 a child (whether or not over 18 years), including a stepchild, adopted child, 
foster child or any child for whom a person has legal responsibility (for example, 
as a legal guardian or authorised carer); 
 a child of a current or former spouse, including a stepchild, adopted child, foster 
child and any child for whom a person has legal responsibility; 
 any child or adult for whom a person is a legal guardian, has parental 
responsibility, or is an ‘authorised carer’, as defined under the relevant 
legislation; 
 an ‘immediate family member’ who is: 
o a current or former spouse (‘spouse’ refers to a husband, wife or partner in a 
de facto relationship, including same-sex relationships). Note that at the 
enactment of Part 4B spouse was defined as a husband or wife or a de facto 
partner but it was not until in 2009 that the AD Act was amended so that the 
meaning of de facto included same sex relationships.  
o a grandchild or grandchild of a current or former spouse (this can include a 
step-grandchild or grandchild through adoption, fostering or other legal 
arrangement); 
o a parent or parent of a former spouse (this can include a step-parent or parent 
through adoption, fostering or any other legal arrangement); 
o a grandparent or grandparent of a former spouse (this can include a step-
grandparent, or grandparent through adoption, fostering or any other legal 
arrangement); 
o a brother or sister, or brother or sister of a current or former spouse (this can 
include a step-brother or step-sister, or a brother or sister through adoption, 
fostering or any other legal arrangement). 
 
Although the relationships covered are expansive, the legislation does not cover caring 
responsibilities for other family members such as uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews or 
cousins, or persons outside the family or domestic relationships, for example, a friend, 
fellow occupant of a flat or house, or neighbour. Nor does it cover other kinship 
relationships found in Indigenous or other communities.
174
 This is in contrast to the 
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 As highlighted in ADB, Balancing the Act: A Submission to the NSW Law Reform Commission’s 
Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 NSW (1994) 152. 
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broad definition of caring responsibilities recommended by the LRC
175 
 and also with 
other legislative approaches in Australia.
176
 
 
In addition, once the family nexus has been met, s 49S also provides that the 
complainant must be able to demonstrate that the identified family member is ‘in need 
of care or support’. This term is not defined,177 but the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel 
have taken a broad view of the meaning of this term, finding that the phrase is a general 
one and should be given a broad interpretation in keeping with the human rights 
purposes of the provision and noting that ‘there is no basis … for confining the 
responsibilities to care for or support another person to particular categories of care such 
as dropping off, picking up or attending a person who is sick’.178 The care need not be 
provided, or required, on a full-time basis and can cover emotional as well as physical 
support.
179
 The Tribunal has also tended to reject any arguments from respondents about 
the manner in which the complainant chooses to provide the care, for example, as to 
whether commercial or other caring options are available.
180
 In only one case out of the 
12 was it found that a caring responsibility did not exist on the facts.
181
  
 
The ADB has recognised that there will be many worker–carers with caring 
responsibilities not covered under s 49S, and has suggested the possibility of complaints 
on other grounds of discrimination such as sex.
182 
This is, in fact, how carers’ 
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 See LRC Report above n 12, 297–309 [5.185]–[5.220].  
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 See for example, that while the s4A, of the SD Act also limits protection to certain ‘immediate family 
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 See Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [34]–[39]; see also ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [46]. 
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 ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [46]. 
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[2005] NSWADT 138 [45]. 
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[205]–[207], it was found by the Tribunal that the complainant on the facts did not have a responsibility 
to provide care or support for her elderly parents. It should be noted in this case that the credit of the 
complainant was a serious issue in relation to her evidence as a whole: at [37].  
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 See ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 31. The ADB also suggested to employers that they 
may find it ‘easier, legally safer and indeed fairer to all your employees to make your carers’ 
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discrimination type complaints were often framed prior to the enactment of Part 4B.
183
 
For example, female workers could bring a complaint on the ground of sex 
discrimination
184
 if it could be demonstrated that caring was a characteristic or an 
attribute pertaining to women. Some of the carers’ complaints from women heard by the 
Tribunal in the period 2001–2011 were also made, in the alternative, on the ground of 
sex, and the Tribunal has accepted as a matter of common knowledge that ‘having 
responsibilities as a carer is a characteristic that appertains generally to women or a 
characteristic that is generally imputed to them’.185 However, there are a number of 
problems with the sex discrimination route. First, male workers may not be provided 
with any protection. Second, it has been argued that legislative protections applying to 
women alone risk representing the issue as one of women’s disadvantage,186 which can 
have the effect of entrenching the gendered caring roles in society rather than leading to 
changes for both men and women.
187
 Part 4B was enacted with the express intention to 
provide protection for men and women, in the interests of gender equality.  For 
example, unlike the protection provided under the SD Act during the period up until 
2011, Part 4B was intended to provide protection for all worker–carers, depending upon 
the nature of the caring responsibility, and not the gender of the carers.
188
 Alternatively, 
                                                                                                                                               
responsibilities policies work for any employee who has the care and responsibility for or support of 
another person so long as you have some evidence of that responsibility’: 21. 
183 
Unfortunately, the ADB was unable to provide any data as to the frequency of carers-related 
complaints lodged on other grounds either prior to or since the enactment of Part 4B. The empirical 
research of carers’ complaints made to the ADB (which is the subject of Part V of this thesis) highlighted 
that only one complaint was declined by the ADB during the decade 2001–2011 because the caring 
relationship did not come within s 49S, relating to a nephew caring for an aunt. However, this does not 
mean that other complaints relating to responsibilities not covered under s 49S were not made on other 
grounds, such as age and disability. 
184 
For example, see the long-running saga of Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174, which predated the enactment 
of Part 4B, and was brought under the sex discrimination provisions under s 24 of the AD Act and in 
which issues related to family responsibilities were also raised. For a summary of the case, see Adams, 
‘Defining’, above n 15. 
185
 Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [73].Chapman noted that the Tribunal, in Spencer, expanded ‘the 
characteristic extension principle beyond its more familiar territory of pregnancy and women’s role in 
caring for infants and babies’: Chapman, Working Paper, above n 15, 27. 
186 
Chapman, Working Paper, above n 15, 27–31considers the operation of the family responsibilities 
provisions under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), which until 2011 was limited in its scope to 
women and direct discrimination complaints relating to dismissal. 
187
 See Fredman, Human Rights, above n 16, 190. However, in contrast, Charlesworth has expressed 
concern that the focus on parental and carer status can work to hide the gendered underpinnings of 
workers with ‘family responsibilities’ where primary caring responsibilities are overwhelmingly 
undertaken by women: Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 15, 113–14. 
188
 Above n 35. See also New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 
5019 (J W Shaw) and LRC Report (1999) above n 12,  299 [5.188]; Juliet Bourke, ‘Using the Law to 
Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian Experience’ (2004) 12 American Journal of Society and the 
Law 19, 67 noted that a particular strength of Part 4B is its focus on discrimination against carers rather 
than a blurred focus through indirect sex discrimination provisions.   
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a complaint involving caring responsibilities not covered under s 49S, open to both 
women and men, can also be brought in a much more circuitous way on the basis of 
association, on the ground of disability or age, if, for example, the person being cared 
for had a disability or was a child or an older person.
189
  
 
1.7.2 Discriminatory Conduct and Working Relationships  
 
Courts and tribunals in Australia, including the Tribunal, have generally taken an 
expansive approach to the nature of workplace conduct covered under discrimination 
legislation and generally it is unlawful to deny a benefit or subject a person to a 
detriment at work because of his or her caring responsibilities.
190
  Part 4B also covers a 
very broad array of work and employment relationships.
191
 Employment in private 
households and small businesses (defined as having a total of five or fewer employees) 
are the only workplaces specifically exempt from the legislation.
192
 However, in 
practice, 89% of the carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB in the first decade of the 
operation of the legislation related to job applicants, or current or former employees, the 
vast majority of whom worked in permanent or ongoing employment
193
 and all 12 
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 See, for example, the association provisions under s 49ZYA(1) for age and s 49B(1) for disability. In 
French v Gosford City Council [2003] NSWADT 273, a complaint that predated Part 4B was brought on 
the grounds of age discrimination and sex. 
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 Section 49V(1) relates to applications for employment and provides that it is unlawful for an employer 
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detriment.  See the Tribunal’s beneficial approach in Correy v St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd [2007] NSWADT 
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1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [40]–[45].  
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 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 455–67 noting that discrimination legislation covers a 
very broad array of working relationships. The other provisions relating to other workplace relationships 
under Part 4B are set out at ss 49W–49ZC are not considered in any detail here, because very few 
complaints are actually made arising out of these situations. The additional provisions cover principals 
against potential or existing commission agents (s 49W); principals against contract workers or 
independent contractors (s 49X); partners in firms of six or more against potential or existing partners (s 
49Y); and local government councillors, or councils against councillors (s 49Z). Further, the Part 4B 
prohibits discrimination in relation to other organisations and their activities associated with work: trade 
unions against potential and existing members relating to membership and access to the benefits of the 
organisation (s 49ZA); employment agents against people seeking their employment services in relation 
to the provision of their services to a person (s 49ZC); and, finally, qualifying bodies that provide 
authorisations or permits to work in a profession or trade (s 49ZB). 
192
 Section 49V(3). 
193
 See Chapter 9, and Figure 9.3.  The empirical data demonstrates that at least 463 complaints (89%) 
came directly under s49V of the AD Act which relates to ‘discrimination against applicants and 
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carers’ complaints heard at the Tribunal related to common law employer/employee 
relationships. For this reason, the terminology employee/complainant/worker–carer and 
employer/respondent is used interchangeably throughout this work when discussing 
parties to complaints made under Part 4B. 
 
It should be noted that a particular strength of workplace discrimination laws that, 
unlike actions or rights under labour laws, Part 4B applies to a very broad array of work 
relationships, regardless of whether the complainant is working in a permanent, casual, 
or full or part-time position; there is no qualifying period of service, and the 
complainant will have 12 months to bring a complaint.
194
 In contrast, labour law 
protections such as those found under the FW Act are limited to the extent that they 
often contain strict eligibility and qualifying requirements as to the nature and 
continuity of employment, and shorter time limits in which to bring an action.
195
 As 
Charlesworth has noted, such eligibility requirements are gendered in their effect 
because they serve to exclude worker–carers and particularly women from industrial 
protections, since women are more likely to take breaks from work and are often 
engaged in casual or precarious work to accommodate their family responsibilities.
196
 
Further, the FW Act, under Division 3, does not generally cover workers in the public 
sector in NSW.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
employees.’ Only nine complaints could be identified as relating to other workplace relationships 
provided for under Part 4B. In the rest the relationship could not be identified. See also Chapter 9 at 9.2.3 
where it is reported that in practice the majority of complaints are lodged by ‘standard’ permanent 
employees, and casual or non-ongoing employees lodge few complaints. 
194
 Section 89B. 
195
 Compare, for example, the eligibility requirements for the right to request (RTR) provisions under s 65 
of the FW Act; or the unfair dismissal eligibility requirements under ss 382–4; or adverse action/general 
protections under pt 3.1. For an overview of the operation of the FW Act see Ronalds and Raper, above n 
2, ch 15;  Rees Rice and Allen, above n 2, ch 14; and Carol Andrades, ‘Intersections between “General 
Protections” Under the Fair Work Act (Cth) and Anti-Discrimination Law: Questions, Quirks and 
Quandaries’ (Working Paper No 47, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law 
School, University of Melbourne, 2009). Ronalds and Raper also summarise the key factors affecting 
choice of jurisdiction: Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 233–7. See also Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 15, 
who also considers the different options available in the industrial and discrimination jurisdictions. But 
see no 193 above, the majority of complaints to the ADB came from permanent or ongoing employees. 
196
 Charlesworth has argued that such eligibility requirements in fact reflect the dominance of the male-
breadwinner model evident in the industrial sphere in the provisions of the FW Act: Charlesworth, Sara, 
‘The Sex Discrimination Act: Advancing Gender Equality and Decent Work’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), 
Sex Discrimination in Uncertain Times (ANU E Book, 2010) 133, 140.  
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1.7.3 Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
 
Following the standard format noted above, Part 4B provides that it is unlawful to 
discriminate against a person, either directly or indirectly, on the ground of his or her 
caring responsibilities. Section 49T of the AD Act provides: 
(1) A person (the perpetrator) discriminates against another person (the 
aggrieved person) on the ground of the aggrieved person’s responsibilities 
as a carer if, on the ground of the aggrieved person having responsibilities 
as a carer, the perpetrator:  
(a) treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same 
circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, 
the perpetrator treats or would treat a person who does not have those 
responsibilities, or  
(b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition 
with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have 
such responsibilities comply or are able to comply, being a requirement 
that is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case and 
with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply.  
 
The complainant is required to prove every element of the relevant statutory definition 
of direct and/or indirect discrimination.
 197
 The elements that must be proven in relation 
to the two types of discrimination are very different, but both are complex and have 
proven extremely problematic for the complainant.
 198
  As well as law reform options to 
alleviate this complexity of the provision, many commentators have repeatedly 
suggested that the burden of proving discrimination should be shifted.
199
 
 
1.7.3.1 Categorising Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
 
Before turning to the provisions under s 49T, it is worth noting that the demarcation of 
conduct, as amounting to direct or indirect discrimination in practice, is often blurred. 
Different aspects of the factual circumstances surrounding the relevant workplace 
conduct can sometimes be categorised as potentially amounting to both direct and 
indirect discrimination, which will also mean a double evidentiary burden if the matter 
proceeds to a hearing. 
 
                                                 
197
 See, for example, Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15, 203; Smith and Allen, above n 2, 4. 
198
 See, for example, Allen, ‘Burden’, above n 45; Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 70, 146–59; Smith 
and Allen, above n 2, 35–6. 
199
 See, for example, Hunter, Indirect, above n 14, 191–2; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 15, 
37; Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15, 211–12, comparing the FW Act general protections under s 351. 
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In Chapter 9 it is noted that the ADB does not routinely code complaints or maintain 
complaints data as to whether conduct alleged in a complaint would amount to direct or 
indirect discrimination, and as noted above, it is not necessary for complainants to 
particularise their complaints in this way. However, the empirical analysis of the carers’ 
complaints lodged at the ADB —outlined in Chapter 9—demonstrates that the factual 
circumstances of many complaints could amount to both direct and indirect 
discrimination. Typically, complaints that were lodged relating to an inability to comply 
with an unreasonable condition or requirement relating to the hours and location of 
work and/or a denial of flexibility, such as a requirement to work full-time, or a denial 
of leave could amount to indirect discrimination. Complaints which could amount to 
direct discrimination often related to situations in which the worker–carer was treated 
less favourably than other workers in relation to for example, recruitment; subjecting 
the complainant to harassment or a hostile working environment; denying access to 
leave, or to workplace benefits such as overtime, a bonus or a company car; or 
termination (whether by way of an actual termination, resignation which often could 
amount to constructive dismissal or redundancy). Many complaints that related to 
termination were very often preceded, if not precipitated, by a workplace dispute 
relating to a denial of flexibility or a related issue that could also amount to indirect 
discrimination, on the basis of an unreasonable condition or requirement.  
 
The complaints heard by the Tribunal also illustrate the blurred lines between conduct 
that may amount to direct and indirect discrimination.
200
 Out of 12 carers’ complaints 
heard, two related to direct discrimination only,
201
 three related to indirect 
discrimination only,
202
 six alleged both direct and indirect discrimination, and in one 
complaint, it was not altogether clear to what the allegations referred.
203
 Therefore, 
eight complaints involved allegations of direct discrimination and nine complaints 
involved allegations of indirect discrimination.  All complaints relating to direct carers’ 
                                                 
200
 Table B, in Appendix B, summarises the grounds and nature of the alleged discriminatory conduct in 
relation to each of the 12 carers’ complaints heard by the Tribunal. 
201
 Only two complaints were brought solely on the ground of direct carers’ discrimination: Correy No 1 
[2007] NSWADT 104 and Merrick [2008] NSWADT 89.  
202
 Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184, Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218, Chacon [2011] NSWADT 72. 
203
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294, Spencer[2005] NSWADT 138, Dubow [2005] NSWADT 231, Stokes 
[2006] NSWADT 295, ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 and Harms [2010] NSWADT 183. In an 
additional case, Monroe [2010] NSWADT 179, it was not clear whether the allegations of carers’ 
discrimination related to direct or indirect discrimination.  
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discrimination were dismissed by the Tribunal.
204
  Both Reddy,
205
 in 2004, and Tleyji,
206
 
in 2005 were upheld on the grounds of indirect discrimination. Part IV of this thesis 
considers the approach of the Tribunal in more detail, but aspects of the decisions are 
noted here briefly. 
 
1.7.3.2 Section 49T(1)(a) Direct Discrimination  
 
In interpreting s 49T(1)(a), the Tribunal has followed the test set out by the High Court 
in Purvis
207
 that two elements must be proven.
208
 The first is differential treatment—that 
the complainant was treated less favourably than a person without the protected attribute 
was, in the same or similar circumstances. This requires the complainant to identify an 
actual or a hypothetical comparator,
209
 and ‘all of the objective features or 
circumstances’ attending the treatment given to the complainant.210 The second element 
is causation—that the reason for the less favourable treatment was the person’s status as 
a carer.
211
 Although it is not necessary to prove any discriminatory intent or motivation 
on the part of the discriminator, the complainant must demonstrate some causal 
connection between the conduct and the prohibited ground of discrimination, which 
may in practice require that the complainant produces evidence about the respondent’s 
state of mind. It has been noted that requiring the complainant to prove the respondent’s 
reasons for a decision or his or her state of mind can be very difficult.
212
  
 
While direct discrimination protections may still be of use in circumstances involving 
overt discrimination or stereotyping, for example in relation to an overtly discriminatory 
term in a job advert, generally since Purvis proving direct discrimination will be very 
                                                 
204
 See Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104, in which the complaint of direct discrimination was upheld, 
but was overturned on appeal in Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4. The four Correy decisions are 
analysed in detail in Chapter 6. 
205
 [2004] NSWADT 218. 
206
 [2005] NSWADT 294. Note that the allegations of direct carers’ discrimination in Tleyji were 
dismissed. 
207 
(2003) 217 CLR 92. For a discussion of the case and its implications, see Smith, Purvis, above n 15. 
208
 See, for example, the Tribunal and Appeal Panel’s application of the direct discrimination provisions 
in in Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [89]–[100]; Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [38]–[43], 
[54]–[55]; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [213]–[219]; ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [52]–[69]; 
Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [99]. 
209
 See, for example, Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 and Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4, in 
which it was necessary to identify and formulate the criteria surrounding the hypothetical comparator. 
210
 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92 [160]–[161], as followed by the Appeal Panel in Correy No 2 [2008] 
NSWADTAP 4 [38]–[39]. 
211
 Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [44]–[55]. 
212
 Allen, ‘Burden’, above n 45, 582–3; Thornton, Promise, above n 14, 180. 
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difficult for complainants. The fact that all of the direct discrimination complaints heard 
by the Tribunal were dismissed indicates that proving the two elements is, and will 
continue to be, a daunting task for complainants.  
 
1.7.3.3 Section 49T(1)(b) Indirect Discrimination  
 
A complainant must prove four elements: 
(i) A requirement or condition exists. 
(ii) Disparate impact—that a ‘substantially higher proportion’ of people 
without carers’ responsibilities can comply with the requirement or 
condition—exists. 
(iii)The complainant is unable to comply with the condition. 
(iv) The condition or requirement is not reasonable having regard to the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
Unlike other jurisdictions in Australia, in NSW the complainant has the burden of proof 
in relation to all four elements, including reasonableness.
213
 In practice, the first and 
third elements caused the least difficulty for the carers’ complainants at the Tribunal. 
The second element of substantial disparate impact, often requiring a statistical analysis 
of an actual or hypothetical workplace, has been extremely problematic for carers’ 
complainants.
214
 The academic literature has also often stressed that the element of 
reasonableness will also cause difficulty for complainants, because business concerns 
and managerial prerogative will often trump the human rights of employees
215
 and cases 
such as Gardiner No 1,
216
 Reddy
217
 and Tleyji
218
 did turn on the issue of whether the 
condition or requirement was reasonable. 
 
 
                                                 
213
 See, for example, s 7C of the SD Act (Cth ) and s 9(2) of the EO Act (Vic). 
214
 See generally Chapter 6, at 6.3.5 – 6.3.6.  See ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241], Stokes 
[2006] NSWADT 295 [75]–[77], Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [60]–[69] and Chacon [2011] NSWADT 
72 [147], in which the complaints failed to demonstrate a disparate impact. See also Tleyji [2005] 
NSWADT 294 [79]–[89], in which the complainant was unable to demonstrate disparate impact but was 
saved by the Tribunal, when it exercised judicial notice on the facts, going on to find that the condition to 
work full-time was unreasonable. 
215
 See, for example, Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 15, 58; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 15. 
216
 [2003] NSWADT 184. 
217
 [2004] NSWADT 218. 
218
 [2005] NSWADT 294. 
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(i) A requirement or condition exists.  
 
Work and family cases often relate to a requirement to work full-time (particularly in 
relation to maternity-related complainants who are seeking to return to part-time 
work)
219
 or to comply with shifts, or rostering
220
 or to work at a specific location.
221
 
While the Tribunal has noted that the condition or requirement must be identified with 
particularity by the complainant, it has otherwise rejected overly technical arguments 
from respondents.
222
 Although this element may appear to be the most straightforward 
of the four elements, the High Court in Amery took a very narrow view of this element 
of the test which may potentially cause problems for complainants in the future.
223
 
 
(ii) A substantial disparate impact exists. 
 
The complainant must prove that the condition or requirement results in a disparate 
impact, whereby a substantially higher proportion of people without the protected 
attribute do comply, or are able to comply, with the condition. There are three potential 
ways this element could be proven. First, a statistical approach which involves adducing 
evidence of the actual or a hypothetical workplace. The complainant has the burden of 
identifying and making a comparative assessment of two ‘status’ groups or ‘pools’ of, 
first, those workers with and, second, those without caring responsibilities. The make-
up of the pools and the difficulties for complainants in making this comparative 
assessment to show a ‘substantial’ disparate impact will obviously vary according to the 
particular workplace context.
224
 While the Tribunal has readily acknowledged the 
difficulties of proof for complainants in relation to this element
225
 at the same time, it 
                                                 
219
 See, for example, Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 and Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294, which were both 
maternity related. 
220
 See, for example, Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104; Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4; Correy v 
St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd [2009] NSWADT 40 (‘Correy No 3’); St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd v Correy [2009] 
NSWADTAP 58 (‘Correy No 4’); Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138; Harms [2010] NSWADT 183; Chacon 
[2011] NSWADT 72. 
221
 See, for example, Dubow [2005] NSWADT 231.  
222
 See, for example, Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [47]–[55]. However, see also Chacon [2011] 
NSWADT 72 [141]–[147], in which the Tribunal found on the facts that there was in fact no requirement 
that Ms Chacon start and finish work at the times she had stated. In ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 
[25], it was found that there was in fact no requirement to work full-time.  
223
 See Chapter 4, at 4.2.3 for a discussion of Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174; See Adams, ‘Defining’, above 
n 15, for a discussion of the case.  
224
 See, for example, Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [66]; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [77]–[89]; Stokes 
[2006] NSWADT 295 [75]–[77]; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241]. 
225
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [74]–[78]. 
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has maintained a strict insistence that the complainant properly discharge the burden of 
proof in relation to it. It has also often been unwilling to make inferences in relation to 
disparate impact that might assist complainants.
226
  
 
Second, disparate impact may also be proved by adducing non-statistical evidence, such 
as historical, psychological or other proof of the effect of a condition or requirement on 
the particular pool or group.
227
 Third, ‘when a court or tribunal considers a matter to be 
so well-known that it does not require proof of its existence it is said to take “judicial 
notice” of that fact or matter’.228 For example, in Tleyji, 229 the Tribunal was willing to 
apply judicial notice of the fact that a substantially higher proportion of persons without 
responsibilities for infant children can or do comply with the requirement to work full-
time.
230
 
 
(c) The complainant is unable to comply with the condition. 
 
In common with other jurisdictions, the Tribunal has taken a beneficial approach to this 
element, confirming that ‘compliance with a requirement is the ability to comply in a 
practical sense rather than a theoretical ability to comply’.231 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 
See ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241]; Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [75]–[77]; Spencer 
[2005] NSWADT 138 [60]–[69]; Chacon [2011] NSWADT 72 [147]. See also Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 
294 [79]–[89], in which the complainant was unable to demonstrate disparate impact but was saved by the 
intervention of the Tribunal, which exercised judicial notice. 
227
 Hunter, Indirect, above n 14, 223–4. 
228
 Ibid 219.  
229
 See Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [77]–[89]. However, compare Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [75]–
[77] and ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241], in which the Tribunal expressly declined to 
exercise judicial notice of such disparate impact in relation to rostering issues and full-time work, when 
the care involved an older school-age child or elderly parents, respectively.  
230
 See also for example, Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [73] where in the context of allegations of sex 
discrimination, it was found that, as a matter of common knowledge, having responsibilities as a carer is a 
characteristic that appertains to women or is a characteristic imputed to them. Note that the Tribunal did 
not consider whether to exercise judicial notice in relation to her carers’ complaint [60]–[69]. The 
Tribunal also declined to exercise judicial notice in ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241]; Stokes 
[2006] NSWADT 295 [75]–[77]; Chacon [2011] NSWADT 72 [147].   
231
 Gardiner No 1 at [59]-[60], citing Bradley v State of NSW [2003] NSWADT 94 at 45. The Tribunal 
has noted, for example, that it is irrelevant that alternative care options or methods of providing the care 
are otherwise available to the complainants: see Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [61]; Spencer [2005] 
NSWADT 138 [45]. 
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(d) The condition or requirement is not reasonable.  
 
The disparate impact is only discriminatory if the condition or requirement is not 
reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case.
232
 Following earlier authorities, 
the test for reasonableness was set out by the Tribunal in Gardiner No 1, the first carers’ 
discrimination case considered,
233
 and has been followed by the Tribunal in subsequent 
carers’ cases.234 It has outlined a number of sub-elements with the basic aim of 
balancing the nature and extent of the discriminatory effect of the requirement against 
three factors:
235
 
(1) the reasons for the requirement including any commercial considerations; 
(2) whether the requirement is appropriate and adapted to its purpose and has a 
logical and understandable basis; and 
(3) whether there is a less discriminatory option. This can include considering the 
possibility of alternative action that would achieve the object of the condition and be 
less discriminatory.
236 
In practice, providing reasonable accommodation may be one 
such non-discriminatory option.
237
 
 
Although the test for indirect discrimination relates to the reasonableness of a condition 
or requirement, in practice, in demonstrating whether a less discriminatory option exists, 
the Tribunal has made it clear that the employer’s conduct in relation to how it deals 
with a request for an accommodation will be relevant. Therefore, although the 
complainant has the burden of proving all elements, including that the condition or 
requirement is not reasonable,
238
 in practice, a respondent will have to counter this 
evidence to demonstrate that the condition was reasonable.
239
 In applying the 
reasonableness test in Tleyji and Reddy (where the respondents’ requirement to work 
                                                 
232
 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 396–9, considering how the courts and tribunals have 
considered the issue of reasonableness in carers’ cases in different discrimination jurisdictions. 
233
 See Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [63]–[70], citing Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade v Styles (1988) EOC 92-239, 77.240 (Wilcox J); Waters (1991) 173 CLR 349, 378 (Brennan 
J).  
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 See, for example, Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [66] and Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [17]. 
235
 Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [46]–[70]. 
236
 For the Tribunal’s approach to this ‘sub-element’, see especially Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [75]–
[90];Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [103]–[105]; and ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]. 
237
 Smith, writing in relation to the DD Act, noted that indirect discrimination provisions have provided 
an, albeit vague and implicit, obligation of reasonable accommodation: Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 
15, 203–4, 206–7. 
238
 Confirmed in Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [66].  
239
 Gardiner No 2 [2004] NSWADTAP 1 [66]. See generally Allen, Burden, above n 45. 
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full-time was found to be unreasonable) the Tribunal found that, in considering a 
request for flexibility such as part-time work after maternity leave, employers should 
‘give full and proper consideration’240 to a request for flexibility and should make 
‘reasonable efforts’ to consider alternatives.241 However, in contrast, the Tribunal 
showed in other carers’ cases, such as Gardiner No 1, that it has been more than ready 
to accept business arguments as to why a condition or requirement is reasonable, 
without considering properly or fully the negative effects of the condition or 
requirement upon the employee and his or her family.
242
 
 
1.7.3.4 Comparing the Approaches of the Tribunal and the ADB to Direct and Indirect 
Discrimination under Part 4B 
 
Generally, the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of direct and indirect 
discrimination under s 49T has very often tended to reflect the contemporary trends 
towards judicial conservatism in the discrimination jurisdictions. This approach can be 
characterised generally as showing little regard for the equality and human rights 
objectives of the laws as well as privileging managerial prerogative over equality.
243
 
The experiences of the carers’ complainants before the Tribunal, which are outlined in 
Part IV, suggest that direct discrimination provisions will do little to protect worker–
carers.
244
 In relation to indirect discrimination, Reddy and Tleyji were welcome victories 
for worker–carers in suggesting that employers must make reasonable efforts to look at 
other options to accommodate their employees.
245
 However, it is also clear that the 
Tribunal avoided expressly considering whether Part 4B requires employers to provide 
reasonable accommodation. The operation of any implied duty of reasonable 
                                                 
240
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [89]; See [75]–[90]. 
241
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [105]. 
242
 See Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [67]–[68]. See also, for example, Chacon [2011] NSWADT 
72 [141]–[147]; Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [77]. For example, in ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 
[233], the Tribunal accepted the business arguments for not agreeing to part-time work and noted that the 
mere availability of less discriminatory options that might accommodate the needs of an applicant ‘does 
not necessarily render unreasonable a decision not to adopt them’.  
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 See, for example, Allen, ‘Burden’, above n 45; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 15; Adams, 
‘Defining’, above n 15; Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 15; Smith and Allen, above n 2; Beth Gaze, ‘Context 
and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 325; 
Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 15; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 15; Murray, ‘Work and Care’, above 
n 145; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 15; Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 15.  
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 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92; Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 15. 
245
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294. Although as noted above, disappointingly, 
Ms Tleyji in fact was not awarded any compensation or other remedy for the carers’ discrimination 
complaint. 
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accommodation arising from the ‘fuzzy’246 reasonableness test in indirect discrimination 
cases is far from certain, in this contemporary era of judicial conservatism.  
 
Turning to the ADB, Part V of this thesis explains and analyses how the ADB has 
approached the interpretation and application of Part 4B, and looks to both its educative 
and complaint-handling functions.
247
 In summary, it is argued that, in contrast to the 
Tribunal’s legalistic approach to the interpretation of Part 4B, the ADB instead provides 
a plain English, non-legalistic explanation of direct and indirect discrimination, together 
with examples of how carers’ discrimination might manifest itself in practice. The aim 
is to raise awareness of rights, obligations and remedies to prevent discrimination, and 
encourage compliance and effective enforcement of the law. For example, the ADB 
explains that direct discrimination is treating someone unfairly, differently or less 
favourably because of his or her actual, past, presumed or future carers’ responsibilities. 
It notes that direct discrimination often involves or relates to the making of a decision 
that negatively affects a job applicant or employee based upon a negative assumption, 
stereotypes or prejudices about the person’s actual, past, presumed or future carers’ 
responsibilities.
248
 The ADB also notes that, in practice, many complaints of carers’ 
responsibility discrimination will relate to indirect discrimination because: 
[m]any claims are likely to involve the way in which work is organised and/or 
the operational requirements for everyone/whole groups of employees, and 
how this might negatively impact on or disadvantage people with carers’ 
responsibilities as opposed to people who don’t have carers’ responsibilities—
for example, shift lengths, start and finish and break times, part-time versus 
full-time work, whether work can be done from home.
249
  
However, rather than focusing on elements or sub-elements or the legal technicalities of 
s 49T, the ADB’s central consistent message set out in its publications250 is that, 
regardless of whether conduct may amount to direct or indirect discrimination, s 49T 
requires that ‘in general’ an employer must do its ‘best to provide any extra or special 
“arrangements” that a job applicant or employee needs in order to manage their carers’ 
responsibilities alongside their work,’ because being ‘inflexible’ can amount to direct 
                                                 
246
 Chapman ‘Schou’, above n 15, 78, 55–56.  
247
 Chapter 8 considers the education function and Chapters 9 and 10 the complaint handling function. 
248
 Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 31, 13; Carer’s Factsheet, above n 62. 
249 Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 31, 11. 
250
 See especially the relevant carers’ publications in above n 62, which deal with rights and obligations 
under Part 4B. 
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and indirect discrimination.
251
 The ADB’s less formal, and purposive, approach to the 
interpretation and application of s 49T may enable workers and employers to understand 
their respective rights and obligations better. It may therefore assist with preventing 
discrimination and ensuring compliance with the legislation, on a day-to-day basis at the 
workplace level. 
 
In terms of complaint handling, when lodging a complaint at the ADB, as noted there is 
no obligation upon the complainant to even demonstrate a prima facie case,
252
 let alone 
specify whether the alleged conduct amounts to direct or indirect discrimination under 
s49T of the AD Act. The ADB tends to investigate and conciliate complaints without 
reference to the technicalities of direct and indirect discrimination.
253
 This approach also 
helps to ensure that the first stage of the enforcement process at the ADB is less 
legalistic than proceedings at the Tribunal.  However, it is also crucial to appreciate that, 
at the same time, the ADB’s approach can also serve to mask the complexity of the AD 
Act, and the extent of the difficulties that the complainant will face if a complaint does 
proceed to the Tribunal. In practice, the complexity of the provisions under s 49T and 
the burdens of proving each and every element of direct or indirect discrimination are 
particularly onerous, and are likely to be a serious deterrent discouraging worker–carers 
from pursuing a complaint to the Tribunal. 
 
1.7.4 Unjustifiable Hardship and the Inherent Requirements  
 
Part 4B replicates the disability provisions under Part 4A and provides for a defence of 
unjustifiable hardship. Only these two grounds under the AD Act contain this defence. 
Section 49V(4) provides that it will not be unlawful to refuse to hire a person or to fire a 
person (so it does not apply to current employees) on the ground of their carers’ 
responsibilities if:  
the person because of his or her responsibilities as a carer would be unable to 
carry out the inherent requirements of the job, or would, in order to carry out 
those requirements, require arrangements that are not required by persons 
                                                 
251
 See, for example, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 31, 13. 
252
 s 89(2). 
253
See generally Chapter 9, at 9.3.2 which outlines the ADB’s informal approach to the process. 
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without those responsibilities as a carer and the making of which would 
impose an unjustifiable hardship on the employer.
254
  
Section 49U sets out all the relevant circumstances that are to be taken into account 
when determining what constitutes unjustifiable hardship:
 
 
 the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to accrue or be suffered by any 
persons concerned; 
 the effect of the relevant responsibilities as a carer of a person concerned; and  
 the financial circumstances of and the estimated amount of expenditure required 
to be made by the employer. 
 
Although the Tribunal has not considered the operation of ss 49U and 49V(4), the High 
Court has considered similar provisions that had existed under the DD Act, finding that 
the inherent requirement and unjustifiable hardship provisions must be read together.
255
 
Therefore, a respondent will only succeed in the defence if the employee was ‘not only 
unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the particular employment without 
assistance; but was also … able to do so only with assistance that it would be 
unjustifiably harsh to expect the employer to provide’.256 What is ‘at issue is whether a 
person or entity could, at the relevant time, have taken steps to avoid the discriminatory 
conduct’.257 The respondent has the burden of proving the defence258 and must show 
that the hardship existed at the time of the discriminatory conduct, not at the time of the 
hearing.
259
  The effect of the defence is to permit conduct that would otherwise be 
discriminatory.  
In determining what constitutes unjustifiable hardship, s 49U requires an employer to 
look beyond the effect on the business.
 260
  A relevant consideration is the potential 
benefits and detriments to the worker–carer as well as any other ‘persons concerned’, 
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 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 401; and 306–9.  ‘Inherent requirement’ is not defined in the AD Act. 
However, the term was described by the High Court as meaning the essential parts of the job or the work 
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 Moxon (No2) v Westbus Pty Ltd [2002] NSWADTAP 24 [50]. 
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which could include the person being cared for, or co-workers. While the express 
positive duty of reasonable accommodation recommended by the LRC
261
 was not 
included in the Part 4B that was enacted, as outlined in the following section, it has been 
suggested by the ADB, and in the literature that ss 49U and 49V(4) operate to have the 
same effect as an implied duty of accommodation, on the basis that together they 
require an employer to take reasonable steps to enable the person to do the job. 
 
1.7.5 Tribunal and ADB Approaches to an Implied Duty 
 
In the absence of an express duty of accommodation, it can be argued that Part 4B may 
operate in practice in two ways to imply a duty of reasonable accommodation on 
employers. The first is through the application of the reasonableness test in cases of 
indirect discrimination. Although the Tribunal has never expressly considered whether 
Part 4B operates to imply a duty of accommodation, as outlined above, its approach to 
the application of the reasonableness test in Reddy
262
 and Tleyji
263
 may in practice 
require employers to take reasonable steps to accommodate a request for flexibility.
264
 
 
Second, it has been argued by the ADB,
265
 and in the literature, that the provisions 
under ss 49U and 49V(4) may ‘take effect to impose an obligation on employers to 
accommodate, although this has not been tested in the cases’.266 Bourke considered that: 
the most innovative aspect of the legislation is the adoption of the disability 
model of discrimination namely its use of concepts such as reasonable 
accommodation and unjustifiable hardship [and] its capacity to produce 
systemic and proactive changes by employers, and to generate positive 
reactions to individual requests for flexibility.
267
 
As noted, this interpretation is made by analogy with the disability discrimination 
provisions under Part 4A,
268
 and also the disability discrimination legislation from other 
jurisdictions across Australia.
269
  However, it is quite clear that ss 49U and 49V(4) do 
not provide any general enforceable right for complainants for two reasons. The first is 
                                                 
261
 LRC Report, above n 12, 305 [5.212]. 
262
 [2004] NSWADT 218 [89]. 
263
 [2005] NSWADT 294 [105]. 
264
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 15, 26; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 15, 41; See also ‘Fair and 
Equal’, above n 15, 203–6. 
265
 See, for example, ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 31. 
266
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 15, 5, 26–7; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 15, 41.  
267
 Bourke above n 188, 33.  
268
 See LRC Report, above n 12, 253 [5.65]–[5.76]. 
269
 See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 401, 304–14.  
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that the provisions operate together as a defence and are therefore only relevant if they 
are raised as such by the respondent, and will usually come into play if a complainant 
has been able to prove discrimination. The unjustifiable hardship/inherent requirement 
provisions have never been tested by the Tribunal because they do not appear to have 
ever been raised as a defence by a respondent employer. Instead whether the respondent 
acted reasonably has been considered in the context of the indirect discrimination 
provisions as noted above.  Second, they have uneven coverage because they apply only 
to hiring and firing decisions, and not therefore to persons currently employed.
270
 
 
In summary, the application of the defence of unjustifiable hardship (but only in the 
context of recruitment and termination) or the requirement in practice for an employer 
to act reasonably, for example, when faced with a request for flexibility (but only in 
cases of indirect discrimination) may imply a duty of accommodation in practice. 
However, both options have numerous deficiencies, are inherently uncertain in their 
application, and are no substitute for an express statutory duty of accommodation for 
workers with caring responsibilities, such as that found for example under the Victorian 
EO Act.
271
  
 
In terms of how the Tribunal has approached an implied duty, the Tribunal has never 
expressly addressed whether Part 4B takes effect to imply a duty of accommodation to 
better meet the policy objectives of the carers’ provisions. In Part IV of this thesis, it is 
argued that the Tribunal has very often operated in a policy vacuum, paying only lip 
service to the human rights and equality objectives of the AD Act and the policy 
objectives of Part 4B. In this context, it should however be noted that the Tribunal may 
be cautious to imply a duty of reasonable accommodation in the absence of an express 
statutory provision.  It may be influenced in this regard by the High Court’s approach to 
the issue of a duty of accommodation in Purvis, where the Court found that the 
‘accommodation’ referred to in s 5(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
did not impose an obligation to make reasonable accommodation for people with 
                                                 
270
 See LRC Report, above n 12, 253 [5.65]–[5.76]. In reviewing the unjustifiable hardship/inherent 
requirement provisions in the context of Part 4A of the AD Act relating to disability, the LRC had 
considered that it was confusing and unsatisfactory to rely upon them to imply a duty of accommodation. 
Instead, it recommended an express statutory duty of reasonable accommodation, subject to a defence of 
unjustifiable hardship. This is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
271
 EO Act (Vic) ss 17, 19. 
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disabilities.
272
 While the approach of the Tribunal in Tleyji and Reddy was encouraging, 
those cases are now almost a decade old, and the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel 
dismissed every direct and indirect discrimination carers’ case before and since then.273 
Further, as noted above, in recent years courts and tribunals from the High Court down 
have favoured a narrow interpretation of discrimination laws, and have often favoured 
high levels of managerial prerogative when determining cases of indirect 
discrimination.
274
  
 
In contrast, the ADB has avoided a technical legal approach to the interpretation and 
application of Part 4B and instead has taken a broadly beneficial and more holistic 
approach to give effect to the policy objectives. It does this even though the legal basis 
for its position is sometimes tenuous and equivocal, and appears to be based upon a 
conflation of the reasonableness provisions under indirect discrimination with the 
unjustifiable hardship provisions. Since 2000,
275
 the ADB has consistently suggested 
that the provisions operate together in practice in order to imply a general duty of 
reasonable accommodation, which together would apply across all worker–carers. For 
example, the current Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors interpret Part 4B as 
providing that: 
In general an employer must make any reasonable arrangements that are 
necessary for a person who has carers’ responsibilities to enable them to do a 
particular job. For example, they may change their starting or finishing times, 
allow them to work part-time or job share with someone else or allow them to 
work from home if these things are possible. An organisation needs to 
properly consider whether or not a position can be done part-time or job share 
before dismissing proposals of this nature … If an employer can demonstrate 
that accommodating the needs of someone with carers’ responsibilities would 
                                                 
272
 The Tribunal has made general statements that the AD Act should be construed broadly, see Stokes 
[2006] NSWADT 295 [19], and also Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [39], noting that the 
legislation should be given a broad interpretation, in keeping with the human rights purpose of the 
provision, citing Waters 173 CLR 349, 359 (Mason CJ and Gaudron J).  However, as noted the Tribunal 
may have been influenced by the High Court in Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92, see 
[27],[86]-[89] (McHugh and Kirby JJ) and [217] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).
 
 Section 5(2) 
provides that when assessing whether a person has been treated less favourably in circumstances that are 
the same or are not materially different that circumstances are not materially different ‘because of the fact 
that accommodation or services may be required by the person with the disability.’  Under the NSW AD 
Act there is no equivalent to s 5 of the DD Act under either the disability or the carers’ responsibility 
provisions. 
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 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218. See Table B, in Appendix B, for a 
summary of the decisions, including the nature of the complaint, grounds of discrimination and outcomes. 
274
 See, for example, Adams, ‘Defining’, above n 15; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 15; Chapman, 
‘Schou’, above n 15. 
275
 See Employer Carer’s Guidelines, above n 31, published in 2000 in preparation for Part 4B the 
following year.  
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cause them unjustifiable hardship then it may not be unlawful to discriminate 
against them.
276
 
In 2011, the ADB, in a publication to mark the first decade of Part 4B warned 
employers that, although an employer is not obliged to grant all or any requests for 
flexible work arrangements, generally it should do so unless it would cause ‘extreme 
financial or operational difficulties or impediments’.277 
 
The ADB, free of the constraints of an adjudicative function, uses its statutory functions 
to interpret and apply Part 4B purposively, consistent with its policy objectives in three 
ways. First, notwithstanding that the legislation is equivocal in this regard, the ADB 
advocates for a general duty of accommodation applying to worker–carers. Second, the 
ADB disseminates this information to raise awareness, prevent discrimination and 
encourage compliance. Third, the ADB has a facilitation and dispute-resolution role 
whereby it provides advice to employees and employers through publications or an 
enquiries service to enable them to attempt a local ‘self-help’ type resolution without a 
complaint being lodged at the ADB. However, if an issue cannot be resolved, the ADB 
also provides a free and relatively informal complaint-handling service, through which 
it may try to facilitate workplace accommodation of caring responsibilities if that is 
what the worker–carer wants. In these ways the ADB’s approach to Part 4B, and the 
operation of an implied duty, is likely to have had an important normative impact in 
terms of how worker–carers and employers understand, implement and engage with 
their rights and obligation at the day-to-day workplace level. The ADB’s interpretation 
disseminated through its complaint-handling function, to the parties to a complaint, is 
also likely to have contributed to the resolution of carers’ complaints involving an 
accommodation. 
 
While the ADB’s interpretation of the law therefore has no binding normative or 
precedential value – as a tribunal or court decision has – nevertheless a key argument 
explored throughout this thesis is that the ADB through its statutory functions has had 
an important norm creation and development role.  In circumstances where there have 
been few formal Tribunal decisions the ADB’s interpretation of the law is likely to have 
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Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 62. 
277
 ADB, Equal Time, above n 62, 4.This quarterly publication was published in 2011 to mark the first 
decade anniversary of the carers’ discrimination provisions under Part 4B.  
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influenced how worker – carers, and employers understand and interact with their rights 
and obligations under Part 4B.  In particular, Chapter 8 provides a more in depth 
explanation and analysis of the effect of the ADB’s education function in this regard, 
and Chapters 9 and 10 provide an empirical analysis of the complaint function.  
 
 
1.7.6 Other Relevant Provisions under the AD Act  
 
There are a number of general provisions under the AD Act that may be relevant to 
complaints of carers’ discrimination, and they are noted briefly here. 
 
Victimisation 
In common with other discrimination laws in Australia,
278
 s 50 of the AD Act provides 
that it is unlawful to victimise a person—that is, to subject the person to a detriment—
because, for example, that person has made allegations against the employer, or has 
made or intends to make a complaint under the AD Act. It is the usual practice of the 
ADB to caution respondent employers not to victimise the complainant in the first pro 
forma correspondence sent to a respondent notifying them of a complaint.
279
 Conduct 
that may amount to victimisation is very often not recognised as such by the 
complainant. It is often reported to the ADB and is then added as a separate ground of 
complaint, either at lodgement of the complaint or as the complaint progresses and the 
conduct occurs. The empirical study of carers’ complaints revealed that 54 
complainants, amounting to 10% of all carers’ complainants, made one or more 
additional complaints  relating to allegations of victimisation.
280
  Victimisation can be 
an important enforceable right even when the primary carers’ discrimination complaint 
is dismissed, because the complainant has been unable to prove discrimination. This 
happened in three of the carers’ cases at the Tribunal, and in the first two of these, 
damages were awarded. In Spencer, it was found that not allowing the complainant to 
return to work after a nervous breakdown and workers’ compensation complaint 
amounted to victimisation; in Monroe, it was found that late payment of wages 
                                                 
278
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, ch 11, provides an overview of the operation of victimisation 
provisions across Australian discrimination jurisdictions. See also Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 129–36. 
279
 The standard pro forma first letter that the ADB used to writes to an employer respondent notifying 
them of the complaint during the decade contained a standard caution in relation to s 50. 
280
 See Chapter 9, at 9.2.4.  
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amounted to victimisation; in Correy, it was found that rostering the complainant, a 
nurse, on returning from maternity leave for nine out of 10 shifts in the particular unit 
where she had specifically asked not to work, for medical reasons, amounted to 
victimisation.
281
 
 
General Exceptions, Defences, and Liability Provisions 
There are no specific exceptions or defences defined under Part 4B other than the 
private household
282
 and small business exceptions
283
 and the inherent 
requirement/unjustifiable hardship provisions noted above.
284
 The AD Act does contain 
a number of general exceptions which may be relevant. For example, there is an 
exception for acts done under statutory authority,
285
 which was relevant in a small 
number of carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB, and/or heard at the Tribunal in 
relation to work safety issues, for example, in relation to the length of hours worked, or 
bringing children into the workplace.
286
 The burden of proving an exception to the AD 
Act is with the employer.
287
 
 
Under s 53, employers and principals will be vicariously liable for acts undertaken by 
their employees or agents in the course of their employment unless it can be shown that 
the employer or principal took all ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent the contravention.288 The 
Tribunal only rarely considered the operation of s 53 in any of the carers’ cases that 
came before it.
289
 In practice, however, cases heard by the Tribunal on other grounds 
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See Table B, in Appendix B, for a summary of the cases. In Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138, $10,000 
was awarded. In Monroe [2010] NSWADT 179, $4650 was awarded. There were four hearings in Correy 
relating to victimisation. On two occasions, Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 and Correy No 3 [2009] 
NSWADT 40, the Tribunal at first instance upheld the victimisation complaint and awarded damages of 
$26,121 (for victimisation and carers’ responsibility discrimination) and $23,665 respectively. The first 
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victimisation was ultimately upheld on a second appeal, Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58, the Appeal 
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 Section 49V(3)(b). 
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Ibid. 
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 Sections 49U and 49V(4). See Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 561–7. 
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 See AD Act pt 6 ss 54–59.  
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See, for example, Harms [2010] NSWADT 183 [26], in which the respondent raised health and safety 
issues in relation to rostering. 
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 See s 104.  
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 See generally Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 2, 769–73 and Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 137–44, for 
an explanation and overview of vicarious liability provisions in Australian jurisdictions. 
289
 See, for example, Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [22], in which the Appeal Panel found that the 
fact that employees who could not be identified may have been responsible for certain decisions is not a 
basis for concluding the respondent would not be vicariously liable. Note that the Appeal Panel referred 
to s 52 in error instead of s 53. 
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show that it is very difficult, but not impossible, for employers to sustain this defence 
unless clear evidence is provided of ‘reasonable steps’.290 
 
Under s 52, it is unlawful to aid and abet an act of discrimination by ‘causing, 
instructing, inducing, aiding or permitting another person’ to carry out an unlawful 
discriminatory act. This provision is useful when the status of the employment 
relationship is complicated or uncertain or when the discrimination occurs off site or is 
caused by a third party that is not the employer. The operation of s 52 was not 
considered by the Tribunal. It was occasionally relevant in a small number of 
complaints that were made to the ADB where it was claimed that an agency or labour 
hire company had permitted or allowed discrimination by the employer.
 291
  Section 52 
was not used to pursue a complaint against an individual such as a co-worker or 
manager personally.  
 
In Chapter 9 it is argued that in practice, where respondents did raise a defence or 
sought to rely on statutory exceptions in their response to a complaint, at the same time, 
they often requested that the complaint be declined by the ADB. In practice, the ADB 
was unlikely to accept the respondent’s submission, unless the exception or defence 
very clearly applied on the facts of the case.
 292
   
 
 
1.8 Concluding Comments  
 
This chapter is intended to explain the foundational statutory context for the following 
chapters of this thesis. It has outlined the statutory context of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977 (NSW) (‘AD Act’), including the substantive provisions under Part 4B, and the 
two-stage enforcement process provided for under the AD Act. This has included an 
overview of the functions and powers of the ADB and the Tribunal, and has flagged 
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 See, for example, the sexual harassment case of Cooper v Western Area Local Health Network [2012] 
NSWADT 39, in which the employer escaped liability because it had a clear code of conduct and had 
provided seminars and training. See also Ronalds and Raper, above n 2, 142–4. 
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how each body has interacted with and applied Part 4B. Many of the issues raised in this 
chapter will be revisited in this thesis.  Chapter 2 now explains the research questions, 
and the theoretical and methodological framework that will be used to answer them. 
Part II provides an overview of the literature and, in particular, Chapter 4 evaluates the 
deficiencies and potential of the standard discrimination law model found in Australia 
including the NSW AD Act. Part III explains in more detail the legal and policy basis 
behind the enactment of Part 4B and outlines the key policy objectives. Part IV 
examines the Tribunal’s approaches to the carers’ complaints that came before it. 
Finally, Part V examines the operation of the ADB’s education and complaint handling 
functions and presents the findings of the empirical review of carers’ complaints lodged 
with the ADB.  
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
and Thesis Overview 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As outlined in the Introduction, there are two main, research questions that will be 
answered in this thesis: The first is in two parts, and asks: how have the ADB’ and the 
Tribunal interpreted and applied Part 4B through their respective statutory functions, 
and does this give effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B? The second asks: has the 
two-stage enforcement process provided an accessible and effective enforcement 
mechanism for worker–carers in NSW? Both questions aim not only to describe how 
the legislation has been interpreted and applied but also to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the legislation in the first decade of the operation of Part 4B between 2001 and 2011.
1
  
 
The thesis takes a realist, ‘law in action’ theoretical approach to the research and uses a 
four-step methodological framework to answer the research questions. This chapter is in 
seven sections. 
 
First, Sections 2.2 and 2.3 outline what is known about the operation of Part 4B under 
the ADB and the Tribunal in terms of primary and secondary sources.
2
 This will 
identify significant gaps in our knowledge, which in turn helps to inform and articulate 
the research questions, and proposed theoretical and methodological framework. It will 
also explain how this research project will contribute to the broader contemporary 
debates in the existing discrimination law literature.  
 
Section 2.4 explains the realist ‘law in action’ theoretical framework. For illustrative 
purposes, several key findings of the empirical ‘in action’ study of the ADB complaints 
                                                 
1
 This project evaluates Part 4B in the first decade of its operation since 1 March 2001. Since the ADB 
annual reports record data by financial year ending on 30 June, in order to facilitate easier comparison 
with data available in the annual reports, the decade end period of the study was extended from 1 March 
2011 to 30 June 2011. 
2
 Note that Part III of this thesis also provides an overview of several contemporary policy documents that 
provided an impetus for, and led to the enactment of, Part 4B.
 
They pre-date Part 4B and do not explain 
how it has operated in practice after enactment. The discussion of the primary documents in 2.2 does not 
include the policy sources underpinning it.  
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are noted to demonstrate how a ‘law in action lens’ contributes to the methodological 
approach. Section 2.5 provides a detailed explanation of the four-step methodological 
framework and the research methods employed to answer the research questions. 
Section 2.6 outlines the significant barriers that prevent access to discrimination 
complaint files for the purposes of academic research. This section explains the privacy 
and secrecy legislative provisions, and also the process involved in achieving Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approval, which was an important step in the 
research design process. Section 2.7 explains the consistency of the ontological, 
epistemological and axiological approaches to the research based on a mixed methods 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data, where the main research method used is 
documents and records analysis.  Finally, this chapter concludes at Section 2.8 that the 
proposed theoretical and methodological approach provides a rigorous framework, and 
that the findings set out in this thesis will substantially increase our understanding of the 
operation of Part 4B, as it is applied by the ADB and the Tribunal, and at both stages of 
the complaint process.  
 
2.2 Primary Sources and Research Methods 
 
There are four categories of primary documents that provide an insight into, and help to 
explain, the operation of Part 4B, how the ADB and Tribunal exercised their functions 
and with what effect. The first three, which are all publicly available, are Tribunal 
carers’ decisions, ADB annual reports and ADB education publications. The fourth 
category is not publicly available and consists of hard copy complaint files held by the 
ADB that were lodged at the first stage of the process. The complaints are subject to the 
secrecy provisions under s 124A of the AD Act.
3
 They are also considered ‘state 
records’ under the relevant legislation,4 and are subject to various legislative privacy 
protections since they contain personal information.
5
 These various provisions combine 
                                                 
3
 See generally ADB, Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW (Revised June 2009) (2009) 
(‘Complaining Factsheet’); and Anna Chapman, ‘Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The 
Paradox of Informal Dispute Resolution’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 321 (‘Complaint-Handling’).  
4
 ADB complaint files are regulated under the State Records Act 1998 (NSW), which requires NSW 
government agencies to make and keep records that fully and accurately document their operations and 
administration, and regulates retention and disposal of records. ADB complaint files are therefore 
considered state records and are subject to these provisions. 
5
 The relevant privacy legislation in NSW is the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 
(NSW) (‘PPIP Act’). See also the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) (‘HRIP 
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to prevent public scrutiny of the complaints process, and complaint files are not 
generally accessible by the public. In Section 2.6, it is also argued that, in practice, there 
are significant barriers to undertaking empirical research of complaint files held by 
discrimination agencies, which will continue to prevent scrutiny of the process. 
 
Finally, a fifth primary source noted here is experiential, relating to the personal insights 
and contribution from the writer, who worked at the ADB for a decade, between 2001 
and 2010, which coincides with the majority of the period of this research project. These 
experiential insights are a supplementary source that may help, in particular, to clarify 
aspects of the document review, for example, in relation to aspects of the complaint 
process at the ADB. Each source is now considered in turn.  As noted in Chapter 1, at 
1.7 how the Tribunal interpreted and applied the law is considered first in this thesis 
before the ADB.  
 
 
2.2.1 Tribunal Carers’ Decisions 
 
The Tribunal heard only 12 carers’ complaints in total during the decade. In only two of 
those, Reddy v International Cargo Express [2004] and Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group 
[2005], were complaints of discrimination upheld, and compensation was the only 
remedy awarded by the Tribunal.
6
 As noted in Section 2.3, some of these cases have 
also received attention in the literature.
7
 The Tribunal decisions explain its approach to 
statutory interpretation as well as a providing an insight into how Part 4B has operated 
in practice, and what effect the legislation has had for worker–carers exercising their 
rights under the legislation. They shed light on who has used the legislation to enforce 
                                                                                                                                               
Act’), which applies to any record that may contain health-related information about a person—which 
complaint files in practice regularly do. ‘Health information’ is defined in s 6 of the HRIP Act. 
6
 Reddy v International Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218 and Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group [2005] 
NSWADT 294. Ms Reddy received $15,000 general damages and $1385 for lost income: Reddy [2004] 
NSWADT 218 [93]–[103]. Ms Tleyji received damages of $5000 for general damages for race 
discrimination but nothing for her carers’ complaint: Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [138]–[142]. For a 
summary of all 12 cases, see Table B, in Appendix B.  
7
 See, for example, Juliet Bourke, ‘Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian 
Experience’ (2004) 12 American Journal of Society and the Law 19; Anna Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-
Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) 26 (‘Working Paper’); Anna 
Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and the Case of Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 
Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’); K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and the Worker-Carer: It’s 
Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 18 (‘Indirect Discrimination’). 
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their rights, and what they have complained about, including, for example, the nature of 
caring responsibilities and the alleged discriminatory conduct. They also illustrate how 
some employers deal with their employees’ caring responsibilities and how they 
manage requests for accommodation. Finally, the Tribunal decisions provide an 
indication of how effective the legislation has been in providing ‘good’ outcomes and 
remedies for worker–carers using the AD Act enforcement process. In Section 2.5, it is 
submitted that a ‘good’ outcome can be evaluated quantitatively in terms of whether 
carers’ complaints are likely to be upheld at the Tribunal8 and qualitatively in terms of 
the nature of the remedies likely to be achieved.  
 
However, it is also clear that examining such a small number of Tribunal decisions 
produced over a decade will provide at best a very narrow perspective about who has 
used Part 4B, how it has been interpreted and applied, how it operates and with what 
effect. It is difficult to generalise about what these cases tell us in terms of effectiveness 
of the legislation because, in reality, the vast majority of carers’ discrimination 
complaints made under Part 4B are dealt with privately and confidentially in the 
‘shadows’ at the ADB.9 
 
2.2.2 ADB Education Publications 
 
Education publications such as factsheets and guidelines demonstrate clearly the ADB’s 
interpretation and application of Part 4B. The ADB has published four key publications 
(‘carers’ publications’) that deal with rights and obligations under Part 4B: Guidelines 
for Employers, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (2000) published in 2000 in 
preparation for the legislation coming into effect in 2001; Carer’s Responsibilities 
Discrimination Factsheet; a special edition of the Equal Time Newsletter of the Anti-
Discrimination Board of NSW (2011) marking the 10th anniversary of Part 4B; and, 
finally, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, Preventing Discrimination and 
Harassment (2009) relating to all grounds of discrimination, and including a section 
                                                 
8
 As noted in Chapter 1, at 1.2.5 since January 2014, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal ‘NCAT’ 
is the Tribunal with jurisdiction to hear complaints under the AD Act.  
9
 Charlesworth and Gaze refer to the first complaint-handling stage of the enforcement process as being in 
the shadows: Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-Discrimination 
Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 88, 88 (‘Shadow’); Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-
Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 325 (‘Context’). 
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about carers’ discrimination.10 The aim of such publications, often targeted specifically 
at employees or employers, is to explain what the law means in plain English. They 
explain rights and obligations under the law and make recommendations about how to 
implement the law, how to prevent discrimination and encourage compliance, and, if 
necessary, how to enforce it. These publications also provide an important documentary 
record about how the ADB interprets Part 4B. In the same way that Tribunal decisions 
illustrate the Tribunal’s approach to statutory interpretation and application, 
publications provide an insight into how ADB staff are likely to interpret and apply Part 
4B in the day-to-day operation of their statutory functions, including handling 
complaints or answering enquiries, and in the provision of training. The relevant carers’ 
publications and the operation of the ADB education functions are considered in detail 
in Chapter 8. 
 
In a decade during which Tribunal decisions applying Part 4B were few in number, the 
carers’ publications provided an important source of information for worker–carers and 
employers grappling with their respective rights and obligations under the legislation. 
For example, the Carers’ Employer Guidelines, published in 2000 in anticipation of the 
legislation and to prepare employers for it, provided detailed practical guidance to 
employers about how to implement their obligations in practice at the workplace level 
and how to resolve issues at that level. It is argued that the ADB’s interpretation and 
application of the law is likely to have had a strong normative effect in relation to how 
employers and worker–carers have understood Part 4B. In particular, a central argument 
running through this thesis is that the ADB has consistently avoided a technical legal 
approach to the interpretation and application of Part 4B, and has advocated that Part 4B 
operates to provide a duty of reasonable accommodation on employers.
11
 
 
For completeness, it should be noted that the ADB website contains a page entitled 
‘Conciliation Cases Handled by the Board’ that provides very short summaries of a 
                                                 
10
 The ADB publications are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.  ADB, Guidelines for Employers, 
Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (2000) 8 (‘Carers’ Employer Guidelines’); ADB, Carer’s 
Responsibilities Discrimination: ADB Factsheet (Revised March 2011) (2011) (‘Carer’s Factsheet’); 
ADB, Equal Time Newsletter of the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW Number 82 (2011) (‘Equal 
Time’); ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, Preventing Discrimination and Harassment 
(2009) (‘Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors’), relating to all grounds of discrimination, including 
carers’ discrimination. 
11
 See, for example, Carer’s Employer Guidelines, above n 10, and ADB, Equal Time, above n 10, 4; 
ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 10, 11. 
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limited selection of conciliated carers’ complaints.12 It provides only limited insights 
into the subject matter and outcomes of the complaints lodged during the decade, and 
was consequently of very limited assistance to this research project.
 13
 
 
2.2.3 ADB Annual Reports 
 
The ADB annual reports provide an overview of the ADB’s operations, including a 
review of its statutory educative and complaint-handling functions. In particular, the 
annual reports provide statistics about, first, the number of telephone enquiries received 
from members of the public and, second, the number of statutory complaints lodged on 
the ground of carers’ discrimination. Table 2.1 records that 5,175 telephone enquiries 
were received in relation to carers’ discrimination between 2001 and 2011. Table 2.2 
records that 555 carers’ complaints were lodged with the ADB under Part 4B in the 
same period. It is also possible to calculate what percentage of enquiries and complaints 
were made on this ground each year, and this is also presented in these tables. In 
addition, annual reports may sometimes provide a more detailed explanation of the 
operation of a ground or area under the AD Act and sometimes provide conciliation 
summaries or a case report of a relevant discrimination complaint heard by a court or 
tribunal. For example, the Annual Report 2001–02 provided a summary of the carers’ 
complaints made in the first year after enactment, which is discussed below.  
 
Enquiries Statistics 
 
Other than the data recorded in Table 2.1, no explanatory data are provided about the 
enquiries received. Table 2.1 shows that the number of carers’ enquiries received by the 
ADB peaked in the early years after the enactment of Part 4B. However, the number has 
generally declined over the decade possibly because more people now use the ADB 
website as a source of information.
14
 Although the ADB does record and code data 
                                                 
12
 As at July 2014, this was limited to 16 summaries. This document is in effect an ad hoc list of 
conciliated outcomes that have been added over the years. See 
http://lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/adb/ll_adb.nsf/pages/adb_cs. 
13
 Compare, for example, the Australian Human Rights Commission Conciliation Register, which is a 
more organised and user-friendly document: https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/conciliation-
register. 
14
 See, for example, ADB, Annual Report 2010–11, 23, reviewing the operation of the education function. 
According to ADB, Annual Report 2010–11, 12, the decline in numbers of telephone enquiries reflects 
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about each enquiry at the time of every call about the ground and area of the enquiry, 
the gender of complainants, and the outcome of each call (for example, self-help, 
referred elsewhere or advised to lodge a complaint), the ADB does not publish any 
other quantitative or qualitative information about enquiries. Additional explanatory 
data relating to carers’ enquiries received over the decade were requested by the writer 
to shed light on the operation of this educative and advisory function in relation to Part 
4B. However, the ADB’s advice to the writer was that it was unable to provide any 
additional data due to ‘severe staffing shortages’.15 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Carers’ Responsibility Discrimination Telephone Enquiries 
from ADB Annual Reports 2000–01 to 2010–11 
Annual Report 
Number of carers’ 
telephone enquiries 
As % of total enquiries made that year (total 
enquiries per year) 
2000–01* 455 3% (16,084) 
2001–02 871 5% (15,880) 
2002–03 765 6% (13,593) 
2003–04 535 5.7% (9,426) 
2004–05 579 5.6% (10,317) 
2005–06 451 4.5% (9,764) 
2006–07 354 4.9% (8,102) 
2007–08 350 4.3% (8,221) 
2008–09 356 4.9% (7,267) 
2009–10 231 4% (5,232) 
2010–11 228 3.9% (5,867) 
Total over the 
decade 
5175 5% (109,753) 
* Data for the 3-month period 1 March 2001–30 June 2001. Part 4B commenced 1 March 2001. 
 
Notes 
The ADB reports for the period note that the most common grounds of complaint and enquiries are sex, race and 
disability. Carers’ or age discrimination usually represent the next most common ground. The ADB has noted that 
this ‘reflects the fact that carers’ responsibilities discrimination is only unlawful in the area of employment, whereas 
other grounds are unlawful in more areas. While all other grounds of discrimination cover all areas of public life, in 
contrast Part 4B covers employment only’ (Annual Report 2001–02, 25.)  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
greater use of the ADB website to access information. It reports that the ADB website received more than 
830,000 hits in that year.  
15
 See Email from Elizabeth Wing dated 14 September 2012: ‘Unfortunately, due to constraints placed 
upon the President by the Director General, the Board is experiencing severe staffing shortages. We are 
unable to assist with your request at this time.  The President is meeting with the Director General next 
week.  If our staffing situation improves, I will contact you again.  You will appreciate however, that even 
if the staffing shortage is addressed there will be some delay as the backlog of core work will have to take 
precedence over your request.’   
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Complaints Statistics 
 
Table 2.2 sets out the number of carers’ complaints received during the first decade of 
operation. Annual reports do not generally provide any analysis by ground of complaint; 
instead, they provide only aggregate complaints data relating to all eight grounds 
covered under the AD Act in relation to, for example, the gender of complainants; the 
type of employer, such as private or public sector; grounds and areas of complaint; the 
subject matter of complaints; and the outcomes of complaints. It is not possible to 
extrapolate the data provided in annual reports by ground of complaint.  In terms of the 
complaint process, annual reports also provide an explanation of the steps in the 
process
16
 and record aggregate data about the outcomes of complaints, the time taken to 
finalise complaints and whether this met ADB performance targets.
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of Carers’ Responsibility Discrimination Complaints from 
ADB Annual Reports 2000–01 to 2010–11 
Annual Report 
Number of carers’ 
complaints received by 
ADB 
As % of total discrimination complaints 
made that year 
2000–01* 20 1.2% (1,587) 
2001–02 67 4.12% (1,625) 
2002–03 88 5.3% (1,659) 
2003–04 43 4.5% (9,44) 
2004–05 39 3.7% (1,052) 
2005–06 40 3.6% (1,089) 
2006–07 29 2.6% (1,098) 
2007–08 46 4.0% (1,144) 
2008–09 67 5.1% (1,323) 
2009–10 55 4.7% (1,168) 
2010–11 61 4.6% (1,332) 
Total over the decade 555 4% (14,021) 
*Data for the 3-month period 1 March 2001–30 June 2001. Part 4B commenced 1 March 2001. 
** The ADB reports for the period note that the most common grounds of complaint and enquiries are sex, race and 
disability. Carers’ or age discrimination usually represent the next most common ground. The ADB has noted that 
this ‘reflects the fact that carers’ responsibilities discrimination is only unlawful in the area of employment, whereas 
other grounds are unlawful in more areas. While all other grounds of discrimination cover all areas of public life, in 
contrast Part 4B covers employment only’ (Annual Report 2001–02, 25.)  
 
Although the annual reports provide limited aggregate data, they can, however, provide 
an important reference point when comparing the outcomes of carers’ complaints with 
complaints lodged on all grounds over the decade. For example, Table 2.3 compares the 
                                                 
16
 For example, see Figure 1.1, in Chapter 1 which was sometimes reproduced in annual reports, see for 
example Annual Report 2000–01, 24. 
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outcomes and settlement rates for all complaints lodged with the ADB as recorded in 
the Annual Reports 2000–01 to 2010–11, with the carers’ complaints reviewed for this 
project as presented in Part V of this thesis.  Table 2.3 demonstrates that, on average, 
30% of all discrimination complaints lodged with the ADB settled. However, the 
settlement rates for the carers’ complaints demonstrate that they had a significantly 
higher average settlement rate of 54% for the same period.
17
  
 
Table 2.3: Average Percentage Outcomes for All Complaints from Annual Reports 
2000–01 to 2010–1118 Compared to Average Outcomes for Carers’ Complaints  
Outcomes 
Complaint period  
July 2000–01 to 2010–11 
Settled 
% 
Not 
settled 
% 
Referred 
to 
Tribunal 
% 
Not 
accepted/ 
declined * 
% 
Not 
proceeded 
with 
% 
Average outcomes for complaints 
across all grounds under the AD 
Act finalised during the period—
data taken from Annual Reports 
2000–01 to 2010–11 
30 70 16 22 32 
Outcomes for carers’ complaints 
finalised over the same period—
data from PhD empirical 
research
19
 
54 46 13 7 26 
Percentage difference of 
outcomes for carers’ complaints 
compared with complaints lodged 
on all grounds under the AD Act  
+24 –24 –3 –15 –8 
* These figures do not include those complaints that were declined first and then referred to the Tribunal at the 
request of the complainant. The outcome of those complaints is recorded as having been referred to the Tribunal as 
this represents the final outcome at the ADB. 
 
 
Explaining the Enforcement Process 
 
Annual reports also provide an insight into how the ADB views the complaint process. 
For example, while the AD Act does not explicitly provide that the complaint process or 
                                                 
17
 See Table D17, in Appendix D, which summarises the annual data from the ADB annual reports 
 2000–01 to 2010–11 
18
 Note that in this Table 2.3 the statistics are rounded to the nearest whole number. The annual reports 
provide a more detailed breakdown in relation to declined complaints, and the reasons why complaints 
were referred to the Tribunal, for example, because they were declined or could not be conciliated; and 
also the reasons why a complaint did not proceed. See the summary of the key complaint handling 
provisions at Figure A1, in Appendix A.  See in particular, ss 89B, 92(1), 93A(1)–(2), 93B and 93 of the 
AD Act, which provides the statutory bases for the finalisation of a complaint at the ADB at the first stage 
of the process. 
19
 See explanation of the complaints data set at 2.2.4. As noted, the carers’ provisions only came into 
effect from 1 March 2001 so the carers’ complaints for the financial years in 2000–01 relate to complaints 
lodged for the three-month period from 1 March 2001 to 30 June 2001. 
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conciliation is confidential or that parties to a complaint must maintain confidentiality. 
According to the annual reports, the aim of conciliation is for the parties ‘to come to a 
confidential agreement or settlement that will resolve the complaint’ by which the 
complainant will usually receive a remedy in return for discontinuing the complaint.
20
   
In its publications, complainants are advised of the availability of a broad and unlimited 
array of remedies that they could ask for, including but not limited to compensation, 
accommodation, apologies, references or ‘anything else that might need to be done to 
make up for the unfair treatment’ as well as potentially broader systemic type remedies 
and outcomes such as policy changes and training.
21
  Although the ADB notes the 
potential availability of these very different remedies, it does not then go on to record in 
its annual reports the nature of the settlement or remedy achieved in relation to specific 
grounds. Therefore, there is no way of knowing how many carers’ complaints settled 
during the period or the nature of the settlements achieved. Annual reports do not 
explain if worker–carers are managing to use the legislation to have their carers’ 
responsibilities accommodated. Neither is it known if the remedies achieved by 
individual worker–carers are of a purely individual nature or whether they have a 
potentially broader or systemic effect at the workplace, such as changes to policy.  
 
 
Annual Report 2001–02: A Review of the First Year of Carers’ Complaints 
 
In recognition of the fact that Part 4B had been operational for over a year, the ADB did 
provide the additional information about the nature of carers’ complaint received in the 
first year after enactment, in the Annual Report 2001–02:  
We received 67 complaints of carers’ responsibilities discrimination during 
2001/2002, making a total of 87 complaints since it commenced as a ground of 
unlawful discrimination … 78.8% of complainants were women. 
Although a wide variety of relationships are covered by the legislation, a 
significant majority of complaints received by the Board involved a parent’s 
responsibility to care for a child, and the majority of these related to women 
being refused part-time work when returning from maternity leave… 
Carers’ responsibilities complaints represented proportionally the fifth most 
common ground. This reflects the fact that carers’ responsibilities 
                                                 
20
 Annual Report 2000–01, 23 and Complaining Factsheet, above n 3.  
21 
See ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 3. 
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discrimination is only unlawful in the area of employment, whereas other 
grounds are unlawful in more areas.
22
 
The ADB provided no information about the outcomes of these 67 complaints, which 
would at least have provided an insight and an indicator as to how effective the 
legislation and enforcement process was in practice in its first year. 
 
Bringing Complaints Data Out of the Shadows  
 
It is clear that annual reports provide very little information about the carers’ complaints 
made between 2001 and 2011. As Charlesworth has noted, in most discrimination 
jurisdictions other than the aggregate data found in annual reports, ‘relatively little is 
known outside the human rights bodies about the complainants who lodge complaints, 
the employers and the workplaces about which they make complaints or the substance 
of those complaints’.23 Crucially, even fundamental and basic data are not publicly 
recorded or available. For example, there is no record of who made the complaints, such 
as their gender, where they worked (by sector, industry or occupation) their employment 
status (full- or part-time, permanent or casual), and what they were complaining about 
(the nature of their caring responsibilities or the nature of the alleged discriminatory 
conduct). Nor are any details publicly available about the outcomes of carers’ 
complaints and, in particular, how many complaints were settled or the nature of the 
remedies achieved. The only other avenue available to ascertain this information is 
empirical research involving access to complaint files, and there are several substantial 
barriers that will continue to prevent access to complaint files made under 
discrimination legislation. 
 
Part V of this thesis seeks to fill in some of these gaps in our understanding of the 
carers’ complaints lodged, and as Table 2.3 illustrates, the findings of the empirical 
research by ground of discrimination can be very different from the aggregate data that 
are presented in the annual reports. The empirical review in Part V demonstrates that, 
not only did carers’ complaints have a 24% higher settlement rate on average than 
complaints lodged on all grounds for the reporting period 2000–01 to 2010–11, but, in 
                                                 
22
 ADB Annual Report 2001-02, 25.  Annual reports and other ADB publications such as factsheets and 
guidelines do also occasionally provide short case studies relating to conciliated complaints, or reports of 
tribunal and court decisions but little other information is publicly available. 
23
 See Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 9, 96.  
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addition, 31% of all carers’ complaints achieved a resolution including an 
accommodation. This enabled the complainant to remain in employment, indicating a 
remedy that achieved a degree of substantive equality, in terms of equality of outcome 
and result for that worker–carer. Twenty-three per cent received compensation or some 
other remedy, and 11% of all complaints involved remedy with potentially broader or 
systemic effect at that workplace. Figure 2.1 (in Section 2.4.4) summarises this 
information in more detail. The empirical study in Part V therefore represents a 
significant contribution to our existing knowledge of the operation of Part 4B. 
 
Given the serious difficulties involved in gaining access to complaint files for research 
purposes, which are outlined below in Section 2.6, there is an urgent need for the ADB 
to provide routinely to the public a more detailed analysis of complaints (and enquiries 
that they receive) by ground, in order to bring the discrimination enforcement 
mechanism out of the shadows. This is because this is the only publicly available insight 
into the operation of the first stage of the enforcement process from which the 
effectiveness of discrimination laws might be better evaluated. However, there is 
evidence that over the decade period of this study the ADB has provided less 
information. For example, by the end of the decade, it provided very little gender 
analysis of complaints across grounds or areas compared to earlier years.
24
  
 
While it is acknowledged that discrimination agencies such as the ADB are chronically 
underfunded, in an age of increasingly advanced information technology and data 
collection and analysis tools, it should become less labour intensive for the ADB to 
routinely collate and publish a broader base of data. The ADB should also consider 
publishing a user-friendly and accessible register of conciliation outcomes that records 
all conciliated outcomes. This would likely lead to greater transparency, and enable 
easier analysis of the effectiveness of the legislation and the enforcement process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Compare for example the ADB Annual Report 2001-02, 29-30 which provided a gender breakdown by 
ground and area of complaint. However, at the end of the decade period of this study the ADB Annual 
Report 2010-11, 15 no information was provided in relation to the gender make up of complaints across 
grounds or areas. 
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2.2.4 ADB Complaint Files: The Carers’ Complaints Data Set 
 
Under the AD Act, a complaint may be lodged against a person alleged to have 
contravened the legislation. The person making the complaint is called the complainant 
and the alleged contravener is called the respondent. A complaint must be in writing but 
need not take any particular form; however, the vast majority of carers’ complainants 
used the standard copy complaint form provided by the ADB.
25
 During the period of 
this study, the ADB carers’ complaint files typically consisted of original or hard copies 
of documents created or received by the ADB during a complaint, including the written 
complaint; correspondence from the ADB to the parties; file notes and telephone notes 
created by complaint handlers; formal recommendations made under the AD Act by 
complaint handlers, who are delegated powers under the AD Act;
26
 a record of the 
conciliation conference, if held (which can sometimes record nothing more than who 
attended, and the outcome, including any terms of agreement or a copy of the 
conciliation agreement);
27
 and finally, any other documents or other evidence produced 
by the parties or any third party. 
 
The complaint process at the ADB is not conducted in public and as noted above, the 
ADB, in exercising its complaint-handling function, considers that it is a private and 
confidential process. This prevents public scrutiny of the ADB’s process. Since 2005, 
these principles of privacy and confidentiality have been expressly embedded under 
s 124A of AD Act via specific secrecy provisions in place so that complaint files and 
information provided to the ADB cannot be disclosed except in certain circumstances.
 28
  
                                                 
25
 See s 89(1) of the AD Act .The ADB provides a standard complaint form see Anti-Discrimination 
Board of NSW, Complaint Form (2013).  The review of the complaints demonstrated that 498 out of 520 
complaints utilised the standard complaint form.  In the remaining 22 complaints the complaint was made 
by letter. At the time of writing the ADB accepts complaints by email but does not provide an on-line 
lodgement service. 
26
 Complaint handlers are delegated certain powers in relation to investigation and conciliation from the 
President under section 94C. However, where the decision making power is not delegated, the President 
in practice makes a decision based on a written recommendation from the complaint handler, and also the 
Manager of the Complaints branch.  For example, in practice, a written recommendation is made in 
relation to a decision to accept a complaint that is lodged outside the 12-month time limit under s 89B, or 
to decline a complaint or to refer a complaint to the Tribunal under ss 92(1) and 93A. This 
recommendation will be prepared by the complaint handler. The President of the ADB may then agree or 
disagree with it. 
27
 See n 20 above. 
28
 See generally ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 3.  Section 124 A(3) of the AD Act provides that 
‘A person to whom this section applies must not, either directly or indirectly, make a record of, disclose 
or communicate to any person any information to which this section applies unless it is necessary to do so 
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In addition, the ADB is regulated by privacy legislation, which controls and restricts 
access to, and disclosure of, personal information such as that contained in complaint 
files.
29
 Clearly, complaint files are an important primary resource from which to assess 
for example, who uses the legislation and how effective Part 4B has been for complaints 
enforcing their rights under the AD Act; however, accessing them is problematic. 
 
In Section 2.6, the considerable barriers to accessing discrimination complaints for 
academic research purposes are explained. However, in summary, pursuant to Ethics 
Protocol 13083, issued on 28 September 2010 by the University of Sydney HREC, and 
in accordance with the confidentiality agreement into which the writer personally 
entered with the ADB, the access was granted to carers’ complaint files made to the 
ADB even though the parties to the complaints had not provided express consent and 
consent could not be implied. Access was granted to original hard copy files on site at 
the ADB offices. The files were not de-identified and were inspected in their original 
complete form, other than the redaction or removal of health records, which was a 
condition of the HREC protocol.
30
 It was also a condition of the protocol that only 
complaint files that were no longer open and had been finalised at the ADB could be 
reviewed.
31
 Therefore, although the annual reports record that 555 carers’ 
discrimination complaints were lodged, at the time the complaint files were inspected 
for this research project, some were still open and were therefore ineligible to be 
included in the research study. 
 
Of the complaints made on the ground of carers’ discrimination between 1 March 2001 
and June 30 2011,
32
 524 satisfied the HREC criteria and were therefore eligible to be 
included in the research project. However, four complaints files could not be located by 
the ADB and were not reviewed. Therefore, 520 out of 524 eligible complaints, 
                                                                                                                                               
for the purposes of, or in connection with, the exercise of a function under this Act or is otherwise 
permitted by this Act.’  
29
 See above n 5. 
30
 See the HRIP Act n 5 above which defined health information. 
31
 See Chapter 1, at 1.4.2. In summary, complaints are ‘finalised’ and closed at the ADB when the 
‘outcome’ was that: 1) the complaint was not accepted for investigation at lodgement, or was declined 
thereafter; or 2) did not proceed; or 3) was settled; or 4) was referred to the Tribunal for a hearing..  
32
 See n 1 above. 
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representing more than 99.2% of all carers’ complaints lodged, and finalised by 30 June 
2011, were reviewed and were included in the study.
33
 
 
In total, 517 complaints were from individual complainants. Sixteen individual 
complainants lodged two carers’ complaints each, usually because different incidents of 
discrimination had occurred or because discrimination was continuing since the first 
complaint was lodged, or two respondents were involved, such as after a change in 
business ownership, or where the allegations involved a second party, such as an 
employment agency or qualifying body as well as the employer. No complaints were 
brought against individual co-workers.
34
 In relation to the three non-individual 
complaints, although the ADB does allow for group or representative complaints, only 
one group complaint was made during the decade: a complaint by a trade union on 
behalf of six women. In addition, one complaint was lodged on behalf of a married 
couple, and one was from a trade union on behalf of a woman. 
 
In summary therefore, ADB complaint files are an important primary source that detail 
who has used Part 4B, how they have engaged with it and to what effect. The 
complaints data set is significantly wider than the 12 cases heard at the Tribunal. It 
provides greater scope for valid and generalisable conclusions to be made and to answer 
the research questions, particularly about the effectiveness of the complaints process 
and the outcomes achieved. The findings of the empirical, qualitative and quantitative 
research are presented in detail in Part V of this thesis.  
 
2.2.5 Experiential Insights as a Qualitative Research Method 
 
An additional and supplementary source of qualitative information about the operation 
of Part 4B is the personal experiences and observations of the writer. The writer worked 
                                                 
33
 Further, it should be noted that there appeared to be several duplicate files that had been included in the 
figure of 555 complaints. This may be a result of the file ‘counting’ system operated at the ADB. For 
example, sometimes a single complaint file would be allocated multiple file numbers without any clear or 
apparent reason. The writer took a common sense approach. For the purposes of this research, such 
multiple files opened at lodgement were counted as one complaint, unless it was clear that they related to 
separate respondents or separate incidents of discrimination.  
34
 Under Part 4B the statutory duty holder is the employer, and there is no provision in Part 4B to allow a 
complaint to be brought against a co-worker. Compare, for example, with the sexual harassment 
provisions under s 22B(6), which covers ‘workplace participants’.  While the aid and abet provision in s 
52 would enable a complaint to be made against an individual in some circumstances it was not used in 
this way during the decade.  
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at the ADB for a decade, between 2000 and 2010, coinciding with the vast majority of 
the period of this study. The writer was employed as a senior legal officer, including 
three years, in 2000–2003, specifically to assist with the implementation and operation 
of the carers’ responsibility provisions in its first year, and between 2007 and 2010, as 
the ADB’s principal/sole legal officer. The legal role included providing internal advice 
and support to the ADB, the president and its staff.
35
 It also involved assisting in the 
drafting of education publications. Externally, legal, policy and law reform advice was 
provided to the government, the public, private and community sectors, and individuals 
about discrimination law.
36
 
 
The writer also spent several periods of approximately three years in total as a 
complaint handler/conciliator at different stages throughout the decade. This role was 
responsible for investigating and conciliating complaints of discrimination. In 
particular, a complaint handler had day-to-day conduct of the investigation and 
conciliation of complaint files made on all grounds, including carers’ discrimination. 
Further, the writer conciliated complaints as a sole conciliator but also co-conciliated 
with at least 10 other complaint handlers, thus witnessing firsthand other conciliation 
approaches. Complaint handler duties also included being rostered to undertake regular 
duty on the telephone enquiries lines. 
 
These personal experiential observations may help to explain any ambiguities that the 
primary source documents do not adequately explain and can enhance our 
understanding of the operation of the ADB’s statutory functions, especially the 
complaint-handling process, during the research period. These observations may help to 
supplement and therefore to triangulate the data found in the primary sources relating to 
the operation of the ADB’s statutory functions. In particular, there are several 
challenges for the empirical researcher in relation to assessing complaint files that will 
benefit from the writer’s personal insights.  For example, the ADB has significant 
discretion to devise its own complaint-handling practices and policies. As Chapman 
pointed out, the ‘NSW legislation, in common with other Australian discrimination 
                                                 
35
 Part 8 of the AD Act provides that the ADB shall be made up of 5 members including the President 
appointed by the Governor. In practice it meets throughout the year.    
36
 After the 2003 restructure of the ADB, which is reported in the ADB Annual Report 2003–04, the legal 
and policy department was abolished, leaving only one legal position to undertake all legal and policy 
functions of the ADB. 
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statutes, contains broad directives rather than detail on complaint handling procedures’ 
and is ‘open-textured in the sense of leaving much of the procedures of “investigation” 
and “conciliation” to the discretion of the … Board’.37  For example, there is no 
statutory requirement that the complaint or conciliation process is confidential and 
private, or that the ADB’s role is one of an impartial facilitator.38 Instead, this is how 
the ADB has, over the years, decided to utilise its statutory powers. It can be difficult to 
identify what the ADB’s practices and policies are if they are not recorded in a central, 
accessible location. Publications such as the Complaining Factsheet
39
 provide only a 
very broad insight into the procedural steps that are taken. While the writer was 
employed at the ADB, such practices were often not collated into a single document or 
location. In particular, between 2001 and 2011, the ADB operated without a formal 
‘complaint-handling manual’ for its staff.40  
 
It can also be difficult for the empirical researcher to generalise about the nature of the 
complaint process because each individual conciliation officer’s preferences and 
particular style of investigation and conciliation can often vary immensely, and this is 
not always apparent from the documents on the complaint file. In the writer’s 
experience, most conciliation officers at the ADB in the research period had 
considerable experience, sometimes over decades, working in the role and tended not to 
be micromanaged by the management level. Therefore, the individual complaint handler 
generally had a significant degree of autonomy and personal discretion as to, for 
example, how proactive his or her role was during the process.  
 
A related problem for the empirical researcher is that there is very often little 
consistency in terms of record keeping and how much information is recorded on the 
complaint file by the individual conciliation officer. Some complaint handlers made 
copious almost verbatim notes while others record the briefest details. Inadequate record 
                                                 
37
 Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 3, 327. The complaint-handling processes and practices 
described by Chapman in this 2000 study were still largely being followed during the first decade of 
carers’ responsibility discrimination, between 2001 and 2011. 
38
 ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 3. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Chapman ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 3. Chapman referred to the ‘complaint-handling manual’, 
which she accessed at that time. Prior to 2001, the complaint-handling manual provided a detailed guide 
to staff to try and ensure the consistency of the statutory complaint process. However, in 2001 the ADB’s 
manual was withdrawn in order to be updated. This process was not completed until 2010-11.  The ADB, 
Annual Report 2010–11, 3, noted that the manual was completed ‘as a guide to staff who are investigating 
and conciliating complaints’.    
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keeping can make a comprehensive analysis of the complaint files, and the ADB’s role 
in the process, quite difficult.
41
 This is particularly the case in relation to recording what 
occurred at the conciliation conference and in private sessions with the parties before, 
during and after the conference.  In the writer’s experience, some conciliation officers 
were generally wary of recording too much detail about conciliation conferences and 
private sessions between the parties at those conferences. Although the admissibility of 
anything said or done was protected ‘in relation to subsequent proceedings relating to 
the complaint’,42 before the secrecy provisions were enacted in 2005, complaint files 
could and were sometimes subpoenaed in other proceedings, most commonly in relation 
to workers’ compensation claims.43 Therefore, there was a concern that information 
recorded on ADB complaint files could be used in other non-related proceedings. On 
those files, the record of the conciliation conference would be likely to be minimalist.  It 
is important to note therefore that written file notes, and especially those relating to 
conciliation conferences and private sessions held between the parties during the 
conference very often will not provide a complete picture of this important part of the 
process and, in particular, do not adequately reflect the ADB’s role in providing advice 
and guidance to the parties during the conciliation process, for example, in relation to 
their rights and responsibilities under the AD Act, as well as settlement negotiations.
 
The 
writer’s experiential insights into such matters are intended as a supplementary source 
only, which may help to clarify aspects of the practical application of the complaint-
handling practices and processes
44
 that are not apparent from the primary sources 
outlined above: ADB annual reports, publications and complaint files. The potential 
bias of the writer is addressed below at 2.7. 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 See two studies of AD Act complaints: Anna Chapman and Gail Mason, ‘Women, Sexual Preference 
and Discrimination Law: A Case Study of the NSW Jurisdiction’ (1999) 21 Sydney Law Review 525, 526; 
Louise Thornthwaite, ‘The Operation of Anti-Discrimination Legislation in NSW in Relation to 
Employment Complaints’ (1993) 6(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 31, 33–4. 
42
 Section 91A(4). 
43
 Prior to the insertion of the secrecy provisions in the AD Act under s 124A taking effect in 2005, 
complaint files were often required to be produced under subpoena or notices to produce in other 
proceedings. In the writer’s experience, the ADB successfully resisted such subpoenas and notices, which 
were withdrawn by the applicant. After 2005 the ADB was still regularly served with notices to produce 
or subpoenas which were usually withdrawn by the applicant once the relevant provisions under s 124A 
where cited. 
44
 See Chapter 9, at 9.3.3 where the writer provides personal insights into the process at the conciliation 
conference. 
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2.3 Secondary Sources: The Literature Review Identifying Gaps in 
Knowledge 
 
Part II of this thesis provides a detailed literature review of academic writings as well as 
reports and policy documents relating to workplace discrimination against worker–
carers. The literature review explains the prevalence and nature of carers’ discrimination 
and identifies the role of the standard discrimination model found under Part 4B to 
address these issues.
45
 It explains the limitations, as well as the potential of 
discrimination laws to tackle carers’ discrimination at work. 46  
 
It is argued that generally, the academic discrimination law literature on family and 
carers’ responsibilities in Australia has often provided an essentially positivist analysis 
of the operation of the various statutory provisions, and how they have been interpreted 
and applied by courts and tribunals.
47
 The period of this research project has also been 
marked by a period of ‘judicial conservatism’48 and by a regressive interpretation of key 
definitional issues by the courts, in relation to the application of direct and indirect 
discrimination provisions, with significant negative ramifications for victims of 
                                                 
45
 See the Introduction to Part II which provides a summary of the literature in relation to Part 4B.  
46
 See for example, Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 9, 88 the complaints have been made either on the 
ground of sex discrimination or under specific carers’ or family responsibilities provisions. See also, for 
example, K Lee Adams, ‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 
263 (‘Defining’); Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7, providing an overview of work and family case 
law in Australia.  
47
 The literature is canvassed in detail in Chapter 4, but see, for example: Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 9, 26 
334–353; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7; Belinda Smith, ‘From Wardley to Purvis—How Far Has 
Australian Anti-Discrimination Law Come in 30 years?’ (2008) 21 Australian Journal of Labour Law 3 
(‘Purvis’) at 4-5 she notes that ‘the potential of anti-discrimination laws to change behaviour and 
transform norms certainly does not depend solely upon the content or judicial interpretation of the 
particular rule that prohibits discrimination’ She notes that judicial interpretation is not the only site of 
norm elaboration but it is the most public and important one.’ See also Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, 
‘Family Friendly Work Practices and the Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 395; K Lee Adams, ‘The 
Problem of Voluntariness: Parents and the Anti-Discrimination Principle’ (2003); Adams, ‘Indirect 
Discrimination’, above n 7; Dominique Allen, ‘Reducing the Burden of Proof in Australia’ (2009) 31 
Sydney Law Review 579 (‘Burden’). Some commentators have also examined other aspects of the 
operation of discrimination law: for example, see Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 9, 88, examining the 
operation of the complaint-handling function in Victoria; and Smith, who has considered alternative 
regulatory approaches: Belinda Smith, ‘It’s About Time—For a New Regulatory Approach to Equality’ 
(2008) 36 Federal Law Review 117; Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) 
Sydney Law Review 689 (‘Bathwater’).   
48
 Jill Murray, ‘Work and Care: New Legal Mechanisms for Adaptation’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and 
Industry 67, 74. 
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discrimination.
49
 This has deeply concerned many commentators, and caused Adams to 
suggest that work and family discrimination law provisions are ‘just not working’.50   
 
It is also generally acknowledged in the literature that discrimination laws, which have 
never ‘represented a blueprint for radical change’,51 have not and cannot, on their own 
dismantle deeply entrenched and gendered ‘ideal worker’ norms.52 These norms are 
identified as the root causes of discrimination against worker–carers and a barrier to 
substantive equality.
53
  However, the literature review concludes by acknowledging that 
discrimination laws do still have an important role to play. In particular, it is suggested 
that an express duty of reasonable accommodation with the burden of proving why the 
responsibilities cannot be accommodated would make discrimination laws more 
effective in meeting the objectives of the carers’ discrimination legislation.54  
 
The role that the first stage of the statutory complaint mechanisms can have in providing 
an informal process for worker–carers to try to avoid the breakdown of the working 
relationship, and to negotiate a timely resolution of a complaint where complainant 
wants an accommodation of their responsibilities, has not been well considered in the 
literature.
55
 This thesis addresses some of these issues in the context of whether the AD 
                                                 
49
 See for example the High Court decision in Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174;  See also the State of Victoria 
v Schou [2004] 8 VR 120 (‘Schou’); and also the disability in education High Court decision in Purvis v 
New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92. Chapter 4 also provides a discussion of the relevant literature. See 
for example, Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal in the World of Work: Two Significant Developments in 
Australian Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of Labour Law 199, 203 (‘Fair and Equal’); 
Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 47; Adams, ‘Defining’, above n 45; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 
7;  Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 9, 327, 353; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above 
n 7. 
50
 Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 7, 18. Note that, as outlined in Chapter 4, Chapman is more 
optimistic in her assessment of some of the Tribunal decisions in relation to Part 4B: Chapman, Working 
Paper, above n 7. Part IV of this thesis considers specifically how this judicial conservatism affected the  
carers’ decisions. 
51
 Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 102 (‘Promise’). 
52
 See Chapter 3 generally for a review of the literature explaining the nature, causes and effects of 
discrimination against worker–carers.  
53
 Natalie Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Work, Life and Care in 
2012—The Australian Work and Life Index (Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2012) 
13–4. See, for example, Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 47; Belinda Smith, ‘Time Norms in the Workplace: 
Their Exclusionary Effect and Potential for Change’ (2002) 11(2) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 
271; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 9; Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Right to Request 
Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 116; Chapman, Working 
Paper, above n 7; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 7. 
54
 See in particular, Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 7; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7 as discussed in 
Chapter 4, at 4.4.3.  See generally Chapter 4 at 4.5.  
55
 See Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’ above n 9; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 7, 61–2.   
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Act has provided an effective enforcement mechanism for worker–carers through the 
two-stage enforcement process. 
 
It is also noted that the operation of carers’ responsibility provisions under Part 4B of 
the AD Act has generally received very limited attention in the literature in the years 
since the provisions were introduced in 2001.
56
 There have been no empirical studies of 
complaints to the ADB under Part 4B. Bourke’s 2004 study of the new carers’ 
legislation in NSW was limited to the early years after the legislation was introduced.
57
 
Some of the 12 Tribunal decisions have however been considered in the literature.
58
 
Chapman, in particular, has considered the Tribunal case law and the operation of Part 
4B and has suggested that unjustifiable hardship
59
 provisions may ‘take effect to impose 
an obligation on employers to accommodate’ caring responsibilities.60   
 
In conclusion, Part II of this thesis will demonstrate that there are significant gaps in the 
broad academic literature about the operation of Part 4B.  
 
2.4 A ‘Law in Action’ Theoretical Lens 
2.4.1 Tribunal Decisions and the Tip of the Iceberg 
 
It is widely accepted that, in reality, very few people who suffer discrimination will 
actually go on to make a statutory discrimination complaint, and only a very small 
proportion of those who do will ever reach a public hearing and determination. As 
demonstrated in Table 2.3 above, the rate of referral to the Tribunal for all complaints 
lodged as reported in ADB annual reports between 2000–01 and 2010–11 was 16%, and 
the average rate of referral for carers’ complaints was 13%. These referral rates in NSW 
                                                 
56
 See, for example, Bourke, above n 7; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 
7; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 7. 
57
 Bourke, above n 7. She considered both the operation of the complaint-handling function based on data 
provided in ADB annual reports and also review of the work and family cases, including Gardiner v New 
South Wales WorkCover Authority [2003] NSWADT 184 (‘Gardiner No 1’), the only case to be heard 
under Part 4B at that stage in 2004 by ADT.  
58
 See for example, Bourke, above n 7; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7; Anna Chapman, ‘Schou’, 
above n 7; Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 7. 
59
 AD Act ss 49U, 49V(4). 
60
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 7, 5, 26–7; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 7, 13, 41; Bourke, above n 
7, 33. 
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are higher than the 5% to 6% referral rate that is often cited in the discrimination law 
literature.
61
  
 
Yet, as noted above, our understanding of the operation of discrimination laws in the 
academic literature on work and care—and any assessment of who is using the law and 
how effective discrimination laws have been or can be in the future—often depends 
upon an analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and/or an analysis of this very 
small number of tribunal decisions.  A positivist understanding of the law based upon 
12 Tribunal carers’ cases cannot necessarily be taken to be representative of how 
worker–carers and employers are engaging with their rights and obligations ‘in action’. 
In reality (as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below, which summarises some of the key findings 
about the outcomes of carers’ complaints arising from the empirical study), the vast 
majority of carers’ discrimination complaints made under Part 4B, 87% over the decade, 
have in fact been dealt with privately and confidentially at the ADB.  
 
2.4.2 Law in Action and New Legal Realism 
 
Roscoe Pound, in the early 20th century, noted the differences between ‘law in books’ 
and ‘law in action’, and the American legal realist Karl Llewellyn conceptualised the 
difference between statutes or common law rules and judicial decision-making—what 
he called the ‘paper rules’ on the one hand and the ‘real rules’ or ‘working rules’ on the 
other ‘in action’ or ‘in context’.62 Statutes and case law provide a doctrinal explanation 
of the law but do not completely explain how the law works, nor can they predict how 
the law will work ‘in action’ because there will be many other factors and, importantly, 
many other ‘actors’ in play that will affect how the law is actually given meaning, and 
applied in practice in society. Since the mid-1990s, there has been recognition in the US 
                                                 
61
 Hunter and Leonard estimated that only around 5% of complaints lodged under anti-discrimination 
legislation in Australia are actually referred to a tribunal or court for hearing, and many of these settle 
before pre-hearing: Rosemary Hunter and Alice Leonard, ‘The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex 
Discrimination Cases’ (Working Paper No 8, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, 1995) 1, (‘Outcomes’). In 1993, Thornthwaite put the 
figure at 6% for employment complaints referred in NSW in the first 10 years of operation of the AD Act: 
Thornthwaite, above n 41. See also Anna Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 3, 322; 
Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 9, 89. 
62
 The phrase ‘law in action’ is usually attributed to Pound’s distinction between what he called law in 
books and law in action: Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law 
Review 12. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step’ (1930) 30 Columbia 
Law Review 431, as discussed by John M. Breen, ‘Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn’ 
(2000) 33 Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 263. 
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of the development of overlapping academic movements, a ‘New Legal Realism’ and 
‘Legal Empiricism’, both of which trace their roots to legal realists like Llewellyn; and 
both of which rely on a ‘methodological eclecticism’ embracing varied empirical 
quantitative and qualitative research methods with the aim of understanding how the 
law works in practice.
63
  
 
‘New Legal Realism’ in particular has been described as embracing ‘a ground level up 
perspective that draws attention to the effect of law on the everyday lives of ordinary 
people’ that is based on a ‘pragmatist tradition’ prioritising ‘action-in-the-world as a 
fundamental source of meaning’ to understand how law is given meaning and to capture 
the ‘messy reality of law as it actually works’.64  George, Gulati and McGinley argue 
that: 
The Legal Realists’ original idea was to understand the law by looking at how 
it worked in the real world … it was more oriented to studying the law from 
the bottom up … it was not about understanding judicial behaviour in the court 
context, but rather about the operation of the law in context.
65
   
They explain that we ‘are interested in the … people who are acting in the shadow of 
the law. How do they perceive that shadow? How do they talk about it? Does the law 
guide and influence their actions in the way that legal scholars assume?’66  
 
It is argued in this thesis that a positivist theoretical approach that relies only upon an 
                                                 
63
 Mark C. Schuman and Elizabeth Mertz ‘Towards a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies 
and the New Legal Realism’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 555, 562, and 555-56. 
This article provides an overview of the development of these two related and overlapping academic 
movements in the US over the last decade. To understand how the theoretical approach works in practice 
see for example Tracey E. George, G. Mitu Gulati and Anne McGinley, ‘The New Old Legal Realism’ 
105 (2011) Northwestern University Law Review 689, who used qualitative interviewing techniques to 
examine how an employment discrimination decision relating to personal grooming requiring female bar 
tenders to wear make-up was understood locally by interviewing judges, lawyers and employees.  The 
purpose of the research was to add to ‘our knowledge of the relevance of case law by focusing on … how 
pronouncements about employment discrimination by the appellate courts translate into understandings 
and behaviours of employees, employers and their attorneys.  As our lens we use evidence of how people 
talk about the relevance of changes in the law.’: 692. In comparison, others such as Thomas J. Miles and 
Cass R. Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’ (2008) 75 University of Chicago Law Review 831, 831-832 
identify the birth over the previous decade of a ‘New Legal Realism’ based upon quantitative research 
methods testing competing hypotheses about the role of law and judicial decisions with reference to 
quantitative and ‘testable hypotheses and large data sets.’ In this article they seek to test models of 
judicial behaviour based upon large datasets for example relating to the decisions of Democratic and 
Republican nominees. 
64
 Schuman and Mertz, ibid 561-562.  Note that George, Gulati and McGinley, ibid 696 use the term ‘the 
New Old Legal Realism’ as a ‘revival of the original Legal Realist ideas [because]… Like Llewellyn we 
want to look at the law and “[h]ow it has been working.”’  
65
 691-692 
66
 George, Gulati and McGinley, ibid 696. 
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analysis of the statutes and/or court and tribunal decisions cannot provide the complete 
picture as to how discrimination laws operate in practice, particularly given the statutory 
schemes that they set up. Discrimination laws such as the AD Act establish statutory 
agencies such as the ADB that, in practice, exercise their statutory functions in the 
‘shadow’ of tribunal and court decisions. These agencies are important ‘actors’ that are 
broadly responsible for the administration of the legislation and have several key 
statutory functions, including public education and complaint handling, through which 
they interpret and apply the legislation on a daily basis. A ‘law in action’ lens can shine 
a spotlight on both the complaint-handling and the education functions of the ADB, 
where a different set of ‘real’ or ‘working’ rules operate concurrently to those operating 
at the Tribunal. Crucially, while the ADB takes its lead from and is guided by, and 
sometimes restricted by, the relevant court and tribunal decisions, it has no adjudicative 
functions. It is argued in Part V that, free of the constraints of an adjudicative function, 
the ADB, through its statutory functions, has often pursued a purposive policy-driven 
approach to the interpretation and application of Part 4B: to prevent discrimination, 
achieve substantive equality by ensuring greater accommodation of worker–carers and 
provide an effective enforcement complaints process.  
 
In addition, worker–carers and their employers are also important ‘actors’ interacting 
with, giving meaning to and using the legislation every day in NSW.  Unlike the 
Tribunal or ADB, they have no regulatory power, but they do engage with and exercise 
rights and obligations on a daily basis. They seek advice and guidance from the ADB by 
calling the enquiries line or they access publications, or the ADB website. They are also 
parties to statutory complaints under the AD Act, and sometimes proceed to the Tribunal 
for a hearing of their complaint.  
 
2.4.3 What ‘Action’ Is Being Evaluated? The Limitations and Practical Realities of 
the Tribunal and ADB Complaints Data Set 
 
Outside of any interaction with the ADB or Tribunal, employers and worker–carers also 
engage with their rights and obligation under Part 4B at the workplace level on a day-to-
day basis. However, in the absence of broad qualitative studies across different groups 
in society or at the workplace or organisational level, it can be difficult to assess in any 
meaningful way how the law is understood and what normative effect it has had in 
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action at that level in society.
67
 Without such studies, it is not clear that worker–carers 
across NSW have been encouraged to seek, or employers encouraged to provide, greater 
flexibility or accommodation of caring responsibilities specifically as a result of Part 
4B.
68
  Further research is clearly required in relation to these aspects of how Part 4B is 
understood and applied ‘in action’ more broadly at the ‘ground’ level by workers and 
employers.
69
  This study paves the way for such an empirical study at the organisation 
or societal level to understand how Part 4B is understood and applied building upon this 
project’s empirical and theoretical ‘in action’ framework.   
 
Denzin and Lincoln have recognised the practical realities when data sources and 
research methods available are limited and noted that, to an extent, the ‘choice of 
research practices depends upon the questions that are asked, and the questions depend 
on their context, what is available in the context, and what the researcher can do in that 
setting’.70 While the 520 carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB may represent the tip 
of the iceberg of discrimination against worker–carers in NSW, these complaints do 
provide us with an important broad data set, spanning a decade, from which to gain an 
insight into the operation of Part 4B at the workplace level. They also provide us with 
an insight into how the enforcement process has operated for worker–carers.  A ‘law in 
action’ mixed methods quantitative and qualitative review of the 520 carers’ complaints 
made to the ADB that are ‘available’—representing an analysis of just over 99% of the 
carers complaints’ made during the decade—will provide much broader data and a 
much broader insight to evaluate effectiveness of the operation of Part 4B, than relying 
                                                 
67
 Rice has noted that ‘we have little understanding of whether and how anti-discrimination laws … result 
in broader understanding of the aims of the legislation, and in consequent changes in behaviour’: Simon 
Rice, ‘And Which “Equality Act” Would that Be?’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), Sex Discrimination in 
Uncertain Times (ANU E Book, 2010) 197, 207.  But see, for example, the empirical analysis of the 
effect of the right to request (‘RTR’) flexibility under s 65 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) in 
the first years after its introduction, contained in two reports: Fair Work Ombudsman, Requests for 
Flexible Working Arrangements and the National Employment Standards (Fair Work Australia, 2013) 
(‘Requests’); and Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 53;  
68
 For example, Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 53, 61–62, demonstrated that workers in 
Australia are routinely requesting flexibility at work and having it granted. This suggests that a new norm 
of providing flexible work or reasonable accommodation exists or is developing in at least some 
workplaces. However, there is nothing to indicate that this is as a result of discrimination laws or the 
operation of Part 4B. 
69
 Compare for example the empirical research which has been undertaken in relating to the RTR under 
the FW Act above n 67. 
70
 Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage, 4
th
 ed, 
2011) 4; See also Schuman and Mertz above, n 63, 562 noting in the context of New Legal Realism, that 
‘Rather than pre-ordaining a preferred methodology NLR scholars argue that research methods should be 
chosen to match the kinds of questions being asked.  Given NLR’s interest in ground-level experience, 
this methodological eclecticism inevitably embraces qualitative as well as quantitative work.’  
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solely upon an analysis of 12 Tribunal decisions.  The empirical review of ADB 
complaints will provide a more complete understanding of how workers–carers and 
their employers are engaging with their rights and obligations, under the AD Act, and 
with what success, on a day-to-day basis. 
 
2.4.4 The Merits of a Realist ‘Law in Action’ Lens  
 
A ‘law in action’ empirical review enables the writer to draw robust and generalisable 
conclusions about the operation of Part 4B. The empirical findings are presented and 
analysed in more detail in Part V of this thesis, but some key findings are presented here 
by way of illustration, to demonstrate how a realist lens provides a more complete 
picture as well as a very different understanding of the operation of Part 4B in practice, 
than a positivist analysis of the Tribunal decisions alone would suggest. The complaint 
outcomes at the Tribunal and ADB are compared through a through a gender and care 
lens to illustrate the important gender and care dimensions of who is using the law and 
with what success which is not necessarily evident from an analysis of the Tribunal 
decisions alone.  
 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the three distinct levels at which Part 4B operates and 
illustrates how a law ‘in action’ takes a wider bottom-up approach to the operation of 
the law.   
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Figure 2.1: A Bottom-Up ‘Law in Action’ Approach to Complaints under Part 4B 
 
Tribunal Adjudicative Function: A ‘Tip of the Iceberg’ Analysis 
 
67 complaints, or 13%, referred by the ADB to the Tribunal for hearing  
12 complaints, or 2%, reach a hearing 
Only two complaints, <0.5% of 520 complaints, upheld: 
 
 Compensation of $16,385 was the only remedy in one complaint: Reddy v International Cargo 
Express [2004] NSWADT 218. 
 In the other case, Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group [2005] NSWADT 294, no remedy was awarded 
for carers’ discrimination. 
The ADB Complaint Function: A ‘Law in Action’ Empirical Analysis 
 
Out of 520 complaints 435 complaints, or 87%, finalised at the ADB and proceed no further. 
 
281 complaints or 54% settled:  
 
 160, or 31% of all carers’ complaints, settled with some form of accommodation, so that the 
employee remained in work (29% of complaints from women and 35% of complaints from men). In 
some cases, complainants also received other remedies including compensation or an apology. 
 276 complainants (274 individuals and two trade unions representing workers) were seeking an 
accommodation. Some form of accommodation was a remedy in 160 of the 276 complaints, 
equating to 58% of all complainants who wanted an accommodation achieving one (56% of 
complaints from women who wanted an accommodation and 61% of men who wanted an 
accommodation). 
 121 complaints, or 23%, settled with a remedy other than accommodation, mainly compensation.  
 56 of the settled complaints, or 11% of all 520 carers’ complaints, resulted in a potentially broader 
systemic outcome, such as a policy change or training. 
 
 
  
 
 Still in the ‘Shadows’ Part 4B and the Workplace Level 
 
Worker–carers and employers engage with rights and obligations under Part 4B on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Tribunal decisions and ADB education and complaint-handling function may have a normative effect to raise 
awareness of rights and obligations, to encourage compliance and to change workplace behaviours. If a 
dispute cannot be resolved, a complaint may be made to the ADB. 
 
There is no known study or research undertaken in relation to the operation of Part 4B at this level. This task 
is outside the current research project. 
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As noted, at the bottom very little is known about the day-to-day interactions of 
employers and employees in the context of Part 4B. In contrast, at the other extreme, the 
12 Tribunal decisions, which are in the public domain, represent just the tip of the 
iceberg in terms of our knowledge and understanding of how Part 4B operates.  Out of 
520 complaints, 67 or 13% of all carers’ complaints were referred to the Tribunal, but 
only 12 or 2% of the 520 carers’ complaints lodged reached a hearing at the Tribunal. 
Only two complaints out of 520, or 0.5% of all carers’ complaints lodged, resulted in a a 
finding of discrimination being made at a hearing at the Tribunal.
71
 In only one 
complaint during the decade was compensation awarded for carers’ discrimination. The 
other 10 complaints to reach a hearing were all dismissed.
72
 Out of the remaining 55 
referred complaints that did not reach a hearing, it is not known what happened in 53 of 
those complaints. Some complaints may have been discontinued or withdrawn, or 
settled at the Tribunal. The Tribunal process did provide for opportunities to mediate or 
resolve complaints pre-hearing,
73
 and it is to be expected that some of those complaints 
that did not reach a hearing may have settled. This indicates another aspect of the two-
stage complaints enforcement mechanism that has received only limited attention in the 
literature, and requires further research.
74
 
 
In the middle, a ‘law in action’ empirical review of the ADB complaints files provides 
an opportunity for a more optimistic assessment as to the effectiveness of the 
enforcement process under the first stage of the complaint process as it relates to Part 
4B. Out of 520 complaints, 435 or 87% were finalised at the ADB, where 281, or 54% 
of all complaints settled, and 160 or 31% involved some form of accommodation, and 
56 complaints or 11% involved a potentially systemic outcome. 
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 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 and Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218.  
72
 See Table B, in Appendix B for a summary of all twelve cases heard at the Tribunal.  
73
 The formal practices and procedures of the Tribunal during this decade are not dealt with in any detail 
in this thesis. The process did involve an option for mediation and settlement, pre-hearing. The Tribunal 
process involves the usual steps of litigation, for example, setting case conferences, mediation, a 
timetable, pleading a case, evidence and the hearing. See the carers’ case of Woodward & Anor v Coolan 
Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] NSWADT 286, in which the complainants discontinued the proceedings, but the 
case provides an insight into the Tribunal’s pre-hearing process at that time, and the steps that the parties 
are required to take in the period after the complaint is referred to the Tribunal for a hearing. See Neil 
Rees, Katherine Lindsay and Simon Rice, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Federation Press, 2008), 645–7, for a summary of the pre-hearing process at that time. 
74
 Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime 
(Themis, 2010), 6–7, (‘Enforcing’). 
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Gender, Care and Outcomes at the Tribunal 
 
Commentators often rely upon reported court and tribunal decisions to indicate 
generalised trends in the operation of discrimination law in relation to who uses the law 
and what they complain about.
75
 A gender and care analysis of the Tribunal carers’ 
decisions demonstrates that 10, or just over 83%, of the 12 Tribunal cases came from 
women. Eight—just under 66%—related to mothers caring for children (three of those 
relating to a return from maternity leave,
76
 and the other five relating to care for school-
age or adult children
77
). The remaining two cases from women related to care for 
elderly parents in one case,
78
 and care for elderly parents and an adult sibling in the 
other.
79
 Only two cases, or just under 17% of the 12 cases heard at the Tribunal, came 
from men, both relating to care for a partner.
80
 No complaints from fathers were heard 
by the Tribunal. In terms of outcomes by gender and care, both cases where a finding of 
discrimination was made related to women who had lost their jobs after requests for 
part-time post-maternity leave were refused; accommodation was not sought as a 
remedy and was not appropriate because the complainants had left employment before 
they lodged complaints and were not seeking reinstatement. The remedies ordered were 
low compensation of $16,385 in Reddy and none for carers’ responsibility in Tleyji.81 
 
The facts and outcomes of the Tribunal decisions may lead to several assumptions about 
the operation of Part 4B, including, for example, first, that men and, in particular, 
fathers are either not suffering carers’ discrimination or not using Part 4B to assert their 
                                                 
75
 Bourke, above n 7, 64 noted that work and care cases ‘demonstrate a narrowness in terms of the 
complainants’ profiles (namely women) and types of caring responsibilities (young children). This is not 
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rights; second, that complainants are unlikely to succeed with their complaints; and 
third that even if they do it is likely that any remedy awarded will be inadequate 
compensation, and not an accommodation of their responsibilities. 
 
Gender, Care and Outcomes at the ADB 
 
Table 2.4 compares the gender and caring responsibilities of the 12 complainants that 
proceeded to a hearing at the Tribunal with the 520 complaints lodged with the ADB. It 
demonstrates how the complaints heard at the Tribunal do not reflect the fact that more 
than one-quarter of all complaints lodged at the ADB came from men. While none of 
the cases heard at the Tribunal were from fathers, 93 complaints, or 18% of all carers’ 
complaints lodged, came from fathers caring for children. The empirical review of the 
ADB carers’ complaints also demonstrates that in 26 complaints, or 31% of all father 
complaints, the men were sole parents, or were separated or divorced from a former 
partner. This suggests that many fathers who complain to the ADB are in effect primary 
carers for their children for all or part of the time through shared care or other formal 
and informal parenting agreements, which places the same pressures on them as those 
usually faced by mothers seeking to combine paid work with their status as primary 
carers at home. These important gender and care dimension of the operation of Part 4B 
are simply not reflected in the 12 cases heard at the Tribunal.  
 
Table 2.4: Comparison of Complaints Heard at the Tribunal and Complaints 
Made to the ADB by Gender and Caring Relationship 2001–2011 
Caring Relationship 
Complaints at 
Tribunal  
Complaints at the 
ADB  
 N  As % 12 N As % 520 
Mothers maternity related  3  25 153  29.4 
Mothers not maternity related 5  41.7 201 38.7 
Grandmother/other parental female carer  0 0.0 8  15.3 
Female carer for adult family member (not a child of the 
complainant) 
2  16.7 20  3.84 
Female Totals  10  83.3 382  73.4 
Fathers  0 0.0 93  17.9 
Grandfather/other parental male carer 0 0.0 2  0.4 
Male carer for adult family member (not a child of the 
complainant) 
2  16.7 34  6.5 
Male caring relationship not identified 0 0.0 6  1.2 
Male Totals  2 16.7 135  26.0 
Totals  12  100 517* 99.4 
* Note that three complaints, <1%, related to complaints that were not from an individual: two from trade unions 
and one from a married couple.  
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Similarly, the Tribunal cases are not representative of, and do not show the nature or 
extent of the outcomes and remedies achieved by many complainants under Part 4B.  
Table 2.5 presents the settlement rates for male and female complainants at the ADB 
and illustrates, that in particular, that men and women are using the complaint process at 
the ADB to achieve settlements, including accommodations, with 29% of women and 
35% of men achieving some sort of accommodation that enabled them to stay in work.  
 
Table 2.5: Settlement Rates and Accommodation Rates as a Percentage of 
Complaints by Gender 
Settlement Outcome Female  Male  
N As % 382  N As % 135  
Settled with accommodation 110 28.7 48 35.5 
Settled with some other remedy 105 27.5 16 11.9 
Total settled complaints and 
average settlement rate  
215 56.2 64 47.4 
 
The empirical findings suggest that some male worker–carers at the workplace level are 
recognising that they have caring responsibilities for children and adult family members 
that may conflict with work commitments.  They are aware that Part 4B may apply to 
help them balance work and care commitments and are willing to ask for some form of 
accommodation of their responsibilities. They are also willing to enforce their rights and 
lodge a complaint if the request is refused. Another important aspect of the empirical 
study in relation to remedies, which is not evident in the Tribunal decisions, is that in 56 
complaints, equating to 11%, the ADB achieved a potentially systemic outcome such as 
a policy change or training of staff that might have great potential in providing greater 
substantive equality for other worker–carers more broadly. 82 
 
In conclusion, a ‘law in action’ theoretical lens provides a much broader understanding 
of how the key actors—the Tribunal, ADB, employers and complainants —engage with 
and give meaning to Part 4B, as well as some insights into the contemporary nature of 
work and care conflicts at the workplace level. A ‘law in action’ lens also suggests a far 
less pessimistic assessment of the capacity and potential of discrimination laws to 
achieve greater equality for worker–carers.  The empirical review of the ADB’s 
education function, and its complaints process and outcomes outlined in Part V of this 
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thesis suggests that, when compared with the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, the ADB’s 
purposive approach to Part 4B, and its complaint process may help to prevent 
discrimination at the workplace level, and may also help to achieve workplace 
accommodation and greater substantive equality for some worker–carers.  
 
2.5 The Methodological Framework: A Four-Step Framework to 
Assess Effectiveness 
 
The aim of the research project is both exploratory and explanatory: to provide a more 
complete explanation and analysis of the operation and effectiveness of Part 4B with 
reference to the ADB and Tribunal functions over the first decade of its operation. It is 
well recognised in the literature that evaluating the effectiveness of discrimination laws, 
establishing an appropriate methodology and selecting appropriate research methods to 
make this assessment can be problematic.
 
Whatever methodology and research methods 
are devised and whatever research questions are chosen to evaluate effectiveness, none 
will provide an unequivocal or unambiguous measure.
83
 However, the rigorous four-
step methodology explained below will provide answers that will help to provide a more 
complete picture of how Part 4B operates in practice, who is using it, what they are 
complaining about, how the enforcement process works and with what effect, with 
specific reference to the Tribunal and ADB.  
 
 
2.5.1 Beth Gaze—Context, Interpretation and Effectiveness 
 
The writer has formulated a four-step methodological framework and research design to 
answer the two broad research questions. The formulation of this framework has been 
heavily influenced by Gaze’s 2002 work considering the context, interpretation and 
effectiveness of anti-discrimination laws in Australia.
84
 Gaze acknowledges that 
discrimination laws can provide an important normative tool to change social practices. 
However, she also notes that it can be difficult to assess the success of discrimination 
laws, which fundamentally aim to change attitudes, behaviours and these social 
practices: 
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111 
 
Discussion about the difficulties of using law to effect social change makes 
clear that it is no foregone conclusion that having legislation in place to 
prohibit discrimination will eliminate discrimination totally, substantially, or 
even to a significant degree. Law can at best deter a practice. Legislation 
aiming for social change can operate at both instrumental and symbolic levels, 
changing actual practices or social understandings. However, a law which is 
relatively ineffective at the instrumental level may not have much impact at 
the symbolic level at which people understand what social practices are 
acceptable.
85
 
She notes that:  
Evaluating the effectiveness of legislation aiming to achieve social change is 
unavoidably problematic. Should we look at the outcomes of cases brought 
under the legislation, or complaint rates and the outcomes of conciliation 
(given that they are decided in the shadow of the law), or general statistics 
concerning the reduction of inequalities in society at which the legislation is 
aimed? The meanings of all these are subject to interpretation, and none 
provides an unambiguous measure.
86
 
However, she does suggest that any assessment of effectiveness will depend upon 
identifying what the aims of the legislation are: 
When anti-discrimination laws were passed in a more optimistic era, it was in 
recognition of widespread discriminatory practices in society that should be 
prevented. It is implicit that our current social structures and practices are the 
result of such discriminatory practices. But what is not clear is how far it was 
intended that these laws should actually bring about change in those social 
structures and practices. The effectiveness of the legislation in achieving its 
aims may depend on identifying exactly what those aims are in order to guide 
its interpretation and application. It may also be necessary to assess how 
capable the legislative scheme is of delivering them.
87
  
In noting that ‘it may also be necessary to assess how capable the legislative scheme is 
of delivering’ the aims of the legislation,88 Gaze also flags that an evaluation of 
effectiveness may also lead to recommendations for improvements to the current 
statutory scheme or its operation. For example, such recommendations may relate to 
identifying specific law reform, if necessary, to make the law more ‘capable’, or may 
relate to recommendations for improvements in how the law is implemented in practice. 
Such recommendations could therefore relate to both substantive and procedural aspects 
of the operation of the law. 
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2.5.2 Applying the Four-Step Framework and the Structure of the Thesis 
 
Building on Gaze’s insights, the writer has formulated the following four-step 
methodological framework to answer the research questions. Steps 1–3 are used to 
answer the first research question (how have the ADB and the Tribunal interpreted and 
applied Part 4B through their respective statutory functions, and does this give effect to 
the policy objectives of Part 4B?). Step 4 is used to answer the second question (does 
the two-stage enforcement process provide an accessible and effective enforcement 
mechanism for worker–carers in NSW?). 
 
Step 1: Identify the objectives of the legislation: In the absence of an objects clause for 
Part 4B, or explanatory memoranda, this will require identifying the objectives from the 
relevant policy sources. 
Step 2: Statutory analysis: To establish whether the legislation on its face gives effect 
to, or is ‘capable’ of giving effect to, the policy objectives of Part 4B; and whether 
substantive law reform could assist in making the legislation more ‘capable’ of meeting 
the objectives.
89
 
Steps 3: Identify the relevant primary sources to understand how the legislation has 
then been interpreted and applied by the Tribunal and the ADB according to their 
statutory functions. The aim is to assess whether their interpretation gives effect to the 
policy objectives of Part 4B, and whether the operation of these functions could be 
made more effective in meeting the policy objectives.  
Step 4: Design and formulate an empirical ‘law in action’ study to assess the 
effectiveness of the enforcement process. The aim is to compare and contrast the 
Tribunal and ADB approaches, with reference to two criteria (process and outcomes) 
from which robust and generalisable conclusions evaluating effectiveness can be 
reached. 
 
 
2.5.3 Evaluating the Enforcement Process: Step 4 
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In evaluating how effective the two-stage complaint process has been for worker–carers, 
two criteria are suggested: first, the accessibility of the enforcement process and, 
second, the nature of outcomes and remedies achieved at the Tribunal and ADB 
respectively. Why these two criteria were selected to compare and contrast the two 
stages of the enforcement process is now explained. 
 
In designing the empirical study of the 520 complaint files to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the enforcement process, it was first necessary to establish what specific criteria 
would be used to make this assessment. Given the general human rights objectives of 
discrimination laws, it is important to remember that the key rationale of the two-stage 
complaint regime used in Australian discrimination laws was to provide informal, low-
cost access to justice for victims of discrimination. The intention was to provide an 
alternative to traditional litigation through the courts, in recognition of the fact that 
those individuals were often already marginalised members of society.
90
 It was intended 
to provide an effective enforcement mechanism for individuals with limited means, to 
reduce adversarialism and to serve the public interest in social harmony.
91
 In light of 
this rationale underpinning the two-stage enforcement process, the writer suggests that 
an effective discrimination law enforcement process must provide, as a minimum three 
factors:  
 
1) A comprehensive and consistent statutory framework 
 
The discrimination legislative provisions (both substantive and procedural) and 
processes put in place under the legislation must be understandable, consistent, and 
accessible.  Worker–carers must be able to easily understand how and in what ways 
they are protected and, importantly, what they need to do if they feel that they have been 
discriminated against. Similarly, employers must be able to understand their legal 
obligations, and how to implement them to comply with the law. It is demonstrated 
throughout this thesis that the substantive provisions under Part 4B are extremely 
complex, and based on direct and indirect discrimination provisions that are difficult to 
understand. There is also a potential but confusing defence of unjustifiable hardship, 
and the provisions in Part 4B may possibly imply a duty of accommodation, in certain 
                                                 
90
 See generally Thornton, Promise, above n 51, 173 and ch VI.  
91
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 74, 9. 
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circumstances, but this is open to interpretation.  Chapter 1, at 1.7 summarised the 
provisions at Part 4B. 
 
2) An informal and accessible enforcement process 
 
At both stages of the enforcement process, complaint-handling agencies and tribunals 
must operate to give effect to the intention of discrimination legislation and to provide 
informal, low-cost access to justice for victims of discrimination. To be effective, both 
stages of the complaint process must be fair, easily understandable by the parties, and 
timely. They must also be free or very inexpensive. At the first stage, complaint-
handling agencies such as the ADB must be well resourced to provide expeditious and 
informal processes. Such agencies must guide the process, which must not be applied 
too rigidly and must offer some degree of flexibility to meet the needs of the parties. 
They should provide advice and assistance to the parties and in doing so should try to 
ensure outcomes that are consistent with the objectives of legislation. Thornton has 
noted that Carmel Niland, an early president of the ADB, took the view, that the ADB 
must take ‘an active rather than a passive role, in protecting the rights of the parties … 
and ensure a resolution which conforms with the legislation’.92 At the second stage, 
respondents, who are often better resourced than complainants, are often legally 
represented. In this context, in the absence of freely available legal assistance for 
complainants, the Tribunal must proactively provide guidance and assistance to 
complainants to ensure that they are not disadvantaged by an overly adversarial and 
formal process. 
 
3) Access to an appropriate remedy 
 
The enforcement process must provide access to an appropriate and suitable remedy. 
For example, compensation is the usual remedy in decided tribunal and court cases in 
the discrimination jurisdiction, and as outlined in Chapter 1, these awards are often 
notoriously low. However, in complaints of carers’ discrimination, complainants may 
specifically want an accommodation of their caring responsibilities, not just 
compensation. In theory, accommodation as a remedy is available at both stages of the 
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process at the ADB and Tribunal.
93
 In reality, whether accommodation is a practical 
remedy will depend upon whether the employment relationship can be maintained 
through a dispute-resolution process under the AD Act. Therefore, factors such as 
timeliness and informality of each stage of the process, which would encourage 
proactive resolution to maintain the relationship, will be key determinants affecting 
whether accommodation will be a practicable or realistic remedy.  
 
In addition, s 108(3) of the AD Act provides that the Tribunal can make an order ‘that 
affects persons other than the complainant’, suggesting the potential for orders that 
could provide broader or systemic remedies and outcomes.  In practice, however, in the 
period of this research project, there is no evidence that the Tribunal ever utilised this 
provision in relation to carers’ complaints or any other complaints. In contrast, 
complainants at the ADB routinely achieve remedies through conciliation involving an 
outcome with potentially broader effect at the workplace level.   
 
 
2.5.4 Three Criteria to Evaluate Effectiveness of Part 4B Process, Outcomes and 
Normative Value 
 
It is suggested that the effectiveness of Part 4B can be evaluated in relation to three 
criteria as to whether the ADB and Tribunal have interpreted and applied the law to 
further the stated policy objectives and with what effect: first, the accessibility of the 
process for complainants; second, the availability of ‘good’ outcomes; and third, the 
broader normative value arising from the operation of their respective functions, which 
affects how law is given meaning and understood from the bottom up by the key 
‘actors’.  
 
1) Do the respective stages of the enforcement process provide access to justice for 
worker–carers?  
 
To determine this, carers’ complaints are analysed to demonstrate, first, how accessible 
the formal adversarial process at the Tribunal is for complainants when compared with 
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the less formal process at the ADB. Factors such as procedural formalities, informalism 
versus adversarialism, timeliness, a requirement for legal representation and the 
financial cost of the respective processes for the parties are considered.  
 
2) Do the respective stages of the enforcement process provide ‘good’ outcomes for 
worker–carers?  
 
It is suggested that what makes a ‘good’ outcome can be assessed quantitatively, in 
terms of complaint resolution rates, and qualitatively, in terms of the nature of the 
remedies that may be achieved. In particular, when a worker–carer wants an 
accommodation, it is necessary to evaluate which stage of the complaint process, at the 
ADB or the Tribunal, will offer the best hope of achieving this outcome. Also 
considered is whether either stage of the process has provided the opportunity for a 
broader or systemic remedy such as a policy change that may have great potential in 
providing greater substantive equality for other worker–carers more broadly. 
 
3) What is the normative value of the ADB and Tribunal approaches to Part 4B? 
 
This criterion seeks to crystallise the key messages, in lay terms, that come from the 
ADB and Tribunal, as they are likely to be understood by the key ‘actors’: employers, 
and worker–carers who are involved in the implementation of rights and obligations 
under Part 4B on a day-to-day basis at the workplace level.  The aim is to identify and 
evaluate these key messages from the perspective of whether first, they are likely to 
encourage employers to implement their obligations properly, especially in relation to 
reasonable accommodation and deter them from breaching the law; and second whether 
they are likely to encourage worker–carers to both exercise and enforce their rights 
under Part 4B.
94
  
 
 
2.5.5 Applying the Four-Step Framework: Research Design, Methods and Data 
Sources 
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Table 2.6 now summarise the application of the framework to answer the research 
questions. Several sub-questions are also identified in relation to each of the four steps.  
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Table 2.6: The Four-Step Framework, Research Design, Methods and Data 
Sources 
Step Purpose Sub-questions Answer location, 
research method 
and/or data source 
Literature  
Review 
 
Identify nature, causes 
and negative effects of 
workplace 
discrimination against 
worker–carers. 
 Part II 
Chapter 3 
 
Explain the standard 
discrimination law 
model; both its defects 
and potential to tackle 
workplace 
discrimination. 
 Chapter 4 
1 Identify the policy 
aims and objectives of 
Part 4B and AD Act.  
What are the policy sources and how 
are the policy objectives articulated? 
 
What are the key objectives that the 
legislation is intended to meet? 
Part III 
 
Method: Document 
analysis of 
contemporary policy 
sources  
2 Undertake a statutory 
analysis of Part 4B to 
establish whether the 
legislation on its face 
gives effect to, or is 
capable of giving 
effect tothe objectives 
of the legislation. 
Does Part 4B on its face give effect to 
those policy objectives identified in 
Steps 1-2? 
 
If not, are there any specific 
recommendations for statutory 
reform? 
Part III 
 
Method: Statutory 
analysis of Part 4B  
3 Assess how Part 4B 
has been interpreted, 
and implemented by 
the ADB and the 
Tribunal.  
 
Assess the 
effectiveness of the 
legislation to meet its 
policy objectives by 
analysing how the 
Tribunal and ADB, 
respectively, have 
interpreted and applied 
Part 4B.  
 
Assess whether they 
have taken a purposive 
and beneficial 
approach to meet and 
further the policy 
objectives. 
What are the Tribunal and ADB 
statutory functions under the AD Act? 
 
How does each body interpret and 
apply Part 4B through those 
respective functions? 
 
What primary sources are available 
for analysis?  
 
Are the Tribunal and ADB 
approaches to statutory interpretation 
and application different?  
 
How does the ‘law in action’ 
theoretical lens assist in making this 
analysis? 
 
Are the Tribunal and ADB 
approaches consistent with, or do 
they further, the identified policy 
objectives of Part 4B? 
 
Are there any particular 
recommendations, (law reform and 
other non statutory options) that 
could ensure that the Tribunal and 
ADB apply a purposive approach? 
Part IV the Tribunal 
 
Method: Doctrinal 
case law analysis  
 
Source: 12 Tribunal 
decisions  
 
 
Part V the ADB  
 
Method: Document 
and record analysis 
and experiential 
insights 
 
Source: Education 
publications, ADB 
complaint files and 
experiential insights  
119 
 
4 Design and formulate 
an empirical ‘in 
action’ study to 
explain how worker–
carers are engaging 
with their rights under 
Part 4B and with what 
success. 
 
Compare and contrast 
the effectiveness of 
enforcement 
mechanisms at the 
Tribunal and ADB 
with reference to three 
criteria: 
1) Accessibility of the 
process  
2) Outcomes and 
remedies 
3) Normative value 
 
What do the complaints to the ADB 
tell us about who is using the law 
when compared with the Tribunal 
decisions, and with what effect? 
 
How is effectiveness defined and 
what specific criteria will be 
measured regarding:  
 the accessibility of the process 
 the outcomes achieved? 
 
What makes an enforcement process 
‘accessible’? 
 
What makes a ‘good’ outcome? 
 
What is the nature of the complaint, 
e.g.  
 The gender of the complainant 
 The employment context  
 Caring responsibilities  
 Type of discriminatory conduct  
 
How accessible is the two-stage 
complaint-handling process: 
The adversarial process at the 
Tribunal v. the less formal process at 
the ADB  
 
Which process is more likely to 
achieve the best outcomes for 
worker–carers: 
 Quantitatively, in terms of 
complaint resolution rates  
 Qualitatively, in terms of the 
nature of the remedies that may 
be achieved? 
 
When a worker–carer wants an 
accommodation to remain in 
employment, will the ADB or the 
Tribunal offer the best hope of 
achieving this outcome? 
 
Are there any specific statutory 
reform options or other 
recommendations as to how the ADB 
and Tribunal could discharge their 
statutory functions in relation to Part 
4B; and/or the complaint process to 
meet the objectives of the legislation 
better? 
 
What are they key messages to 
worker–carers and employers/ what is 
the normative value?  
Part IV the Tribunal 
 
Method: Quantitative 
and qualitative 
analysis of outcomes 
and processes 
 
Source: 12 complaints 
heard at Tribunal  
 
 
Part V the ADB  
 
Method: Document, 
record analysis and 
experiential insights; 
quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of 
complaints. 
  
Source: ADB 
complaint files and 
experiential insights 
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2.5.6 Complaints Data Collection 
 
As noted, the data set of 520 carers’ complaints will be compared with the 12 Tribunal 
decisions. The data were collected in accordance with the Data Collection and Coding 
Sheet, which is attached at Appendix C. Direct access was granted to the original hard 
copy ADB complaint files, on site at ADB offices over a 12-month period in 2011–
2012.  No identifying information was collected during the process, and any data 
collected were de-identified at source when they were entered directly into an Excel 
spreadsheet in chronological order by date of lodgement when each complaint was 
allocated an identifying research number (‘RN#’). NVivo software was used to assist 
with data analysis. The data collected were analysed to provide a broad quantitative and 
qualitative descriptive overview of the complaints, which is set out in Chapter 9, 
including who the worker–carers were; their gender and the nature of their caring 
responsibilities; their occupation, their employment status, the respondent industry 
group and sector (additional information was also noted, for example, in relation to 
‘repeat players’ or respondents with multiple complaints against them);95 the nature of 
the discriminatory conduct; whether complainants sought accommodation and if they 
achieved one; how and if the disputes were resolved, and if so, the nature of the 
remedies that were achieved; and finally, whether the remedies were individual or 
systemic in nature. Rich qualitative data were collected to illustrate how worker–carers 
and employers understand and interact with their rights and obligations ‘in action’ and 
qualitative case studies and complaint summaries are provided in Chapter 10. 
 
In terms of the enforcement process, key quantitative factors included the informality of 
the process; time taken to finalise a complaint; methods of settlement, for example, 
whether a conciliation conference was held; and whether the parties had legal 
representation. In addition, qualitative case summaries and other information were 
recorded to provide a richer understanding of the complaint process in practice, its 
informality and the ways in which the ADB often expedited the process, especially 
when the complainants wanted to maintain their employment and have their 
responsibilities accommodated.  
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2.5.7 Recommendations to Make Part 4B More Effective 
 
It was noted above that when undertaking the four-step framework it may also be 
‘necessary to assess how capable the legislative scheme is of delivering’ the policy 
objectives.
96
 However, this thesis is primarily intended to provide an analysis and 
evaluation of the operation of Part 4B between 2001 and 2011.  A detailed analysis of 
future statutory reform options requires further in-depth research, including an 
investigation of different legislative approaches in Australia and overseas. In addition, it 
has been widely argued in the literature that the standard Australian discrimination law 
model, such as that found under the AD Act, requires a substantial overhaul and that it 
can only be fixed with extensive substantive and procedural law reform.
97
 The writer 
concurs with the broad assessment that a substantial overhaul of both substantive and 
procedural enforcement aspects of the law is required. It is likely that any such reforms 
would serve to make the operation of the carers’ provisions more effective.  These are 
further aspects of the law which require further research.   
 
This thesis does not have a separate chapter or part dealing with recommendations for 
reform.  Instead, if recommendations are made for specific law reform, or for other 
ways to make the operation of the legislation more effective, they are dealt with briefly 
in each respective part:  Part III considers substantive law reform to Part 4B to make the 
law more effective on its face to meet the policy objectives; Part IV includes 
recommendations for law reform and other recommendations to make the Tribunal’s 
role under the AD Act more effective;
98
 and Part V does the same in relation to the 
operation of the ADB functions.  
 
2.6 Overcoming Barriers to Empirical Research of Complaint Files 
 
There are several serious practical barriers for researchers seeking to access 
discrimination complaint files held by discrimination agencies such as the ADB for the 
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purposes of empirical research.
99
 This is particularly the case for any project that seeks 
to access a large number of files. The barriers to accessing complaint files are outlined 
below, together with an account of the writer’s experiences and the strategy used to gain 
access to the carers’ ADB complaint files. This will illustrate the methodological 
difficulties involved for empirical researchers in the discrimination law field, but will 
also demonstrate some solutions that may assist other researchers in this field.  
 
2.6.1 Confidentiality, Privacy, Ethics and Practical Obstacles 
 
The barriers to accessing ADB complaint files in NSW are both legislative and 
practical, and include: 
 The confidential and private nature of the complaints process at the ADB. 
 The secrecy provisions under s 124A of the AD Act in place since 2005,100 
together with NSW privacy legislation
101
 regulates the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information during and after the complaint process.  The 
effect of which is that consent of an individual is required before their personal 
information can be disclosed.
102
  
 Difficulties in obtaining HREC approval given the ethical concerns relating to 
privacy and confidentiality issues. 
 The expense of undertaking such research. Access to hard copy complaint files 
was required to be undertaken on site at ADB offices. Although around 170 
complaint files were still on site at ADB offices and could be accessed free of 
charge, in total, around 350 files were retrieved for this PhD project from the 
NSW State Government archives where they were being stored. The standard 
fee for file retrieval for a single file was $13.20.  The ADB negotiated a reduced 
                                                 
99
 See, for example, Charlesworth, Sara, Paula McDonald, Anthea Worley, Tina Graham and Alissa 
Lykinna. Formal Complaints of Workplace Sexual Harassment Lodged with the Australian Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunities Commissions 1 July 2009–31 December 2009 (Centre for Work + Life, 
University of South Australia, 2012), 2, noting that, for that particular study of sexual harassment across 
various agencies, when direct access was not granted, this was overcome by staff from the relevant 
commission collecting the data using a proforma. This would not be practical for large-volume research 
such as this project with 520 files. Nor would it be possible when the agency is chronically underfunded, 
such as at the ADB, and in practice is unlikely to have resources available to assist in this way by 
completing the proforma.  
100
 Section 124A(3). See n 28 above. 
101
 The PPIP Act and the HRIP Act. 
102
 To alleviate these privacy issues, since 2010, the standard complaint form contains a consent to 
disclosure for academic research. See the ADB Discrimination Complaint Form n 25 above.  
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rate of $5.50 per file on behalf of the writer. With the reduced rate, the charge 
for file retrieval was still $1,900, paid by the writer, with assistance from a grant 
from the University of Sydney. Without the reduced rate, the fee would have 
been around $4,600.  
 The time-consuming nature of the on-site inspection process when files can 
range from several pages to hundreds of pages, and usually consist of 
handwritten documents and notes which can be difficult to read. The file 
inspection was undertaken over approximately one year, between 2011 and 
2012. 
 The co-operation of the agency, if not its active support, is crucial and especially 
for the purposes of the HREC application.  In addition, at the practical level, 
ADB staff were required to organise file retrieval, and there were physical 
considerations such as making available space for 520 hard copy files to be 
stored and inspected over a year, and in circumstances in which the ADB, like 
many human rights agencies, is chronically underfunded and stretched to 
capacity. 
 
2.6.2 The Human Research Ethics Process 
 
The ADB was strongly supportive of the research project and was willing to provide 
access to the carers’ complaint files as provided for under s 119(1)(h) of the AD Act, 
which provides that the ADB may: 
liaise or collaborate with academics and other persons engaged in carrying out 
. . . research or enquiries relating to discrimination when it considers it 
appropriate to do so and, for those purposes, to facilitate disclosure to those 
persons of information obtained under this Act. 
Although s 124A allows access to complaint files for the purposes of academic research, 
it expressly provides that the ADB must still ensure that it complies with the relevant 
state privacy legislation relating to the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information. In particular, such information should not be disclosed without the consent 
of the individual concerned.
103
 Before granting access to the files for academic research, 
the ADB would need, in practice, to ensure that every person involved in a 
discrimination complaint (complainant, respondent and any third party whose 
                                                 
103
 In NSW, public sector agencies must comply with the PPIP Act and the HRIP Act. 
124 
 
information is contained on the file) had given their express consent to their information 
being disclosed for research purposes. Alternatively, any personal information on the 
file would need to be ‘de-identified’ by an ADB officer prior to access being provided 
to the files. In the writer’s experience, this would require copying of the relevant files 
and redacting of personal information. For a research project involving 520 files, both 
options are likely to be highly impractical, especially given the ADB’s chronic 
underfunding. 
 
To overcome these hurdles, the writer sought to rely upon the Privacy Commissioner of 
NSW Public Interest Direction on Disclosures of Information by Public Sector Agencies 
for the Purposes of Academic Research 2000 (NSW) (‘Public Interest Direction’).104 
This Direction recognises that it is sometimes in the public interest for public sector 
agencies to depart from the NSW privacy legislation to provide access to the agency’s 
records containing personal information for academic research, even though there has 
been no express consent for the disclosure from the individuals concerned. However, 
paragraph 6 of the Public Interest Direction provides that the proposed research must 
be: 
Approved by a committee established for the purpose of giving ethical 
approval to research projects after such a committee has considered the 
privacy implications of the collection and subsequent use of such information 
by the researcher in the absence of express consent 
 
To satisfy the HREC, the writer proposed that she would put in place several data 
collection and analysis safeguards that would protect the identity and personal 
information of any individuals concerned. These safeguards included that none of the 
parties to the complaints, nor any other person noted in the file, was to be identified and 
no identifying information was recorded during the data collection period. The 
complaint files were accessed on site at the ADB offices and all data collected were de-
identified at source at the collection point, and no documents containing personal 
information were photocopied or removed. Each of the 520 files would be given a 
sequential chronological research number (RN#) from the date of lodgement which 
would be used to identify complaints. Therefore, no personal information would be 
recorded at any stage. Nevertheless, the HREC was initially reluctant to approve the 
                                                 
104
 The Public Interest Direction has been renewed annually since 2000. The direction does not apply to 
health information as defined in s 6 of the HRIP Act. 
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research, given the significant privacy issues involved in accessing files when express 
consent to the disclosure was not provided or when personal information was not de-
identified prior to access.  
 
To overcome the concerns of the HREC, the writer made a second submission arguing 
that it was not practicable to seek express consent or to de-identify or redact information 
on 520 files.  The submissions were supported expressly by the ADB because funding 
constraints did not allow it to engage in its own research and it did not have the 
resources available either to de-identify every file or to write to each and every 
identified individual seeking express consent, (for example, it would be necessary to 
identify and write to complainants, respondents and co-workers named on the file, 
witnesses or any other person such as the person who was being cared for). Further, in 
any event, the likely response rate would be low, given that the period of the study 
spanned a decade and it might be difficult to trace individuals. The proposed research 
study was intended to provide a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the entire decade 
to make its conclusions more reliable, valid and generalisable. This would be 
compromised if access was not provided to all complaints made. 
 
It was argued that access to the ADB complaint files should be granted in the public 
interest for several reasons, including that neither academics nor state government 
agencies, including the ADB, have ever engaged in a review of the operation of Part 4B. 
It was also argued that, given the budgetary constraints of the ADB, it was unlikely that 
it would be in a position to undertake such research in the future. It was submitted that 
in weighing up the public interest in allowing the study to proceed on the basis of access 
to all files, as opposed to public interest in protecting individuals who had not provided 
either express or implied consent, the public interest in the project substantially 
outweighed the public interest in the protection of privacy. 
 
The research project was approved by the HREC. In addition to the safeguards 
suggested by the writer, two other conditions were put in place by the HREC: first, 
health information about any person would be removed from the file prior to access 
being granted by the ADB; second, ongoing carers’ complaints were excluded from the 
study. Pursuant to Ethics Protocol 13083, issued on 28 September 2010, and the 
confidentiality agreement entered into by the writer with the ADB, the ADB granted 
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access to carers’ complaint files lodged and finalised.  Access was granted to the 
original complaint files, with no redacting of any personal or other information except 
in relation to health records, which were removed or redacted by ADB staff prior to 
inspection.  
 
In conclusion, there are a number of not inconsiderable barriers that empirical 
researchers will face in trying to access complaint files.  Although access to smaller data 
sets may be easier for the researcher to achieve because it may be possible to obtain 
express consent or to redact personal information, research involving a higher volume 
of complaints, and/or over a longer period may still be problematic.
 
It is likely that the 
ADB’s practice since 2010 of seeking the consent on the ADB complaint form for the 
disclosure of a complainants’ information for academic research purposes may also 
alleviate some of these privacy issues in this regard in the future.
 105
  It is also possible 
for an empirical researcher to rely upon the Public Interest Direction to achieve HREC 
approval so that high-volume complaint files can be accessed in NSW. Even so, the 
empirical researcher must still overcome significant practical difficulties in relation to 
expense, physical inspection facilities, the time-intensive inspection process, and most 
importantly it must ensure the ongoing support of the agency involved for the project.  
 
2.7 Consistency of the Ontological, Epistemological and Axiological 
Perspectives  
 
The research design, methodology and research methods set out above are ontologically 
and epistemologically consistent, based primarily upon an explorative and interpretive 
mixed methods approach. This mixed methods approach provides a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of several primary sources, supplemented by the personal insights of 
the writer and the academic literature. It is based upon an explorative and interpretive 
analysis of the operation of the law, conducted by a writer who is part of the research 
with her own experiences, knowledge and biases.  
 
                                                 
105
 See n 102 above. The consent to disclosure which is now found on the ADB Discrimination 
Complaint Form above n 25, may serve to alleviate some of these pressures, but only in respect of the 
complainant who consents on the complaint form and not any persons who are identified in the complaint.  
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Ontologically, this research project takes the view that the nature of reality is socially 
constructed, founded upon social and cultural interactions between people. The research 
considers the role of socially constructed anti-discrimination laws in the context of long-
entrenched social and cultural norms about work and care. The key focus is the 
operation of a particular statutory scheme in which the ADB and the Tribunal operate to 
discharge their statutory functions, and in which worker–carers and employers are also 
key actors. They have respective rights and obligations under the legislation and interact 
with each other and with the ADB and the Tribunal. The aim is to explore, explain and 
provide insights into how the law is operating ‘in action’, by examining not only 12 
Tribunal cases but also 520 complaints. Epistemologically, given the stated ontological 
viewpoint, the research questions are designed to elicit interpretivist, holistic and 
context-driven responses focusing on effectiveness. A ‘law in action’ lens supports this 
approach, because it aims to provide a more complete and holistic understanding of the 
operation of the law in practice and the role and interaction of the key actors the ADB, 
the Tribunal, employers and worker–carers. 
 
In addition, given that the personal qualitative experiential insights of the writer are 
utilised as a supplementary research method, it is important to understand and identify 
at the outset how those personal insights and inevitable subjectivities are to be dealt 
with in the research process. As Creswell argues, when considering the axiological 
assumptions underlying qualitative research, the writer acknowledges that qualitative 
research is value laden and that biases are present, and the ‘researcher openly discusses 
values that shape the narrative including his or her own interpretation’.106 
Acknowledging the potential bias of the researcher enables the reader to determine how 
much weight to give to this aspect of the research. In this project, the writer has 
professional and personal connections with the ADB and its staff. The writer also 
acknowledges that she has a strong personal, and professional commitment to the aims 
of anti-discrimination legislation, regarding it as an important, if imperfect, tool in the 
fight against discrimination. The stated interpretivist, epistemological and ontological 
approach to this research can accommodate the writer’s experiential insights as a 
supplementary qualitative data source, which may provide a deeper understanding of the 
                                                 
106
 John W Cresswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches 
(Sage, 2
nd
 ed, 2007) 17.  
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operation of the AD Act ‘in action’ and may also triangulate the findings arising from 
the primary documentary data sources.  
 
In summary, the goals of the research questions are to gain an understanding of the 
operation of Part 4B and to examine how effective the enforcement process has been at 
the end of a 10-year period in terms of outcomes and processes. The research 
methodology and methods employed are ontologically, epistemologically and 
axiologically consistent.  
 
2.8 Concluding Comments: The Methodological Framework 
 
This chapter has outlined a rigorous ‘law in action’ theoretical and methodological 
framework to answer the research questions. This thesis will address the substantial 
gaps in our current knowledge, first about the implementation and application of the 
operation of Part 4B, as it is applied by the ADB and the Tribunal through their 
statutory functions; and second how effective the enforcement process has been for 
complainants, and also more broadly, with reference to three criteria in terms of the 
accessibility of the process, the individual and systemic outcomes achieved, and the 
normative impacts.     
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PART II:  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES AND THE 
LITERATURE 
 
Introduction and Overview 
 
 
The anti-discrimination law framework has played a critical role in protecting individual 
workers with family responsibilities and in providing a context within which conflict 
about work and family is negotiated in the workplace,
 1 
as well as providing a 
complaints mechanism and dispute-resolution process. In particular, before the 
enactment of the FW Act anti-discrimination laws provided the main legal arena in 
which individual ‘worker–carers’2 pursued care and family responsibility disputes in 
NSW and throughout Australia,
3
 either on the ground of sex discrimination or under 
specific carers’ or family responsibilities provisions.4 These disputes have often arisen 
                                                 
1
 Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2005) 
23(1) Law in Context 88, 88 (‘Shadow’). 
2
 K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and the Worker-Carer: It’s Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law 
in Context 18’, 19 (‘Indirect Discrimination’). 
3
In addition to individual complaints brought under discrimination legislation, the industrial relations 
jurisdiction also played a critical role in a number of test cases for example, Family Leave Test Case 
(1994) 57 IR 21, and Family Provisions Case [2005] AIRC 692. See Jill Murray, ‘The AIRC’s Test Case 
on Work and Family Provisions: The End of the Dynamic Regulatory Change at the Federal Level’ 
(2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 325. The recent Australian Human Rights Commission 
(‘AHRC’), Supporting Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report (2014), 
Appendix F, 353–66, also notes that increasingly work and family cases are brought either by individuals 
or by the Fair Work Ombudsman under the industrial or employment Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW 
Act’) jurisdiction. See, for example, Ucchino v Acorp Pty Limited [2012] FMCA 9; Fair Work 
Ombudsman v Felix Corporation written judgment awaited; Fair Work Ombudsman v A Dalley Holdings 
Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 509; Fair Work Ombudsman v Wongtas Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 30.  
4
 Part IV of this thesis provides an analysis of the 12 carers’ discrimination cases heard by the Tribunal 
under Part 4B of the AD Act between 2001 and 2011. See also, for example, the long-running saga of New 
South Wales v Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174, as analysed by K Lee Adams in ‘Defining Away 
Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263. In relation to work and family cases in 
other jurisdictions, see especially the reported cases under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘SD 
Act’): Hickie v Hunt and Hunt [1998] HREOCA 8; Escobar v Rainbow Printing Pty Ltd [2002] FMCA 
22; Kelly v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2003] FMCA 584; Mayer v Australian Nuclear Science and 
Technology Organisation [2003] FMCA 209; Thomson v Orica [2002] FCA 239; Song v Ainsworth 
Game Technology Pty Ltd [2002] FMCA 31; Howe v Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] FMCA 242; Iliff v 
Sterling Commerce Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 1960; Sterling Commerce Australia Pty Ltd v Iliff 
[2008] FCA 702. For a summary and analysis of cases in Australian discrimination jurisdictions, 
including the epic saga of State of Victoria v Schou [2004] 8 VR 120, see, for example, Anna Chapman, 
‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre for 
Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) 
(‘Working Paper’); Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and the Case of 
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when requests for flexibility and a workplace accommodation, such as a request for 
part-time work or other flexible work arrangement, have been denied. In spite of the 
burgeoning discrimination law literature about work and family in the past decade in 
Australia the operation of carers’ responsibility provisions under Part 4B of the AD Act 
has however received only very limited attention in the literature in the years since the 
provisions were introduced in 2001. 
 
Bourke, in 2004,
5
 is the only commentator to consider in any detail the operation of Part 
4B, and this study was limited to the early years after the legislation was introduced. It 
included a summary of quantitative data relating to complaints made under the new 
legislation and a review of work and family cases, including Gardiner v WorkCover,
6
 
the only case to be heard under Part 4B at that stage by the Tribunal in NSW.
7
 In 
addition, other commentators have considered some aspects of the interpretation or 
operation of Part 4B, or the Tribunal’s decisions. Chapman,8 Adams9 and Rees, Rice 
and Allen
10
 considered some of the cases heard by the Tribunal and, in particular, 
indirect discrimination case law across Australian jurisdictions more broadly.  
Nevertheless, a complete and detailed analysis of the Tribunal’s approach to the 
interpretation and the application of Part 4B, the operation of its adversarial process, 
and the outcomes of the carers’ complaints heard since 2001 is missing in the literature. 
This thesis will address this gap by providing an analysis of the carers’ cases that came 
before the Tribunal in the period 2001–2011, and by locating the Tribunal’s approach 
within the broader contemporary discrimination law framework in Australia. 
                                                                                                                                               
Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’); Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 
2; Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, ‘Family Friendly Work Practices and the Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law 
Review 395; John von Doussa and Craig Lenehan, ‘Barbecued or Burned? Flexibility in Work 
Arrangements and the Sex Discrimination Act’ (2004) 27 UNSWLJ 892; Beth Gaze, ‘Quality Part-time 
Work: Can Law Provide a Framework?’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and Industry 89. 
5
 Juliet Bourke, ‘Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian Experience’ (2004) 12 
American Journal of Society and the Law 19. 
6
 Gardiner v New South Wales WorkCover Authority [2003] NSWADT 184 (‘Gardiner No 1’). The 
decision was handed down in August 2003, more than two years after Part 4B commenced. 
7
 Prior to 2014, the relevant tribunal with power to adjudicate complaints under the AD Act was the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal.  See Chapter 1, at 1.5.1. 
8
 Chapman has considered many of the carers’ cases that came before the Tribunal: Chapman, Working 
Paper, above n 4. 
9
 See, for example, Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 2, 28–30. 
10
 Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) provide an overview of the ground of carers’ and family 
responsibilities including in NSW at 378–404, and a discussion of Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 
at 390–3, 397–8 and Reddy v International Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218 at 398–9. See also Chris 
Ronalds and Elizabeth Raper, Discrimination Law and Practice (Federation Press, 4
th
 ed, 2012) 19–20. 
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Nor have the carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB been subject to analysis, by the 
ADB, or any other government or non-government agency, or in the academic 
literature. As noted in Chapter 2, other than bare quantitative data provided in ADB 
annual reports, very little is known about the carers’ complaints that have been made to 
the ADB.
11
 The ADB’s complaint-handling function in relation to Part 4B has never 
been considered other than by Bourke, as noted above.
12
 However, the complaint-
handling functions of other discrimination agencies in Australia, and/or the ADB, have 
been broadly canvassed and critiqued in the discrimination law literature. This literature 
provides important insights into the usually confidential complaint-handling process, 
bringing it out of the ‘shadow’13 of discrimination laws. However, these studies are of 
only limited relevance to the operation of Part 4B. They have largely focused on 
analysing the particular jurisdiction, or the effectiveness of a particular agency’s 
complaint-handling processes relating to investigation and conciliation, or the nature of 
the conciliated outcomes under a particular ground, or the effect of another law on 
discrimination complaints.
14
 Different quantitative and qualitative methods have also 
                                                 
11
 See Chapter 2, Tables 2.1 and 2.2, presenting a summary of complaints and enquiries data from the 
ADB annual reports for the period 2000–01 to 2010–11. 
12
 Bourke, above n 4, 19. 
13
 This term is used by Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 1, and Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in 
Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 325 in relation to the first stage 
of the complaints process at agencies such as the ADB. 
14
 In relation to the AD Act and the operation of the complaint-handling function of the ADB, see Anna 
Chapman, ‘Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The Paradox of Informal Dispute Resolution’ 
(2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 22, 321 (‘Complaint-Handling’), which critiqued the AD Act conciliation, 
investigation and complaint-handling processes in some detail. The complaint-handling processes that she 
discussed were, on the whole, still in place during the period 2001–2011, despite amendments to the AD 
Act that took effect in 2005 in relation to complaint handling.  See also Anna Chapman and Gail Mason, 
‘Women, Sexual Preference and Discrimination Law: A Case Study of the NSW Jurisdiction’ (1999) 21 
Sydney Law Review 525, which examined sexuality and vilification in NSW in a small number of 
complaints; Louise Thornthwaite, ‘The Operation of Anti-Discrimination Legislation in NSW in Relation 
to Employment Complaints’ (1993) 6(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 31, considering employment 
complaints made under the AD Act. In relation to other jurisdictions, see, for example, Charlesworth, 
‘Shadow’, above n 1, and Sara Charlesworth, Claiming Discrimination: Complaints of Sex and Gender 
Discrimination in Employment under the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (The Centre for Applied 
Social Research, RMIT University, 2008) (‘Claiming Discrimination’), both of which relate to an 
empirical study of discrimination complaints made over a three-month period in 2004 under the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) as it was then, prior to the enactment of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 
(Vic); Rosemary Hunter and Alice Leonard, ‘The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases’ 
(Working Paper No 8, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, 
University of Melbourne, 1995) (‘Working Paper’), which involved sex discrimination complaints in the 
period 1989–1993 in several jurisdictions in Australia, Victoria, South Australia and the federal Human 
Right and Equal Opportunity Commission but did not include the NSW AD Act jurisdiction; Dominique 
Allen, ‘Behind the Conciliation Doors: Settling Discrimination Complaints in Victoria’ (2009) 18(3) 
Griffith Law Review 778 (‘Conciliation’), considering complaint handling in Victoria between 2006 and 
2007; Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime 
132 
 
been used in these works, including examining complaint files,
15
 interviewing staff at 
statutory complaint agencies, or parties to the complaints,
16
 and observing 
conciliations.
17
 Very often, such studies related to a relatively limited period of time, 
often months, and therefore a limited sample of complaints made over that specified 
period.
18
 Although the studies of Charlesworth
19
 and Hunter and Leonard
20
 concerned 
complaints related to sex discrimination and work and care, neither related to 
complaints made under Part 4B of the AD Act. 
 
These complaint-handling studies do provide important insights into the operation of the 
first stage of the discrimination law enforcement process and, in particular, the 
operation of the relevant practices and procedures commonly adopted in the ‘shadows’. 
Nevertheless, there is a danger in trying to reach generalisable conclusions from these 
studies about the operation of the complaint process in NSW as it relates to the 
operation of Part 4B. Many of these studies were often quite narrowly focused in terms 
                                                                                                                                               
(Themis, 2010) (‘Enforcing’), considering the federal jurisdiction under the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’)/AHRC and the effect of changes to the legislation after 2000; 
Charlesworth, Sara, Paula McDonald, Anthea Worley, Tina Graham and Alissa Lykinna, Formal 
Complaints of Workplace Sexual Harassment Lodged with the Australian Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commissions 1 July 2009–31 December 2009 (Centre for Work + Life, University of South 
Australia, 2012), considering formal complaints of workplace sexual harassment lodged with the 
Australian Human Rights agencies in a six-month period in 2009. See also Paula McDonald and Sara 
Charlesworth, ‘Settlement Outcomes in Sexual Harassment Complaints’ (2013) 24(4) Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 259; Anthea Worley, Sara Charlesworth and Paula McDonald, ‘Why Do 
some Sexual Harassment Complaints Settle While Others Don’t?’ (2013) 38(2), Alternative Law Journal 
96. In the federal jurisdiction, Raymond and Ball considered conciliation at the HREOC (the predecessor 
of the AHRC) in terms of outcomes and process in three articles spanning 2000–2005: Tracey Raymond 
and Jody Ball, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Context of Anti-Discrimination and Human Rights 
Law: Some Comparisons and Considerations (2000) AHRC 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/alternative-dispute-resolution-context-anti-discrimination-
and-human-rights-law2000>; Tracey Raymond and Jody Ball, Dispute Resolution in the Changing 
Shadow of the Law: A Study of Parties’ Views on the Conciliation Process in Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law (2002) AHRC <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/dispute-resolution-
changing-shadow-law-study-parties-views-conciliation-process-federal>; Tracey Raymond and Jody Ball, 
Five Years On: An Update on the Complaint Handling Work of the Australian Human Rights Commission 
(2005) AHRC <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/five-years-update-complaint-handling-
work-australian-human-rights-commission-2005#toc2_3>. 
15
 See, for example, Margaret Thornton, ‘Equivocations of Conciliation: The Resolution of 
Discrimination Complaints in Australia’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 733 (‘Equivocations’); 
Thornthwaite, above n 14; Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 14; Chapman and Mason, above 
n 14; Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 14; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 1; Charlesworth, 
Claiming Discrimination, above n 14; Charlesworth et al, above n 14 (2013).  
16
 See, for example, Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 14; Allen, ‘Conciliation’, above n 14; 
Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 14. 
17
 Thornton, ‘Equivocations’, above n 15. 
18 
See, for example, Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 14; Chapman and Mason, above n 14; 
Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 14; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 1; Charlesworth et al, 
above n 14. 
19
 Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 1; Charlesworth, Claiming Discrimination, above n 14. 
20 
Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 14. 
133 
 
of the jurisdiction, and/or the subject matter of the particular study in terms of the 
ground of a complaint and/or the method employed. 
 
It is clear that, after more than a decade, there is a substantial gap in our knowledge 
about complaints of carers’ discrimination made under Part 4B since the legislation was 
introduced. For example, nothing is known about who complained, what their caring 
responsibilities were, or the outcomes of their complaints. These gaps are not addressed 
in the contemporary literature or elsewhere. Further, in relation specifically to carers’ 
discrimination complaints, it is also hypothesised in this thesis that when a complainant 
is seeking an accommodation of his or her carers’ responsibilities, free, timely and 
informal conciliation can provide a valuable opportunity for the parties to negotiate an 
accommodation, so that the worker–carer can stay in work if that is what he or she 
wants. This aspect of the conciliation process and its particular suitability for those 
complainants who wish to remain in employment has not been well explored in the 
literature.
21
 However, by looking to the works of Menkel-Meadows
22
 and Sturm,
23
 it is 
argued in this thesis that the first stage of the complaint process, such as at the ADB, 
may provide an important ‘problem-solving’24 mechanism for worker–carers to 
negotiate an individual accommodation of their responsibilities, maintaining the 
employment relationship, achieving a measure of substantive equality and sometimes 
with the potential for broader systemic outcomes.
25
  
 
The primary objective of the literature review in Part II of this thesis is to identify the 
gaps in our knowledge about the operation of Part 4B in NSW.  However, as 
Charlesworth has noted work and family ‘[d]iscrimination complaints do not occur in a 
vacuum. They are located in a specific workplace context and in the broader context of 
social and labour market change—and the adequacy of responses by government and 
employers to those changes’.26 Chapman has also noted that ‘it is acknowledged that the 
                                                 
21
 See generally Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 1. See also Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 4, 61–2.  
22
 Carrie J Menkel-Meadows, ‘Dispute Resolution’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 596. See Chapter 4, at 4.3.3for a 
discussion of this work in relation to alternative dispute resolution. 
23
 Susan Sturm ‘Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach’ (2001) 101(1) 
Columbia Law Review 459 and see discussion below in Chapter 4, at 4.4.2. 
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Hunter and Leonard have noted the potential of conciliation to achieve broader systemic remedies: 
Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 14, 27–30.   
26
 Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 1, 96.  
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meaning and utility of all legal rules … is shaped by the context in which they operate. 
This includes the dynamics of individual work relations and broader cultural 
understandings and values of work, care and gender’.27  Therefore, in the light of the 
limited attention that the operation of Part 4B has received generally in the Australian 
discrimination and work and family literature, this literature review also explores the 
issues raised in the discrimination literature about the broader context in which Part 4B 
operates. This context includes explaining the nature, causes and effects of workplace 
discrimination against carers and the role of discrimination law—both its limitations 
and its potential—to address inequality and disadvantage faced by worker–carers. It is 
intended that this broad literature review will provide a deeper understanding of the 
contemporary Australian context in which Part 4B operates, where issues such as 
carers’ discrimination, work and family, and work–life balance are the subject of a wide 
variety of legal and policy approaches in Australia
28
 and overseas.
29
  
 
Chapter 3 presents an examination of the nature, extent, causes and effects of workplace 
discrimination against worker–carers and provides an explanation of the policy 
objectives underpinning discrimination law approaches to work and care. Then, in 
Chapter 4, the limitations, as well as the potential, of the traditional discrimination law 
model found under Part 4B to tackle workplace discrimination against worker–carers 
are examined. It considers whether, and if so how, discrimination laws based on duties 
of restraint and complex concepts of direct and indirect discrimination can have a 
meaningful role in helping to meet the policy objectives of work and family 
discrimination. In particular, the works of Fredman,
30
 Sturm
31
 and Chapman
32
 focusing 
on the role of positive obligations and a legislative duty of reasonable accommodation 
or adjustment within the discrimination law framework will be explored. It will be 
argued that the literature strongly suggests that, substantively, a duty of reasonable 
                                                 
27
 Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 4, 44. 
28
 See, for example, AHRC, Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who Care (2013). 
29
 While the literature review focuses on Australian literature, limited reference is also made to the UK 
and European Union approaches to work–life balance and carers’ discrimination and commentators such 
as Sandra Fredman, Joanne Conaghan and Hugh Collins. The works of several US and Canadian 
academics such as Susan Sturm, Elizabeth Emmens, Shelagh Day and Gwen Brodsky are also cited.  
30
 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2011, 2
nd
 Edition); Sandra Fredman, 
Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008); Sandra 
Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2002); Sandra Fredman, ‘Breaking the Mould: 
Equality and a Proactive Duty’ (2012) American Journal of Comparative Law 60(1). 
31
 Sturm, above n 23.  
32
 Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 4. 
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accommodation may have significant potential to challenge structured and systemic 
discrimination against worker–carers, and that conciliation providing a ‘problem-
solving’ forum, in contrast with the litigious and more adversarial process at the 
Tribunal,
33
 may provide an important option for the resolution of carers’ complaints 
when reasonable accommodation and maintenance of the employment relationship is a 
key goal. 
 
The literature review thus provides the foundational basis for the following chapters in 
this thesis, which explain—and provide the first ever assessment—of the operation of 
Part 4B in NSW during the first decade of the legislation, between 2001 and 2011, and 
the roles of the Tribunal and ADB in this regard. 
 
                                                 
33
 Sturm, above n 23, 458. 
136 
 
Chapter 3: Carers’ Discrimination 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Before considering how effective discrimination law has been, or can be, to address 
workplace discrimination against worker–carers, it is first necessary to identify the 
nature, causes and effects of the inequality that the laws are intended to address. This 
then also provides a more complete understanding of the policy objectives that Part 4B 
of the AD Act is intended to achieve. The chapter is in four parts. 
 
In Section 3.2, the gendered effects of the public/paid and private/unpaid work 
demarcations are explored, as well as the pervasive nature of the deeply entrenched 
‘ideal worker’ norms. Section 3.3 considers whether the ideal worker is ‘alive and 
well’,1 and how relevant ideal worker norms are in the 21st century given major 
demographic changes such as the ‘feminisation of labour’.2 The effects of the ‘big 
squeeze’3 on worker–carers are considered, as well as the growing impetus for greater 
workplace flexibility and accommodation to balance work and care. In Section 3.4, the 
‘rhetoric of choice’4 that often surrounds women’s and men’s decisions about work and 
care is explored, and the gendered effects of those ‘choices’ are examined. Finally, 
Section 3.5 then turns to the literature that considers how employers have responded to 
issues of work, care and flexibility. In particular, this is examined from the perspective 
of benevolent employers seeking to do the right thing, and is also viewed both through 
an ‘economic prism’5 and from the perspective of employers unwilling to give up their 
                                                 
1 
Natalie Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Work, Life and Care in 
2012—The Australian Work and Life Index (Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2012) 
8. 
2
 Barbara Pocock, The Labour Market Ate My Babies (Federation Press, 2006), ch 3, 46 (‘Labour’). 
3
 This phrase is the title of the report of Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1. 
4
 K Lee Adams, ‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263, 282 
(‘Defining’). 
5
 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2011, 2
nd
 ed) 25–6 (‘Discrimination’). 
See generally Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) report summarising the equality and 
business cases: AHRC, Supporting Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review 
Report (2014) 15–22, ch 4 (‘Supporting’); Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) 
Sydney Law Review 689, 690 (‘Bathwater’). 
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closely guarded exercise of managerial prerogative.
6
 In addition, a key theme in the 
literature is identified in relation to the imperative to address hostile workplace 
‘cultures’7 where line managers and supervisors are identified as key players to ensure 
the effective implementation of work–life policies and legislative obligations, such as 
those found under Part 4B.
8
 
 
3.2 ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Distinctions, and Ideal ‘Ideal Worker’ 
Norms 
3.2.1 Public and Private Demarcations in Law and Work 
 
In this section, the nature of the demarcations between public/care work traditionally 
carried out by women versus private/paid work carried out by men is explained. This 
demarcation informs not only the jurisdictional reach of western liberal discrimination 
law in the area of work and employment, but also the ‘ideal worker’ norms explained in 
the following section. For example, although the term ‘public’ life is not actually used 
under the AD Act, Thornton has explained that Australian anti-discrimination legislation 
has always drawn a line between public and private worlds, reflecting the public/private 
split of western liberal traditions.
9
 In the literature, public paid work and private family 
care work are often described as occupying two separate spheres. Work is a key focus of 
discrimination law, but only in relation to paid work in the public sphere.
10
 Under the 
AD Act, the majority of all complaints lodged—usually around 60% each year—relate 
to discrimination in paid employment.
11
 
 
                                                 
6
 Hugh Collins, ‘The Right to Flexibility’ in Joanne Conaghan and Kerry Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work 
and Family: Critical and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2005) 99, 124 
(‘Flexibility’); K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and the Worker-Carer’: It’s Just Not Working’ 
(2005) 23(1) Law in Context 18, 35–41 (‘Indirect Discrimination’). See generally AHRC, Supporting, 
above n 5, ch 4. 
7
 See AHRC, Supporting, above n 5, ch 4, and recommendations aimed at employers: 9–13. 
8
 See, for example, AHRC, Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who Care (2013), ch 10, 
51–2 (‘Investing’). 
9
 Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 1–24, 244, 261 (‘Promise’). See also Anna Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, 
Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) 10–17 (‘Working Paper’); Neil Rees, Simon 
Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Federation 
Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 3–4, 11–16; Fredman, Discrimination (2011), above n 5, 1–8, 18–25. 
10
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 9, 10–17; Thornton, Promise, above n 9, 102. 
11
 Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW, Annual Report 2010–11, 14. 
138 
 
As Chapman noted, the ‘spheres of care and family … in legal philosophy are left 
untouched by legal regulation’.12 Therefore, there is an implicit assumption that paid 
workers in the public world can be dealt with as ‘disembodied from the entire context of 
their lives’13 in the private world. Conaghan and Chudleigh have argued that this 
dominant: 
view of the market and family as two separate and distinct spheres, fails to 
perceive the interaction between the two; how for example, a woman’s role in 
the public sphere is limited and influenced by the domestic burdens she has to 
carry in the private sphere.
14
  
Similarly, Pocock pointed out that, in reality: 
Many Australians live within a complex web of working and home life, where 
caring, reproduction and paid work jostle alongside each other in their 
demands for time, energy and money … Conventional categories of labour 
and economic analysis, which treat paid work as separate from home, life and 
the care that essentially underpins work, are hopelessly inadequate to the task 
of understanding this whole.
15
  
Although carers’ responsibilities discrimination legislation, such as that found under 
Part 4B of the AD Act, does not attempt in any way to regulate the private world of 
unpaid care work, it does blur the boundaries because it recognises and protects private 
care responsibilities. It has the effect in practice of requiring employers to take into 
account the private unpaid caring responsibilities of their employees and it may require 
an employer to accommodate those responsibilities by making adjustments at the 
workplace.
16
 For example, in NSW the factors relevant to the operation of the defence 
of unjustifiable hardship under Part 4B have the effect of requiring employers to 
consider the effect of their actions on ‘any person concerned’, which would include the 
worker–carer and the person being cared for—matters squarely in the private sphere.17 
 
Therefore, Part 4B straddles both public and private spheres, and challenges the 
assumptions of a strict public/private divide. There is an implicit acknowledgement that 
work and family are intertwined areas, which challenges the view of the workplace as a 
                                                 
12
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 9, 11. 
13
 Thornton, Promise, above n 9, 59. 
14
 Joanne Conaghan and Louise Chudleigh, ‘Women in Confinement: Can Labour Law Deliver the 
Goods?’ (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 133, cited in Thornton, Promise, above n 9, 58. 
15 
Barbara Pocock, The Work/Life Collision: What Work is Doing to Australians and What to Do about It 
(Federation Press, 2003) 15 (‘Work/Life’). 
16
 Collins, ‘Flexibility’, above n 6, 124; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 9, 11–12.  See for example, 
the duties of reasonable accommodation or adjustment contained under the EO Act (Vic) and DD Act 
(Cth) as outlined in Chapter 1 at 1.2.3. 
17
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.4. 
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‘discrete and bundled sphere of social and economic activity in which its participants 
are fully and exclusively engaged’.18 
 
3.2.2 The Ideal Worker 
 
The literature has provided a detailed explanation and analysis of deeply entrenched 
ideal worker norms and the subsequent resultant gendered negative effects that are at 
the root of much workplace discrimination against worker–carers.19  These norms 
underpin gendered assumptions about who is responsible for paid public work and 
private care work and the value attributed to each.
20
 Charlesworth has argued that ‘the 
unequal division of labour in the household has proved resistant to change and women 
still shoulder the main burden of unpaid “family work”’ and that ‘while no longer 
representative, the norm of the “ideal worker”, as Joan Williams calls him or the 
“unencumbered citizen” as Sandra Berns calls him is a powerful one’.21 As a result, the 
‘workplace is designed around a worker with the body and societal role of a man, which 
constitutes gender discrimination’.22 Thornton has argued that these ‘work patterns are 
based on the male model’ whereby ‘an employee is expected to show loyalty by 
unlimited availability’ and ‘the labour market is actively hostile to women with 
                                                 
18
 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Women, Work and Family: A British Revolution’ in Joanne Conaghan, Richard 
Fisch and Karl Klare (eds), Labour Law in an Era of Globalisation: Transformative Practices, and 
Possibilities (Oxford University Press, 2004) 53, 56 (‘Women’). See also Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 5; 
Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, ‘Family Friendly Work Practices and the Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law 
Review 395, 426. 
19
 See the recent report from the AHRC, Supporting, above n 5, for example, at 9, 11, 64, for a discussion 
of the effects of these negative stereotypes; Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the 
“Shadow” of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 88, 94–5 (‘Shadow’); Smith, 
‘Bathwater’, above n 5; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 9; Smith and Riley, above n 18, 416; Adams, 
‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 6, 20–1; K Lee Adams, ‘The Problem of Voluntariness: Parents and 
the Anti-Discrimination Principle’(2003) 92 Deakin Law Review 91, 110 (‘Problem’); Anna Chapman, 
‘Work/Family, Australian Labour and the Normative Worker’ in Joanne Conaghan and Kerry Rittich 
(eds), Labour Law, Work and Family: Critical and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 
2005) 99 (‘Work/Family’); Rosemary Owens, ‘Engendering Flexibility in a World of Precarious Work’ in 
Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Hart, 2006) 
329 (‘Engendering’); Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Legal Production of Precarious Work’ in Judy Fudge and 
Rosemary Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Hart, 2006) 283 (‘Precarious’); 
Jill Murray, ‘Work and Care: New Legal Mechanisms for Adaptation’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and Industry 
67 (‘Work and Care’). 
20
 See generally Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 5, 689–90. 
21
 Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 19, 94–5, citing Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Work and 
Family Conflict and What to Do About It (Oxford University Press, 2000) 3 (‘Unbending’); Sandra Berns, 
Women Going Backwards: Law and Change in a Family Unfriendly Society (Ashgate, 2002) 5; Smith, 
Belinda ‘How Might Information Bolster Anti-Discrimination Laws to Promote More Family-Friendly 
Workplaces?’ (2014), 56(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 547, 548-49. 
22
 Joan Williams and Nancy Segal, ‘Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against on the Job’ (2003) 26 Harvard Women’s Law Review 77, 116. 
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childcare responsibilities’.23 She noted that women are considered to have less 
commitment to the paid workforce than men, and it is often assumed they will be less 
satisfactory employees.
24
 Ideal worker norms therefore lead to direct discrimination 
stereotypes against worker–carers, especially women. 
 
Ideal worker norms are also a root cause of indirect discrimination against worker–
carers. Hunter has argued that gendered ideal worker norms have also resulted in 
‘institutional’ or ‘structural discrimination’, which can occur ‘without any wilful act of 
prejudice on the part of employers, but simply by the functioning of labour market 
norms’.25 She noted that ‘it is now well recognised that organisational norms, rules and 
procedures, used to determine allocation of positions and benefits, have generally been 
designed, whether deliberately or unreflectively,
26
 around the behaviour patterns and 
attributes of the historically dominant group in public life’,27 that is, the male 
breadwinner and the ideal worker.  
 
These norms are in turn perpetuated and supported by employers, who often favour and 
utilise high levels of managerial prerogative to make decisions about the organisation of 
work as they see fit in the interests of efficiency.
28
 In the 21
st
 century, workplaces that 
rely upon ideal worker norms are often characterised by ‘inflexible work arrangements, 
work intensification and unsupportive workplace cultures’29—those very issues that are 
the root causes of workplace discrimination against worker–carers.  
 
In Chapter 4 below, it is noted that direct and indirect discrimination legislative 
provisions can help to challenge these ideal worker norms.
30
 For example direct 
discrimination protections can prevent worker-carers from being denied access to a job 
                                                 
23
 Thornton, Promise, above n 9, 59; Rosemary Hunter, Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace 
(Federation, 1992) 4–5 (‘Indirect’)’; Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 5, 689–90, 695–8; Williams, 
Unbending, above n 21, 85. 
24
 Thornton, Promise, above n 9, 58; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 19, 94–5. 
25
 Hunter, Indirect, above n 23, 4–5. See also Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 15–16 (‘Discrimination’). 
26
 The courts have also emphasised that respondents may be in breach of discrimination laws in the 
absence of a discriminatory intent: Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1993) 173 CLR 349, 359 
(Mason CJ and Gaudron J); Purvis v NSW (2003) 217 CLR 92, 142–3 [160] (McHugh and Kirby JJ), 163 
[236] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
27
 Hunter, Indirect, above n 23, 4–5. See also Fredman, Discrimination (2002), above n 25, 15–16; Smith, 
‘Bathwater’, above n 5, 690. 
28
 Collins, ‘Flexibility’, above n 6, 124; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 19, 113–14. 
29
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1, 7. 
30
 See Chapter 4, 4.2 and see also Chapter 1, at 1.2.   
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or being denied a benefit at work such as access to a promotion, or training because they 
have children or other caring responsibilities. Indirect discrimination protections or 
legislation which provides for a duty of reasonable accommodation can also require 
employers to provide workplace accommodations.  Such accommodations could 
include: an employer agreeing to allow part-time work; job sharing; teleworking from 
home; compressed working hours, for example, working five days over four; flexibility 
with start/finish times, rostering or shifts; access to paid and unpaid leave; and ensuring 
access to benefits such as promotion, training, career development opportunities, or 
other benefits.  Policy changes, such as the introduction of flexible work policies, could 
also lead to the dismantling of ideal worker norms in relation to full-time work and 
working hours, and could lead to greater flexibility at the workplace.   
 
3.3 Changing Demographics: Is the Ideal Worker ‘Alive and Well’? 31 
 
Despite the decline of the male breadwinner and the ‘feminisation of labour’, with 
increasing levels of women participating in the workforce,
32
 assumptions that this male 
breadwinner represents the ideal worker remain a pervasive and deeply entrenched 
cultural and social norm in the 21
st
century workplace.
33
 Charlesworth, for example, has 
argued that the dominance of the male-breadwinner model is very much evident in the 
industrial sphere in the provisions of the FW Act relating to work and family.
34
 Skinner, 
Hutchinson and Pocock have also noted that: 
the male breadwinner/female caregiver model of the 20
th
 century is alive and 
well … and many workplace cultures are made in the image of the full-time, 
                                                 
31
 Ibid 8 
32
 Pocock, Labour, above n 2, 48–50. 46–77 where Pocock explains the ‘feminisation of labour’ over the 
past decades, whereby women with caring responsibilities, whether for children or for other people, have 
taken up paid employment: at 46–77. See also Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’) reported: 
A highly significant change over the last thirty years is the increase in the proportion of women in 
paid employment, increasing from 40% of women in 1979 to well over half (55%) in 2009 … Much 
of the growth in female employment has been in part-time and casual jobs. 
ABS, Measures of Australia’s Progress (Catalogue No 1370, 2010) (‘Measures’). 
33
 Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 5, 689–97; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 19; Chapman, Working 
Paper, above n 9; Sara Charlesworth, ‘The Sex Discrimination Act: Advancing Gender Equality and 
Decent Work’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), Sex Discrimination in Uncertain Times (ANU E Book, 2010) 
133 (‘Advancing’); Hunter, ‘Precarious’, above n 19. 
34
 Charlesworth, ‘Advancing’, above n 33, 140. See also Hunter, ‘Precarious’, above n 19, in which she 
argues that labour regulation in Australia has contributed to the gendered nature of precarious work.  
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male worker unencumbered by care responsibilities. Australian women work 
around this image and the practices it embeds.
35
 
They argue that there has been only a ‘partial adaptation’ whereby:36  
The Australian policy environment has adapted to working women around the 
edges—modifying ‘standard’ employment practices, made in the image of 
men without care responsibilities, to provide part-time work and paid parental 
leave for example—but it has not fundamentally transformed to reflect the 
different life-time work and care patterns of most women. Women are 
stretched in light of this partial adaption which leaves them very busy on the 
work and home fronts.
37
 
 
3.3.1 Demographics of Care 
 
The AHRC report Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who Care (2013) 
provides a detailed analysis of the nature of unpaid caring work in contemporary 
Australia, the barriers it creates for the equal participation of worker–carers, and the 
negative social and economic consequences that result.
38
 It estimates that 5.5 million 
men and women between the ages of 15 and 64 have unpaid caring responsibilities (2.5 
million men and 3 million women).
39
 The trend for more and more women to enter the 
workforce—‘the feminisation of labour’40—over the past decades is continuing, and 
women with caring responsibilities, whether for children or other people, continue to 
take up paid employment.
41
 Much of the growth in female employment has been in part-
time
42
 and casual or contingent jobs.
43
 Recent data from the ABS provides that
 
women 
                                                 
35
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1, 8. 
36
 Ibid 7–8. 
37
 Ibid 7 (emphasis in original). 
38
 See, for example, AHRC, Accumulating Poverty: Women’s Experiences of Inequality over the Life 
Cycle (2009) (‘Poverty’), in which the Commission examined the gender gap in retirement savings. 
39
 AHRC, Investing, above n 8, xii–xiii. 
40
 Pocock, Labour, above n 2, ch 3, 46–77. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Regarding the gendered negative effects of the global financial crisis in recent years, see Jenny 
Chalmers, Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Part-time Work and Caring Responsibilities in 
Australia: Towards an Assessment of Job Quality’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and Industry 41; Beth Gaze, 
‘Quality Part-Time Work: Can Law Provide a Framework?’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and Industry 89 
(‘Quality’); Jenny Chalmers and Trish Hill, ‘Marginalising Women in the Labour Market: “Wage 
Scarring” Effects of Part-time Work’ (2007) 33(2) Australian Bulletin of Labour 180; Baird et al, Women, 
Work and the Global Economic Downturn. An Essay Commissioned by the Federal Office for Women 
(2011) 
<http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/women_work_global_economic_dow
nturn_rpt_0.pdf>. 
43
 The ABS reported that, for the period of this research project generally, the number of casuals in the 
workforce is increasing; however, it is increasing at a rate lower than that of all employed persons: ABS, 
Forms of Employment, Australia, November 2011 (2012 Catalogue No 6359.0). In 1998, there were 8.3 
million employed persons of whom the number of casuals was 1.5 million (18% of all employed persons). 
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comprise 45.9% of all employees, of whom 53.6% work full-time (24.6% of all 
employees) and 46.4% work part-time (21.3% of all employees); women also constitute 
69.6% of all of all part-time employees and 55.3% of all casual employees.
44
 Similarly, 
the trend for a move away from male-breadwinner households, at around 30%, to dual 
income households, which stand at more than 60% of all households, is likely to 
increase further, and as a result, the ‘pressures on work and family balance are likely to 
intensify rather than moderate’.45 Pocock estimates that 40% of mothers have returned 
to work before their child is a year old, and this trend continues upward.
46
 It is also clear 
that the nature of workers’ caring responsibilities will continue to change during their 
working life cycle. For example, Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have found that one 
in five workers has caring responsibilities for an adult with a disability or provides elder 
care, and they have described the increasing numbers of workers who are also 
‘sandwich’ carers—often women—who combine two forms of care, for their children 
and for adult family members or friends who are elderly or disabled.
47
  Adams noted 
that, in Australia:  
Government policies designed to push carers into the workforce combined 
with demographic and social forces influencing movement into the paid labour 
market by those with caring obligations …. Suggest that more people in the 
future will experience the pressures of dual roles of working and caring.
48
 
It is inevitable, therefore, given the pressures of demographic changes, that more and 
more workers—men and women—will need to access flexibility to balance work and 
care and employers will have to learn to manage this.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
The proportion of casuals reached a peak of 21% of all employed persons (2.2 million casuals and 10.4 
million employed persons) in 2007, and in 2011, it was at 19% of all employed persons (2.2 million 
casuals and 11.4 million employed persons). More women than men are employed as casuals. The 
proportion of casual females decreased from 61% in 1998 to 55% in 2011, while the proportion of casual 
males increased from 39% in 1998 to 45% in 2011. See also ABS, Measures, above n 32. 
44
 Workplace Gender Equality Agency, Gender Workplace Statistics at a Glance (February 2014) 
<https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/2014-02-10-Stats_at_a_Glance.pdf > (‘Statistics’), citing 
ABS, Labour Force Australia December 2013 (2014, Catalogue No 6202.0); ABS, Forms of Employment 
Australia November 2012 (2013, Catalogue Number 6359.0). 
45
 Pocock, Labour, above n 2, 139–40. 
46
 Ibid 51–2. 
47
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1, 43–4. 
48
 Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 6, 35. See, for example, AHRC, Investing, above n 8; 
AHRC, Supporting, above n 5; Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1. 
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3.3.2 Women: Social and Economic Well-Being 
 
Although men do have unpaid caring responsibilities, women still shoulder the burden 
for the majority of unpaid care work, and while ideal worker norms continue, this is 
unlikely to change.
49
 The negative effects in the long and short term arising from the 
burdens of care are highly gendered.
50
 Women’s unpaid care work is rarely recognised 
as the productive good for society that it is, and that, in reality, it subsidises the paid 
work of the ideal worker.
51
 Women spend significantly more time than men providing 
unpaid care, and as a result, have significantly lower rates of workforce participation 
than men.
52
 Women are also more likely to be working part-time or in casual and more 
precarious employment than men; this is particularly so for mothers.
53
 The AHRC has 
found that ‘many women settle for paid work that is below their skill level or is of an 
insecure nature, such as casual work, as this is the only type of work that provides them 
with flexibility to attend to their parental responsibilities’.54 Jobs that are compatible 
with carers’ responsibilities are often precarious and offer low pay, low security and low 
satisfaction.
55
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 See generally, AHRC, Investing, above n 8; Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Right to Request 
Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 116; Sandra Fredman, 
‘Precarious Norms for Precarious Workers’ in Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens (eds), Precarious Work, 
Women and the New Economy (Hart, 2006) 177, 200 (‘Precarious’). 
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Council of Trade Unions, Australians Want Time to Care: A Summary Report of Views Regarding 
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Therefore, many workers—particularly women—increasingly face the ‘big squeeze’56 
or ‘care crunch’,57 with serious negative economic consequences for example, in terms 
of pay, access to other workplace benefits or adequate retirement incomes. The AHRC 
has also highlighted in detail the serious longer-term economic detriments that arise for 
women during their working life cycle as they move in and out of the paid workforce.
58
 
The literature also highlights the personal and social costs for worker–carers and their 
families. Many worker–carers have high levels of work–life interference and work–life 
stress,
59
 as they ‘struggle to juggle’60 the often competing demands, of work and caring 
responsibilities.
61
 It is reported that women face the highest levels of work–life strain,62 
and because women undertake most of this care work, they are most at risk
63
 of 
experiencing negative effects on their well-being and also on that of their families.
64
 
Well-being in this context does not just encompass physical and mental health, but also 
entails ‘an adequate standard of living, happiness and, in the context of families, close 
supportive relationships and care-giving’.65  
 
The ‘decent work’ agenda of the International Labour Organization (‘ILO’)66 has also 
focused on the close connections between gender discrimination, job quality and 
economic and social well-being. Charlesworth noted that ‘[t]he concept of decent work 
… has the potential to move beyond the confines of the workplace to the “work’s place” 
in personal, social and economic life’.67 In Europe, commentators such as Collins have 
argued that there is a need to achieve better ‘quality’ jobs for worker–carers68 to ensure 
‘social inclusion’ for those worker–carers who contribute so much to the well-being of 
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society, but who are often marginalised and disadvantaged in terms of their social and 
economic well-being.
69
 
 
3.3.3 Men as Worker–Carers 
 
Naturally, the literature often focuses on the disadvantage to women worker–carers 
because women shoulder the burden of the majority of private caring responsibilities in 
society,
70
 and as a result suffer the most discrimination in paid work.
71
 Smith noted that, 
because ‘work-family’ conflict is disproportionately experienced by women, it is often 
characterised as a women’s issue and the work–family debate has therefore revolved 
around ways that women can balance their dual roles in the public and private sphere.
72
 
However, it is becoming apparent that more and more workers, including men, will 
have the dual burdens and challenges of balancing, paid work and unpaid care work in 
the future.  Current ideal worker norms inhibit those men who would like to undertake 
more responsibility for care.  
 
Fredman has noted that ‘the importance of ensuring that individuals can navigate the 
boundary between paid and unpaid work without undue cost cannot be overstated’ 
because ‘[i]t is only then that men will be in a position to move away from the male 
breadwinner model and share the dual responsibilities of paid and unpaid work’.73 
Reflecting this concern, there has also been a focus in the Australian literature on 
strategies and mechanisms to ensure that more men take on a fairer burden of unpaid 
care, for example by encouraging men to request flexibility at work.
74
 Smith noted that 
‘providing family leave benefits and alternative work time options does not guarantee 
that men will take up more of the unpaid family caring work and thereby change the 
sexual division of labour’; nevertheless, ‘such initiatives do contribute to substantive 
                                                 
69
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gender equality by reducing the costs and risks borne by those who undertake the 
traditionally female role of care giving, thereby supporting and validating this work’.75  
 
3.3.4 Normalising Accommodation but Avoiding a New Gendered Norm 
 
Workplace flexibility and reasonable accommodation of caring responsibilities is 
identified in the literature as a key legal and policy strategy
76
 to enable worker–carers to 
combine work and care. The AHRC has highlighted many of the key issues: 
Research shows that access to flexibility in the workplace assists carers to 
remain in and re-enter employment ... Changes to workplace culture, work 
organisation and working arrangements are necessary to support unpaid carers 
and for workplaces to retain their skills and knowledge. If unpaid carers can 
maintain their attachment, or re-enter the workforce, society will benefit by 
drawing on their skills, knowledge and experience, mitigating the negative 
impact on their labour force attachment and life course earnings, and 
capitalising on Australia’s investment in their human capital.77 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have also reported on the benefits of flexibility in 
terms of well-being, noting that when workers had made a request for accommodation 
to help balance work and care responsibilities, ‘[t]he work–life outcomes of those who 
were granted their requests were—not surprisingly—better than those whose requests 
were refused’.78 They also demonstrated that workers in Australia are routinely 
requesting flexibility at work and having it granted. They found that, in 2012, 20.6% of 
Australian workers had made a request for a change to their work arrangements in the 
previous 12 months—just below the level of 22.4% recorded in 2009.79 Further, the 
majority of requests in 2012 (61.9%) were granted, which is comparable to the situation 
in 2009. This suggests that a new norm of providing flexible work or reasonable 
accommodation exists or is developing in at least some workplaces.
80
 They have, 
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however, cautioned that the development of this new norm is, in fact, highly gendered—
women are twice as likely to make a request as men, and men are more likely to have a 
request for accommodation refused;
81
 further, it is limited to certain types of 
‘workplaces where flexibility was not unusual and managers and workers accepted the 
need for flexibility as normal rather than exceptional’.82 Therefore, it appears that this 
acceptance is in fact often very gendered in its application and, in reality, is also often 
limited to such workplaces that are likely to be in the public sector or in larger 
workplaces. 
 
Given that it is often the case that men are reluctant to seek flexible work, Charlesworth 
and Campbell have expressed particular concern that work and family regulations 
providing for a right to request (‘RTR’) flexibility or reasonable accommodation will in 
effect result in a highly gendered take-up of flexible work, which in practice can have 
the effect of further embedding gendered working time norms with negative effects for 
women.
83
 The challenge then will be, first, to encourage and enable men, and not just 
women, to achieve flexibility and, second, to change the attitudes of those organisations 
that are not supportive of flexibility.
84
  
 
3.4 The ‘Rhetoric of Choice’85 
 
Smith has noted that work–family conflict is often a conflict of time, or rather time 
norms,
86
 reflecting that ‘such practices often are so embedded and routine that no one 
thinks to question them. They are just the way things get done’.87 As noted ideal worker 
norms have led to stereotypes, and negative assumptions about the commitment and 
competency of workers who cannot or do not comply with those norms.
88
 How women 
and men manage to combine work and care to meet these time norms is often thought of 
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in terms of individual choice, where for example, having children is considered a 
private lifestyle choice
89
 and where the real-life pressures on worker–carers are thus 
ignored. Assumptions and presumptions about the ‘choices’ that worker–carers have 
made in the past, or have open to them in the future, is a major cause of discriminatory 
practices against worker–carers. In her study of carers’ complaints made under the 
Victorian legislation, Charlesworth found that requests for accommodation or flexible 
work are seen as emanating from ‘individuals ‘‘choices’’ to take on both family work 
and market work … Work organisation and task allocation appear to be naturalised and 
employees can ‘choose’ to fit in or not.’90  
 
3.4.1 Women and ‘Choice’  
 
Smith has summed up women’s ‘choices’, equating to three options: 
[W]omen can, for instance, ‘choose’ to comply with the long-hours norm, by 
outsourcing their domestic and caring responsibilities, or by not having 
children. Alternatively, they can ‘choose’ to remain in their traditional role of 
stay-at-home carer and housewife, underutilising their qualifications and 
facing economic and social risks. Or, they can ‘choose’ to do what most 
women do in Australia—undertake the bulk of domestic and caring work and 
accept the jobs that conflict least with these responsibilities.
91
 
Women are unable to reach their ‘capacity to realise the personal and financial benefits 
of engaging in quality, well-paid jobs over the life cycle’92 because of these ‘choices’ 
made at different stages of their lives. From this perspective, the female teachers in New 
South Wales v Amery
93
 (‘Amery’) had freely ‘chosen’ to work in lower-paid casual 
positions to enable them to balance work and family, even though it meant lower pay 
and insecurity.
94
  Having to ‘choose’ a poor quality job is of particular concern for 
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women.
95
 Charlesworth argued that the changes wrought by globalisation and the 
deregulation of labour markets have contributed to newer forms of gender inequality: 
the growth of non-standard precarious work ‘where “flexible” labour has brought with it 
not only increased demands for women workers … but also risk, uncertainty and 
underemployment’.96 Fredman suggested that the growth of the flexible and precarious 
female workforce is ‘characterised by low pay, low status, and little by way of job 
security, training or promotion prospects’.97 In reality, many worker–carers seeking 
flexibility may find that they have no choice but to take these low-quality jobs, in 
casual, contingent work,
98
 below their skill set, in low-paid, low-skill, poor quality 
work,
99
 often in highly feminised sectors.
 100
 As noted above, ‘choosing’ this work has 
strongly negative gendered effects in the long and short term—economically, socially 
and in terms of their well-being.
101
 Charlesworth also noted that when employers have 
provided some accommodation, it is also clear that it can be taken away, because the 
needs of the organisation are paramount, and workers with family responsibilities who 
cannot fit in are then ‘constructed as the problem’.102 
 
Even when a woman is able to achieve flexibility and, for example, move from full-time 
to part-time in better ‘quality’ jobs, Murray has noted that employers, whether 
intentionally or as a result of unconscious discrimination, will often then consider that 
part-time workers are ‘part of the “periphery” of the business, not the core of valued 
workers’.103 Choosing part-time work and flexibility may also bring with it a loss of 
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equivalent pay or long-term ‘wage scarring’104 and a loss of opportunities for promotion 
or training
105
 because management perceives a loss of commitment. In effect, many 
women ‘may have to take a step backwards in the organisation in order to secure the 
hours they need to combine work and care’.106 Similarly, Williams writing in the US 
context has argued that many women end up in part-time work as the logical alternative 
to full-time work, but are then marginalised with restricted prospects for advancement 
and lower pay, which amounts to an occupational dead end; in addition, part-timers are 
given less interesting work and less respect.
107
 Pocock has also highlighted that there is 
an increasing number of women in Australia who are well educated, qualified or 
professional with strong workplace attachment and identity who are shocked to find that 
this collides with their later ‘choices’ and ‘identification as mother and carers’.108  
 
3.4.2 Men and ‘Choice’ 
 
There is evidence that many men would like to work more flexibly, to enable them to 
share more of the burden for caring work at home.
109
 They often do not make a request 
for accommodation, fearing stigma, especially in male-dominated industries, and are 
more likely than women to have those requests refused, which indicates that men also 
face sex discrimination in this regard.
110
 Joan Williams in the US has argued for the 
need to ‘reframe the ways we talk about gender beginning with an examination of the 
role of masculine norms that make men reluctant or unable to play an equal role in 
family life’.111 Smith noted that men are in some ways ‘even more constrained although 
not necessarily disadvantaged’ because they are often faced with the masculine norm of 
the male breadwinner. They have ‘fewer choices or rather, are not expected or even 
permitted to choose how to combine care-giving roles with paid work’ and face a degree 
of ‘punishment or disapproval for breaching the masculine norm’. She added that a 
                                                 
104
 Chalmers and Hill considered empirical data from the UK and Australia indicating that part-time work 
impinges on wage growth: Chalmers and Hill, above n 42. 
105
 Fair Work Ombudsman, Best Practice Guide Work and Family (Fair Work Australia, 2013) 4 (‘Best 
Practice’) has noted that there is a need not just to create more part-time opportunities but also to create 
‘meaningful part-time employment opportunities.’  
106
 Murray, ‘Work and Care’, above n 19, 78. 
107 
Williams, above n 21, 72–3. 
108 
Pocock, Labour, above n 2, 53–4. 
109
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 1, 13. 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 Williams, Unbending, above n 21, 5, and generally ch 3, considering the masculine norms at work in 
the US. 
152 
 
‘system that offers such limited choices for those who undertake women’s traditional 
duties is a system that discriminates against women.’112  The challenge, then, as 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have identified, is how to increase awareness of 
legislative rights and change workplace cultures to provide an enabling environment for 
men and women to request an accommodation, as well as a mechanism to challenge any 
refusal.
113
 It is envisaged that discrimination laws and industrial legislation will have an 
important role to play in this regard,
114
 but only if they can genuinely expand the 
options available to men at the workplace and genuinely facilitate the implementation of 
their choices. This may also help to ensure that a highly gendered take-up of flexible 
work by women only is avoided.
115
 
 
3.5 The Employer Perspective 
3.5.1 Selling the Benefits of Flexibility through an ‘Economic Prism’116 
 
Many commentators such as Smith have pointed out that ‘work-family conflict is no 
longer seen as purely a private or individual concern, but a crucial issue for 
organisations seeking to compete for employees and customers in global markets’.117 
From an employer perspective, ideal worker norms and the ‘assumptions and practices 
that they support are not good for society or for business’ because ‘they limit 
participation and development of workers who undertake both paid work and unpaid 
caring work ... and undermine workplace productivity’.118 Workplace practices that 
discriminate against worker–carers are ‘not only inequitable but also ineffective’.119 The 
AHRC has argued that the gender gap in work has serious economic consequences at 
the national and organisational level, particularly to the extent that it contributes to 
women’s under participation or withdrawal from the workforce.120 Therefore, it follows 
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that employers should prevent discrimination against worker–carers and proactively 
implement work and family policies, not just to comply with the law because it is the 
right thing to do, but also in the interests of productivity and economic efficiency.
121
 
From the European perspective, Fredman has pointed out that the impetus for equality 
has been viewed through an ‘economic prism’122 whereby inequality is considered a 
source of economic inefficiency
123
 and equality is a source of mutual benefit for 
workers and employers.
 
However, some commentators are less convinced, and instead 
point to the ways in which employers have used the concept of flexibility to bolster and 
support high levels of managerial prerogative. 
 
3.5.2 Managerial Prerogative 
 
Fredman has cautioned that: 
there is always the danger that instead of a genuine and mutually reinforcing 
coincidence of aims, the rhetoric of convergence has merely obscured the 
extent to which market concerns have stunted the growth of a truly rights 
based equality principle. When the courts hold the balance between the 
equality value and that of market or business concerns, the weight given to the 
various values becomes crucial.
124
 
Some employers therefore view flexible work with hostility as an unwelcome 
interference in the exercise of managerial prerogative
125
 to determine work and time 
organisation in the image of the ideal worker.
126
 As explained later in Chapter 4, the 
Australian courts over the past decade, in cases such as Amery
127
 and Schou,
128
 have 
also tended to give more weight to maintaining high levels of managerial prerogative 
instead of achieving the policy goals of equality. Many commentators have expressed 
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concern that business concerns have regularly trumped the caring responsibilities of 
worker–carers.129  
 
Other commentators have also argued that employers are far from convinced by these 
productivity and efficiency arguments. For example, in the European context, Collins 
argued that employers resist workplace flexibility because it represents a direct attack 
on managerial prerogative, and ‘the employer’s view of the imperatives of productive 
efficiency’.130 Smith and Riley noted that in the work–family debate there is also an 
alternative view that words such as ‘flexible’ and ‘co-operative’ are in fact duplicitous 
words to disguise management’s real agenda to dismantle any ‘remaining rigidities of 
working time and practices that hinder an inexorable path to greater and greater 
productivity … threatening longer, less predictable hours’.131  
 
3.5.3 Challenging Hostile Workplace Cultures 
 
As Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have highlighted, legislation supporting flexibility 
that sets out clearly the respective rights and obligations of worker–carers and 
employers, and also provides guidance about how these rights and obligations can be 
implemented in practice, can play an important role in providing workplace flexibility 
for workers.
132
 However, it has been recognised in the literature that legislation and 
policies aimed at flexibility or work–life balance will have little effect if they are not 
effectively implemented at the workplace level.
133
 Most recently, the AHRC Report 
Supporting Working Parents has emphasised the need to raise awareness among 
employers and employees of rights, entitlements and obligations. It has also noted the 
gaps between workplace policies and effective implementation, and emphasised ways 
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that employers and organisations could more effectively prevent discrimination.
134
 As 
Gaze noted, ‘the struggle is as much over minds as it is over rules’.135  
 
Recent reports and surveys relating to work, care and flexibility have explained how 
critical workplace culture and employer commitment can be, 
136
 and that a particular 
challenge is how to change the attitudes and cultures of those line managers and 
supervisors with decision-making powers who are often not supportive of flexibility.
137
 
The AHRC has noted the ‘leadership lottery’ where the decision or attitude of direct or 
line managers often determined how effectively a policy was implemented.
138
 Fredman 
has similarly noted that ‘not only can line managers subvert policies but it is difficult to 
achieve any more than formal compliance unless there is an appropriate ethos’.139 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have reported that: 
In many workplaces getting flexibility is difficult especially where standard 
working arrangements are dominant, the climate is hostile to flexibility, or 
workers anticipate a stigma arising from a request for flexibility. Improving 
things will require basic knowledge of rights to request, and workers’ 
confidence that their request will be treated seriously and not result in negative 
consequences. Without effective redress, a right to request is not much help in 
workplaces where cultures are resistant and arbitrary refusal is likely.
140
 
They noted that workers who make requests for accommodation ‘are likely to be in 
workplaces that are not hostile to flexibility requests, and where relationships between 
employees and their supervisors enable effective communication and negotiation of 
requests’.141 The AHRC has also noted the crucial role of management and human 
resources departments claiming that ‘[s]upportive management and human resources 
departments are vital and influence the take up of workplace flexibility options by 
carers’.142 
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135
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Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have suggested that the success of legislation aimed at 
increasing flexibility, such as the RTR under the FW Act:
143
 
is likely to rely on a number of factors: worker and management knowledge of 
the new right, a commitment to genuinely enact the new right, a desire by 
workers for flexibility, worker confidence that they will not be directly or 
indirectly punished or stigmatised for asking, management’s perception that 
agreeing to requests is worthwhile and that unreasonable refusal will have 
negative consequences for them.
144
  
In summary, the literature suggests that a supportive workplace culture is crucial from 
the perspectives of both employees and employers. From the employees’ perspective, a 
supportive enabling workplace culture will empower them to feel comfortable and 
confident that they will not be ‘stigmatised’ for requesting flexibility.145 Voluntary 
regulations or requirements on employers may well have little effect because, as 
Fredman noted, it is well established that a system based entirely on self-regulation will 
have little effect.
 146
 An effective enforcement mechanism must also be established. This 
mechanism must be readily accessible, and employees must know if and how to seek 
redress without fearing retribution.
147
 From the employers’ perspective, they must 
understand their obligations to proactively prevent discrimination, to genuinely support 
flexible work, and to try to genuinely accommodate a worker’s requests whenever 
possible. Further, aside from any legal obligations or threat of sanction under 
discrimination or industrial laws, employers will need to be convinced that flexibility is 
best practice, makes good economic sense and is the ‘right thing to do’.148 
 
3.6 Concluding Comments 
 
It is clear that challenging workplace discrimination against carers, to alleviate and 
eliminate the disadvantage in its various manifestations that worker–carers suffer, is 
necessarily a longer-term goal because such a challenge effectively amounts to a 
concerted war of attrition against long-held gendered ideal worker norms and deeply 
entrenched demarcations of public and private work. These norms are further reinforced 
                                                 
143
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by often hostile workplace cultures and an unwillingness to give up the primacy of 
managerial prerogative. Chapter 4 now considers whether the standard model of 
discrimination law, such as that found under Part 4B of the AD Act, has a role to play in 
challenging these deeply entrenched social and workplace norms about care and paid 
work.
149
 
 
                                                 
149
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Chapter 4: Anti-Discrimination Law as a Response to Carers’ 
Discrimination 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the traditional discrimination law model found across 
Australia, including under the AD Act in NSW, is based on negative duties of restraint 
whereby it is unlawful to discriminate against a person directly or indirectly on certain 
prescribed ‘grounds’.1 Enforcement is the responsibility of the individual complainant 
alleging discrimination. If a complaint proceeds to a hearing at the Tribunal, the 
complainant will have the burden of proving that the respondent discriminated against 
him or her.
2
 Smith and Allen have argued that under this: 
fault-based model of regulating equality, three things are assumed: that 
discrimination is an unusual occurrence, it is carried out as an individual act, 
and the act harms an identifiable victim. The focus is on discrimination as a 
wrongful act that inhibits equality and thus must be regulated. Being 
understood as individual in action and individual in consequences, a tort-style 
model of regulation is used to regulate this kind of behaviour by prohibiting 
the impugned conduct and requiring any perpetrators to make amends for their 
aberrant behaviour by compensating the identified victim.
3
  
Fredman has summarised the inadequacy of both the substantive provisions and the 
enforcement mechanisms: 
Legal formulations of equality must be coherent and comprehensible and, 
equally importantly, they must contain mechanisms for making equality 
effective. But traditional enforcement and compliance mechanisms are often 
inappropriate in the equality context … a right to equality might be an empty 
promise if it requires each individual victim of discrimination to conduct 
proceedings against a particular defendant, particularly if the defendant is her 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 1, at 1.2. For a general discussion of the operation of the traditional discrimination models 
in Australia, see Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (Federation Press, 2
nd 
ed, 2014) for an analysis of direct discrimination, at 74–117, 
and for an analysis of indirect discrimination, at 117–142. See also Chris Ronalds and Elizabeth Raper, 
Discrimination Law and Practice (Federation Press, 4
th
 ed, 2012) 31–52.  
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discrimination. See Gardiner v New South Wales WorkCover Authority [2003] NSWADT 184 [66] 
(‘Gardiner No 1’). Under s 104 of the AD Act, the proof of an exception or a defence is with the 
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Dominique Allen, ‘Reducing the Burden of Proof in Australia’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 579 
(‘Burden’); Belinda Smith and Dominique Allen, ‘Whose Fault Is It? Asking the Right Questions When 
Trying to Address Discrimination’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 31, 35–6. 
3
 Smith and Allen, above n 2, 32. 
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employer, the factual and legal issues are complex and the remedy limited to 
compensation.
4
 
Much of the frustration with the current discrimination law frameworks in Australia 
arises for two reasons. First, it is clear that it is very difficult for individual workers to 
engage with and enforce their rights successfully and effectively given, for example, the 
complexity of the legislation and the burdens of proof and evidence. Second, there are 
concerns that a traditional model of discrimination law based on duties of restraint 
enforced by an individual worker will have very little effect on the broader structural 
and societal aspects of discrimination for worker–carers, such as those embodied in 
ideal worker norms.
5
 
 
The aspirations that discrimination laws alone are able to transform society ‘so that the 
scales of justice are not perpetually tilted in favour of the powerful’6 have long been 
recognised as ‘unrealistic’.7 In NSW, these limitations have been understood since the 
first days of the AD Act.  Premier Wran, when introducing the Bill in 1976 ‘for the 
purpose of eliminating discrimination and promoting equality and equal treatment of all 
human beings’8 noted that: 
The Government is not under any illusion that this bill is a panacea for all the 
problems relating to discrimination in our community … It is well aware that 
the elimination of intolerance and prejudice, the promotion of equality and the 
complete eradication of unjust discrimination … will not be achieved 
overnight. The Government will concede that this provision for individual 
                                                 
4
 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 3–4 (‘Discrimination’).  
5
 See generally Anna Chapman, ‘Work/Family, Australian Labour Law and the Normative Worker’ in 
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Regulatory Approach to Equality’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 117; Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and 
the Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) Sydney Law Review 689 (‘Bathwater’); Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, 
‘Family Friendly Work Practices and the Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 395; Sara Charlesworth, 
‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 
88 (‘Shadow’); K Lee Adams, ‘The Problem of Voluntariness: Parents and the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle’ (2003) 92 Deakin Law Review 91; K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and the Worker-
Carer: It’s Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 18 (‘Indirect Discrimination’); K Lee Adams, 
‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263 (‘Defining’). 
6
 Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 261 (‘Promise’). 
7
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 See s 119 of the AD Act. 
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remedies is a step-by-step mopping up of isolated pockets of discrimination 
rather than an attack on the cause of that discrimination.
9
  
More than 35 years later, the literature suggests that it is not clear that discrimination 
laws are even capable of providing an adequate individual remedy for worker-carers 
faced with discrimination, let alone challenging deeply entrenched discriminatory 
structures and ideal worker norms.  
 
This Chapter is in five sections.  Section 4.2 considers the literature in relation to the 
inadequacy of the standard discrimination law model, and the judicial responses to these 
provisions. Section 4.3 then turns to the literature critiquing the two-stage individual 
complainant enforcement model. Sections 4.4 – 4.5 consider whether, and how, 
discrimination laws can have a meaningful role to play to combat workplace 
discrimination against worker–carers. The chapter concludes, in Section 4.6, by 
suggesting that the literature indicates that while discrimination laws have serious 
substantive and procedural shortcomings, and cannot overcome deeply entrenched ideal 
worker norms and practices, these laws and their enforcement process can, and do play 
an important role in the 21
st
 century, as part of a broad multifaceted legal and policy 
arsenal to tackle workplace discrimination. 
 
4.2 The Substantive Provisions 
4.2.1 Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the difference between direct and indirect discrimination is often 
conceptualised not just in terms of the type of conduct that is targeted but also in terms 
of the policy goals of the legislation and the ‘type’ of equality—formal or substantive—
that the direct and indirect discrimination provisions respectively aim to achieve.  The 
provisions have also proven to be extremely complex in their application when they 
have been interpreted by courts and tribunals in Australia.
10
  
 
                                                 
9
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 November 1976, 3337–47 
(Neville Wran). 
10
 See Chapter 1, at 1.2.2;  See for example, Rosemary Hunter, Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace 
(Federation, 1992) 3–8 (‘Indirect’); Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 1–24; Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 5, 5–7, 
23–7.  See also the discussion of equality in the UK, in Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2011, 2
nd
 ed), ch 1 (‘Discrimination’); 
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Commentators have accepted that direct discrimination protections based on liberal 
theories of formal equality and equal treatment have been important in breaking down 
prejudice, assumptions and stereotypes in society, by ensuring that people should be 
treated the same regardless of protected characteristics. However, it is also widely 
acknowledged in the literature that an equal treatment direct discrimination model 
cannot address the root causes of inequality, because it does not seek to question 
dominant norms unless they make overt distinctions between different groups.
11
 For 
example, if a job is advertised as a full-time position, direct discrimination legislation 
requires the employer to treat job applicants alike and base its decisions on merit. The 
gender or caring responsibilities of the applicant should not therefore be relevant to the 
selection process. But if the applicant cannot work full-time because of his or her caring 
responsibilities, and requires an accommodation, direct discrimination will be of no 
assistance because the reasons why that applicant is unable to work full-time are not 
relevant to the application of an equal treatment model. Direct discrimination does not 
require an employer to accommodate the caring responsibilities of a worker, and there is 
then ‘a danger that the specific needs’ of disadvantaged groups ‘if overlooked or 
disregarded on the pretext of uniform equality, will turn into factors of exclusion arising 
from discriminatory or stigmatising practices’.12 
 
Indirect discrimination legislative provisions were developed in response to the 
perceived limitation or ‘hollowness’ of the concept of formal equality based on the 
concept of equal treatment.
13
 They were viewed as a means for dismantling systemic 
and structural discrimination in the community,
14
 to challenge the structural causes of 
disadvantage arising from the ‘norms, rules and procedures, used to determine the 
allocation of positions and benefits’.15 Indirect discrimination focuses on substantive 
equality in terms of equality of opportunity or equality of result. Smith has noted that 
                                                 
11
 See, for example, Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 6, 24; Fredman, Discrimination (2011), above n 10, 
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when there are ‘relevant differences, simply ignoring them will not promote equality of 
opportunity or outcome’.16 
 
In the context of carers’ discrimination, Adams has highlighted that the ‘theory behind 
indirect discrimination would permit individual claimants to challenge such structural 
work practices or policies as a requirement of full-time hours or a lack of flexible 
working times or methods which can adversely impact workers with caring 
obligations’.17 Indirect discrimination provisions may challenge seemingly neutral but 
deeply gendered and entrenched ideal worker norms and employers may be in breach of 
indirect discrimination laws in the absence of a discriminatory motive or intent.
18
   
However, in spite of the existence of indirect discrimination legislation such as that 
found under s 49T, it is clear that the ideal worker norms and the social and economic 
disadvantage they cause remain deeply entrenched within society. This is in spite of the 
increasing numbers of women in the workforce and the growing demands for flexibility 
from worker–carers in the 21st century, leading Adams to conclude that in spite of their 
potential in theory, indirect discrimination legislative protections are ‘not working’ for 
worker–carers.19   
 
 
4.2.2 Proof, Evidence and Judicial Conservatism  
 
Complainants have the onerous burden of proving that discrimination has occurred, and 
both the direct
20
 and indirect discrimination
21
 provisions–as they have been interpreted 
by the courts and tribunals–have proved to be extremely complex in this regard in their 
application.
22
 Allen has highlighted that, in particular, ‘proof is central to enforcement; 
if the complainant cannot prove their case then, in effect, they have no right’.23 To 
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alleviate the evidentiary burdens on complainants, many commentators have repeatedly 
suggested that the burden of proving discrimination should be shifted to the 
discriminator. This has happened in some discrimination legislation in relation to certain 
aspects of indirect discrimination, but not in NSW.
24
  
 
Gaze and Hunter have also noted that courts and tribunals have become increasingly 
legalistic in their approach noting that: ‘[a]nti-discrimination tribunals have tended to 
adopt adversarial proceedings and to follow the rules of evidence even though they are 
not bound to do so, and aspects of anti-discrimination law have become very technical 
even in tribunal adjudication’.25 Allen has also noted that discrimination courts and 
tribunals further compounded this burden by subjecting complainants to the more 
onerous Briginshaw standard of evidence,
26
 This provided that, given the serious nature 
of allegations in complaints of discrimination cases, and the ‘gravity of consequences’27 
for respondents if a complaint is upheld, a court must proceed cautiously, requiring a 
higher standard of evidence from the complainant
28
 that ‘should not be produced by 
inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences’.29 As a result, the courts and 
tribunals were often unwilling to make inferences or take into account circumstantial 
evidence that may assist the complainant,
30
 even when the respondent or a third party 
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(2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 325, 331–3 (‘Context’). 
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controls the information that the complainant needs to establish his or her complaint, 
and when complainants often have no choice but to rely upon indirect or circumstantial 
evidence.
31
 The Tribunal in NSW followed the Briginshaw principles for much of the 
decade period of this study.
32
 However, it is hoped that the Full Federal Court decision 
in Qantas v Gama in 2008 will ensure that the more onerous Briginshaw standard will 
no longer be applied in discrimination complaints,
33
 and the Appeal Panel in NSW has 
since expressly rejected it in 2009.
34
  Allen has also suggested amending discrimination 
laws to provide for non-discretionary inferences which may assist complainants, so that 
‘there is an expectation that a respondent will provide the tribunal with an explanation 
for their behaviour and that an inference should be drawn against a respondent … who 
fails to do so adequately’.35  
 
Many commentators have also noted that a problem related to the burden of proof is the 
general trend over the past decade for discrimination laws to be read very technically 
and narrowly by the High Court and appellate courts,
36
 with little regard for the 
beneficial objects or policy aims of discrimination laws, thereby exacerbating the 
difficulties the complainant has with establishing discrimination.
37
  Notwithstanding 
that High Court, other courts and discrimination tribunals, including the Tribunal in 
NSW,
38
 have repeatedly confirmed that discrimination legislation should be construed 
broadly and beneficially given its human rights purposes,
39
 the application of 
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 Allen, ‘Burden’, above n 2, 583; Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 180.  
32
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33
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discrimination laws has often tended to be black letter and conservative.
40
 High Court 
cases such as Purvis
41
 (involving direct discrimination) and Amery
42
 (involving indirect 
discrimination) are characterised by ‘narrow and conservative interpretations’ while 
‘sidestepping the underlying human rights issues’ raised in the complaints of 
discrimination.
43
 In Amery, in 2006, Kirby J noted that: 
In no decision of this Court in the last decade concerned with anti-
discrimination laws, federal or state, has a party claiming relief on a ground of 
discrimination succeeded. If the decision of the courts below was unfavourable 
to the claimants it was affirmed, if favourable it was reversed.
44
  
Gaze argues that this conservative approach reflects ‘[a] judicial assumption that there is 
nothing new or special about equality claims and that anti-discrimination law is merely 
another area where legislation must be interpreted by impartial judges according to the 
usual “neutral” principles of statutory interpretation’.45 This ‘judicial conservatism’46 
has ‘limited the scope of the legislative provisions and increased the difficulties for 
complainants in establishing their cases’.47 The broader objects of discrimination 
legislation are ‘now lost from sight in the minutiae of statutory construction’.48 As a 
result, ‘far from promoting and developing the beneficial intentions of human rights 
law’, there has been a regressive interpretation of key definitional issues, ‘to the point 
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where key provisions are becoming unenforceable’ with significant negative 
ramifications for workers with carers’ responsibilities.49 
 
In work and family cases, the higher courts have interpreted and applied the legislation, 
and the tests for direct
50
 and indirect discrimination, technically, with decisions such as 
Amery
51
 and Schou
52
 that favour employers and have the effect of bolstering support for 
high levels of managerial prerogative.
53
 At the same time, there is a general reluctance 
on the part of the courts and tribunal to even acknowledge let alone engage with the 
policy objectives relating to gender equality, work–life balance or reasonable 
accommodation. Such an approach has significant negative ramifications both for the 
individual complainants and in terms of the broader normative and precedential value of 
the decisions.
54
 It puts in doubt the capacity of the standard discrimination law model to 
be an effective tool to achieve substantive equality for worker–carers, either as 
individuals or, more systemically, by challenging and changing institutionalised ideal 
worker norms. 
 
4.2.3 Work and Care: The Limitations of the Standard Discrimination Model  
 
It is clear that discrimination laws must aim to achieve substantive equality for worker–
carers at both an individual and a broader systemic level. Smith has noted that a goal of 
‘substantive equality would mean de-gendering work and care’, to enable participation 
of all citizens in both productive and reproductive work’.55 There have been some well-
founded doubts in the literature as to the capacity and efficacy of the traditional negative 
duty of restraint model of discrimination legislation found under the AD Act to achieve 
these broad substantive equality objectives. A brief summary is now provided of the 
main critiques in the literature regarding the operation of direct discrimination and 
indirect discrimination legislative provisions relating specifically to work and family. 
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While direct discrimination has provided some important protections for worker–carers, 
and has been an important tool to challenge overt discrimination in the workplace,
56
 the 
literature has noted that the application of the test for direct discrimination set out by the 
High Court in Purvis which was outlined in Chapter 1, makes it very hard for a 
complainant to prove the two elements of differential treatment and causation in 
practice.
57
  Even before Purvis many commentators had also noted the limitations of a 
formal equal treatment direct discrimination approach to work, care and gender in any 
event. For example, Thornton has noted: 
If women are to accept maleness as the norm in the culture of work, anti-
discrimination legislation can assist them. The fact that the hypothetical 
employee is always assumed to be a man with a wife at home who has freed 
him from household and family responsibilities is not questioned … Thus the 
unbroken career pattern is the model for a woman to espouse, despite the fact 
that she must engage in socially-necessary child bearing and childrearing.
58
  
Similarly, Joan Williams noted that for 30 years feminists have focused on ‘defending 
the rights of women who experience discrimination, despite their ability to perform as 
ideal workers … [however] anti-discrimination law needs to help not only the women 
who can perform as ideal workers but also the majority who can’t’.59 She argued that 
‘not only do we need to fight for equality in the workplace as it is today; we also need to 
deconstruct the masculine norms in market work’.60 Rittich has also pointed out the 
inadequacy of a formal discrimination approach to carers’ discrimination in the 
workplace:  
Given the historically gendered allocation of unpaid [family] work, part of 
what labour market equity for women requires is not simply formal means of 
non-discrimination, but access to the labour markets under terms and 
conditions that do not disadvantage [them].
61
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To be effective, discrimination law must directly challenge the notion that it: 
is impossible or too expensive to require employers to accommodate women’s 
private lives … what’s at issue is not the private frolic of some flighty women 
but the clash of two deeply held social norms: the norm of parental care and 
the ideal worker norm.
62
  
It would appear that direct discrimination protections do little more in practice than 
require consistent and equal treatment, and it is not therefore an adequate mechanism to 
meet this this challenge successfully.  
 
In theory, indirect discrimination provisions promised the potential of achieving 
substantive equality by dismantling systemic and structural discrimination
63
 in the 
workplace based on ideal worker norms and stripping back seemingly neutral conditions 
and practices to examine the substantive effects upon worker–carers.64 Smith noted that 
they have always required employers to ensure that any requirements or conditions that 
have a disparate effect on a protected group were reasonable, which: 
implied some requirement to assess the rule for its reasonableness and provide 
accommodation of what could reasonably be expected but this obligation was 
never very clear and has been under enforced because indirect discrimination 
is conceptually difficult to understand and has posed particularly onerous 
evidentiary burdens on claimants.
65
 
It has been acknowledged in the literature that some indirect discrimination cases ‘have 
been of a path breaking nature’,66 such as the High Court decision in Australian Iron & 
Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989).
67
 However, fundamentally indirect discrimination 
provisions are still essentially part of a negative restraint model, with which it is 
extremely difficult for employers and employees to understand and engage.
68
 By way of 
contrast, Murray has compared the legislative language of right to request (RTR) 
legislation in the European context with the indirect discrimination provisions, such as 
those found under s 49T(1)(b), and noted that: 
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these new [RTR] laws say to employers: please do what you can to help 
workers achieve the changes they seek … anti-discrimination law, even if 
liberally applied will be less effective in bringing about societal change … 
[because it] speaks in a more obtuse, negative language. It says to employers, 
you must not unless it is justified, place a requirement upon workers who 
might be less able to comply [because of their caring responsibilities].
69
 
As the following discussion of the literature relating to key indirect discrimination cases 
now shows, the application of indirect discrimination laws in practice in the past decade 
have been overwhelmingly disappointing, and the potential of indirect discrimination 
provisions to affect genuine substantive equality for worker–carers must be in doubt. 
Part IV of this thesis considers the Tribunal’s approach to direct and indirect 
discrimination in the carers’ complaints that came before it in this context.70 
 
As noted above, many discrimination law commentators have pointed to the 
conservative approach to the interpretation and application of discrimination laws 
around work and family in recent years. This conservatism, particularly from the High 
Court and appellate courts in relation to indirect discrimination is illustrated in cases 
such as the epic long-running sagas of Amery and Schou. Although the High Court has 
not considered the application of direct discrimination in relation to carers’ 
discrimination, by way of analogy, its approach in the disability discrimination case of 
Purvis
71
 suggests a similar technical approach to the application of the elements of 
direct discrimination, with little regard for the human rights and equality objectives of 
discrimination laws.
72
 
 
In Amery the complaint, which predated the enactment of Part 4B
73
 was brought by a 
number of female casual teachers employed by the NSW Department of Education 
under the indirect sex discrimination provisions under s 24 of the AD Act. They alleged 
that they were unable to access higher increment levels of pay, which were dependent 
upon having permanent employment status. It was argued that female teachers were 
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obliged to accept casual status to manage their work and family commitments. The 
majority of permanent teachers were men, whereas most casual teachers were women 
who performed work of equal value. It was argued that a condition or requirement of 
permanency had a disparate impact on women and was not reasonable. Ultimately, the 
High Court found in favour of the State.
74
 The majority of the High Court dismissed the 
claim that there was a condition or requirement of ‘permanence’ if one wanted to 
receive the higher pay rates.  Adams noted that the majority decision simply accepted 
the employer’s definition of the relevant employment, thereby defining away any 
discriminatory effect as an ‘incident of management’.75 She argued that ‘the majority 
holding in Amery will hinder the achievement of gender equality in the workplace by 
ignoring the disproportionate impact of caring responsibilities on women workers’,76 
and has effectively ‘defined away discrimination provisions by sleight-of-hand, 
rendering management prerogative extremely difficult to challenge through Anti-
Discrimination legislation’.77 She concluded that the decision has ‘considerably set back 
Australian anti-discrimination jurisprudence’ and represents ‘a missed opportunity for 
the Court to highlight the issues surrounding workers with family responsibilities, 
expose the gender implications imbedded in existing work structures, and provide real 
regulatory force to the notion of an equal society’.78 Similarly, Smith noted that: 
the willingness and capacity of the courts to adopt a fuller conception of 
equality is in doubt. The High Court of Australia has clearly eschewed a 
commitment to substantive equality … [and has taken] an extraordinarily 
narrow reading of indirect discrimination in respect of gender equality.
79
 
Cases such as Amery serve to highlight the practical difficulties and enormous 
emotional and financial burdens faced by complainants engaging in protracted 
litigation. The complainants lodged their complaints in 1996, and then faced a decade of 
litigation before finally losing, because of complex legal technical arguments about the 
existence of a condition or requirement.
80
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Similarly, in the long-running saga of Schou
81
 in Victoria, Ms Schou had only required 
an accommodation including to work from home as a ‘short term solution to a short 
term problem’ and when the employer refused to accommodate, she resigned. ‘The 
employer’s unwillingness to be flexible for the short time necessary … robbed Ms 
Schou of her career. The law proved incapable of remedying her loss’.82 Instead of 
achieving a temporary accommodation, she lost her job and career. She then faced the 
emotional and financial cost of litigation before the courts for eight years before finally 
losing, when as Sutherland noted that the Victorian Court of Appeal put in place a 
reasonableness test:  
which set the bar higher for complainants seeking to establish that a 
requirement is ‘not reasonable’. Instead of balancing the consequences of the 
complainant’s failure to comply with the requirement against the cost of 
alternative requirement [providing a modem to allow her to work from home 
to look after a child] the courts required Ms Schou to establish that her 
alternative proposal was just as ‘efficacious’ as her employer’s requirement to 
attend on site.
83
 
 
Both Amery and Schou demonstrate the complexity of the test for indirect 
discrimination and the narrow approaches taken by the higher courts. In both cases, the 
discrimination tribunals and lower courts had previously found in favour of the 
complainants, multiple times over many years,
 84
 only to have the decisions 
overturned.
85
 This suggests that, despite ground-breaking cases such as Banovic more 
than 25 years ago,
86
 indirect discrimination claims today will offer little hope for 
worker–carers to achieve substantive equality for an individual complainant, let alone in 
terms of effecting broader systemic changes in society. 
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Sutherland has argued that inconsistencies between the decisions of the discrimination 
tribunals that are then overturned by the higher court also seriously undermine the 
central purposes of carers’ and family responsibilities legislation: 
Where decisions at the tribunal and appellate level do not provide a consistent 
interpretation of the law, some employers may be discouraged from 
implementing flexible arrangements on the basis that they cannot ascertain 
whether these arrangements are necessary, or sufficient to ensure compliance 
with the legislation. These employers will continue to design working 
conditions around the ideal worker … at the same time the unpredictability of 
outcome is likely to discourage employees from requesting more flexible 
working arrangements on an informal basis and from pursuing their claims in 
a hostile litigious environment, characterised by uncertainty, lengthy delays 
and escalating costs.
87
 
Further, in cases such as Schou, Amery, and Purvis,
88
 the respondents were all public 
sector and state government agencies, reflecting a common theme in discrimination 
complaints whereby public sector agencies and government departments, in particular, 
are often ‘repeat players’89 or ‘habitual offenders’,90 willing to spend many years and 
public funds on costly litigation, presumably afraid to open the floodgates of worker 
demands.
91
 Employers may ask why they should comply with the obligations under 
discrimination legislation when the state’s own commitment to discrimination 
legislation is questionable if not openly hostile. Adams regards the nature of the 
respondents in these cases as ‘even more troubling than the courts’ decisions 
themselves’.92 In a broader normative context the implications are indeed serious since 
the very standing of discrimination legislation and its moral authority can lose 
legitimacy.   
 
Turning specifically to Part 4B, the academic literature in relation to both the statutory 
provisions under Part 4B and the Tribunal’s application of them has been limited. 
Bourke has noted that a particular strength of Part 4B is its focus on discrimination 
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against workers who are carers rather than a blurred focus through the indirect sex 
discrimination provisions.
93
 Adams and Bourke have considered the operation of the 
indirect discrimination provision under s 49T(1)(b), and the Tribunal’s approaches to 
the application of it, in the case of Gardiner v WorkCover, in which the Tribunal 
dismissed the first complaint of carers’ discrimination under Part 4B that it heard. 
Adams was critical of the Tribunal’s application of the reasonableness test in relation to 
a requirement for the complainant to relocate.
94
 In contrast, Bourke agreed that 
WorkCover had acted entirely reasonably and criticised Ms Gardiner as being 
unreasonable in her expectations.
95
 Chapman has also considered some of the carers’ 
cases that have come before the Tribunal
96
 and more optimistically has argued that the 
Tribunal’s application of the reasonableness test in the indirect discrimination cases of 
Reddy and Tleyji may take effect to impose an obligation of reasonable accommodation 
on employers to accommodate their workers’ caring responsibilities.97 Chapman viewed 
the Tribunal decisions favourably, noting that: 
interpretations of the New South Wales tribunal under indirect discrimination 
clearly require more than mere formal equality from employers. They move 
towards a substantive understanding of equality, and in doing so shine a light 
on inadequacies of the dominant conception of equality that underlies anti-
discrimination law as being merely that of consistency in treatment.
98
 
Chapman and Bourke have also suggested that the inherent requirement and 
unjustifiable hardship provisions may also operate to imply a duty of accommodation 
requiring employers to take positive steps to accommodate employees.
99
 Bourke has 
argued that: 
The most innovative aspect of the legislation is the adoption of the disability 
model of discrimination namely its use of concepts such as reasonable 
accommodation and unjustifiable hardship … [and] … its capacity to produce 
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systemic and proactive changes by employers, and to generate positive 
reactions to individual requests for flexibility.
100
 
 
In conclusion, it would appear that direct discrimination protections will do little to 
challenge ideal worker norms and structures to achieve substantive equality, and few 
would disagree with Adam’s assertion that ‘indirect discrimination protection for 
workers with caring responsibilities is not working’.101 Yet Adams’ has not given up 
totally on the potential transformative powers of indirect discrimination laws. She has 
argued for a change in the attitudes of judges and for legislative reform to help workers 
with family responsibilities to achieve substantive equality in the workplace, noting 
that: 
the vitality of indirect discrimination as an engine for structural transformation 
in the workplace depends on whether the courts—including the High Court—
are willing to acknowledge that the world has changed; and employees, 
employers and work must change with it.
102
  
Further: 
we must sensitise judges to the burdens faced by worker–carers. The bench 
must recognise the transforming character of indirect discrimination 
legislation, which can deconstruct old notions of management prerogative. 
Where judicial decisions impede the achievement of a gender-equal society, 
parliaments must be willing to amend anti-discrimination legislation (perhaps 
repeatedly).
103
  
It is also argued below in Section 4.4 that a legislated duty of reasonable 
accommodation, where the burden of proof lies with the employer, who must prove why 
an employee cannot be accommodated, is one legislative amendment that could assist in 
overcoming some of the difficulties associated with the traditional direct/indirect model 
of discrimination law, because it moves away from a purely negative duty of restraint 
model of discrimination law, requires employers to take positive steps to accommodate, 
and removes the onerous burden of proving the elements of indirect discrimination.
104
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4.3 Individual Enforcement 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, discrimination laws are generally based firmly upon a duty of 
restraint model.
105
 The traditional model of discrimination legislation is underpinned by 
an assumption that individual perpetrators have breached the duties of restraint and the 
individual victims may then enforce their rights against those individual perpetrators.
106
 
The literature outlined below generally suggests that this is an inadequate enforcement 
mechanism which provides inadequate remedies, and which does not address structural 
inequalities arising from ideal worker norms.
107
 Thornton has noted that it is well 
recognised that inequality and discrimination are often not caused by any one 
individual
108
 because ‘the effects of past discrimination are usually diffuse and often 
embedded in social structures’.109 It follows that discrimination laws, such as the AD 
Act, will be limited in their scope and application while they are based on the concept of 
individual fault and individual enforcement, the aim of which is to restrain prejudicial 
behaviour, and compensate for harm. The laws do not therefore generally require 
positive steps to be undertaken to eradicate inequality, to prevent inequality from 
arising, or to address inequalities not due to a perpetrator’s action.110  
 
The VEOHRC has succinctly summed up the limitations of discrimination laws to 
prevent or counter systemic discrimination, but at the same time, has provided a strong 
acknowledgement and affirmation that individuals must still have an accessible 
mechanism for them to be able to address discrimination:  
Discriminatory outcomes are not necessarily apparent until a pattern is 
formed—that is, after the fact and after individuals have been discriminated 
against. And even then, the pattern can be viewed as the ‘natural’ outcome of 
‘the way it’s always been done’—and therefore beyond examination or 
question. Herein lays one of the key difficulties in dealing with this form of 
discrimination at an early or ‘preventative’ level—and the ‘punishment’ is 
equally difficult. How can a ‘system’ be penalised—especially if it is a system 
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used across an industry or service? This must be addressed by requiring the 
system to achieve certain outcomes in relation to achieving equality, and to 
allow scrutiny and analysis of how this is done. Preventative measures also 
bear analysis—that is, what can be done to prevent systemic discrimination in 
the first place? In the exploration of systemic discrimination it is critical to 
remember that no matter how systemic an issue is its impact is experienced by 
individuals who are entitled to seek effective redress.
111
 
Another major criticism in the literature is that discrimination laws do not establish a 
regulator or an enforcement agency that has the task of pursuing or prosecuting people 
or organisations that break the law.
112
 Compared with agencies such as the Fair Work 
Ombudsman operating under the FW Act, discrimination agencies such as the ADB 
have no statutory power to take enforcement measures for breaches of the AD Act,
113
 
such as initiating complaints or issuing fines.
114 
Recent decisions in the Fair Work 
jurisdiction serve to emphasise the potential of other such agency enforcement 
strategies.
115
 
 
Turning to the complaint process, in Chapter 1 it was explained that the AD Act follows 
the standard model of the ‘two-stage enforcement’ process116 where conciliation is 
attempted and if this is unsuccessful a complaint can be referred to the Tribunal
117
 
where it is then adjudicated in an adversarial forum.
118
 There is no right of direct access 
to a court or tribunal to enforce these laws.
119
 It has been acknowledged in the literature 
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that, while some discrimination cases reaching a hearing have resulted in broader 
systemic outcomes,
120
 in practice, most complaints of discrimination are dealt with 
confidentially at the first stage. If a complaint is settled it will result in a private 
confidential settlement involving primarily compensatory remedies.
121 
Hunter and 
Leonard have, however, also suggested that ‘individual complaints are a potential 
source of far-reaching change’, where for example policy changes are achieved. They 
note that this is particularly the case when the complaint-handling agency actively has a 
policy of ‘raising broader issues related to a complaint as part of a conciliation process. 
This result indicates a maximum use of individual complaints’.122 
 
The main critiques and shortcomings of both stages of the enforcement process 
identified in the literature are set out below. However, by then looking to the works of 
Menkel-Meadows
123
 and Sturm
124
 it is argued that the first stage of the complaint 
process, may provide an important mechanism for worker–carers to negotiate an 
individual accommodation of their responsibilities, maintaining the employment 
relationship, and achieving a measure of individual substantive equality sometimes with 
the potential for broader systemic outcomes.
125
 
 
 
4.3.1 The First Stage 
 
The deficiencies in the first stage have been well canvassed in the literature.
126
 Hunter 
and Leonard
127
 have summarised the key criticisms of the private conciliation model: 
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Critics of conciliation in discrimination cases have argued that while the 
substance of anti-discrimination legislation expresses a public interest in the 
elimination of discrimination and confers individual rights to be free from 
discrimination, there is no guarantee that conciliation protects the public 
interest or even individual rights, especially if agencies see the goals of 
conciliation to achieve some kind of resolution of the dispute between the 
parties, or to keep cases out of tribunals, or to resolve disputes as quickly as 
possible. There are concerns about the power relations between the parties, 
and whether conciliation, far from redressing power imbalances, simply 
exacerbates inequalities and works to the advantage of the more powerful 
party.
128
 The fact that the process of conciliation is confidential and that the 
outcomes are often kept confidential also means that neither the processes nor 
the outcomes of conciliation are open to public scrutiny.
129
 Consequently 
conciliation neither empowers others to complain nor creates precedents for 
future cases. In this context agencies’ claims that conciliation is successful in 
dealing with conciliation cases are open to question.  
There are also concerns that the complaint-handling and conciliation processes, which 
were intended to provide informal, low-cost and quick access to justice, have become 
increasingly legalistic, adversarial and formal and that agencies such as the ADB treat 
the parties as ‘formally equal disputants’130 even when there is obviously an ‘inherent 
inequality between the parties’.131 Discrimination agencies have been criticised for 
doing little to address unequal bargaining positions, for staying neutral and impartial, 
and for providing little substantive assistance to the complainant.
132
 
 
It is acknowledged that the conciliation process does provide the opportunity for 
individuals to engage in a free, informal, non-legalistic process to resolve their 
complaints without having to go to a court or tribunal: ‘It encourages victims of 
discrimination to file complaints because of guarantees of privacy and confidentiality, 
which also encourage respondents to cooperate’;133 but a major concern is that ‘it also 
precludes public scrutiny’.134 As a result, any normative or educative value of the 
                                                                                                                                               
127
 Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 122, 1. See also Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above 
n 126, 323. 
128
 See generally Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 126. 
129
 See generally Hunter and Leonard, Working Paper, above n 122, 1; Thornton, Promise, above n 6, ch 
5. 
130
 Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 126, 345; Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 25, 9. 
131
 Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 175.  
132
 See generally Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 126.  
133
 Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 152. 
134
 Ibid. 
179 
 
complaint to provide the opportunity for social change is lost.
135
 Thornton, in particular, 
has been critical of the private nature of conciliation,
136
 noting that: 
The general educative role of the privatised model is uncertain, for it is based 
on an excessively optimistic view that society is inexorably moving towards 
the ideal end state, and that each complaint … has a positive ripple effect in 
reducing the overall incidence of discrimination in the community …. Positive 
social change emanating from such action can be no more than ad hoc.
137
  
Thornton views the ‘privatisation of justice’ as detrimental to the interests of the 
disadvantaged because it shuts out from public view the very nature of the inequality 
from which the individual and the group suffers.
138
 She views anti-discrimination 
legislation as nervous about public scrutiny of wrongful acts of discrimination whereby 
‘violations are treated not in the way that crimes are treated but as private peccadilloes’ 
to ‘be dealt with primarily in a confidential and non-threatening privatised environment; 
a public hearing is generally available only as a last resort following the failure of 
conciliation’.139  
 
These critiques of conciliation, however, have tended to ignore or understate the 
important role that informal conciliation can have in offering timely access for worker–
carers to try to negotiate an accommodation so that they can stay in their job–in 
circumstances in which a dispute has arisen because, for example, an employer has 
denied a request for flexibility.  A key argument of this thesis is that a free complaint-
handling mechanism such as that found at the ADB that utilises a ‘triage’140 system to 
allocate complaints can provide access to a timely and informal dispute-resolution 
forum without resort to adversarial litigation. It offers worker–carers an opportunity to 
negotiate a resolution to maintain their employment relationship and achieve an 
accommodation, and a degree of substantive equality if that is what they want.  
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Menkel-Meadows,
141
 writing in the context of dispute resolution more generally, has 
posed an important philosophical question (which she does not answer) regarding 
‘[w]hether the privacy of the parties is more important, or should be measured against 
the transparency to others of both process and outcomes’.142 She noted that ‘litigation 
romanticists’,143 in many contexts involving cases with public policy implications, view 
private settlements as: 
an anathema to justice concerns—transparency, developing precedent and 
rules for other parties and the larger system and accountability, among other 
values. The issue of whether legal claims ‘belong’ to the claimants (to resolve 
or deal with however they see fit) or to the larger society or justice system 
remains a philosophical and jurisprudential question unanswerable by 
empirical study or data.
144
 
Clearly, there are underlying tensions about the purpose of the enforcement role of 
discrimination law. Whether its aim is to provide an individual remedy and/or at the 
same time to provide precedential value, and/or challenge structural discrimination 
more broadly in the public interest; and whether it is capable of doing any or all of 
these.
145
  
 
For all its shortcomings, it is still generally acknowledged that conciliation can and does 
play an important role in the discrimination law enforcement scheme. For example, as 
Thornton, has acknowledged: 
While the inscrutability of conciliation undoubtedly limits the public benefits 
of a more open process, it is a desirable alternative for particular categories of 
complainants who would be unlikely to pursue complaints to the public level 
… [For some complainants] conciliation can be a small space in which to air 
their grievances which would probably be regarded as de minimis by a formal 
court but which loom large within their working lives [and] … the conciliation 
process nevertheless does create a space where individual women and 
members of minority groups may achieve small political victories in 
advancing their substantive ‘rights’ which would be unlikely, if not impossible 
within a formal system of adjudication.
146
 
This thesis will contribute to the literature in this regard by arguing that for many 
worker–carers in NSW suffering discrimination at work, resolving a dispute, balancing 
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work and care, keeping their job, and/or trying to negotiate an accommodation are all 
pressing concerns ‘which loom large within their working lives’. For these worker–
carers, their claims do ‘belong’147 to them, as individuals, to achieve individual work–
life balance and flexibility, and possibly a degree of individual substantive equality as 
they see fit.  For these workers longer-term strategies to challenge deeply entrenched 
ideal worker norms in society, or to provide normative precedents for the future are 
unlikely to loom as large for them in their day to day working lives, as they do for legal 
commentators.   
 
Because the complaint processes at the ADB is not concerned with proving fault,
148
 its 
aim is to finda workable solution between the parties. Menkel-Meadows has also argued 
that negotiations can be made: 
[m]ore effective by responding to parties’ underlying needs and if possible 
creating solutions that increase the size of the pie rather than seeking monetary 
solutions as “proxies” for a whole range of human needs’.149  
In the context of carers’ discrimination, these human needs relate to issues such as 
balancing work and care, and the well-being of workers and their families.  Conciliation 
also represents what Sturm has described as a ‘problem-solving’150 approach to 
workplace discrimination, where for a complainant who wants to maintain his or her 
employment relationship, it can offer an important opportunity for worker–carers to 
exercise their rights and to negotiate a timely resolution of a workplace dispute, in a 
relatively informal, non-legalistic environment.  In conclusion, while the academic 
literature has often made a negative assessment of the first stage of the enforcement 
model based on confidential conciliation, the importance and the potential of this 
mechanism for worker–carers should not be underestimated.  
 
4.3.2 The Second Stage  
 
In practice, once a complaint reaches the Tribunal,
151
 the individual complaints of 
discrimination are fought in public in an adversarial forum, where the complainant has a 
                                                 
147
 Menkel-Meadows, 605. 
148
 See ADB, Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board ADB Factsheet (Revised June 2009) (2009).  
149
 Menkel-Meadows, 607. 
150
 See Sturm, above n 109. This work is discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.2. 
151
 See Chapter 1, at 1.5 for a summary of the Tribunal’s statutory powers. 
182 
 
high burden of proof and claims are often fiercely resisted by employers.
152
 Further, as 
discussed above, recent decades have been marked by a period of ‘judicial 
regression’153 and ‘conservatism’ in the discrimination law jurisdiction, including in 
relation to work and family.
154
  The literature highlights that the second stage of the 
process was intended to provide an alternative to traditional litigation through the 
courts. Thornton has explained that ‘specialist tribunals’ were ‘established to hear cases 
expeditiously and cheaply in what is intended to be a non-threatening environment 
relatively free of the trappings of a formal court’.155 Gaze and Hunter have noted that: 
Their accessibility rested on their lack of formality, with the intention that 
legal representation would not be necessary [and] … each party bore their own 
cost of running their case ... Low cost, speedy, informal and specialist 
decision-making was intended to provide an effective remedy to individuals 
with limited means, reduce adversarialism and serve the public interest in 
social harmony.
156
  
Although the tribunals were still founded on an adversarial model, their processes were 
intended to allow individuals to run their own cases ‘relying on the expertise of tribunal 
members … and their general obligation to ensure fairness to all parties to the 
proceedings’.157 Thornton has suggested that, in theory, a discrimination tribunal could 
obtain the relevant information it needs just as easily by an inquisitorial method.
158
 
However, she argued that because adversarialism is so deeply entrenched in our legal 
culture, valued as a ‘neutral mode which enhances the ascertainment of truth’, as a 
result, ‘an inquisitorial alternative does not appear to have been seriously considered for 
the jurisdiction’.159  
 
It is argued that adversarialism is not however, an appropriate method in the 
discrimination jurisdiction because it serves to reinforce inequalities in wealth and 
power between employers and employees. Respondents all too often wage a war of 
attrition upon the complainant and, at the same time, will fight and appeal cases—to the 
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High Court if necessary—until they receive a favourable decision, thereby skewing the 
discrimination jurisprudence in their favour.
160
 Individual complaints have a difficult 
burden of proof, claims are fiercely resisted by employers,
161
 and there is a fundamental 
power imbalance because employers are likely to be better resourced than individual 
employees to run litigation.
162
 In practice, complainants are often aggressively cross-
examined
163
 on the minutiae of even seemingly uncontroversial aspects of their 
evidence.
164
 For those complainants who persevere and reach the second stage of the 
enforcement process, tribunals have become ‘almost as intimidating’ as traditional 
courtrooms.
165
   
 
Other commentators have also emphasised the personal, emotional and financial costs 
for an individual of running litigation.
 
Gaze and Hunter
166
 and Williams
167
 noted that 
litigation is costly in both financial and emotional terms, and, as Williams noted, it can 
hurt career prospects in the long run because ‘who wants to hire a troublemaker?’168 It is 
also argued that it is unfair for individual complainants—‘by the very nature of the 
legislation, members of traditional disempowered groups’169—to have to bear the 
burden to challenge systemic or class-wide discrimination which serves a broad public 
purpose.
170
 Smith has argued that ‘expecting them alone to identify breaches, press 
claims, and enforce outcomes without any public assistance represents a fundamental 
regulatory weakness even when the initial dispute-resolution system is relatively 
informal and accessible’.171  
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Even if a finding of discrimination is made at the second stage the likely remedy which 
will be ordered is inadequate compensation.
172
 Individual complaints rarely give rise to 
an ongoing obligation upon respondents to correct institutional structures that give rise 
to discrimination.
173
  In the adversarial environment, the important social policy and 
gender equality objectives of Part 4B—achieving substantive workplace equality for 
individual worker–carers and the broader objectives of changing or eradicating 
gendered ideal worker norms—then become viewed ‘not as a common goal but as a site 
of resistance’.174 Sturm has argued that ‘after-the-fact enforcement’, in which breaches 
of the law are regarded as individual violations to be punished, is ineffective in 
addressing structural and systemic forms of workplace bias. Instead, it is suggested that 
laws can play a role in providing for a ‘problem-solving’ approach based on local, 
workplace-context-based solutions to prevent discrimination and achieve substantive 
workplace equality.
175
  
 
4.3.3 Addressing the Gaps in the Literature  
 
It is argued in this thesis that in spite of the often negative critiques in the discrimination 
law literature, the first stage of the enforcement process does provide an important 
potential remedy for individual worker–carers to achieve workplace accommodation 
and substantive equality, with the potential for systemic outcomes that should not be 
underestimated. As noted from the analysis of the literature above, this aspect of 
conciliation has not been well considered in the discrimination law literature.
176
 In the 
empirical overview of carers’ complaints in Part V of this thesis it is argued that 
complainants have the opportunity to make a complaint in an accessible and relatively 
informal, supportive, timely and cost-efficient environment. When worker–carers 
actually want to be accommodated and stay in their jobs, conciliation will offer a better 
chance of achieving that compared to litigation at the Tribunal.  Complaints to the ADB 
can result in ‘good’ outcomes for individuals, and with the potential for broader 
systemic type remedies too such as policy changes at the workplace.  
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In Part IV of this thesis, the carers’ complaints that came before the Tribunal in NSW 
between 2001 and 2011 are analysed. It is clear that the Tribunal’s approach to carers’ 
discrimination complaints has often followed the judicial regression, legalism and 
adversarialism noted in the literature. A complaint to the Tribunal is not likely to offer a 
better process or outcome for the individual complainant, and particularly those seeking 
an accommodation, than a complaint to the ADB. Notwithstanding the two victories for 
the complainants in Reddy and Tleyji
177
 Tribunal decisions are generally unlikely to 
have a sweeping precedential, educative value or public policy value, given the 
Tribunal’s application of the law in an effective policy vacuum.178 In only two cases has 
a finding of carers’ discrimination been made by the Tribunal over the decade and 
compensation has been the only remedy.
179
 
 
4.4 Reasonable Accommodation: Expanding the Potential of 
Discrimination law  
 
This section now considers the potential of discrimination laws to tackle carers’ 
discrimination, and whether those laws can be made more effective in this regard. 
Where it is clear that there are two competing norms, work and care, then, as a first step, 
it is necessary to ask how can discrimination legislation help, by asking ‘what are the 
best strategies … to solve conflicts of norms, evaluate their margin for manoeuvre and 
negotiate reasonable adjustment’.180 In particular, the work of three academics—
Fredman, Chapman and Sturm—are discussed and it is suggested that in particular two 
complementary regulatory strategies may make carers’ discrimination laws, such as 
those under Part 4B, more effective in their operation. The first is an express legislative 
positive obligation of employers to tackle discrimination, such as through a duty of 
reasonable accommodation;
181
 the second is a focus on ‘problem-solving’182 to keep 
worker–carers in their jobs if that is what they want. Both strategies do not simply rely 
on after-the-fact enforcement in which inadequate compensation for the individual 
worker who has had to leave his or her job is the usual remedy, while the offending 
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discriminatory practices often remain untouched.
183
 Instead, focus is more proactive, 
and the aim is to change fundamentally how, when and where work is done and, in 
effect, to challenge managerial prerogative in this regard.  It also focuses on providing 
an enabling environment to empower employees to negotiate an accommodation that 
suits them offering the potential for substantive equality for the individual complainant, 
and with the potential to change workplace structures more broadly.   
 
An obligation of reasonable accommodation may be viewed as both an inclusive and a 
proactive approach to the competing norms of work and care, because it aims to balance 
the needs of worker–carers and employers. The aim of an obligation of reasonable 
accommodation or adjustment in these circumstances is to ‘correct the discriminatory 
effects of a norm either by exempting the individual concerned from its application or 
by adapting the norm itself’.184 What is reasonable will obviously depend on the 
circumstances of the particular workplace, employer and worker–carers, and in practice 
will require balancing the needs of the business with the caring responsibilities of a 
worker–carer. A duty of reasonable accommodation may therefore provide ad hoc 
solutions for individual employees, but it also suggests more structural solutions aimed 
at tackling the clash of the two competing norms of work and care.
185
 In terms of 
‘exempting the individual’, such adjustments could include an employer agreeing to 
allow part-time work; tele-work from home; flexibility with start/finish times, rostering, 
or shifts; access to paid and unpaid leave; and ensuring access to benefits such as 
promotion, training, career development opportunities, or other benefits.
186
 In terms of 
‘adapting the norm itself’, workplace and organisational policy changes such as the 
introduction of flexible work policies could lead to the dismantling of norms in relation 
to full-time work.
187
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These concepts of reasonable accommodation and flexibility are now central to the 
work–life policy debate in Australia,188 including in the anti-discrimination and 
industrial law spheres. At the state level, the Victorian EO Act provides that an 
employer must not ‘unreasonably refuse to accommodate the responsibilities that a 
person has as a parent or carer’.189 At the Commonwealth level, the FW Act RTR190 
provides for a right to request flexible work in certain circumstances in which a worker 
has caring or family responsibilities. While the FW Act RTR focuses on the right to 
request, and the Victorian discrimination legislation focuses on the duty upon an 
employer to reasonably accommodate a request,
191
 and although there are important 
differences in terms of coverage and enforcement mechanisms,
192
 essentially, the 
mechanisms share a common policy goal in relation to balancing work and family 
commitments by accommodating employees’ caring responsibilities.193 
 
In this section, the works of Fredman, and Chapman, in particular, focusing on the role 
of a positive obligation of reasonable accommodation within the discrimination law 
framework, are first explored. Sturm’s problem-solving approach to workplace 
discrimination as an alternative to litigation, and how this may apply to the complaints 
conciliation model under discrimination law model, is also outlined. Finally, the ways in 
which a duty of accommodation for worker–carers may help to tackle structural and 
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systemic discrimination are also considered in the context of some of the broader policy 
objectives identified in the work and family literature since Part 4B was enacted in 
relation to job quality, social inclusion, and well-being; whether the operation of a duty 
may lead to the evolution of a new norm of flexibility; and whether the mechanisms 
providing for a duty can help to empower worker–carers to exercise their rights and 
achieve substantive equality. Before turning to these three academics, it is also noted 
that many commentators have expressed strong reservations about the concept of a duty 
of reasonable accommodation. As Canadian commentators Brodsky and Day have 
noted, its goal is essentially ‘assimilationist’, to: 
accommodate those that do not quite fit. We make some concessions to those 
who are ‘different’ rather than abandoning the idea of normal and working for 
genuine inclusiveness … its goal is to .make ‘different’ people fit into existing 
systems.
194
  
However, it will be argued that in conclusion the literature suggests that a 
discrimination law duty of reasonable accommodation may provide substantive equality 
for worker–carers individually, and may also have significant potential to challenge 
structured and systemic discrimination against worker–carers. Further, the 
discrimination law conciliation process at agencies such as the ADB can provide an 
important problem-solving mechanism to achieve a negotiated resolution of carers’ 
complaints, including those seeking accommodation. 
 
4.4.1 Fredman’s ‘Unified Approach to Equality’195 
 
Fredman, in the UK, has identified four objectives of anti-discrimination laws to 
achieve greater substantive equality. Discrimination laws should: 
i. promote respect for equal dignity and worth of all—to redress stigma and 
stereotyping; 
ii. entail an accommodation and positive affirmation and celebration of identity in 
the community; 
iii. break the cycle of disadvantage associated with ‘out groups’; and 
iv. facilitate the full participation in society.196  
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Fredman does not specifically examine carers’ discrimination in this context. However, 
the four equality aims are directly relevant to how carers’ discrimination and the 
resultant negative effects on worker–carers, in particular, women, might be addressed 
via discrimination legislation with the aim of achieving greater substantive equality. For 
example, by helping to:  
i. reduce stigma and gender stereotyping about who undertakes care work and the 
negative effect and resultant inequality that this then has on their paid workforce 
participation; 
ii. challenge negative assumptions about the commitment of worker–carers to their 
paid jobs, and recognise and value the important contribution to society of 
unpaid caring work; 
iii. encourage the accommodation of caring responsibilities at work in order to, first, 
facilitate full economic and social participation of worker–carers and, second, to 
try to address the disadvantage that worker–carers suffer; 
iv. ensure that worker–carers can therefore participate fully in work and society 
without discrimination. 
 
To achieve these objectives, she has argued that equality laws require ‘a widening of the 
scope of unlawful discrimination, and a sharpening of the tools to achieve, not just a 
negative prohibition on discrimination, but also a positive duty to promote equality’.197 
The concept of positive duties has usually been considered in the context of obligations 
on the state through, for example, a statutory public sector duty such as that found under 
the Equality Act 2010 (UK)
 198
 or in Australia through a legislative duty to take action to 
ensure Equal Employment Opportunity.
 199
  It has also become increasingly clear that, 
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without positive duties, on employers—across all sectors, public and private—to 
promote equality, and prevent discrimination in their workplaces, patterns of 
discrimination and social exclusion will remain unchanged. Fredman has argued that 
‘real progress can only be made through a unified approach to equality, one which 
includes both negative and positive duties’.200  
 
A duty of reasonable accommodation moves away from a model based on penalising 
individual acts of unlawful discrimination and compensating individual victims.
201
 
Fundamentally, it recognises that responsibility for achieving equality is not limited to 
those who can be proved to have caused it.
202
 A duty of accommodation may operate in 
practice to place a positive onus on employers, not just to accommodate individual 
workers on an ad hoc basis, but also to identify and address patterns of inequality in 
their workplace, and to promote equality. It looks towards a model promoting equality 
through structural change, which may both challenge ideal worker norms in paid work 
and change attitudes towards the responsibility for, and value of, unpaid care work.
203
 
This represents a move towards a ‘regulatory model that casts a wider net, requiring 
duty holders not merely to refrain from wrong but also to make at least reasonable 
efforts to eradicate discrimination and promote equality’.204 In theory, employers must 
take responsibility for discovering discrimination in their workplaces as well as 
remedying it.
205
 
 
4.4.2 Sturm’s ‘Problem-Solving’ Approach to Workplace Discrimination206 
 
Sturm, in the US, has argued that there is a need to ‘regulate dynamically in a world of 
complexity and change’.207 A new approach is required to address the challenges of 
second-generation discrimination at work,
208
 which she defined as ‘social practices and 
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patterns of interaction between groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude 
non-dominant groups’.209 Sturm suggested a proactive ‘problem-solving’210 approach to 
address such discrimination: 
[S]econd generation problems cannot be reduced to a fixed code of specific 
rules or commands that establishes clear boundaries governing conduct. 
Instead, their resolution requires a different process, namely problem-solving. 
That process identifies the legal and organizational dimensions of the problem 
… builds individual and institutional capacity to respond, and helps design and 
evaluate solutions that involve employees who participate in the day-to-day 
patterns that produce bias and exclusion.
211
  
Echoing Fredman, Sturm argued that the traditional judicial rule enforcement regulatory 
approach to discrimination, which views breaches of the law as violations to be 
punished, is ineffective in addressing second-generational structural and systemic forms 
of workplace bias, which are in need of systemic resolution.
212
 Employers must 
therefore be encouraged ‘to combine legal compliance with proactive efforts’ to 
improve their workplaces.
213
 While Sturm acknowledged that courts have a role in 
shaping internal problem-solving processes,
214
 she advocated for a move towards a 
judicially decentred, holistic and dynamic regime to address second-generation bias.
215
 
She has focused on the local day-to-day context of the workplace where patterns of bias 
and exclusion are produced.
216
 A problem-solving approach also highlights the issue of 
workplace cultures and relevant problem-solving workplace actors. Sturm suggested 
‘integrating problem-solving and accountability’217 where ‘normative elaboration occurs 
through a fluid, interactive relationship between problem-solving and problem 
definition within specific workplaces’.218 It also suggests that both employers and 
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employees have a central role in providing ‘dynamic interactions between general legal 
norms and workplace-based institutional innovation that promotes effective problem-
solving’.219 A problem-solving approach envisages a role for the individual worker to 
challenge these discriminatory structures and practices. At the same time employers 
must be encouraged to develop the capacity to expose and deal with second-generation 
discrimination,
220
 that is, to understand the nature of the problem and the aims of the 
legislation, and then to respond at the appropriate organisational level to remedy it. 
Employers should also learn from previous problem-solving efforts.
221
 In this context, a 
legislative duty of reasonable accommodation may represent a key strategy for problem-
solving at the workplace level, while the informal conciliation process at the ADB may 
provide a problem-solving forum for the key actors to meet and attempt the resolution 
of a dispute.  
 
4.4.3 Chapman’s ‘Third and Separate Form of Discrimination’222  
 
In the Australian context, Chapman has highlighted ‘the inadequacies of the dominant 
conception of equality that underlies anti-discrimination law as being merely 
consistency in treatment’.223 She has suggested that the traditional negative restraint 
model of discrimination laws can be expanded to provide a clear and explicit statutory 
positive obligation of reasonable accommodation on employers,
224
 thus reflecting the 
‘unified approach’ to equality suggested by Fredman.225 Chapman has noted that a duty 
of reasonable accommodation, as it is operating under the Victorian EO Act,
226
 whereby 
an employer must not unreasonably refuse to accommodate an employee’s caring or 
parental responsibilities, in effect, represents a ‘third and separate form of 
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discrimination [protection] in addition to direct and indirect discrimination.’227 This 
marks a ‘departure from the past’228 and moves ‘towards a substantive conception of 
equality … in terms of outcomes and results’.229 
 
A duty of reasonable accommodation as a separate, third type of discrimination discards 
the artificiality of the notions of direct and indirect discrimination and the complex and 
idiosyncratic elements that a complainant must prove.
230
 Chapman has noted that 
‘accommodation provisions are intended to offer an additional entitlement to employees 
above the protection afforded by indirect discrimination’ and importantly refocus ‘the 
issue of reasonableness on the employer’s refusal, and not the original requirement or 
condition’.231 Reflecting Sturm’s focus on local-context-based problem-solving, 
Chapman also noted that ‘[a] preparedness to explore options and consider alternatives 
in a flexible and informal manner appear to be the markers of a desirable process 
towards accommodation, and one which the legislation ought to encourage’.232 It 
represents a proactive, inclusive problem-solving strategy whereby both employers and 
worker–carers are key problem-solving actors; it also has the potential to challenge and 
change the ideal worker norm structures underpinning carers’ discrimination at work.233 
 
To illustrate the potential of a duty of accommodation, Chapman considered whether 
the epic saga of Schou
234
 would have resulted in a decision in favour of Ms Schou if the 
complaint had been brought under the reasonable accommodation provisions under ss 
17 and 19 of the EO Act, if they had existed, rather than the indirect discrimination 
provisions under which the original complaint was brought that were available at the 
time. She concludes that ‘it seems that a person in Schou’s position would have a strong 
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claim … in the form of an unreasonable failure to accommodate’.235 She views this as a 
litmus test for an evaluation of the reasonable accommodation provisions, pointing out 
that: 
If these new legal mechanisms are not able to provide a modern day Schou 
with accommodation and assistance, what hope is there for the vast numbers 
of women parents working in vulnerable sectors of the labour market, who are 
engaged in the private sector by medium and small businesses, and in insecure 
part-time and casual work?
236
  
However, Chapman did also highlight that there are still potential problems under the 
discrimination enforcement model: first, in terms of evidentiary burdens under the 
legislation whereby the complainant under the EO Act still has the burden to show that 
the employer’s reasons for the refusal are unreasonable237 and the ‘fuzzy reasonableness 
standard of the accommodation provisions’ generates ‘methodological questions’ about 
how the different factors that the employer must take into account should be weighed;
238
 
and second, in terms of the common problems associated with the individual grievance 
framework typical of anti-discrimination laws noted above,
239
 such as power 
differentials and disparities in resources between an employer and an employee.
240
  
 
4.4.4 Reasonable Accommodation to Tackle Structural and Systemic 
Discrimination 
 
In Chapter 5 the objectives of Part 4B
241
 are noted to include gender equality in paid and 
unpaid work, balancing work and care, and accommodation of caring responsibilities. It 
is argued that a legislative duty of reasonable accommodation is both an objective and a 
strategy to achieve these interdependent objectives.
242
 As the extent of the disadvantage 
that worker–carers suffer and their families suffer has become more apparent, a number 
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of other interrelated policy aims can also be identified in the work and family literature 
which aim to prevent and alleviate this disadvantage.
243
 A duty of reasonable 
accommodation may help to achieve three other broad policy objectives outlined in the 
literature: first, by achieving better ‘quality’ jobs244 and recognising the need to ensure 
‘social inclusion’ and well-being for worker–carers;245 second, by challenging the 
traditional view that ‘flexible work is non-standard’,246 which may lead to the evolution 
of an alternative view in which flexibility is the norm;
247
 and third, by providing a 
mechanism that in practice will empower and enable worker–carers to exercise their 
rights to achieve substantive equality.
248
 
 
(i) Job Quality, Social Inclusion and Well-Being 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the social and economic pressures, disadvantage and inequality 
that many worker–carers—especially women—suffer in the labour market over their 
life cycle is well documented.
249
 Strazdins, Shipley and Broom have argued that 
employee well-being, job security and job control are key determinants of good-quality, 
family-friendly jobs.
250
 If worker–carers can have their responsibilities accommodated 
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so that they can access and maintain better quality jobs, this may avoid them drifting off 
into a world of contingent low-paid work.  
 
Commentators in the UK and Australia have stressed that a key aim of discrimination 
laws is social inclusion
251
 and ‘well-being’.252 While job quality and access to decent 
work are considered an essential element or significant site for its achievement. Collins 
has argued that access to a good-quality job provides opportunities not only to achieve 
economic goals such as a wage, but also to acquire knowledge, skills, friendship and 
participation in the work community. Work is not just about material wealth but is also 
a vital ingredient of well-being; therefore, worker–carers who are forced into low-
paying, precarious employment are likely to suffer a cycle of persistent disadvantage. 
Collins suggested that the goal of social inclusion requires that: 
employers … make reasonable adjustments in order to enable members of the 
excluded group to overcome obstructions to their obtaining work suitable for 
their skills and capacity. This duty requires employers to consider amongst 
many other things how the workplace is organised, how jobs are structured, 
and how the skills and capabilities of the workers could be improved with a 
view to the reduction of barriers to employment for excluded groups.
253
  
Similarly, Charlesworth and Campbell have stressed the importance of mechanisms 
such as discrimination law duties of reasonable accommodation or RTR legislation as 
key strategies for workers to access and maintain workplace attachment, to stay in their 
jobs and vary their working hours.
254
 For example, they noted that a move to part-time 
work, as and when caring responsibilities arise, can ‘facilitate longer term adaptation 
without the need for the worker to leave their job and find another one. It thus avoids 
the problem of poor job quality in part-time work and paves the way for a return to full 
time hours when circumstances change’.255 Maintaining attachment to work can avoid 
workers entering the cycle of disadvantage and exclusion, provided that their part-time 
status or other flexible arrangements do not lead to jobs that result in a diminution in 
working conditions or benefits.
256
 A duty of reasonable accommodation on employers is 
a crucial strategy in this regard. This applies not only to worker–carers who are able to 
plan ahead for when caring responsibilities might arise, for example, in relation to 
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maternity, but it is also important for those workers who are faced with unforeseen 
circumstances requiring an accommodation, often on a temporary or an urgent basis.  
 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock
257
 and the AHRC
258
 have demonstrated that the 
changing demographics in the 21
st
 century will increase the ‘struggle to juggle’259 the 
often competing demands of work and caring responsibilities. In practice, many workers 
will have different caring responsibilities over their working life cycle, and their 
requirements for flexibility may change accordingly, and many times, over their 
working lives. Collins has suggested that a greater diversity of working arrangements 
will therefore be required over and above traditional categories of flexibility such as 
part-time and casual work, along with new approaches to when, how and where work is 
done.
260
 A duty of reasonable accommodation is one strategy that would enable 
employees to access and maintain the diversity of working arrangements and temporary 
or longer term flexibility that they need at any particular time in their lives. 
 
(ii) Assimilation or the Evolution of a New Norm of Flexibility? 
 
Some commentators have suggested that, by arguing that worker–carers must be 
accommodated, or treated as a special arrangement within the existing status quo,
261
 this 
fundamentally reinforces the fact that the worker–carer is being accommodated or 
assimilated
262
 within the existing ideal worker norm as a special case, while the 
offending structures remain in place.
263
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Therefore, the question arises as to whether a duty of accommodation can provide not 
just an individual accommodation helping to achieve substantive equality at that 
individual level, but whether it can also help to develop an alternative workplace norm 
of flexibility. A norm whereby accommodation of caring responsibilities is recognised 
as normal, and is no longer thought of as a special arrangement but rather the new norm. 
Emmens has argued (in the context of disability discrimination) that workplace 
accommodations need to be ‘integrated’, because a key aim of discrimination legislation 
is to integrate people into the workplace and community,
 264
 thus replacing exclusion 
with full participation.
265
 Flexibility for carers will become normal when ‘the 
requirements of carers … [are] accepted as a norm not a luxury’.266  Gaze has noted that 
a mechanism is needed to allow employees to normalise the requirements for a family-
friendly workplace that requires employers to consider the needs of non-ideal 
workers.
267
 The literature suggests that reasonable accommodation is one such 
mechanism that can assist to normalise flexibility in this regard. 
 
A duty of reasonable accommodation for worker–carers may also represent an 
important and necessary step in the evolution and development of a new norm of 
flexibility because it implicitly recognises and does not trivialise the burdens of unpaid 
care work as merely women’s work. Instead, it represents an acknowledgement that 
unpaid care work is recognised and valued, and should be accommodated, affirmed and 
integrated, thereby ‘supporting and validating this work’.268 Given the demographic 
changes noted in Chapter 3, and the increasing number of men and women whose 
caring responsibilities will often change over, and concurrently with, their working life 
cycle, it may well happen that, as a practical reality, workplace flexibility and 
accommodation will become routine and normalised. In this way, it is hoped that the 
norm of the ideal worker will gradually be replaced by a norm of flexibility. 
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workers’.  
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Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock
269
 and Charlesworth and Campbell
270
 have also 
pointed to the European regulatory experiences related to work and family, arguing in 
favour of a broadly conceived right to request flexible work that is available to all 
employees generally in the interest of work–life balance and well-being.271 Collins has 
similarly suggested that there is a need for all workers, and not just those with care or 
family responsibilities, to achieve a ‘satisfactory balance between work and private life’ 
in a ‘good quality job’ and to: 
reconfigure the notion of a good job as one that provides an adequate level of 
income, offers the possibility of career progression, and at the same time 
permits the individual to achieve a sense of well-being through the realization 
of a satisfying balance between work and private life.
272
  
In the Australian context, Charlesworth and Campbell noted that such a broad right to 
flexibility would help to achieve a better work–life balance and reduce work–life 
interference, and could also: 
help address the gendered take up of flexible work and gendered working time 
norms and it would challenge the view that flexible work is non-standard. A 
broad right to request would also create a more solid base for the 
implementation of flexible work rights and lower the potential for resentment 
from those excluded.
273
  
 
(iii) Empowering and Enabling the Individual Worker
274
  
 
A duty of reasonable accommodation for worker–carers requires employers to take into 
account the private caring lives of their workers, and importantly, it also envisages a 
fundamental change to existing workplace power differentials because it suggests a co-
existing role for employers and employees as key ‘problem-solving actors.’275 Adams 
has argued that: 
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the employer should … be seen as a facilitator of workers to achieve desired 
outcomes rather than a ‘manager’ with broad powers to dictate the manner of 
performing work. Where a worker can reasonably restructure a job to permit 
meeting family responsibilities and still accomplish the task (as opposed to 
accomplishing the task the way the employer would prefer) accommodating 
the worker should be required.
276
  
Adams maintained that workers as individuals should be empowered to have input into 
their own working time, structures and conditions,
277
 and has concluded that: 
although commentators have noted that anti-discrimination legislation cannot 
by itself attain substantive equality for women workers with family 
responsibilities, a vital anti-discrimination law does place a potentially 
powerful regulatory tool in the hands of the individual—a tool which is not 
dependent on the goodwill of fellow employees, union negotiators, or even the 
employer—a potential mechanism the disadvantaged can use to level the 
playing field with the privileged.
278
  
Murray has also suggested that when legislation or industrial instruments provide RTR 
or a duty of accommodation, ‘more workers may be emboldened to make the request 
and push for satisfactory answers. The result might be cultural change in the perceived 
barriers to flexible work’.279 
 
The literature suggests that, in practice, the policy aims of work and family 
discrimination legislation—whether gender equality in paid and unpaid work, work–life 
balance, the accommodation of caring responsibilities, social inclusion, decent jobs or 
dismantling gendered workplace norms and replacing them with a new norm of 
flexibility—are all interconnected and, to an extent, interdependent objectives to 
achieve substantive workplace equality for worker–carers by challenging ideal worker 
norms. In asking ‘what are the best strategies … to solve conflicts of norms, evaluate 
their margin for manoeuvre and negotiate reasonable adjustment’,280 the literature 
suggests that discrimination laws may provide one strategy to help resolve the conflicts 
between paid ideal worker norms and unpaid caring norms, both of which are deeply 
entrenched in society and deeply gendered. A statutory duty of accommodation will 
further strengthen and possibly revitalise discrimination laws to achieve these goals.  
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In conclusion, increasingly, the literature has called for discrimination laws to move 
away from a duty of restraint model and to instead take a ‘unified approach to 
equality’,281 providing both negative and positive obligations. A discrimination law duty 
of reasonable accommodation, representing a problem-solving approach to balance 
work and care, if it is supported by accessible informal enforcement mechanisms, is one 
important practical legal provision identified in the literature that can help to achieve 
these policy objectives. Eventually, reasonable accommodation and flexibility may be 
considered the norm for all workers, and not just a ‘special arrangement’,282 and thus 
employers would accept the ‘need for flexibility as normal, rather than exceptional’.283 
 
4.5 Work–Life Balance: Does Anti-Discrimination Legislation Have a 
Role? 
4.5.1 The Limitations of Discrimination Laws as a ‘Blue Print for Radical 
Change’?284 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that discrimination continues as an everyday occurrence for 
many workers, especially women, who struggle to balance work and family 
commitments in the face of ‘inflexible work, work intensification and unsupportive 
workplace cultures’,285 and then struggle to manage its detrimental effects on them and 
their families.
286
 While it is generally accepted that discrimination laws have played an 
important normative role and contributed positively to creating a fairer society in which 
‘the notion that discrimination is unfair and wrong’ is broadly accepted,287 obviously, 
there is still a long way to go. These laws are not a panacea for workplace inequality 
against worker–carers. In particular, discrimination laws have often failed to either 
protect individual worker–carers or achieve meaningful systemic change in relation to, 
for example, the dominant ideal worker norms, or to encourage and enable more men to 
work flexibly and to shoulder more of the responsibility for unpaid caring work.
288
 
However, as Thornton noted more than 20 years ago, discrimination laws have never 
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‘represented a blueprint for radical change’289 and ‘it would be unrealistic to expect 
legislation to play this radical role’.290 Fredman has also acknowledged that ‘at the end 
of the day, we may also have to acknowledge the limits of the role traditional legal 
provisions and processes can play in bringing about social change.’291 
 
However, as Brodsky, Day and Peters
292
 have noted (in the context of disability 
discrimination laws in Canada, but which is equally applicable to carers’ discrimination 
in NSW), discrimination laws properly implemented can be an important tool:  
We do not suggest that human rights machinery, can by itself eliminate all 
forms of disability related barriers. But we do believe that if human rights 
commitments were implemented with seriousness by governments at all 
levels, and if tribunals and courts adjudicated human rights legislation 
purposively, and substantively to provide clear-sighted direction to public and 
private actors, much could be done to improve the life of people with 
disabilities. 
The review of the literature in this chapter makes it clear that discrimination laws 
cannot, on their own, lead to the dismantling of deeply entrenched and gendered 
workplace norms, but they can help.
293
 Therefore, it is necessary to recognise their 
limitations, but at the same time work with, and expand their potential. 
 
4.5.2 A Multifaceted Legal and Policy Approach to Work and Care 
 
It is increasingly clear that a concerted multifaceted legal and policy approach, led by a 
consistently committed state, is needed to address these ‘inflexible work arrangements, 
work intensification and unsupportive workplace cultures’ that are at the root of many 
cases of workplace carer discrimination.
294
 Conaghan has noted that the focus from 
governments, legislators and policymakers on ‘family-friendly workplaces’ is crucial 
because it has increasingly emphasised the interdependence of work and family, 
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recognising that ‘the workplace and family are inextricably linked rather than distinct 
and occasionally overlapping’. She noted that: 
once the interdependence of work and family responsibilities is acknowledged 
it becomes harder to attribute value only to paid work. Thus, the pursuit of 
family-friendly working policies goes beyond … assumptions about the 
boundaries of ‘work’ and ‘workplace’. It compels the integration of unpaid 
care work into the economic, political, and legal discourse.
295
  
Legislators and policymakers pursuing ‘family-friendly’ workplaces to help ensure 
greater equality for worker–carers, especially women, must deploy a range of legal and 
policy approaches, including ‘carrots and sticks’, via ‘information, education, 
exhortation and legislation’.296 Industrial and workplace relations, tax, family, education 
and training, family and welfare, and access to, and the cost of childcare are all relevant 
sites for legal or policy intervention and innovation.
297
  
 
Further, given the rapid pace of the enormous social, economic and demographic 
changes that have occurred over the past decades, and that will likely continue in the 
future as more workers ‘struggle to juggle’ work and care,298 it is clear that these 
multiple legal and policy approaches cannot remain static. As various AHRC reports
299
 
have demonstrated, the burdens and negative effects of work and care in the short and 
long term are complex. Legal and policy responses will need to be dynamic, and adapt 
and develop, as new challenges materialise, to ensure that the social good and value of 
unpaid care work is somehow recognised, and that worker–carers are not socially and 
economically excluded from reaching their full potential because of workplace 
discrimination.
300
  
 
This literature review has indicated that although there is an acknowledgement that 
discrimination laws alone cannot overcome such deeply entrenched social and 
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workplace norms, it is also acknowledged that they can, and do, play a key role
301
 as 
part of a multifaceted legal and social policy arsenal to tackle carer discrimination.
302
 
Around the world, anti-discrimination laws are being used as part of this arsenal.
303
  
 
4.5.3 A Cautionary Postscript: Avoiding the Chaos of Overlapping Regulation 
 
A broad legal and policy arsenal to support workplace flexibility and accommodation of 
caring responsibilities will obviously require some form of central vision and control at 
the state and different government levels in Australia, if the different measures are to 
complement each other in terms of both vision and the results to be achieved.
304
 
Australia, with its federal system of government, has a number of challenges in ensuring 
a clear and consistent work and family policy approach. For example, as noted in 
Chapter 1, Australian states, territories and the Commonwealth
305
 all have 
discrimination legislation covering, to some extent, carer and gender discrimination, and 
how this is regulated in each jurisdiction will depend upon whether the legislation 
provides protections through direct or indirect discrimination, or a duty of 
accommodation.
306
 At the same time, the industrial and workplace relations sphere 
jurisdiction has also played a significant and concurrent role in securing family-friendly 
work conditions, including provisions for access to leave and flexibility. Industrial test 
cases were also crucial in this regard.
307
 The provisions of the FW Act in relation to the 
RTR and parental leave
308
 as well as the introduction of paid parental leave have also all 
provided an important new impetus to improve support for work and family regulation 
and a renewed commitment of the state to these aims.
309
 In addition, discrimination 
                                                 
301
 Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 5. 
302
 See, for example, AHRC, Investing, above n 243, ch 5–6, ddiscussing discrimination and employment 
regulation; Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 5; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 24; Chapman, Working Paper, 
above n 5; Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 188. 
303
 Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 5, 691; AHRC, Investing, above n 243, 35; Skinner, Hutchinson and 
Pocock, above n 190, 14; Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 188, 134–5. 
304
 See AHRC, Investing, above n 243, 10–5. 
305
 See Chapter 1, n 4, explaining the failed attempts to consolidate the four discrimination statutes at the 
Commonwealth level.  
306
 See generally Chapman, Working Paper, above n 5; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 24. 
307
 See, for example, Murray, ‘AIRC’, above n 84; Sue Williamson and Marian Baird, ‘Family Provisions 
and Work Choices: Testing Times’ (2007) 20 Australian Journal of Labour Law 53. 
308
 See s 65 of the FW Act, which provides for an RTR, and s 76, which provides the right to request a 
further 12 months’ extension of unpaid parental leave up to a maximum of 24 months with the right to 
return to the position held.  
309
 See, for example, AHRC, Investing, above n 243; AHRC, Poverty, above n 243; Smith, ‘Bathwater’, 
above n 5, 691–2. See also Elizabeth Hill, ‘Budgeting for Work-Life Balance: The Ideology and Politics 
of Work and Family Policy in Australia’ (2007) 33(2) Australian Bulletin of Labour 226, considering the 
205 
 
complaints can be brought under the general protections provisions under s 351 of the 
FW Act.
310
  
 
While multiple complementary approaches are to be welcomed, there is an obvious 
danger that the potentially overlapping provisions under the industrial FW Act and anti-
discrimination legislation at state and federal levels, each with their own supervising 
agency and processes, will be confusing for workers and employers trying to navigate 
their rights and responsibilities. For example, in relation specifically to legislative 
obligation of reasonable accommodation, although the FW Act RTR focuses on the right 
to request, and a discrimination law duty such as that found under the Victorian EO Act 
focuses on the duty upon an employer to reasonably accommodate a request, essentially, 
they share a common policy goal of accommodating employees’ caring 
responsibilities.
311
 However, there are crucial differences; in particular, the FW Act RTR 
has serious limitations in relation to the employment relationships covered, and lacks an 
accessible review or enforcement mechanisms if the request for flexibility is denied.
312
  
Chapman has illustrated that from a worker–carer’s perspective it will not always be 
clear which offers the best option,
313
 and further in NSW where there is no express duty 
of reasonable accommodation, only an uncertain implied duty, the options are likely to 
be even more confusing for workers and employers.   
 
Given the multiplicity of legislative and policy approaches, employees and employers 
will require clear and accessible ‘structured guidance’314 on their rights and obligations, 
and how to navigate them. Charlesworth and Campbell have noted that: 
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it is now widely accepted that good policy in this increasingly important area 
requires a broader societal approach, including in particular the introduction of 
minimum standards that can guide an employer in his or her response and 
guarantee a result that meets social and economic goals.
315
  
They argue that the legislative approaches to work and family often generally assume 
that: 
cultural change within workplaces around support for employees with family 
responsibilities can be realised by providing structured guidance for employers 
about the ‘right thing to do’. To this extent the weight given to employee 
rather than employer-oriented flexibility in guidelines and other related 
material produced … will be crucial.316  
From the perspective of the employer Smith has also recently noted that Australian 
laws: 
Prohibit discrimination but do little to help employers to identify and address 
discrimination as it manifests in the work-place. Proscription alone is not 
enough. We need more sophisticated regulation that acts to both prompt 
commitment to the goal of gender equality and work–life integration, and also 
enable achievement of that goal. Guidance materials can enhance the 
regulatory framework of discrimination laws and help to address this 
particular weakness.
 317
 
She argues that guidance materials can ‘prompt greater commitment to the regulatory 
goals; explain the diverse and insidious ways in which discrimination can manifest; and 
provide clear and useful examples of alternative, more inclusive ways to operate.’ 318  
She suggests that guidance could be provided in three ways: legislative translation, rule 
illustration and best practice guidance, where:  
Each could act on compliance barriers, including a lack of understanding 
about what constitutes discrimination and a lack of knowledge and skills, to 
develop alternative, more family-friendly ways of working. To be effective, 
legal regulation (and lawyers) needs to focus less on rules and more on 
capacity and motivations.
319
  
 
In focusing on how to achieve effective implementation and compliance, the literature 
also implicitly and sometimes expressly recognises the important educative and 
normative role for statutory bodies such as the ADB.
320
 As noted in Chapter 1, the 
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educative and awareness-raising role of the ADB should not be underestimated, given 
that its websites and publications
321
 are often the first port of call for many workers and 
employers.
322
 In this regard, the AHRC has recently made a number of key 
recommendations that emphasised the need to educate, raise awareness and provide best 
practice guidance in relation to workers who are parents.
323
 It has recommended that the 
relevant government agencies, including the AHRC, state and territory anti-
discrimination and equal opportunities authorities as well as the Fair Work agencies and 
the Department of Social Services ‘collaborate to produce … information and guidance 
material, and disseminate it through their agencies’, in relation to ‘clear, comprehensive 
and consistent information about employer obligations, employee rights and leading 
practices and strategies’.324 Smith has also argued that ‘ultimately, however, to achieve 
equality, organisations have to look internally and produce local and contextual 
information about how discrimination manifests and can be addressed, and this requires 
more than the provision of information by external agencies’.325 
 
This thesis examines in more detail the role that the ADB has played through its 
statutory education and complaint/conciliation functions in relation to Part 4B through 
which it has provided ‘structured guidance’326 to worker–carers and employers. Part V 
of this thesis uses a law in action lens to examine more closely the operation of both the 
ADB’s education and complaint-handling functions and their normative impact in terms 
of how Part 4B has been understood, interpreted and applied, and with what effect.  
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4.6 The Literature Review Concluding Comments 
 
Workplace discrimination against carers in the 21
st
 century is obviously still a pervasive 
and serious barrier to social and economic equality, especially for women.
327
 The 
literature suggests that in spite of the deficiencies of the standard discrimination model 
in Australia, there is still great potential to harness the ‘transformative power’ of 
discrimination laws,
328
 if they are properly implemented by the state, courts and 
tribunals, and employers, and if the rights under these laws are understood, accessible 
and utilised by worker–carers.329 
 
As noted above, a key argument that has emerged in recent years is the role that a 
positive duty of reasonable accommodation may play within the existing discrimination 
law framework, and, in particular, in the context of worker–carers.330 It will be argued 
in the following parts of this thesis that a positive duty of accommodation is both a key 
objective of Part 4B and a key strategy to protect worker–carers from discrimination 
and to achieve substantive equality for the individual worker–carer with the potential for 
broader systemic change. While Part 4B contains no express statutory provision, it has 
certainly been interpreted and applied in practice as operating to imply such a duty.
331
 
 
It is acknowledged that there are some concerns in the literature that a focus on 
individual accommodation represents an ad hoc response which is essentially 
assimilationist and does not effectively challenge the underlying discriminatory work 
structures.
332
 However, it can be argued that a duty of reasonable accommodation can 
also have strong normative force to transform discriminatory workplace practices and 
cultures. It rests upon the concept of a positive duty to achieve equality and a proactive 
‘problem-solving’ context-based approach to flexibility where worker–carers and 
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employers are key actors.
333
 It offers the potential of ensuring that employers take 
proactive steps to change discriminatory practices, processes and policies at their 
workplace. This may help to foster and develop the evolution of a new norm of 
flexibility, in order to achieve the policy goals of gender equality in paid and unpaid 
work, and better work–life balance for worker–carers. Flexibility may then no longer be 
thought of as a special arrangement for women, but may be conceived as normal for 
women and men who work and have caring responsibilities,
334
 if not for all workers.
335
  
 
In addition, it is suggested that agencies such as the ADB can play an important role to 
raise awareness of rights and obligations, to prevent discrimination and to encourage 
compliance through their education and complaint-handling functions. An accessible 
problem-solving enforcement conciliation mechanism based upon an informal, free and 
timely process may also help to support worker–carers exercising their rights. This may 
help to empower individual worker–carers to negotiate and fight for what they need 
‘free of stigma’336 in the context of their caring responsibilities at that particular time in 
their lives. In Part V of this thesis, which provides an empirical study of carers’ 
complaints made to the ADB between 2001 and 2011, it is demonstrated that 31% of all 
carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB resulted in an accommodation for the worker–
carer and in 11% of all complaints made, led to an outcome with potentially broader, 
systemic effects for that workplace, for example, policy changes.
337
 These findings 
suggest that a duty of reasonable accommodation, even if it is implied rather than 
expressly provided for, may help to achieve substantive equality for worker–carers in 
NSW and encourage a norm of flexibility. 
 
In this thesis, it is argued that anti-discrimination legislation—particularly if it contains 
positive duties, including a duty of reasonable accommodation for worker–carers,338 has 
a problem-solving focus,
339
 recognises the need to tackle hostile workplace culture and 
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is supported by an accessible enforcement mechanism
340—can play an important part in 
achieving the equality goals for worker–carers. 
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PART III: THE POLICY CONTEXT 
 
Chapter 5: The Policy Objectives of Part 4B 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In NSW, s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) expressly provides that regard is ‘to 
be had to purposes or objects of Acts and statutory rules’ and that: 
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction 
that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule 
(whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act …) shall 
be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. 
Very often, discrimination legislation, including the carers’ legislation under Part 4B, 
does not expressly articulate what those objectives are.
1
 For example, the AD Act does 
not actually have a general objects clause but in outlining the functions of the ADB 
under s 119 it is clear that its purpose, firmly anchored within a human rights context, is 
to prevent and eliminate discrimination and promote equality and equal treatment of all 
human beings, and provide an effective enforcement mechanism.
2
 In the second reading 
speech introducing the Anti-Discrimination Bill in 1976, Premier Neville Wran noted 
that: 
The protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual is of 
paramount importance to governments. The principle that all human beings are 
born equal, have a right to be treated with equal dignity and a right to expect 
equal treatment in society is a principle firmly upheld by my Government.
3
 
Parliaments have enacted anti-discrimination laws in order to protect human dignity, 
and therefore, it should follow that courts and tribunals should give effect to the 
Parliament’s intention to meet these general human rights policy objectives.  
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In Chapter 2 it was explained how Gaze has highlighted the importance of identifying 
the objectives underpinning discrimination legislation in order to guide the 
interpretation and application of those laws. She further noted however that ‘it is rare 
for judges to consider the policy or concepts underlying these laws’ and that they ‘most 
often give a literal or narrow reading’ of anti-discrimination provisions.4 Early High 
Court decisions had found that discrimination legislation should be read purposively, 
broadly and beneficially to give effect to the important social policy and human rights 
objectives of discrimination laws.
5
 However, a key theme in the literature during the 
past decade has been that courts and discrimination tribunals, from the High Court 
down, have often favoured a judicially conservative approach
6
 whereby the broader 
policy objectives of discrimination legislation are ‘now lost from sight in the minutiae 
of statutory construction’.7 Rees, Rice and Allen have also noted that carers’ 
responsibilities legislation in Australia in particular has illustrated how: 
Anti-discrimination legislation gives courts and tribunals the task of making 
unfamiliar and complex social policy decisions that have wide application. 
This usually occurs within a largely adversarial framework … and often in the 
absence of sufficient evidence and expertise necessary to make broad social 
consequences. This inadequate approach to achieving social policy objectives 
is at times compounded by the appeal courts’ ignorance of, or unwillingness to 
give effect to, the broader aims of anti-discrimination legislation.
8
 
Returning to the four-step methodological framework outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter 
identifies the policy objectives of Part 4B (Step 1).
 9
  It then asks whether the legislation 
                                                 
4
 Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University 
Law Review 353 (‘Context’), 332-333.  See Chapter 2, at 2.5 setting out the methodological framework of 
this thesis which was very much influenced by Gaze’s work. See also K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect 
Discrimination and the Worker-Carer: It’s Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 35 (‘Indirect 
Discrimination’); K Lee Adams, ‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 278, 281 (‘Defining’); Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal in the World of Work: Two 
Significant Developments in Australian Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 202 (‘Fair and Equal’); Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-
Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 111 (‘Shadow’); Anna Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-
Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) (‘Working Paper’).   
5
 Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 4, 353. The High Court found that, in construing legislation designed to 
protect basic human rights and dignity, the courts ‘have a special responsibility to take account of and 
give effect to [its] purpose’: Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 359 (Mason CJ 
and Gaudron J, with whom Deane J agreed). Rees, Rice and Allen have summarised the High Court 
approaches to discrimination cases over the years: Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 1, 33–7. 
6
 Jill Murray, ‘Work and Care: New Legal Mechanisms for Adaptation’ (2005) 15(3) Labour and 
Industry 74 (‘Work and Care’). See Chapter 4, at 4.2, reviewing the literature in relation to this judicial 
conservatism. 
7
 Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime (Themis, 
2010) 21; Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 4, 325;  
8
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 1, 386. 
9
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5. 
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on its face from a the ‘law in the books’10 perspective, gives effect to, or is capable of 
giving effect to, the intended policy objectives of Part 4B (Step 2).
11
  In considering 
how capable the legislative scheme is in delivering the objectives, any deficiencies in 
the legislation are identified
12
 and options for reform which may make the law more 
effective in its operation are also recommended.
 13
  Section 5.2, identifies a number of 
contemporaneous policy sources that very clearly articulate the policy objectives 
underpinning the enactment of Part 4B in 2001.
14
 In particular, the Attorney-General’s 
second reading speech of the Carers’ Bill15 and the NSW Law Reform Commission 
(‘LRC’) report on the review of the AD Act16 are considered in detail. Section 5.3 then 
examines whether the provisions of Part 4B
17
 adequately give effect, or are capable of 
giving effect, to those identified policy objectives.
18
  Two key recommendations are 
made, with the aim of ensuring that the legislation is more capable
19
 of meeting its 
objectives: first, extending the definition of caring responsibilities under s 49S to better 
recognise the breadth of caring responsibilities that worker–carers may have, and 
second, providing a clear and unambiguous duty of reasonable accommodation.  
 
5.2 Identifying the Policy Objectives Underpinning Part 4B 
5.2.1 Locating Policy Sources 
 
If legislation is to be interpreted purposively in accordance with its objectives as 
required under s 33 of the Interpretation Act (1987) NSW then it is necessary as a first 
step to determine what this purpose is.  As noted above, neither the AD Act nor Part 4B 
                                                 
10
 See Chapter 2, at 2.4.  
11
 This chapter concentrates on the policy objectives outlined in key contemporary sources leading up to 
the enactment of Part 4B. For a more contemporary analysis of the objectives of right to request and 
reasonable accommodation legislation in the last decade see for example Sara Charlesworth and Iain 
Campbell, ‘Right to Request Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 116. They identified three policy goals that right to request (‘RTR’) regulation legislation aims to 
achieve: better work and family balance, gender equality and job quality: In this article, RTR is used as an 
umbrella, including both the formal RTR regulation under s 65 of the FW Act and a duty of reasonable 
accommodation in the discrimination jurisdiction sphere, such as that found under ss 17–19 of the EO Act 
(Vic). 
12
 See generally Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 4, 329-330. 
13
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5 outlining the limited nature of the recommendations for law reform in this thesis. 
14
 See Chapter 3, which outlines the literature explaining the nature, causes and effects of workplace 
discrimination against workers with caring responsibilities.  
15
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw).  
16
 LRC, Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Report No 92 (1999) (‘LRC Report’). Rees, 
Rice and Allen, above n 1, 378–83, discussing this LRC Report and the second reading speech. 
17
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7 which outlines the provisions under Part 4B 
18
 Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 4, 329.  
19
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5.7 explaining the approach to law reform options in this thesis. 
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contains an objects clause. The first issue in trying to identify the policy objectives 
underpinning Part 4B is where to locate the relevant policy sources. Under s 34 of the 
Interpretation Act ‘extrinsic’ material may be considered if it is capable of assisting in 
ascertaining the meaning of the provision if the ordinary meaning conveyed by the 
provision leads to a result that is either ‘manifestly absurd or is unreasonable’;20 or if the 
provision is ‘ambiguous or obscure’, taking into account its context in the Act and the 
‘purpose or object’ underlying the Act.21 Section 34 provides that the categories of 
‘extrinsic’ material that may be considered include, but are not limited to, LRC reports, 
international treaties and Ministers’ speeches introducing the Bill. As noted below all of 
these materials are available in relation to Part 4B and are included in the discussion 
below. 
 
Rees, Rice and Allen have noted that ‘clear and comprehensive statements of the policy 
goals’ of discrimination laws in Australia are ‘rare, perhaps because the task of 
producing them is so difficult’.22 They also identify a number of ‘traditional’ sources 
including Ministers’ second reading speeches, judgments, academic writings and LRC 
reviews. They note that ‘generally speaking legislators and judges have shied away 
from making detailed statements about the social policy which underpins anti-
discrimination legislation’.23 In contrast, while ‘academic writers have not been so 
diffident’ they tend to ‘describe the goals which the commentators believe that 
legislation of this nature should embody rather than identify the goals of those laws 
which parliament has enacted’.24 They further noted that ‘there have been surprisingly 
few law reform commission reviews of anti-discrimination legislation’ and ‘in those 
reports which do exist law reform commissions have been inclined to concentrate on the 
detail of the law rather than to examine the social policy reflected in the law’.25   
 
When identifying each of these ‘traditional’ policy sources in relation to Part 4B, it is 
argued that the Tribunal in NSW has generally ‘shied away’ from express 
acknowledgement of or engagement with the policy aims of Part 4B.
26
 Its decision-
                                                 
20
 Section 34(1)(b)(i). 
21
 Section 34(1)(b)(ii). 
22
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 1, 11–12. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Ibid. 
26
 See in particular, the analysis of the carers’ cases in Chapter 6. 
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making has often taken place in a policy vacuum, where it has rarely considered the 
objectives of Part 4B in an express or meaningful manner. It was noted in the literature 
review that academic writing devoted specifically to analysing the operation of Part 4B 
has been rare.
27
  However, there are four key ‘extrinsic’ policy sources which provide 
an insight into the contemporary policy rationale for the introduction of Part 4B. Even if 
these objectives were not then actually or adequately reflected in Part 4B, they are, 
nevertheless, important sources: first, to aid statutory interpretation and application; and 
second they can also be used to evaluate whether or not Part 4B has been subject to a 
purposive interpretation by the Tribunal and the ADB to meet its objectives:
28
 The four 
sources are: 
 International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 156) Concerning Equal 
Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with 
Family Responsibilities (1981) (entered into force 11 August 1983), ratified by 
Australia in 1990
 (‘ILO Convention 156’)  
 Balancing the Act (May 1994)—the ADB’s submission to the NSW LRC’s 
review of the AD Act 1977 (NSW)
29
 
 The LRC Report30 that prompted the enactment of Part 4B. 
 Attorney-General Shaw’s second reading speech introducing the Carers’ 
Responsibilities Bill to Parliament, on 3 May 2000
31
 (‘Carers’ Bill second 
reading speech’). 
 
 
5.2.2 The International Labour Organization Convention No. 156 Workers with 
Family Responsibilities (1981) 
 
The ILO Convention 156, which was ratified by Australia in 1990, was as an important 
impetus which led to the enactment of carers’ and family responsibilities legislation at 
                                                 
27
 See, for example, Juliet Bourke, ‘Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian 
Experience’ (2004) 12 American Journal of Society and the Law 19; Chapman, Working Paper, above n 
4; Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and the Case of Deborah Schou’ 
(2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’); Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 4. 
28
 See Bourke, above n 27, 29, for a discussion of the policy objectives of the legislation. 
29
 ADB of NSW, Balancing the Act: A Submission to the NSW Law Reform Commission’s Review of 
the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 NSW (1994) (‘Balancing the Act’). 
30
 LRC Report, above n 16. 
31
 Above n 15. 
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Commonwealth and state level in Australia.
 32
  For example, in NSW the LRC noted the 
importance of the Convention’s objectives to ‘reduce the conflict between work and 
family responsibilities’33 and the Carer’s Bill second reading speech makes clear that 
Part 4B was enacted to implement Australia’s international obligations under it.34 In 
recognising the gendered effects of work and care Convention 156 closely aligns its 
aims with those of the broader human rights objectives of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979.
35
 It notes the 
fundamental relationship between family responsibilities and gender discrimination, and 
also supports a change in the traditional role of men and women in society, and the 
family, in order to achieve full equality between men and women.
36
 It requires state 
parties to take steps to prevent discrimination in employment against workers with 
caring responsibilities. The Convention applies to men and women who have 
responsibilities for children and ‘immediate’ family members ‘where such 
responsibilities restrict their possibilities of preparing for, entering, participating in or 
advancing in economic activity’. It requires states to make it an aim of: 
national policy to enable persons with family responsibilities who are engaged 
or wish to engage in employment to exercise their right to do so without being 
subject to discrimination and, to the extent possible, without conflict between 
their employment and family responsibilities.
37
 
Consistent with such international instruments, the convention allows national 
governments to decide how best to implement these objectives in line with national 
conditions, but it does include a broad obligation that the competent authorities and 
bodies in each country should take appropriate measures: 
to promote information and education which engender broader public 
understanding of the principle of equality of opportunity and treatment for 
men and women workers and of the problems of workers with family 
                                                 
32
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 1, 378–83. They also note developments in the industrial relations 
sphere, in particular, relating to the Family Provisions Case [2005] AIRC 692. 
33
 LRC Report, above n 16, 298 [5.190]. 
34
 See n 31 above. 
35
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA Res 34/180, 34 UN 
GAOR Supp (No 46) 193, UN Doc A/34/46 (adopted 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981). 
Australia ratified this convention in 1983. Article 11 relates to employment.  
36
 See the Preamble: 
The problems of workers with family responsibilities are aspects of wider issues regarding the 
family and society which should be taken into account in national policies, and … the need to create 
effective equality of opportunity and treatment as between men and women workers with family 
responsibilities and between such workers and other workers. 
37
 ILO Convention 156 arts 1–3. 
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responsibilities, as well as a climate of opinion conducive to overcoming these 
problems.
38
 
Although Convention 156 does not specify that state parties should employ anti-
discrimination or other legislation,
39
 using the anti-discrimination law framework, at 
state and federal level
40
 is one way to one way to implement Australia’s international 
obligations. This framework provides legislative protection from discrimination for 
workers, as well as access to a complaints mechanism, and it also sets up agencies with 
broad educative roles, such as the ADB, to ‘promote information and education’ to 
‘engender broader public understanding’ as required under the Convention.41  
 
5.2.3 Balancing the Act: The ADB Submission to the LRC (1994) 
 
As would be expected, the ADB’s submissions were given some weight by the LRC, 
given that the ADB is at the coalface in terms of receiving complaints and enquiries 
from the public and employers, having a statutory role encompassing general educative 
and law reform functions, and working as an advocate for the principles of anti-
discrimination and equality.
42
 In particular, the LRC specifically acknowledged the 
ADB’s important role to ‘develop principles and guidelines’ for the operation of the AD 
Act to increase ‘levels of understanding and certainty’.43 In its submission to the LRC 
the ADB explained the nature and prevalence of workplace discrimination against 
worker–carers, and made three main recommendations about the substantive scope of a 
carers’ ground, including a separate non gender specific ground for family 
responsibilities,
44
 a definition of ‘family’ that is broader than parenthood45 and a broad 
                                                 
38
 ILO Convention 156 art 6. 
39
 For a discussion of the implementation of the convention in Australia, see Sara Charlesworth and 
Alison Elder, ‘Convention No 156 and Recommendation No 165: Australia’ in Adrienne Cruz (ed), 
Working Paper 2/2012 Good Practices and Challenges on the Maternity Protection Convention 2000 
(No. 183) and Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 1981 (No. 156): A Comparative Study 
(International Labour Organization, 2012) 79. 
40
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 1, 378–83, 386–90, outlining the importance of the ILO Convention 156 
as an impetus for carers’ and family responsibilities legislation at Commonwealth and state level in 
Australia. At 386–7, they explain in particular the constitutional basis for the enactment of the federal 
legislation under the SD Act 1984(Cth), and see Chapter 1, at 1.2.4 and accompanying n 35 for a 
summary of the relevant family responsibilities provisions under that Act. 
41
 Section 119. See Chapter 1, at 1.3.1, outlining the ADB’s statutory functions under the AD Act. Chapter 
8 considers the education function in more detail. 
42
 See Chapter 1, at 1.3.1 and 1.4. 
43
 LRC Report, above n 16, 306 [5.213]–[5.215]. See also at 298, specifically acknowledging the ADB’s 
Balancing the Act submission. 
44
 ADB, Balancing the Act, above n 29, 150. 
45
 Ibid 152. 
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scope of operation that is not limited to employment,
 
but encompasses all other areas 
under the AD Act.
46
  The submission was silent regarding whether any new ground 
should contain a duty of reasonable accommodation. 
 
In response to the LRC question, ‘Should inflexible hours in the workplace, and 
practices that ignore the competing dual roles of women as primary carer in the home 
and worker be considered grounds for indirect discrimination?’,47 the ADB responded: 
Discrimination on the ground of family responsibilities should be a separate 
ground of discrimination because the use of indirect sex … provisions is too 
selective and cumbersome to provide justice to people of either sex who 
experience discrimination because of family responsibilities.
48
 
The ADB argued that ‘a separate ground of family responsibilities is preferable because 
an increasing number of men are taking on these responsibilities’49 noting that: 
the most obvious employment practices which affect workers with family 
responsibilities are requiring employees to work full-time, refusing to employ 
people with young children, refusing to grant any time off (or other 
employment benefits such as a transfer closer to home) to care for sick family 
members, refusing to allow flexible work hours, requiring workers to work 
long hours, travel extensively or move to any location within the state.
50
 
The ADB was in favour of some nexus with a family relationship, but based on a 
relationship broader than parents caring for children. It noted that there may be some 
relationships outside the traditional nuclear family, such as ‘parents, and other elderly 
relatives not to mention extended families and those where the relationships are based 
on affinity such as the Aboriginal kinship system’.51 However, the ADB did not suggest 
how to define which relationships should be included.
52
 
 
5.2.4 The NSW LRC Report 
Five aspects of the LRC approach and its recommendations are now considered. First, 
an overview is provided of the LRC’s substantive recommendations for a ground of 
                                                 
46
 See Chapter 1, at 1.2.1. The other areas under the AD Act are accommodation, education, goods and 
services, and registered clubs. 
47
 ADB, Balancing the Act, above n 29, 153. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid 152–3. 
52
 Ibid 152. See LRC Report, above n 16, referring to an ADB discussion paper on family responsibilities, 
where it is noted that the ADB recommended coverage based on a family relationship, and extended it to 
broadly include people who are ‘wholly or principally dependent on, or … a member of the household’ of 
the worker. 
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carers’ responsibilities. Then four specific aspects of its rationale are considered in turn: 
gender discrimination and breaking down the traditional division of labour in the public 
and private spheres; whether the inherent requirement/unjustifiable hardship provisions 
can provide a duty of accommodation; the centrality of an express duty of reasonable 
accommodation to achieve substantive equality; and responding to business objections.   
 
(i) The LRC’s Substantive Recommendations  
 
In 1991, the LRC was asked to review the AD Act by the NSW Attorney-General. The 
review took eight years and culminated in the LRC Report, which ran to almost 1,000 
pages.
53
 After undertaking a broad consultation process, the LRC finally reported back 
in November 1999, making 161 recommendations, including the enactment of a new 
Anti-Discrimination Bill (‘LRC Draft Bill’) including a new ground of carers’ 
responsibility, which was drafted as part of the process and annexed to the report.
54
 The 
LRC recommended that the AD Act should provide for an express duty of reasonable 
accommodation on the grounds of disability, carers’ responsibilities, pregnancy and 
breastfeeding subject to a defence of unjustifiable hardship.
55
  It was intended as part of 
a new strategy to achieve substantive equality and promote the opportunities of 
disadvantaged groups, including carers at work.  
 
                                                 
53
 LRC Report, above n 16. The LRC Report is in two volumes. Volume 1 (at 1–582) primarily deals with 
substantive provisions. Volume 2 (at 583–944) deals with complaint handling. The LRC Report also 
appends the proposed Draft Bill (at 789–876). Where sections of the LRC Report are produced in this 
chapter, footnotes are omitted. 
54
 The relevant provisions are set out in the LRC Draft Bill as follows: 
 Section 14 defines the ground of caring responsibility discrimination, the obligation to take 
reasonable steps to accommodate, and the operation of the defence of unjustifiable hardship, 
and provides that the employer will have the burden of proof. 
 Sections 17–19 define caring and family responsibilities. 
 Section 25 defines ‘reasonable steps’. 
These provisions are explained below, in the context of the LRC recommendations. It should be noted 
that, in terms of the structure the current AD Act, which has essentially been in the same format since its 
inception, it follows the ‘older’ model of discrimination laws in Australia, and consists of different parts 
for each ground and the relevant areas under each ground.  See Rees, Rice and Allen above n 1, 400 
explaining the different structures between this older model and the ‘newer model’—for example, found 
under the Victorian EO Act—which sets out the list of attributes and then sets out the areas of activity. 
The LRC Draft Bill proposed the newer model. However, the LRC Draft Bill was not enacted, a complete 
overhaul did not occur, and the carers’ provision was inserted into the older model as Part 4B. 
55
 See LRC Report, above n 16 at xxv, 297–308, Recommendation 8 at 108 and Recommendation 40 at 
308.  
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A new ground for carers’ responsibility would apply in the area of work only,56 but as 
with other grounds under the AD Act, would cover a broad array of workplace situations 
and relationships.
57
 The LRC noted that ‘recognition of the need for protection from 
discrimination for people with family responsibilities has evolved through an awareness 
of changes in the roles and responsibilities within families and the impact of those roles 
on employment’, and the need to reduce the conflict between work and family.58 The 
LRC was very concerned with how to further what it considered important social policy 
objectives, and also give effect to Australia’s ratification of the ILO Convention 156 to 
‘reduce the conflict between work and family responsibilities’.59 It also recognised that 
in the industrial relations sphere there was an increasing willingness for industrial laws 
to seek solutions consistent with anti-discrimination principles.
60
  
 
The LRC’s detailed deliberations illustrated in the excerpts from the LRC Report 
discussed below demonstrate that its rationale was based on the strategic proposition 
that a proactive duty of reasonable accommodation was the key to achieving substantive 
equality for worker-carers, better work–life balance, and gender equality in paid and 
unpaid care work. Most importantly, it argued that the traditional discrimination law 
duties of restraint would be inadequate to achieve these objectives, noting that ‘this 
ground will have little effect in practice if it does not include an obligation to make 
reasonable accommodation … to achieve the underlying social policy’.61 
 
The LRC Draft Bill provided a broad approach to the definition of caring 
responsibilities, which included both ‘family responsibilities’ (defined as care for a 
relative) and caring responsibilities for a person ‘as a result of a “significant personal 
relationship”’, where the relative or person is ‘substantially dependent for ongoing care, 
                                                 
56
 Ibid 307–8 [5.190]–[5.220], noting that the focus on employment reflects the industrial focus of ILO 
Convention 156, and the area of employment as defined by the ILO Convention (No 111) Concerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation or Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) (entered into force 15 June 1960). The LRC was unwilling to extend to areas other than 
employment because it saw no evidence of a ‘broader social problem in this area’. 
57
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.2.  
58
 LRC Report, above n 16, 301 [5.201]. 
59
 Ibid 298 [5.190], citing art 3 of the ILO Convention 156. 
60
 Ibid 307 [5.216]. See also at 300 [5.195], referring to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and a 
number of Australian Industrial Relations Commission decisions granting certain concessions to workers 
with responsibilities in the Personal/Carer’s Leave Test Case (1995) 62 IR 48 and the Family Leave Test 
Case (1994) 57 IR 21.  
61
 LRC Report, above n 16, 305 [5.212]. 
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attention and support (including financial, physical or emotional support)’.62 The LRC 
also expressly stated that the nature of such caring responsibilities was very broad and 
not confined to looking after sick relatives, but could also ‘include attending important 
school functions of a dependent child, attending medical appointments and religious, 
spiritual, traditional and cultural observances’.63 The LRC Draft Bill provided that an 
employer would discriminate if it ‘fails to take reasonable steps to accommodate’ the 
caring responsibilities of a worker.
64
 ‘Reasonable steps’ were defined broadly to cover 
adjustments in terms of how, when and where work would be undertaken.
65
 The duty 
was subject to a defence of unjustifiable hardship, where relevant factors included 
weighing up financial effects or other detriments to the employer, and any benefit for 
the worker–carer, and any ‘public interest in taking the steps’ and with the employer 
having the burden of proving why it was unable to accommodate the employee.
66
 It 
therefore focused on the reasonableness of the employer’s refusal which the employer 
would have to justify.
67
 This could then simplify and reduce the burden of proof for 
complainants.
68
 It would also potentially mitigate many of the evidentiary burdens 
                                                 
62
 Section 18 of the LRC Draft Bill defines carer responsibilities as ‘the responsibilities of a person on 
whom another person is substantially dependent for ongoing care, attention and support (including 
financial, physical or emotional support) as a result of a significant personal relationship’. See LRC 
Report, above n 16, 303 [5.206]. 
63
 LRC Report, above n 16, 304 [5.207]. 
64
 LRC Draft Bill s 14(1) provides that there is an obligation to accommodate needs of persons having 
special characteristics: 
(1) A person (the first person) discriminates against another person (the second person) who has a 
special characteristic if: 
(a) the first person fails to take reasonable steps to accommodate those needs of the person that 
result from having the special characteristic, and 
(b) the taking of those steps would allow the person to obtain a relevant benefit or avoid a relevant 
detriment. 
65
 Ibid s 25 provides that reasonable steps include:  
(a) changes to the physical conditions of the work place 
(b) changes to work practices 
(c) variations in the terms and conditions under which the work would otherwise be undertaken 
(d) the provision of special services or facilities, so as to permit the person to perform adequately 
the essential requirements of the work. 
66
 Ibid s 14(3) provides that unjustifiable hardship is imposed on the first person if the detriment or 
disadvantage to the first person (including financial expenditure) involved in taking the steps 
(a) is significant in all the circumstances, and 
(b) is disproportionate to any benefit that may be obtained by the first person in the circumstances 
(including that resulting from any particular qualities of the second person), and 
(c) is not justifiable, despite the benefit to the second person and any public interest in taking the 
steps. 
67
 EO Act (Vic) under ss 17–19, noted by Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 27, 59. 
68
 Note that under ss 17–19 of the EO Act, the complainant still has the burden to show that the 
employer’s reasons for the refusal are unreasonable. See Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 27, 62, discussing 
this weakness in the legislation. 
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arising from disparities in resources and knowledge between an employer and 
employee.
69
 
 
Although the LRC did not use the language of the academic literature, its rationale, 
indicates that policy objectives would be achieved by challenging ideal worker norms, 
public and private distinctions, and—importantly—challenging managerial 
prerogative—all issues flagged in the literature review in Chapter 3.70 The LRC’s 
deliberations therefore pre-empt and reflect many of the debates found in the 
discrimination law literature about the capacity and potential of traditional 
discrimination law models, based on duties of restraint, to effect genuine social change 
and achieve substantive equality for worker–carers.  
 
(ii) Gender, Work and Care in the Public and Private Spheres 
 
The LRC highlighted the interdependency of gender discrimination and the traditional 
division of labour in the public and private spheres as key barriers to substantive 
equality. It pointed to the major demographic changes in relation to more women in 
paid work, and argued that a main impetus for explicit protection for workers with 
carers’ responsibilities is gender equality: 
There has been considerable debate in recent years as to the level of protection 
which can be accorded to persons attempting to accommodate conflicting 
obligations, including family responsibilities, especially in the area of 
employment. The pressure to accommodate such needs is partly a reflection of 
the growing recognition that many of those with primary responsibility for 
dependent children and elderly or disabled family members are also in the 
work force. … Traditionally, such women would have primary responsibility 
for caring for the children at home and in dealing with emergencies … Looked 
at from the other perspective, only one in three of two parent families conform 
to the traditional model of male bread winner and female non-employed 
carer.
71
  
It recognised that women can face a double burden of paid work and unpaid care work, 
and that men have not taken on a fair share of unpaid care work: 
Given the level of female participation in the work force, it may be thought 
that the rising concern as to the allocation of family responsibilities is partly a 
result of increasing pressure on men to exercise such functions. However, such 
                                                 
69
 See generally Dominique Allen, ‘Reducing the Burden of Proof in Australia’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 579 (‘Burden’). 
70
 See Chapter 3, in particular at 3.2 and 3.5, explaining these issues in the context of the literature. 
71
 LRC Report, above n 16, 297 [5.185]. 
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evidence as there is suggests that the average male contribution to family care 
has increased only marginally.
72
 
It recommended a non gender specific ground for carers’ discrimination to help break 
down this traditional division of labour: 
Given the primary role of women to care for children and elderly or disabled 
dependants, recognition of the need to accommodate those with family 
responsibilities may also be seen as recognition of the existence of a form of 
indirect discrimination based on sex. From that conclusion it may be argued 
that family responsibilities protection is not a significant extension of the 
concept of sex discrimination. However, as with many examples of indirect 
discrimination, it is arguable that it will only be properly addressed in practice 
if it is specifically dealt with in the AD Act.
73
  
While the Commission accepts that protection of those with family 
responsibilities will largely benefit women, the availability of such protection 
may itself help to break down the traditional division of responsibility on 
male/female lines.
74
 
It argued that any solution must necessarily focus on the gendered demarcations of paid 
work in the public sphere and unpaid care work in the private sphere.
75
 Although the 
LRC did not use the terminology ‘ideal worker’, it effectively recognised what Smith 
has noted that ‘substantive equality would mean de-gendering work and care, enabling 
the participation of all citizens in both productive and reproductive work’.76 The LRC 
suggested that discrimination law could work towards substantive equality for the 
individual worker, while also offering the potential of more systemic and broader 
cultural changes in how work and care are regarded in society. 
 
 
(iii) Implying a duty by analogy with the disability provisions under Part 4A  
 
The LRC recognised that the traditional model of discrimination law based on duties of 
restraint alone could not deliver substantive equality. It strongly recommended an 
express duty of reasonable accommodation requiring positive action from an employer. 
In reaching this conclusion, the LRC first considered whether the inherent 
requirement/unjustifiable hardship defence under the existing disability discrimination 
                                                 
72
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 Ibid 298 [5.187]. 
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 See Chapter 3, at 3.2.1. 
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 Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) Sydney Law Review 689, 698 
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provisions in Part 4A,
77
 already operated in practice to provide a duty of 
accommodation, and thus whether an express duty was required, or whether these 
provisions sufficed.
78
 The LRC found that the existing disability provisions in the AD 
Act did require a ‘level of accommodation even in circumstances where a disability may 
render it difficult for a … person to carry out all the functions of a position’.79 However, 
it found that there were a number of major problems with the operation of these 
provisions in practice.
 80
  It noted that while they amounted to an ‘intention’ to require 
reasonable accommodation for the particular disabilities of the person
81
 they were 
expressed in ‘confusing’ and ‘negative’ terms so that the obligation was imposed as an 
‘exception to a defence’.82 It recommended an express duty because accommodation ‘is 
an essential element of the prohibition not merely a limited exception’.83 It also noted 
that the provisions applied only to job applicants, and to the termination of employees.
84
 
The LRC found that the drafting and structure was confusing and unhelpful because it 
did not relate to ‘all aspects of employment’.85 It subsequently recommended that a duty 
of accommodation should apply to all aspects of employment and not be limited to 
hiring and firing situations.
86
  
 
Unsurprisingly, in the context of the disability provisions the LRC considered that the 
need to address the confusion via an express duty was ‘a matter of importance’.87 When 
it came to the new ground of carers’ discrimination, it recommended the same express 
duty to avoid the obvious deficiencies of an implied duty.
88
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78
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 See AD Act ss 49C, 49D(4); LRC Report, above n 16, 256 [5.73]–[5.76]. 
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disability and breastfeeding, to which ss 14 and 25 would then apply. 
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Unfortunately, as discussed further below, the explicit duty recommended by the LRC 
and contained in the LRC Draft Bill —that was clear, unambiguous and applied broadly 
to work situations involving recruitment, current employees and terminations, with the 
employer having the burden of proving why it was unjustifiably difficult to take 
reasonable steps—was omitted from Part 4B.89 Instead, the structure of the existing Part 
4A, the effect of which was largely discredited by the LRC, was replicated in the 
enactment of Part 4B.
90
 Carers’ responsibility and disability are the only two grounds 
under the AD Act that contain this inherent requirement/unjustifiable hardship defence.  
Chapter 1, at 1.7.5 considered the existing structure and operation of this defence under 
Part 4B and whether and how it has been interpreted by the ADB and Tribunal. 
 
(iv) An Express Duty of Reasonable Accommodation  
 
The LRC noted that it was important to acknowledge as a starting point that 
family/caring responsibilities and employment obligations sometimes conflict:
91
  
A principle of equality of treatment alone will not impose an obligation on an 
employer to improve the flexibility or otherwise vary the conditions attaching 
to a particular position. Accordingly, this ground will have little effect in 
practice if it does not include an obligation to make reasonable 
accommodation, subject to the defence of undue hardship. This is because 
actual or potential availability for work at particular hours may be a relevant 
consideration in relation to some employment. Rather than disregard this fact, 
it is necessary to acknowledge its force and impose reasonable requirements to 
achieve the underlying social policy.
92
 
The proposed LRC duty was intended to have the effect of requiring an employer to 
take into account the private world of the individual employee (such as the nature, 
extent and effect of his or her individual caring responsibilities) and the ‘public 
interest’.93 It therefore had the potential to directly challenge the current dominant 
gendered ideal worker norms
94
 in terms of working time, work organisation and job 
design, relating to how, where and when jobs are done and by whom.
95
  
                                                 
89
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 LRC Report, above n 16, 301 [5.202]. 
92
 Ibid 305 [5.212]. 
93
 LRC Draft Bill s 14(2)–(4). 
94
 See generally Chapter 3. 
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(v) Responding to Business Objections 
 
The LRC recognised that such an express duty would amount to a significant challenge 
to managerial prerogative by requiring employers to consider the private caring 
commitments of their workers, to adjust the workplace to accommodate those 
commitments and, if necessary, to defend that decision.
96
 The LRC appeared acutely 
conscious of the need to achieve an ‘appropriate balance’97 between the rights of 
workers with caring responsibilities and the needs of business.  However, given the 
important social policy aims, the LRC was not afraid to confront and then largely 
dismiss many of the concerns that business had raised.
98
  
 
The LRC identified two main objections raised by business: the cost burden and the 
uncertainty of the potential defence of unjustifiable hardship. The LRC dismissed both 
objections, recommending that ‘the appropriate balance is achieved through the “undue 
hardship” defence which provides a degree of flexibility’ for employers.99 It noted that: 
One argument against the ‘reasonable accommodation’ approach is that it 
imposes a burden on employers, and in particular small business. … In the 
first place, the objection bears the hallmarks of the objections historically 
raised in relation to regulation of anti-social conduct in many areas … In 
practice, the overriding social policy contained in anti-discrimination 
principles was given effect and the adverse economic consequences proved to 
be exaggerated.
100
 The second aspect of the objection really focuses upon the 
uncertainty which is said to flow from the ‘undue hardship’ defence. However, 
this uncertainty has not proved a significant difficulty in relation to the area of 
disability discrimination … To the extent that new situations give rise to novel 
complaints, the usual course is likely to follow: namely that the ADB and … 
the ADT will develop principles and guidelines which will give rise to 
increasing levels of understanding and certainty.
101
 
Under the LRC model found in the Draft Bill an employer was therefore expected to 
provide reasonable accommodation, and would have to demonstrate that any hardship 
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was significant, disproportionate and unjustifiable in the circumstances.
102
 Importantly, 
therefore it was made clear that business should not be allowed to trump the important 
social policy objectives of equality for worker–carers, without a very good reason.  The 
LRC concluded that: 
The Commission has … given consideration to the evidence of changing 
practices on the part of employers, flowing in large part from a growing 
awareness of the social problem and from the increasing willingness of 
industrial laws to seek solutions consistent with anti-discrimination principles. 
Further, the Commission has given weight to the importance of the underlying 
social principle, as reflected in the ratification by Australia of ILO Convention 
No. 156. It is the firm view of the Commission that the proposed ground of 
family and carer responsibilities should include a prohibition on treatment 
based directly on this ground and should include a requirement that such 
responsibilities be the subject of reasonable accommodation.
103
 
 
In conclusion, the LRC report demonstrates its nuanced understanding of the nature, 
extent and effects of workplace discrimination against carers—especially women. Its 
recommendations reflect a pragmatic and essentially common sense strategy for 
reasonable accommodation to try to address work–life conflict, and to balance important 
social and equality goals against the hostility and objections of business.
104
 It also 
reflects and pre-empts many of the issues and concerns raised in the literature in 
recognising that it was necessary to move beyond an equal treatment model of 
discrimination law in order to achieve substantive equality. It thus suggested imposing a 
positive obligation that, in many ways, reflects Fredman’s calls for a unified approach 
to equality based not just on a negative prohibition on discrimination but on positive 
duties to promote equality.
105
 Its recommendations also reflect what Chapman has 
called a ‘third and separate’106 form of discrimination protection, an ‘additional 
entitlement’107 which moves away from the traditional negative duties legislative 
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 Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 11, 135 noted the comment of a Victorian member of the 
Legislative Council describing the duty of accommodation in the EO Act as ‘just codified common sense’  
105
 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2011, 2
nd
 edition) 6–8 
(‘Discrimination’); Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 175 (‘Human Rights’). See also Belinda Smith and Dominique Allen, 
‘Whose Fault Is It? Asking the Right Questions When Trying to Address Discrimination’ (2012) 37(1) 
Alternative Law Journal 31, 36. 
106
 Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 27, 52, in the context of the EO Act (Vic). 
107
 Ibid 59. 
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models.
108
 Such a duty looks towards a more substantive understanding of workplace 
equality, ‘in terms of outcomes and results’.109 The LRC duty of reasonable 
accommodation, with the burden of proof on the employer, could sidestep the 
artificiality of the notions of direct and indirect discrimination, and the complex and 
idiosyncratic elements that a complainant must prove in relation to each. It also 
suggested a significant intrusion across public and private work demarcations,
110
 and 
recognised the interdependence of the industrial and discrimination law spheres to 
tackle this problem of carers’ discrimination. Importantly, the LRC was willing to tackle 
employer hostility and resistance to any perceived attack on managerial prerogative.
 111
 
Such willingness has often been sorely absent in the decisions of the courts and 
tribunals in work and family discrimination cases,
112
 including many of the carers’ 
decisions of the Tribunal, which are considered in detail in Part IV of this thesis. 
 
The LRC Report is therefore a crucial ‘extrinsic’ policy source to explain the social 
policy objectives of Part 4B and it can help to support a broad and beneficial 
interpretation of the legislation by the Tribunal and ADB to meet those objectives. In 
addition, it is an important source against which to measure how effective the carers’ 
provisions have been when considered from the perspectives of the Tribunal and ADB. 
 
 
5.2.5 The Second Reading Speech 
 
In May 2000, the Attorney-General of NSW introduced the Anti-Discrimination 
Amendment (Carers’ Responsibilities) Bill (2000).113 Unlike other jurisdictions, the 
NSW Parliament does not utilise explanatory memoranda when a Bill is introduced to 
explain its intentions. The second reading speech is therefore important because it is the 
only contemporaneous official record to provide a direct insight into the aims and 
objectives of the Government in introducing the legislation. The speech emphasises that 
                                                 
108
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the legislation was intended to give effect to both the key recommendation of the LRC 
and Australia’s international commitments under ILO Convention 156. 
 
Attorney-General Shaw stated that it was intended to ‘have a positive impact on 
families, by encouraging the equitable employment of men and women with caring 
responsibilities’ and helping them balance work and care: 
The purpose of the bill is to … provide protection for the many carers who are 
unfairly treated in the workplace when they try to balance work and family 
commitments. The amendments recognise the changing structure of work and 
family life, and the growing number of women and men in the work force who 
are also the primary carers of children, adults with disabilities, or other family 
members in need of care and support. 
Whilst protection of those with family responsibilities will largely benefit 
women—since women usually play the primary role in caring for children, the 
elderly and people with disabilities—this amendment is not simply an 
extension of the concept of sex discrimination, as it will protect both men and 
women who undertake such care. The bill defines responsibilities as a carer to 
cover the variety of family and caring relationships which exist in our 
community, including those involving spouses and de facto spouses, children 
and stepchildren, grandchildren, parents, and grandparents. 
The definition includes caring responsibilities that a person has presently, had 
in the past, or will have in the future, and those that it is thought that a person 
has, had or will have. The amendment will impose an obligation on employers 
to accommodate employees’ caring responsibilities, ensuring that employers 
proactively consider whether existing or new workplace policies have a 
discriminatory impact on employees with caring responsibilities … [emphasis 
added]. 
Discrimination will not be unlawful if, taking into account all of the relevant 
factors, the person’s responsibilities as a carer would prevent him or her from 
carrying out the inherent requirements of a job. The bill also provides a 
defence where an employer would have to make arrangements to 
accommodate an employee’s caring responsibilities which would place an 
unjustifiable hardship upon the employer. 
This speech demonstrates a clear legislative intent about the centrality of the policy 
aims of gender equality, balancing paid work and unpaid care work, and the importance 
of a positive obligation of reasonable accommodation. In addition, the Attorney-
General’s emphasis on ‘proactive’ action highlighted the potential for the carers’ 
legislation to move beyond the traditional prohibition on discrimination model of equal 
treatment, instead requiring employers to ‘proactively consider whether existing or new 
workplace policies have a discriminatory impact on employees with caring 
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responsibilities’. Thus the potential for discrimination laws to challenge broader 
discriminatory practices beyond the individual worker–carer is acknowledged.  
 
As explained in Chapter 1, the complete overhaul of the AD Act recommended by the 
LRC never occurred, and the majority of recommendations—particularly in relation to 
definitional and substantive issues—were never acted on.114 Instead, the AD Act was 
amended in 2000 to specifically include the new ground of carers’ responsibility 
discrimination in work, but the explicit duty of reasonable accommodation, so central to 
the LRC’s recommendations, was unfortunately omitted. It is argued in the following 
section that the legislation that was enacted is clearly incapable of giving effect to the 
Attorney-General’s hopes of imposing a statutory ‘obligation on employers to 
accommodate employees’ caring responsibilities.115 
 
 
5.3 Making Part 4B More ‘Capable’116 of Meeting its Objectives  
 
Chapter 1 at 1.7 outlines the provisions that were enacted under Part 4B. In summary, 
Part 4B closely follows the standard discrimination law template based on negative 
duties of restraint. It is unlawful to discriminate against a person because of his or her 
carers’ responsibilities for a family member or relative specified under s 49S who is ‘in 
need of care or support’. However, the phrase ‘care or support’ is not defined further in 
the legislation.
117
 Part 4B applies very broadly to work relationships, including 
employees, contractor workers, commission agents, independent contractors and 
partners,
118
 with specific exceptions only for private households and small business.
119
 
Section 49T defines what constitutes discrimination, covering direct
120
 and indirect 
discrimination
121
 on the ground of a person’s current, past, future or presumed caring 
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responsibilities.
122
 An express duty of reasonable accommodation on employers is not 
provided for. Like the disability provisions in Part 4A, Part 4B provides a potential 
defence of unjustifiable hardship, in relation to hiring and firing decisions.
 123
  
 
Other than limiting the ground of carers’ discrimination to the area of employment, the 
drafters of Part 4B did not give effect to LRC’s recommendations found in the LRC 
Draft Bill.
124
 Thus, the LRC’s warnings that ‘this ground will have little effect in 
practice if it does not include an obligation to make reasonable accommodation … to 
achieve the underlying social policy’125 and that the inherent requirements/unjustifiable 
hardship provisions are confusing, have uneven application and do not provide a 
consistent duty of accommodation
126
 were ignored.  
 
It is unclear why the duty of reasonable accommodation was not included in Part 4B. It 
may be surmised that the drafters of Part 4B, notwithstanding the LRC warnings, 
considered that simply replicating the disability provisions provided an adequate 
implied duty of accommodation.  It may also have been relevant that as the major 
structural overhaul of the Bill, as recommended by the LRC, was not being actioned in 
2000, it was considered too difficult to insert an express duty provision for one ground 
of the AD Act only, and which would then appear inconsistent with the rest of the AD 
Act. In the writer’s experience working at the ADB in 2001, there was considerable 
momentum and anticipation that the government at that time was in favour of enacting 
an entirely new AD Act based on the LRC Report. In this climate, Part 4B may have 
been considered no more than a temporary ‘stopgap’ legislative solution until the new 
Act as recommended by the LRC was enacted.
127
 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, when assessing whether the statutory provisions, on their face, 
give effect to the policy objectives Gaze noted that ‘it may also be necessary to assess 
how capable the legislative scheme is of delivering’ the policy objectives, which may 
                                                 
122
 Section 49T(2). 
123
 Sections 49U and 49V(4) replicate the provisions found in the disability discrimination provisions in 
pt 4A ss
 
49C, 49D(4). These are the only two grounds to contain this defence. 
124
 In particular, see LRC Draft Bill ss 14, 17–19, 25. 
125
 LRC Report, above n 16, 305 [5.212]. 
126
 Ibid 253 [5.65]–[5.76]. 
127
 See ADB, Annual Report 2001–2002, 57–9, which notes the work that the ADB undertook in response 
to the LRC Report.  
232 
 
then lead to recommendations for improvements to the current statutory scheme
128
 in 
order to better meet the policy aims of the legislation.
 
The following sections now 
outline a number of deficiencies under Part 4B, which significantly hinder the 
achievement of these policy aims.
 129 
  Two reform options are also suggested by which 
Part 4B could be made more capable of meeting these goals.
 130
 
 
   
 
 
5.3.1 Caring Responsibilities under s49S 
 
The Limitations of s 49S 
 
As noted in Chapter 3,
 131
 many worker–carers have very broad caring responsibilities 
within their families and communities, for children, and/or adult family members or 
friends who are elderly or disabled.
132
 The LRC recommendations for a very broad 
definition of caring responsibility based on a family relationship or as a result of a 
‘significant personal relationship’133 were ignored by the drafters of the legislation. The 
definition of carers’ responsibilities under s 49S is instead limited to a defined set of 
family relationships, and does not define what is meant by care and support.
134
  
Therefore, s 49S does not cover situations where a genuine caring relationship and 
responsibility exist in relation to another family member not listed under s 49S (such as 
uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, cousins) and other people outside the family relationship 
(such as a friend, flatmate or neighbour in the community). For example, somewhat 
arbitrarily, a worker–carer with responsibilities to care for a former partner’s parents or 
a former partner’s step-sibling is covered under s 49S, but a worker’s responsibilities to 
                                                 
128
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129
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care for a cousin, aunt or uncle, niece or nephew, or a neighbour or friend is not.
135
 In 
addition, the legislation does not cover some kinship relationships found in Indigenous 
or other communities.
136
 
 
Options for Reform  
 
It is recommended that the family nexus threshold under s 49S be removed in favour of 
a broad definition of care and support that would be the basis of demonstrating a caring 
relationship. This would provide broader coverage for all worker–carers in NSW who 
have genuine caring commitments and would reflect the reality of work and care for 
many workers in society. Care and support should be defined more broadly in line with 
the recommendation of the LRC,
137
 or following the Victorian EO Act.
138
 Similarly, in 
the industrial relations sphere, since July 2013, the RTR under s 65 has been expanded 
significantly so that employees with very broad caring responsibilities are entitled to 
make a request for flexible work.
139
  
 
 
5.3.2 A Duty of Reasonable Accommodation  
As outlined in Chapter 1,
140
 even without an express duty of reasonable accommodation 
there are two possible legal bases from which such a duty can be implied under Part 4B. 
The deficiencies in relation to each are now summarised, and then options for law 
reform are recommended to make the legislation more capable of meeting its objectives. 
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The Limitations of an Implied Duty under Part 4B  
 
(i)Unjustifiable hardship and inherent requirements  
In her review of the first years of the operation of Part 4B, Bourke argued that: 
The most innovative aspect of the legislation is the adoption of the disability 
model of discrimination namely its use of concepts such as reasonable 
accommodation and unjustifiable hardship … [and] … its capacity to produce 
systemic and proactive changes by employers, and to generate positive 
reactions to individual requests for flexibility.
141
 
Chapman considered that the ‘provisions may also take effect to impose an obligation 
on employers to accommodate’, although she noted that this has not been tested in the 
cases.
142
 It has also been suggested by way of analogy with the disability provisions
143
 
that these provisions amount to or have the same effect as a duty of reasonable 
accommodation requiring an employer to take reasonable steps to enable the person to 
do the job.
144
 
 
However, it is quite clear that ss 49U and 49V(4) cannot provide any general 
enforceable right for complainants, first, because they apply only to hiring and firing 
decisions and, second, because they operate as a defence and are therefore only relevant 
if they are raised as such by the respondent. The provisions do not clearly, or explicitly, 
obligate an employer to take proactive steps to accommodate an employee, but rather 
reinforce the LRC’s concerns that the inherent requirement/unjustifiable hardship 
provisions are expressed in ‘confusing’ and ‘negative’ terms operating as a defence 
intended to potentially absolve an employer from a finding of unlawful 
discrimination.
145 
The provisions do not appear to have ever have been relied on by any 
of the respondents in the carers’ cases before the Tribunal, 146 and because they operate 
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as a defence, they cannot be (and thus have not been) raised by the complainants. They 
cannot therefore provide worker–carers with an effective enforcement mechanism to 
achieve either an accommodation or substantive equality. These factors suggest that the 
provisions are of little practical benefit from the perspective of employees requesting an 
accommodation and seeking to enforce their rights.  
 
In summary, there are three key shortfalls by which the inherent 
requirement/unjustifiable hardship provisions fail to meet properly the policy objective 
of Part 4B in relation to a duty of reasonable accommodation. First, they have only 
limited coverage applying to hiring and firing decisions. In particular, the provisions do 
not therefore apply to current employees who find that their caring circumstances 
require some form of accommodation at work, unless the employer is considering 
terminating them. As outlined further in Part V, empirically, the majority of complaints 
lodged with the ADB came from current employees, many of whom were urgently 
seeking an accommodation to stay in their current job. In addition, very few job 
applicants or former employees who would come within the ambit of the provisions and 
who made complaints to the ADB had any interest in seeking a remedy involving 
working for the employer and/or have their responsibilities accommodated. 
 
Second, discrimination laws must be comprehensive, consistent, accessible and user 
friendly so that individual worker–carers can more easily understand their rights, how 
and in what ways they are protected, and what to do if they feel they have been 
discriminated against. In addition, employers should be able to understand easily their 
obligation to comply with the law. Instead, Part 4B ‘speaks in [the] … more obtuse, 
negative language’ that is typical of discrimination legislation.147 It locates the concept 
of accommodation within the operation of a defence mechanism whose purpose is to 
excuse an employers’ otherwise unlawful discriminatory conduct. The complexity of 
the drafting and structure of ss 49U and 49V(4) render the provision unnecessarily 
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complicated and uncertain for worker–carers trying to understand their rights and for 
employers trying to understand their obligations. The provisions do not provide the 
certainty, clarity or accessibility that ‘are desirable for users of the law, as compliance 
and norm development depend at least in part on parties knowing and understanding 
their obligations and rights’.148  
 
Third, the structure posits an implied duty of reasonable accommodation behind an 
unnecessary smokescreen—through the operation of a defence to a traditional negative 
prohibition, rather than providing an explicit positive proactive duty of accommodation 
to achieve an important social policy goal. Normatively, this obscures the important 
social policy goals of the carers’ legislation to enable workers to try to balance work 
and care to ensure greater substantive equality, and to help break down the traditional 
division of labour on male/female lines.
149
 Such equivocation can undermine 
employers’ commitment to the policy aims of the legislation—assuming employers can 
even understand those aims in the first place. In contrast, an express duty, as proposed 
by the LRC, would have had very strong normative potential, placing a clear legal 
obligation on employers to weigh up actively and properly whether they could take 
‘reasonable steps’ to accommodate worker–carers. 
 
(ii) Reasonableness in complaints of indirect discrimination 
It can be argued that the application of the reasonableness test in cases of indirect 
discrimination
150
 and as it has been applied by the Tribunal in Tleyji and Reddy
151
 
operates to imply a duty of accommodation in practice.
152
 Chapman has noted that in 
Tleyji and Reddy
153
 the Tribunal ‘has required employers to at least consider and make 
reasonable efforts to accommodate an employee’s request to alter her working 
arrangements’.154 When deciding whether a condition or requirement is reasonable the 
court or tribunal will consider whether or not there is a less discriminatory option. In 
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 Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 4, 202. 
149
 LRC Report, above n 16, 279 [5.185]–[5.188]. 
150
 Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 4, 203, 206.  
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 See Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [105]; Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [75]–[90]. 
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followed in subsequent cases in Gardiner v New South Wales WorkCover Authority [2003] NSWADT 
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218 [75]–[90]. 
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 See Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [105]; and Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [75]–[90]. 
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 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 4, 26; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 27, 41. 
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considering this factor, it may be relevant whether the employer could have 
accommodated the worker. This is just one aspect of the reasonableness test that must 
be balanced against the reason for the requirement, including any commercial 
considerations.
155
  
 
However, relying upon indirect discrimination provisions to imply a duty is also 
inherently uncertain in practice and also lacks a strong normative force.  Complainants 
face the onerous burdens of proving all four elements of indirect discrimination. The 
discrimination law work and family cases during the past decade from the High Court in 
Amery
156
 down to the discrimination tribunals
157
 have frequently demonstrated that 
managerial prerogative, and operational requirements will often trump the rights of 
workers under discrimination legislation.
158
 Further, while the approach of the Tribunal 
in Tleyji and Reddy was encouraging, those cases are now almost a decade old, and the 
Tribunal has dismissed every direct and indirect discrimination carers’ cases before and 
since then.
159
   
 
In summary, notwithstanding that it may be possible to imply a duty of reasonable 
accommodation under Part 4B, any implied duty is clearly uncertain, and lacks both the 
strong normative force and general application envisaged in the LRC’s proposed model 
and as seemingly supported by Attorney-General Shaw.  The application of the defence 
of unjustifiable hardship and the requirement in practice for an employer to act 
reasonably when faced with a request for an accommodation, but only in cases of 
indirect discrimination, have numerous deficiencies. These deficiencies include the 
complexity of the legislative provisions, with the structure and drafting of Part 4B 
causing confusion for employees and employers; the difficult evidentiary burdens of 
proof for the complainant;
160
 and the potential uncertainty arising from the Tribunal’s 
responses to the application of Part 4B. 
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Options for an Express Duty 
 
The merits of an express duty of reasonable accommodation have become even clearer 
since the LRC Report and the enactment of Part 4B.  It is recommended that Part 4B be 
amended to include an express duty of reasonable accommodation. In the decade since 
Part 4B was enacted, there have been several different legislative approaches to 
ensuring greater flexibility for worker–carers in both the discrimination and the 
industrial jurisdictions in Australia.
161 
While some focus on the right of the employee to 
request flexibility and others focus on the duty of an employer to accommodate a 
request reasonably, such legislative approaches generally share a common policy aim of 
gender equality and balancing work and family commitments by accommodating 
employees’ caring responsibilities.162 For example, under the Victorian EO Act an 
employer must not ‘unreasonably refuse to accommodate the responsibilities that a 
person has as a parent or carer’.163 At the federal level in the industrial relations 
arena,
164
 the FW Act (2009) provides an RTR for workers with very broadly defined 
caring responsibilities.
165
 The FW Act also provides ‘adverse action’ protections on the 
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 See generally, Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 11 in which the federal FW Act RTR under s 65 
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Regulatory Change at the Federal Level’ (2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 325, 325 (‘AIRC’); 
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165
 Section 65 FW Act.  
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grounds of carers’ and family responsibilities,166 and outside the work and family area, 
the DD Act also introduced a duty of reasonable adjustment in 2009.
167
 
 
In Chapter 4 it was noted that there is a need to provide clear ‘structured guidance’ on 
rights and obligations and how to implement them.
168
 It is therefore recommended that 
an express duty of reasonable accommodation should clearly specify which factors are 
relevant to determining reasonableness or unjustifiable hardship. The aim would be to 
ensure that employers genuinely consider a request and do not just focus on the business 
needs. They must also consider the effect on, for example, the worker–carer, his or her 
family, and the person for whom care is provided, as well as any benefits that might 
flow to third parties, such as co-workers or customers of a business. If the LRC 
recommendation were followed, the public interest would also be a relevant 
consideration and could provide a powerful tool by which to tackle broader or systemic 
discrimination.
169
 
 
Given these prerequisites, there are two work and care discrimination statutory models 
that could be used as a starting point for the drafting process.
170
 The first is the 
recommendation of the LRC in the Draft Bill that provided that an employer 
discriminates if they ‘fail to take reasonable steps to accommodate’, with the employer 
having the burden to demonstrate unjustifiable hardship. The second is the Victorian 
model, which requires that an employer cannot unreasonably refuse to accommodate an 
employee’s responsibilities, although the burden of proving discrimination still rests 
with the employee in this option. Importantly, both options set out the relevant factors 
to be considered when determining unjustifiable hardship or whether a refusal was 
unreasonable.
171
 
                                                 
166
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The duty of accommodation proposed by the LRC and found in Victoria in 
discrimination laws is preferable to the model found under the FW Act RTR. The RTR 
provides a right to employees with a broad array of caring responsibilities to make a 
request for flexibility, which can only be refused on business grounds. However, there is 
no requirement that the employer consider the circumstances or caring responsibilities 
of the employee, or the effect on the employee or anyone else such as the person being 
cared for, if the request is not granted.
172
 Under the RTR, there are also strict eligibility 
requirements under the scheme,
173
 and there is no express enforcement mechanism by 
which a worker can challenge or have reviewed an employer’s refusal.174  
 
In contrast, in the discrimination law context 
175
 there is a recognition—whether through 
an express duty or through unjustifiable hardship or indirect discrimination 
provisions—that an employer should look beyond business reasons when deciding 
whether it is able to accommodate, and must take into account the needs and 
responsibilities of the worker.
176
 Discrimination laws, such as under the AD Act, also 
provide a two-stage discrimination enforcement model that provides parties with an 
opportunity for informal dispute resolution, before a complaint may be referred to the 
Tribunal for a hearing. As will be argued in Part V, conciliation at discrimination 
                                                                                                                                               
unsuccessful in arguing that the respondent had acted unreasonably in refusing her request fo r 
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agencies, such as the ADB, can be an important mechanism for employees to have the 
opportunity of reaching an accommodation and keeping their job, under a relatively 
informal and timely process, away from formal litigation. 
 
In examining whether the proposed express duty of reasonable accommodation would 
make the operation of Part 4B more effective, the work and family policy debate has 
expanded considerably since Part 4B was enacted. This was demonstrated in the 
literature that was outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, where it was also highlighted that 
discrimination law is only one strand of a multifaceted legal and policy approach to 
workplace discrimination against carers.
177
 Any recommendations for law reform 
should be made taking into account this broader work and family policy framework that 
has developed since the LRC Report and since Part 4B was enacted in 2001.  In Chapter 
4, the works of Fredman, Sturm and Chapman in particular were highlighted in the 
context of the potential for discrimination laws to address discrimination against 
worker–carers.178 A duty of reasonable accommodation fits with Fredman’s unified 
approach to equality, embracing both positive and negative duties,
179
 in which equality 
is seen as a mutual goal for employers and employees, and not as a site of resistance.
180 
The focus is not just to react to individual complaints of discrimination, but also to 
identify and address the institutional bases of inequality.
181
 As Sturm argued, employers 
must be encouraged to engage in ‘effective problem-solving’ that enables employers ‘to 
combine legal compliance with proactive efforts’ to improve their workplaces.182 A duty 
of accommodation in practice may also therefore  provide problem-solving strategy that 
is focused on the local daily context of the workplace, where patterns of bias and 
exclusion are produced,
183
 so that a worker can hopefully be accommodated and keep 
his or her job. A duty of reasonable accommodation may help to challenge the attitudes 
of employers, managers, supervisors and other important stakeholders, such as co-
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workers, customers and clients of a business. This may lead to attitudes being 
challenged broadly across society and ideally to normalise flexibility for all workers.
184
   
 
Chapman, has also argued that an express duty of accommodation with the burden of 
proof on the employer shifts its focus to the reasonableness of the employer’s refusal, 
and moves away from the burdens of proving the four elements of indirect 
discrimination.
185
 Further, voluntary or genuine compliance with legislation on behalf of 
an employer may not always be forthcoming. A discrimination law duty of 
accommodation provides that attempts at local context-based problem-solving are 
backed by the force of law, and are undertaken with the threat of a sanction via a 
complaint to the ADB looming in the background, and possibly a hearing at the 
Tribunal, if a request is unreasonably refused. The availability of an accessible and 
timely enforcement mechanism is an important aspect of the discrimination law duty.
186
 
 
In recent years, since Part 4B was introduced, the full extent of the complex nature of 
the disadvantage that worker–carers suffer and its consequences for them and their 
families has been well canvassed in the literature.
187
 In Chapter 4, it was noted that a 
number of interrelated and interdependent policy aims to redress this disadvantage can 
be identified in the work and family literature since Part 4B was enacted.
188
 It is argued 
that an express duty of accommodation will also help with these broader policy 
objectives in four ways. The first is by helping to ensure greater well-being
189
 and social 
inclusion
190
 for worker–carers. Reasonable accommodation is potentially a mechanism 
by which ‘individuals can navigate the boundary between paid and unpaid work without 
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undue cost’,191 which may help to ensure that they can access and/or retain good-quality 
jobs, and decent work, so that flexibility does not simply mean precarious 
employment.
192
 The second is by helping to prevent and address the gendered take-up of 
flexible work to encourage men as well as women to seek flexible work.
193
 The third is 
by challenging the traditional view that ‘flexible work is non-standard’194 and providing 
an alternative view in which flexibility is the norm.
195
 Finally, a duty of accommodation 
supported by the ADB enforcement mechanism potentially provides worker–carers with 
a voice to challenge managerial prerogative.
196
  It may help to empower worker–carers 
to exercise their rights to achieve substantive equality, and to engage with their rights to 
access employment opportunities, or maintain their existing employment.  
 
In conclusion, it is argued that more than a decade after Part 4B was enacted an express 
legislative duty of reasonable accommodation still remains a fundamental key policy 
strategy that would make Part 4B ‘more capable’ of meeting its social policy 
objectives.
197
  
 
5.4 Part 4B a Lost Opportunity? 
 
The enactment of Part 4B was important because of its explicit focus on discrimination 
against worker-carers regardless of their gender, thereby providing a level of protection 
for both male and female carers at work.
198
 However, the provisions that were enacted 
missed a unique opportunity for the NSW Government to make a clear, strong, 
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normative statement about the intention of the legislation to impose an express positive 
obligation of reasonable accommodation on employers. The current Part 4B fails to 
adequately give effect to the policy aims and objectives of the carers’ legislation in 
NSW. It also fails to provide a clearly understandable legislative basis for the 
corresponding rights and obligations for worker–carers and employers, respectively, and 
clear ‘structured guidance’199 about how to implement those rights and obligations.  
 
Returning to steps 1 and 2 of the framework to measure effectiveness and 
recommendations to make the Part 4B ‘more capable’ of meeting its objectives,200 it is 
recommended that as well as removing the family nexus under s 49S, so as to provide 
broad protection for worker–carers in NSW, an express duty of reasonable 
accommodation is also enacted. This express articulation of a duty would have a 
number of important normative effects. It would enable the ADB and the Tribunal to 
identify clearly, and better meet, the policy objectives during the exercise of their 
statutory functions. In addition, it would signal a recommitment of the State of NSW to 
these important social policy aims, thereby sending a direct message to employers about 
what is expected of them. In this regard, there is evidence that an express duty might 
also provide a renewed impetus for employers to implement the legislation more 
proactively at the workplace level.
201
 It would also mean that NSW would catch up with 
other jurisdictions that have been more proactive in placing positive obligations on 
employers.
202
 The empirical study of complaints lodged with the ADB, outlined in Part 
V, suggests that men and women are exercising their rights under the current Part 4B in 
order to achieve workplace accommodation. Providing for an express duty may 
encourage even more worker–carers to do so, and may encourage more employers to 
accommodate them 
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PART IV: THE TRIBUNAL AND THE CARERS’ 
DECISIONS 2001–2011 
 
Chapter 6: The Tribunal, Interpretation and Application  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In order to answer the research questions, and in accordance with the methodological 
framework set out in Chapter 2,
1
 Part IV of this thesis now focuses on the Tribunal’s 
adjudicative function and the 12 complaints that were heard between 2001 and 2011. 
The first research question asks how the Tribunal interpreted and applied Part 4B and 
whether this gives effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B. This question is answered 
this chapter. Section 6.2 outlines the statutory context of the Tribunal’s powers, notes 
the main critiques in the academic literature in relation to the adjudicative stage as it 
applies to the Tribunal and highlights how this thesis contributes to this literature. 
Section 6.3 then provides a summary and doctrinal analysis of a number of key carers’ 
decisions to assess whether the Tribunal gave effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B.   
 
In addition, a comprehensive Table of Carers’ Complaints heard by the Tribunal is 
provided in Appendix B which provides a chronological summary of all 12 carers’ cases 
heard during the decade, including: the outcomes and any remedy ordered, as well as a 
summary of the complaint, the nature of the caring responsibility, the allegations, 
whether the conduct was characterised as direct or indirect discrimination, and reasons 
for the decisions. Part IV of this thesis should be read in conjunction with it.  
 
The second research question asks whether the second stage of the enforcement process 
provided an accessible and effective enforcement mechanism for worker–carers in 
NSW. This is answered in Chapter 7.  
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 See Chapter 2, at 2.5. 
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6.2 The Tribunal: Context and Overview  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, under the AD Act only the Tribunal can make a legally 
binding determination of a complaint.
2
 A complaint cannot be lodged directly with the 
Tribunal and only when a complaint cannot be resolved for some reason at the ADB
3
  
may a complaint be referred to the Tribunal.
4
 Under s 108 of the AD Act, the Tribunal 
has powers to order an appropriate remedy.  The burden of proving a complaint is with 
the complainant.
5
 An order of the Tribunal can also be appealed by a party to the 
proceedings and, between 2001 and 2011, appeals were made to the Appeal Panel of the 
Tribunal.
6
 From an access-to-justice perspective, the parties may represent themselves, 
there is no fee to take proceedings to the Tribunal,7 and the AD Act is generally a no-
costs jurisdiction, with the general rule that each party is to pay his or her own costs.
8
  
 
In Chapter 2, it was explained that very few complaints reached a hearing at the 
Tribunal. Out of 520 complaints, while 67, or 13% of carers’ complaints, were referred 
to the Tribunal
9
 during the decade 2001–2011, only 12 complaints, or 2% of all carers’ 
complaints lodged with the ADB, reached a hearing.
10
 The Tribunal process did provide 
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website of the NCAT, since January 2014, fees in applications brought under the NSW AD Act are 
waived. See NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Fees (2 January 2014) 
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9
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for opportunities to mediate or resolve complaints pre-hearing, and it may be expected 
that some of those complaints that did not reach a hearing may have settled.
11
 Others 
may have been discontinued or withdrawn. This chapter considers only the 12 
adjudicated decisions.
12
 
 
Although s 108 provides for a broad array of remedies if a complaint is substantiated,
 13
  
compensatory damages have been the usual remedy in NSW.  Historically 
compensation awards have been low, unsurprisingly, since the compensation limit of 
$40,000 was only increased to $100,000 in 2007.
14
 In addition, since 2005, an order 
may extend to conduct of the respondent that affects persons other than the complainant 
or complainants, which suggest scope for broader systemic outcomes at a workplace.
15
 
However, the Tribunal has never made an order under this provision in the carers’ cases 
that have come before it or on any other ground of discrimination. 
 
The Tribunal’s practice and procedures between 2001 and 2011 were also regulated by 
the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) (‘ADT Act’) and s 73 confirmed 
                                                                                                                                               
with the ADB and settled between those dates. Note that the decision in Zareski v Hannanprint Pty Ltd 
[2011] NSWADT 283 was handed down in December 2011; the complaint was unsuccessful. Further, in 
one other carers’ complaint that was referred, the complainants withdrew the complaint at the Tribunal; 
see Woodward & Anor v Coolan Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] NSWADT 286 (‘Woodward’). Therefore, out 
of 67 complaints heard, 13 in total reached a hearing, one was discontinued, and it is not known what 
happened in the remaining 53. 
11
 The CAT Act provides express legislative commitment to, and actively promotes, alternative dispute 
resolution—and can require parties to take part. It may be expected that, similarly, only a small 
proportion of complaints referred to the NCAT in the future will reach a hearing. See s 37 of the CAT Act. 
12
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 6–7, note that the empirical literature has concentrated on the 
first stage of the conciliation process. See Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 7, 645–7, for a summary of 
the pre-hearing process at that time. The formal practices and procedures of the Tribunal during this 
decade are not dealt with in any detail in this research project. However, note that the process did involve 
an option for mediation and settlement, pre-hearing. The Tribunal process involved the usual steps of 
litigation, for example, setting case conferences, mediation, a timetable, pleading a case, evidence and the 
hearing. Woodward [2004] NSWADT 286 provides an insight into the Tribunal’s pre-hearing process, 
and the steps that the parties are required to take in the period after the complaint is referred for a hearing.  
13
 Including compensation of up to $100,000 ‘for any loss suffered by reason of the respondent’s 
conduct’; injunctive style orders to compel the ‘respondent to perform an act or course of conduct to 
redress the loss or damage suffered by the complainant or to prohibit conduct; orders for apologies and 
retractions; and orders to set aside or vary a contract. See Chapter 1, at 1.5 for an overview of the 
Tribunal’s powers.  
14
 AD Act s 108(2).  See Chapter 1, at 1.5 and in particular n 142 comparing NSW with other jurisdictions 
in this regard where the limit is uncapped.  
15
 AD Act s 108(3). This and a number of procedural amendments were made in 2005 pursuant to the 
Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (NSW). 
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an ‘express legislative commitment to informalism’16 providing that the Tribunal may: 
‘determine its own procedure’; is not ‘bound by the rules of evidence and may inquire 
into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of 
natural justice’; and is ‘to act with as little formality as the circumstances of the case 
permit and according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case 
without regard to technicalities or legal forms’. This commitment has been replicated in 
s 38 of the CAT Act.
17
 During the decade, the Tribunal and Appeal Panel have 
acknowledged this requirement to act with ‘as little formality as the circumstances of 
the case permit’18 but have also noted that they are guided by s 140 of the Evidence Act 
1995 (Cth), and the civil standard of proof, on a balance of probabilities.
19
  
 
A key theme of this chapter, reflecting similar concerns in the literature, is that the 
statutory commitment to informalism contrasts sharply with the reality of the Tribunal 
application of Part 4B in the carers’ cases that came before it.20  Gaze and Hunter have 
noted that: ‘[a]nti-discrimination tribunals have tended to adopt adversarial proceedings 
and to follow the rules of evidence even though they are not bound to do so, and aspects 
of anti-discrimination law have become very technical even in tribunal adjudication’.21  
The Tribunal, subject to the common law hierarchies of courts and precedents, and 
accompanying rights of appeal has very often tended to adopt adversarial proceedings 
following the rules of evidence, and the conservative and narrow interpretation of 
discrimination laws, emanating from the superior courts.  As the American realist Karl 
Llewellyn noted, ‘judicial decision making is indeed among the most conservative and 
                                                 
16
 Thornton notes that similar provisions existed in the discrimination legislation at that time, across state 
and federal jurisdictions: Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford 
University Press, 1990) 174 (‘Promise’). 
17
 Note that ADT Act s 73 was repealed but was replicated under CAT Act s 38. Note that s 38(3) does 
provide for rules of evidence in relation to the exercise of certain functions related to enforcement 
proceedings or civil penalties. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 See the Appeal Panel decision in St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd v Correy [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [25]–[26] 
(‘Correy No 4’). Under s 104 of the AD Act, the proof of an exception or a defence is with the respondent. 
In ACE v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2011] NSWADTAP 23 (‘ACE No 
2’), the Appeal Panel confirmed that as in most civil cases, ‘[t]he standard is “the balance of 
probabilities” and although not bound by the rules of evidence, the Tribunal guided by those principles, 
including the principles relating to the standard of proof which are set out in s 140 of the Evidence Act 
1995 (Cth)’: at [38]. Section 140 provides that, in a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a 
party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. The court may 
take into account the nature of the cause of action or defence, the nature of the subject-matter of the 
proceeding and the gravity of the matters alleged 
20
 Thornton, Promise, above n 16, 174. 
21
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 23; See also Thornton, Promise, above n 16, ch VI. 
249 
 
inflexible … such is its fixity that it almost always impedes other social change’.22 
Therefore, Tribunal decision-making that looks to precedent looks backwards, and even 
though it is not a court, the Tribunal may be constrained by higher court decisions. This 
then impeded its ability to keep pace with social and demographic changes relating to 
work and care and to proactively meet the social policy objectives of eradicating 
discrimination against worker–carers. 
 
It was noted in Chapter 1
23
 that the key objectives of the second stage of the 
enforcement process are to ensure ‘[l]ow cost, speedy, informal and specialist decision-
making ... to provide an effective remedy to individuals with limited means, reduce 
adversarialism and serve the public interest in social harmony’24 as an alternative to 
traditional litigation through the courts.
25
 It was intended to ‘allow individuals to run 
their own cases without the need for legal representation, relying on the expertise of 
tribunal members … and their general obligation to ensure fairness to all parties to the 
proceedings’.26 Thornton has suggested that, in theory, a discrimination tribunal could 
obtain the relevant information it needs just as easily by an inquisitorial method, but 
notes that the adversarial system is so entrenched in our legal culture that the 
inquisitorial system was never really considered a viable option, and there exists a 
strong attachment to adversarialism.
27
 In Chapter 4, the literature critiquing the second 
stage of the process was outlined.
28
 It was noted that complaints of discrimination are 
fought in public in an adversarial forum, where the legislation is complex, and the 
complainant has a high burden of proof,
29
 and claims are often fiercely resisted by 
employers.
30
 For those complainants who persevere and reach the second stage of the 
enforcement process, tribunals have become as intimidating as a traditional courtroom,
31
 
                                                 
22
 Karl Llewellyn, ‘The Case Law System in America’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review, 989, 996. This 
article publishes excerpts from Llewellyn’s writings in 1928.  
23
 See Chapter 1, at 1.2.5. 
24
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 9 continue that this ‘situation has changed since 1986, with the 
rise of neo-liberalism … Aspirations for universal access to justice have given way to “user pays” and 
personal responsibility’. 
25
 See generally Thornton, Promise, above n 16, 173, ch VI.  
26
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 20, 22–3. 
27
 Thornton, Promise, above n 16, 173–5. 
28
 See Chapter 4, at 4.2 and 4.3 outlining the critiques in the literature in relation to increasing 
adversarialism, inadequate outcomes and remedies in a time of judicial conservatism
.
 
29
 See generally Dominique Allen, ‘Reducing the Burden of Proof in Australia’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 579, 581–3 (‘Burden’). 
30
 See, for example, New South Wales v Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174 (‘Amery’); Purvis v New South 
Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92 (‘Purvis’).  See discussion in Chapter 4, at 4.2.3. 
31
 Thornton, Promise, above n 16, 173. 
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where for example complainants may be aggressively cross-examined.
32
 There are 
enormous personal, emotional and financial costs for an individual complainant 
involved in running litigation, where outcomes are uncertain.
33
 Recent decades have 
been marked by a period of ‘judicial regression’34 across the discrimination law 
jurisdictions
35
 where decisions are made with little or no reference to the policy 
objectives of the legislation.
36
 Even if a complainant is successful and a finding of 
discrimination is made, remedies generally involve inadequate compensation, with no 
obligation upon employers to rectify discriminatory conduct.
37
 
 
In relation to the first research question, Section 6.3 below will now provide primarily a 
qualitative overview and doctrinal analysis of the limited number of carers’ cases that 
were heard by the Tribunal in the first decade after the introduction of Part 4B. This 
decade coincided with a period
38
 of increased legalism, adversarialism
39
 and ‘judicial 
conservatism’ in relation to the interpretation and application of discrimination laws in 
Australia generally.
40
 The aim is to locate the Tribunal’s approach in this broader 
context, and to build upon the existing literature by identifying how the Tribunal has 
interpreted and applied the law, and whether this gives effect to the objectives of Part 
4B, identified in Chapter 5 in relation to gender equality, work–life balance and a duty 
of reasonable accommodation.  It was noted that Part 4B does not however contain an 
                                                 
32
 Thornton also notes that barristers often use ‘an offensively aggressive and hectoring tone in cross 
examination’ of complainants in the jurisdiction: Thornton, Promise, above n 16, 173. See, for example, 
Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [34]–[38]; St Joseph’s Hospital v Correy [2008] NSWADTAP 4 
[6]–[7] (‘Correy No 2’); Spencer v Greater Murray Area Health Service [2005] NSWADT 138 [46]–[50], 
in which the complainants had to justify the basis of their care choices and decisions with sometimes 
painstaking detail. 
33
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 16–18; Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Work and 
Family Conflict and What to Do About It (Oxford University Press, 2000) 101; Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, 
above n 3, 90–5; Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal in the World of Work: Two Significant Developments in 
Australian Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of Labour Law 19, 204 (‘Fair and Equal’); 
Thornton, Promise, above n 16, 169; Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive 
Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008) 190 (‘Human Rights’). 
34
 K Lee Adams, ‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263, 263–
4 (‘Defining’). 
35
 See Chapter 4, at 4.2. 
36
 Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University 
Law Review 325 (‘Context’). 
37
 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights, above n 33, 190; Susan Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach’ (2001) 101(1) Columbia Law Review 459, 475–6, 521, 567; 
Belinda Smith and Dominique Allen, ‘Whose Fault Is It? Asking the Right Questions When Trying to 
Address Discrimination’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 31. 
38
 See generally Chapter 4, at 4.2 and 4.3. 
39
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 9. 
40
 Jill Murray, ‘Work and Care’, above n 35, 74. 
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express duty of accommodation.
 41
  In practice, therefore, an implied duty of reasonable 
accommodation will only operate effectively via the Tribunal’s adjudicative function if, 
in its decision-making, it takes a purposive, broad and beneficial approach to statutory 
interpretation and application. A purposive approach is required to give effect to both 
the human rights objectives of the AD Act, generally and the policy objectives of Part 
4B, specifically. 
 
In spite of the express legislative commitment for informality
42
 and the fact that the 
Tribunal has acknowledged that Part 4B should be construed broadly and beneficially, 
given the human rights purposes of the AD Act,
43
 it has applied Part 4B in a technical 
way. It has also fostered an adversarial legalistic formal process. Echoing similar 
concerns in the literature, it has not provided an ‘effective remedy to individuals of 
limited means’ offering ‘low cost, speedy, informal specialist decision making’ to 
‘reduce adversarialism and serve the public interest in social harmony’.44  
 
The approach of the Tribunal, and its Appeal Panel, during the decade can generally be 
characterised by three features: first, a narrow approach to statutory interpretation and 
evidence with particular reference to the tests for direct and indirect discrimination; 
second, a general unwillingness to make any inferences that may assist a complainant to 
discharge this burden of proof not only in relation to the substantive complaint
45
 but 
also in relation to proving loss and claiming damages;
46
 and third, application of the law 
to the facts in what is described by the writer as a policy vacuum. As a result, the 
outcomes for complainants at the Tribunal have been poor. Even taking into account 
                                                 
41
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7, and Chapter 5, at 5.3. 
42
ADT Act s 73; CAT Act s 38. 
43
 See Stokes v Serco Sodexho Defence Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWADT 295 [19] (‘Stokes’), noting that 
the AD Act should be construed broadly. See also Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [39], noting that 
the legislation should be given a broad interpretation, in keeping with the human rights purpose of the 
provision, citing Waters v Public Transport Corporation 173 CLR 349, 359 (Mason CJ and Gaudron J) 
(‘Waters’). 
44
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 9. 
45
 See Chapter 4, at accompanying references 4.2 discussing the Briginhsaw standard of evidence which 
was accepted in the first carers’ case, Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [12]. It was finally rejected in 
2009 in Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [31]–[41] following Qantas Airways v Gama [2008] 
FCAFC 69 the Appeal Panel.  
46
 See, for example, Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group [2005] NSWADT 294 (‘Tleyji’), in which, even 
though the carers’ complaint was substantiated, no claim was made for damages so none were ordered; 
see also discussion of Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 below, in which the award of damages was 
overturned because it had not been pleaded properly. 
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that some of the cases on the facts appeared to have little merit,
47
 in ten out of the 12 
cases before the Tribunal, the carers’ complaints were dismissed because the 
complainant had been unable to prove one or more elements of the relevant tests for 
direct or indirect discrimination. All of the direct discrimination cases failed, and only 
two of the indirect cases, Reddy and Tleyji,
48
 succeeded. Moreover, the broader 
normative message to worker–carers and employers is unclear and disappointing. While 
Reddy and Tleyji
49
 were welcome victories for the complainants and may indicate that 
Part 4B operates to imply a duty of reasonable accommodation, it is clear that the 
Tribunal could have done much more to meet, and further the policy objectives of Part 
4B. 
 
6.3 Carers’ Complaints at the Tribunal 2001–2011 
This section first provides an overview of the 12 complaints.  This is followed by a 
more detailed doctrinal analysis of the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of the 
relevant direct and indirect discrimination provisions in a number of key carers’ 
decisions.  
 
Who were the carers and what responsibilities did they have? 
Reflecting the fact that women are predominantly responsible for caring responsibilities 
in the home and family, and that the majority of carers’ complaints made to the ADB in 
the decade came from mothers,
50
 ten of the complaints heard by the Tribunal came from 
women, eight of which were from mothers caring for children. Three—Reddy, Tleyji 
and Correy—related to a return from maternity,51 four—Gardiner No 1, Stokes, Chacon 
and Dubow—related to care for school-age children, and Merrick related to care for an 
                                                 
47 
A common sense approach needs to be taken here. A number of cases appeared to have little merit on 
the facts or there were issues of credit with the parties. See, for example, ACE v State of NSW (TAFE 
Commission and Department of Education and Training) [2010] NSWADT 180 (‘ACE No 1’); Merrick v 
Wallace Bishop Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADT 89 (‘Merrick’); Chacon v Rondo Building Services Pty Ltd 
[2011] NSWADT 72 (‘Chacon’); Dubow v Attorney-General’s Department [2005] NSWADT 231 
(‘Dubow’).  
48
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 and Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 In summary, 382 or 73% of complaints came from women, and 354 or 68% of all complaints came 
from mothers. See Chapter 2, at 2.4.4 and Table 2.4 which compares the gender and care differences 
between complaints made to the ADB and then heard at the Tribunal.  Chapter 9 below also summarises 
many aspects of the complaints lodged at the ADB from a gender and care perspective. 
51
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; Correy v St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd [2007] 
NSWADT 104 (‘Correy No 1’). See also the three subsequent decisions: Correy No 2 [2008] 
NSWADTAP 4; Correy v St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd [2009] NSWADT 40 (‘Correy No 3’); Correy No 4 
[2009] NSWADTAP 58. See Table B, in Appendix B.  
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adult child.
52
 The remaining two cases—Spencer and ACE No 1—related to women 
with elder care or other adult care responsibilities.
53
 Many of the complaints from 
women were also brought on alternate grounds of sex discrimination, either because 
they related to pregnancy and maternity or on the basis that more women than men have 
caring responsibilities.
54
 Two cases—Monroe and Harms—came from men, and related 
to care for a partner or former partner; Monroe involved a same-sex partner.
55
 
Interestingly, none of the complaints that reached a hearing came from fathers, even 
though during the decade 18% of the carers’ complaints lodged with the ADB came 
from fathers.
56
 Several complaints also alleged other grounds of discrimination, such as 
race,
57
 HIV,
58
 and disability,
59
 all of which were dismissed. However, Spencer and 
Monroe successfully received compensation for victimisation even though their carers’ 
responsibilities complaints were dismissed.
60
  
 
Overview of the Tribunal’s approach and findings  
The key findings arising from the cases can be summarised as follows:  
 As noted, the Tribunal only considered 12 cases of carers’ responsibility 
discrimination between 2001 and 2011. In three cases—Reddy, Tleyji and 
Correy No 1—the Tribunal found that the complainants had been discriminated 
against on the ground of their carers’ responsibilities. However, Correy No 1 
was later overturned on appeal.
61 
 
 In two other complaints—Gardiner No 2 and ACE No 2—the complainants 
appealed the Tribunal’s first instance decisions dismissing their complaints.62 
The appeals were dismissed. 
                                                 
52
 Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184; Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295; Chacon [2011] NSWADT 72; 
Dubow [2005] NSWADT 231; Merrick [2008] NSWADT 89.  
53
 Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180. 
54
 For example, Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 and Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138, in which 
complaints of sex discrimination were also dismissed; and Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 and Reddy [2004] 
NSWADT 218, in which, because the Tribunal made findings of carers’ discrimination, and did not then 
go on to determine the sex discrimination component. 
55
 See Monroe v Moore [2010] NSWADT 179 (‘Monroe’); Harms v Sydney South West Area Health 
Service [2010] NSWADT 183 (‘Harms’). 
56
 See n 50 above. During the first decade of operation, men made 135 or 26% of complaints, and 93 or 
18% of all complaints were lodged by fathers.  
57
 For example, Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294.  
58
 Monroe [2010] NSWADT 179. 
59
 Dubow [2005] NSWADT 231; Monroe [2010] NSWADT 179. 
60
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.6 which outlines the victimisation provisions. 
61
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104.  
62
 Gardiner No 2 [2004] NSWADTAP 1 and ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23.  
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 None of the carers’ cases have ever been considered by higher courts. 
 Once a family relationship under s 49S is identified, the Tribunal and Appeal 
Panel have tended to take a broad approach to the meaning of caring 
responsibilities under Part 4B, and have found that the phrase is a general one 
and should be given a broad interpretation in keeping with the human rights 
purposes of the provision.  
 All complaints relating to direct discrimination were dismissed.  
 Reddy and Tleyji both related to findings of indirect discrimination after denials 
of part-time work on returning from maternity leave. The Tribunal found that an 
employer must properly consider whether the job could be carried out without 
the discriminatory condition or requirement, in these cases, a requirement to 
work full-time. Both women had resigned and neither sought reinstatement or 
accommodation. The complaints illustrate that by the time a complaint reaches 
an adversarial hearing—often years after the alleged conduct had occurred—an 
accommodation is going to be neither desired, nor an appropriate or realistic 
remedy.
63
 
 In Tleyji, the Tribunal took judicial notice as a matter of ‘common knowledge’ 
that workers without caring responsibilities for babies and infants are more 
likely to be able to work full-time. It noted that carers of infants may not be able, 
or may not want, to work full-time and may therefore be unable to comply with 
a condition or requirement to work full-time.
64
 The Tribunal has refused to 
extend this assumption in relation to flexibility to other categories of worker–
carers, such as those with school-age children or who care for adults. The effect 
of this in practice has been that the Tribunal has been unwilling to accept, 
without specific evidence being adduced, that these worker–carers may also be 
unable to comply with ideal worker norms, such as the requirement to work full-
time.
65
  
 At no stage has the Tribunal ever expressly considered or addressed the policy 
objectives of Part 4B as to whether Part 4B operates to imply a duty of 
reasonable accommodation. 
                                                 
63
 See Chapter 7 below which considers the inadequacy of the remedies ordered in these two cases, and 
also the effectiveness of the complaints process in relation to issues such as timeliness. 
64
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294. 
65
 ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [242]; Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [76]. 
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 The Tribunal has not been required to consider all of the provisions in Part 4B. 
In particular, it appears that it has never been required to consider the operation 
of the unjustifiable hardship/inherent requirement defence under ss 49U and 
49V(4) and whether the defence may operate in practice to imply a duty of 
accommodation.
66
  
 
The following section now presents a more in-depth analysis of the Tribunal’s approach 
to the interpretation and application of Part 4B in a number of carers’ cases that came 
before it, in relation to three elements of Part 4B: caring responsibilities (definition and 
coverage of caring responsibilities);
67
 workplace conduct covered (denying a benefit or 
subjecting to a detriment);
68
 and the elements and tests for direct and indirect 
discrimination.
69
 Although the Tribunal took a broad and beneficial approach to the first 
two, in contrast, its application of the tests for direct and indirect discrimination was 
marked by a strictly narrow and technical interpretation of the provisions that defeated 
the complaints.  
 
6.3.1Caring Responsibilities: The Family Nexus and ‘Care or Support’ 
 
Under s 49S of the AD Act, there are two components to be satisfied: only certain 
specified family relationships are covered, and only when the family member is in need 
of ‘care or support’. Care and support is not defined.70 The Appeal Panel has found that 
the existence of a caring responsibility is a threshold issue and that the carers’ 
discrimination provisions are only ‘enlivened where the alleged victim has 
responsibilities as a carer’.71 All of the cases to the Tribunal involved family 
relationships covered under s 49S, so the first element of the test was not in issue. 
 
                                                 
66
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.5. In particular, see Juliet Bourke, ‘Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: 
The Australian Experience’ (2004) 12 American Journal of Society and the Law 19, 33; Anna Chapman, 
‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre for 
Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) 9–
10, 26–7 (‘Working Paper’).  
67
 AD Act s 49S. 
68
 Ibid s 49V. 
69
 Ibid s 49T. 
70
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.1.  
71
 ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [206]. 
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In relation to the ‘care and support’ test, generally, the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel 
have taken a broad view of the meaning of this term. They have found that the phrase is 
a general one and should be given a broad interpretation in keeping with the human 
rights purposes of the provision because ‘there is no basis … for confining the 
responsibilities to care for or support another person to particular categories of care such 
as dropping off, picking up or attending a person who is sick’.72 The care need not be 
provided or required on a full-time basis, and can cover emotional as well as physical 
support.
73
  Importantly, the Tribunal has also tended to reject any arguments from 
respondents about the manner in which the complainant chooses to provide the care, for 
example, as to whether commercial or other caring options are available.
74
 In only one 
case out of the 12 was it found that a caring responsibility did not exist on the facts of 
that case.
75
  
 
It should be noted that even though the Tribunal has taken a beneficial approach to s 
49S the adversarial nature of the process means that in practice, a complainant is 
required to demonstrate with some particularity the precise nature of the support 
provided. The Tribunal has also indicated that it will require very specific evidence of a 
genuine need for care or support to be provided.
76
 While it may be expected that the 
responsibility to provide care and support may not be in issue for infants and younger 
children,
77
 this should not necessarily be taken for granted.
78
 For example, in Correy, 
                                                 
72
 See Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [34]–[39]; ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [46]. 
73
 ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [46]. 
74
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [61]. See also Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [56]–[65]; Spencer 
[2005] NSWADT 138 [45]. However, note that availability of other care options may be a relevant 
consideration in relation to the element of reasonableness: In Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184, the 
Tribunal considered it relevant that Ms Gardiner had not claimed in her evidence ‘there would be no one 
available to care for her children during the time that she was absent or that she would have to employ 
someone to do so’: at [67]. See also Appeal Panel decision in Gardiner No 2 [2004] NSWADTAP 1 [61]–
[64]. 
75
 In ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [205]–[207] it was found by the Tribunal that the complainant on 
the facts did not have a responsibility to provide care or support for her elderly parents. It should be noted 
in this case that the credit of the complainant was a serious issue in relation to her evidence as a whole: at 
[37]. The Appeal Panel upheld the decision.  
76
 In the other 11 cases, a caring responsibility was found to exist—in some cases, after it was disputed by 
the employer. See, for example, Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [34]–[39], which involved care of 
children who were six and eight years old. In determining what constituted a responsibility, the Tribunal 
took a broad definition of what constituted caring responsibilities, including emotional care of school-
aged children. See also Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138, which related to the care of elderly parents and an 
adult sister; the Tribunal noted that complainant ‘need not establish that her parents and sister could not 
survive or function without her care or support. The hurdle set by s 49S(1) is not that high. It is enough 
that she establish that her parents and/or sister were in need of care and support’: at [34].  
77
 See, for example, Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [21], which related to care of infants after maternity 
leave and it was not in issue that the complainant had carers’ responsibilities; and Stokes [2006] 
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Ms Correy had six children between the ages of 12 months and 16 years, of which the 
employer was fully aware. Sensibly, the Tribunal at first instance had found that it was 
not in issue that Ms Correy had taken maternity leave and had responsibilities as a carer 
for an infant.
79
 However, on appeal, the respondent argued that it could not be assumed 
without evidence that a mother always has responsibilities as a carer. Although the 
Appeal Panel dismissed the argument, it is interesting and illustrative of the nature of 
the adversarial process that the respondent was willing to challenge this aspect of the 
complainant’s case in circumstances in which Ms Correy was returning from maternity 
leave after the birth of a baby and had five other children who were all minors.
80
 In 
terms of discharging the burden of proof, complainants with caring responsibilities for 
older children,
81
 older family members, or individuals with a disability
82 
will be 
required to demonstrate expressly that the care and support test is satisfied, particularly 
when the respondent does not accept that such a relationship exists.
83
 In addition, they 
should also expect to come under challenge from the respondent in relation to how or 
why the care is provided in the way that the complainant has chosen, and whether other 
options are available.
84
  
 
6.3.2 What Employer Conduct Is Covered? Benefits and Detriments 
 
All 12 carers’ complaints heard at the Tribunal related to traditional employer–
employee relationships.
85
 Courts and tribunals in Australia, including the Tribunal, have 
generally taken an expansive approach to the nature of workplace conduct covered and, 
generally, it is unlawful to deny a benefit or subject a person to a detriment at work 
because of his or her caring responsibilities.86 For example, in Correy No 1 and Correy 
                                                                                                                                               
NSWADT 295 and Dubow [2005] NSWADT 231, in which it was not in issue that the mothers had 
caring responsibilities for their school-age children.  
78
 Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [6]–[7]. 
79
 Ibid [6], noting that ‘[i]t goes without saying that … [the] child was both substantially dependent upon 
and in need of her care and support’. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184. 
82
 See Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180. 
83
 ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [37]–[48]. Complainants may need to support the existence of the 
responsibility with medical or other such evidence. 
84
 Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [46]–[50]. 
85
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.2, noting that almost all of the complaints lodged with the ADB related to 
employer–employee relationships.  
86
 See ss 49V(1)–(2) as outlined in Chapter 1, at 1.7.2. See generally Neil Rees, Simon Rice and 
Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Federation Press, 2nd 
ed, 2014) 455–67.The Tribunal’s approach is illustrated in in Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [87] and 
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No 2, the Tribunal accepted that the detriment suffered by a worker–carer may be more 
subtle than simply a financial detriment and may involve less tangible or longer-term or 
future detriments.
87
  
 
Correy No 1 and Correy No 2
88
 
 
After a period of maternity leave, Ms Correy, a nurse, was not allowed to return to the 
job she had been doing for almost a decade and was rostered to return as a ‘floater’. She 
alleged that this amounted to direct carers’ discrimination. After she complained, she 
was rostered to work nine out of 10 shifts in a psychiatric unit in which she had 
specifically asked not to work for personal health reasons and alleged that this 
amounted to victimisation. She resigned before returning to work. At first instance, it 
was found that there were a number of detriments flowing from the decision not to 
return Ms Correy to her pre-maternity position. Although her pay and other entitlements 
did not change by being a ‘floater’, the hospital did subject her to a detriment in terms 
of loss of job satisfaction and loss of certainty in rostering.
89
 At first instance, both the 
carers’ responsibility discrimination and the victimisation complaints were found to be 
substantiated and Ms Correy was awarded $26,121 for economic loss. 
 
On appeal, the Appeal Panel did not accept the hospital’s argument that treatment has to 
be detrimental in the sense that it either affected Ms Correy’s caring responsibilities or 
caused her a financial loss, and it found that a decision that will take effect in the future 
may still constitute a detriment. It accepted Ms Correy’s evidence that loss of job 
satisfaction, collegiality, specialist skills and certainty of roster arrangements was 
objectively a detriment that disadvantaged her as a matter of substance as distinct from a 
trivial matter.
90
 However, as discussed below, the Appeal Panel found that she had not 
proved direct discrimination and her carers’ discrimination complaint was dismissed. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
by the Appeal Panel in Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [14]–[37]. See also Gardiner No 1 [2003] 
NSWADT 184 [40]–[45].  
87
 Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [87]; Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [87].  
90
 Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [37]. The award of damages was overturned, the carers’ complaint 
dismissed and the victimisation complaint remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. See Table of 
Cases in Appendix B for a chronological summary of the four Correy decisions. 
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6.3.3 Direct Discrimination: The Correy Saga  
 
Part 4B follows the traditional format found in Australian discrimination jurisdictions
91
 
and covers direct discrimination
92
 and indirect discrimination.
93
 All of the direct 
discrimination complaints failed.
94
 The Correy decisions set out below demonstrate 
very clearly the difficulties for complainants in proving the relevant elements and also 
the effect of the narrow and legalistic interpretation of the Appeal Panel. 
 
In interpreting s 49T(1)(a), the Tribunal has followed the test set out by the High Court 
in Purvis
95
 in relation to the two elements that must be proved:
96
 differential 
treatment—that the complainant was treated less favourably than a person without the 
protected characteristic;
97
 and causation—that the reason for the less favourable 
treatment was the person’s status as a carer.98 It is not necessary to prove any 
discriminatory intent or motivation on the part of the discriminator, but the complainant 
must demonstrate some causal connection between the conduct, and the prohibited 
ground of discrimination. As the discussion of Correy No1
99
 and No 2 below 
illustrates,
100
 since the High Court decision in Purvis, proving these two elements is a 
particularly daunting task.
101
 The decisions also illustrate that, even if the Tribunal at 
first instance takes a broad and beneficial approach, the Appeal Panel in NSW appears 
constrained by the hierarchy of precedents when applying the law. The facts are noted 
above.
 
Because the case was brought on the grounds of direct discrimination, the issue 
                                                 
91
 See generally Chapter 1, at 1.2, outlining the standard discrimination law model in Australia; Section 
1.7.3, which considers the provisions under s 49T; and Chapter 4, at 4.2, which outlines the literature 
critiquing the model and its application by the courts and tribunals. 
92
 AD Act s 49T(1)(a). 
93
 Ibid s 49T(1)(b). 
94
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.3outlining the number of carers’ cases heard by the Tribunal in relation to either 
direct or indirect discrimination or both.  See Appendix B and the Table of Cases for summaries of the 
cases. 
95
 See Chapter 1, at 1.5, and Chapter 4, at 4.2. See generally Belinda Smith, ‘From Wardley to Purvis—
How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law Come in 30 years?’ (2008) 21 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 3 (‘Purvis’).  
96
 See, for example, how the Tribunal and Appeal Panel interpreted and applied AD Act s 49T(1)(a) in 
Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [89]–[100]; Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [38]–[43], [54]–[55]; 
ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [213]–[219]; ACE No 2 [2011] NSWADTAP 23 [52]–[69]; Spencer 
[2005] NSWADT 138 [99]. 
97
 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92 [160]–[161]. See for example, the Appeal Panel in Correy No 2 [2008] 
NSWADTAP 4 [38]–[39]. 
98
 Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [44]–[55]. 
99
 [2007] NSWADT 104 [89]–[123 ]. 
100
 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [43], [52]–[55].  
101
 (2003) 217 CLR 92. Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 95. 
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of reasonableness, or reasonable justification, of the employer’s conduct was irrelevant. 
In addition, even though it was found that Ms Correy had been constructively 
dismissed, the respondent does not appear to have relied on the defence of unjustifiable 
hardship, indicating that the practical application of the defence in complaints of direct 
or indirect discrimination was non-existent during the decade.
 102
  This further throws 
into doubt the utility of the inherent requirement/unjustifiable hardship provisions to 
imply a duty of accommodation in practice.  
 
Correy No 1
103
  
 
In Correy No 1, the Tribunal applied the two limb test set out by the High Court in 
Purvis. In relation to the first limb,
104
 it was found that the offending less favourable 
treatment was the decision not to return Ms Correy to her pre-maternity position. The 
Tribunal found that s 49T(1)(a) ‘requires that treatment to be compared with that 
afforded to an actual or hypothetical EN [enrolled nurse] without responsibilities as a 
carer’ who was, or would be, in the same, or not materially different circumstances to 
Ms Correy. Because there was no actual comparator, the Tribunal suggested that the 
appropriate hypothetical comparator, taking into account ‘all of the objective features 
surrounding the offending treatment’ as per Purvis, ‘was … an enrolled nurse without 
carers’ responsibilities, who took 12 months leave of absence, wished to return to 
his/her pre-leave position and had a statutory right to do so’.105 The Tribunal determined 
that Ms Correy was treated less favourably than such a person would have been because 
it was more likely that the hypothetical comparator would have been returned to the pre-
leave position.
106
  
 
In relation to the second limb, causation,
107
 the hospital had claimed that Ms Correy’s 
responsibilities played no role in its decision not to return her to her pre-maternity leave 
position. However, the Tribunal found that ‘the taking of carers’ leave was part and 
                                                 
102
 Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [7]–[10]. The Tribunal found that she was constructively 
dismissed:[165]-[171].  The case was run on the basis of direct discrimination only, although arguably it 
could have been run on the basis of indirect discrimination, for example, that there was a condition or 
requirement to return as a floater rather than to a permanent position.  
103
 [2007] NSWADT 104. 
104
 Ibid [89]–[100]. 
105
 Ibid [94]. 
106
 Ibid [98]–[100]. 
107
 Ibid [101]–[123]. 
261 
 
parcel of her discharging her responsibilities to care for the infant child. The taking of 
the leave and those responsibilities were inextricably linked’.108 It continued that had 
Ms Correy not been absent on carers’ leave, the need to fill her spot would not have 
arisen: ‘It follows therefore that there was a causal link between Ms Correy’s 
responsibilities to care for her infant child and the Hospital’s ultimate decision not to 
return her to [her pre-maternity leave position]’.109  
 
The complaints of direct discrimination and victimisation
110
 were found to be 
substantiated. Damages as claimed by the complainant in the sum of $26,121 for 
economic loss were awarded. A claim for general damages of $30,000 for injury to 
feelings, embarrassment, humiliation, stress, loss of confidence and loss of enjoyment 
of life was rejected due to lack of evidence.
111
 
  
Correy No 2
112
 
 
The Appeal Panel overturned the first instance decision on the basis that the Tribunal 
had made various errors of law in relation to its interpretation and application of the 
Purvis direct discrimination test. In relation to differential treatment,
113
 the Appeal 
Panel found that the correct comparator was an enrolled nurse without carers’ 
responsibilities in which: 
the circumstances attending the treatment given to Ms Correy were that she 
took 12 months leave and wished to return to the same job but the Hospital did 
not regard her as having a statutory entitlement to return to that job [only] the 
right to be given work, where possible, in her pre-leave position.
114
 
It found that it could not be said that the employer would have treated the hypothetical 
comparator in those circumstances more favourably.
115
 In relation to the causation 
                                                 
108
 Ibid [121]. 
109
 Ibid [123]. 
110
 Ibid [128]–[156]. The hospital did not explain why it then rostered nine out of 10 of her shifts in the 
psychiatric unit despite being aware of her objections. It was noted that the hospital could have taken 
steps to prevent any necessity for doing it, for example, by seeking volunteers to transfer from other 
wards. Although there was no direct evidence of victimisation, it could be inferred from the events and 
circumstances, and the hospital’s failure to provide any alternative explanation. 
111
 Ibid [157]–[175]. 
112
 [2008] NSWADTAP 4. 
113
 Ibid [38]–[44]. 
114
 Ibid [41]. 
115
 Ibid [43]. 
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element,
116
 the Appeal Panel found that Ms Correy’s ‘responsibilities as a carer was not 
one of the reasons for the Hospital’s treatment of her. The reason was that she had been 
absent during 2004 and 2005 on maternity leave’. The nexus between the two was not 
enough to satisfy the test.
117
 The Appeal Panel then dismissed the carers’ responsibility 
complaint.
118
 That was the end of the carers’ complaint.  
 
Correy’s Hollow Victory 
 
Ms Correy’s victimisation complaint was remitted back to the Tribunal in Correy No 
3,
119
 and then appealed again by the respondent in Correy No 4.
120
 Although these two 
Correy decisions did not involve the ground of carers’ discrimination, the decisions are 
important in illustrating the negative effects arising from increased formalism, 
adversarialism and ‘judicial conservatism’121 which have been broadly canvassed in the 
literature.
122
 In Correy No 3, the Tribunal found that Ms Correy had been victimised and 
she was awarded damages of $23,665 for economic loss. The hospital again appealed. 
The Appeal Panel upheld the finding of victimisation, but the award of damages was 
overturned because it was found that Ms Correy had not suffered any economic loss as a 
result of the victimisation. It found that Ms Correy had already decided that she would 
not return to work except in her pre-maternity position well before the rostering 
decisions—which were found to amount to victimisation—were even made. Therefore, 
the victimising conduct did not materially contribute to her economic loss.
123
 The 
Appeal Panel noted that there might have been merit in compensating Ms Correy for 
other loss or damage; however, she had only sought damages for economic loss,
124
 and 
because the parties are bound by the manner in which the case was conducted before the 
Tribunal, the Appeal Panel was not able to make an order for other loss or damages. It 
                                                 
116
 Ibid [44]–[55]. 
117
 Ibid [55]. 
118 
Ibid [42]–[43], [55]. 
119
 [2009] NSWADT 40. 
120 
Correy No 3 [2009] NSWADT 40; Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58. 
121
 Murray, ‘Work and Care’, above n 35, 74; and see Chapter 1, at 1.5 and Chapter 4, at 4.2. 
122
 See Chapter 4, at 4.2.  
123
 Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [49]. 
124
 Although she had initially sought general damages for non-economic loss in Correy No 1 [2007] 
NSWADT 104, no damages were awarded for this head of loss. When the matter was remitted back to the 
Tribunal in Correy No 3 [2009] NSWADT 40, she had sought damages only for economic loss. 
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was found that ‘as no claim was made for any other remedy, no remedy has been 
ordered’.125 
 
Even with the representation of a barrister throughout the litigation, the complexity of 
the process was obviously difficult to navigate. Although the Tribunal at first instance in 
Correy No 1, and after remission of the victimisation complaint in Correy No 3, had 
taken a broad and beneficial approach its decisions were overturned on both occasions 
and with some force by the Appeal Panel. Unfortunately, Ms Correy’s ultimate claim 
for damages was defeated by a technical approach to the quantification and pleading of 
damages, even though it was accepted that the employer had victimised her, and she had 
lost her job held for a decade. The final decision in Correy resulted in a manifestly 
unfair and unjust result for the complainant.  It is not clear how Ms Correy’s litigation 
was funded, and whether she was also faced with substantial legal costs. 
 
The broader implications of Correy for direct carers’ discrimination complaints  
 
There are a number of serious implications that arise from the Correy decisions. First, 
the cases indicate that the Appeal Panel operated in an effective policy vacuum. In light 
of the policy objectives underpinning Part 4B, the Appeal Panel’s approach to 
differential treatment and causation resulted in a somewhat perverse outcome, 
completely at odds with the policy objectives of Part 4B. On the facts, it was accepted 
that Ms Correy did have a statutory right to return to her pre-maternity position. 
However, in effect, the employer’s state of mind that it did not ‘regard her as having a 
statutory entitlement’ became the crucial factor determining the case. Looking at the 
‘objective features or circumstances’ in effect served to privilege what the employer 
claimed was its belief or perception. This then trumped Ms Correy’s statutory right to 
return to the job she had been doing for 10 years. Instead, she was relegated to a 
position of a ‘floater’, which would not have happened had she not taken maternity 
leave, with a resultant loss of job satisfaction, collegiality, specialist skills and certainty 
of roster arrangements, which the Appeal Panel had accepted amounted to a substantial 
detriment.
126
 
 
                                                 
125
 See Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [53]–[54].  
126
 Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [37]. 
264 
 
The Appeal Panel in fact privileged the subjective circumstance regarding the 
employer’s belief about her right to return. The Appeal Panel’s decision effectively 
ignored the ‘objective’ circumstances arising out of the context and reality of both the 
complainant’s individual circumstances underpinning her protected carer characteristic.  
It also ignored the ‘objective’ context of the deeply entrenched disadvantage that 
women suffer at work due to pregnancy, maternity and caring responsibilities as a result 
of the discriminatory policies and practices underpinning ideal worker norms.
127 
The 
time around the birth of a child is often the first time that women have been faced with 
discrimination because of their gender and child-rearing role, and is also often just the 
start of a lifetime of economic and workplace disadvantage.
128
 The artificiality of the 
formal equal treatment principle underpinning direct discrimination provisions,
129
 as 
they have been interpreted since Purvis,
130
 will serve to decontextualise both the 
individual complainant’s experiences of discrimination and the causes of this deeply 
entrenched discrimination. Correy No 2 does not bode well for future carers’ complaints 
of direct discrimination.
131
 The Correy saga gives weight to the concerns raised in the 
literature about an era of ‘judicial conservatism’ in which little regard is paid to the 
policy objectives of the legislation.
132
 In particular, the two Appeal Panel decisions 
illustrate a complete lack of a purposive approach. No regard whatsoever was had for 
the remedial or beneficial human rights objectives of the AD Act or the objectives 
underpinning Part 4B.  
 
                                                 
127
 See, for example, Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), Supporting Working Parents: 
Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report (2014) (‘Supporting’). Note also that, in relation 
to the carers’ complaints lodged at the ADB, maternity related complaints were lodged by 153 women 
between 2001 and 2011, equating to 29% of all carers’ complaints lodged during the period.  This is 
explained further in Chapter 9. 
128
 See, for example, three reports from the AHRC, ‘Accumulating Poverty: Women’s Experiences of 
Inequality over the Life Cycle’ (2009); AHRC, ‘Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who 
Care’ (2013); AHRC, Supporting, above n 127. 
129 
For a critique of the formal equal treatment model of direct discrimination in the literature, see Chapter 
4, at 4.2. 
130
 (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
131
 See also Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138, in which the complaint of direct carers and sex 
discrimination—on the basis that she was asked to change her hours to work five days a week—failed. 
Although it was found on the facts that the treatment afforded to Ms Spencer was ‘demonstrably less 
favourable’ than that afforded a male co-worker who was not directed to change his hours, the complaint 
failed in relation to causation: at [99]. It was found that there was no evidence either direct or inferred that 
the decision for her to return to a five-day week was made on the ground of her gender or carers’ 
responsibilities to satisfy the Tribunal: at [115]–[119]. 
132
 Murray, ‘Work and Care’, above n 35, 74. See generally Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 36, and Chapter 4, 
at 4.2.2 
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Second, the cases also illustrate that in spite of the express legislative commitment to 
informality,
133
 the Appeal Panel in particular, in relation to its interpretation of the 
substantive provisions, and also its approach to the quantification of damages, has been 
very strict and legalistic. Its decisions indicate an abject failure to meet the access-to-
justice aims ‘to provide an effective remedy to individuals of limited means, reduce 
adversarialism, and serve the public interest in social harmony’.134  
 
Third, Correy again reinforces that pregnancy and maternity discrimination continues to 
be a very a serious issue for women,
135
 and also that the direct discrimination 
protections afforded under the AD Act are likely to provide little, if any, protection in 
practice. They are also unlikely to provide an appropriate remedy for worker–carers.136 
In terms of alternative causes of action for maternity-related discrimination, although 
indirect discrimination may offer an alternative, as discussed below, this too is fraught 
with difficulty for complainants. Actions brought under the federal Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) (‘SD Act’) have also followed the Purvis test.137 Worker–carers seeking 
to enforce their rights not to be discriminated against because of their carers’ 
responsibilities may be better served, if they are eligible, by bringing a complaint under 
the FW Act. Recent decisions from that jurisdiction have demonstrated alternative 
causes of action, which also potentially have a strong normative deterrent value, both in 
terms of civil penalties being imposed after prosecutions and individual remedies for 
pregnancy or maternity-related complaints brought under the adverse action 
provisions.
138
 
                                                 
133
 ADT Act s 73; CAT Act s 38. 
134
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 9. 
135
 See, for example, AHRC, Supporting, above n 127.  
136
 See Smith, ‘Purvis’, above n 95, 20, for a discussion of the application of the Purvis approach in 
relation to the issue of maternity leave. She notes that applying the Purvis approach to the issue of 
maternity leave has allowed the ‘employer to use the taking of leave as a basis for decision-making and to 
ignore the reasons for taking the leave’ with no distinction made ‘between maternity leave and any other 
sort of leave despite the acknowledged connection between maternity and pregnancy, a protected trait and 
traditional source of disadvantage’. 
137
 See the maternity case Iliff v Sterling Commerce Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 1960 and Sterling 
Commerce Australia Pty Ltd v Iliff [2008] FCA 702, brought under the SD Act, in which a similar 
rationale was applied to defeat a complaint of direct sex discrimination. 
138
 The High Court considering the operation of the adverse action provisions in Part 3-1 of the FW Act in 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 41 has similarly 
placed the focus on the reasons of the employer’s decision-maker for taking particular alleged adverse 
action [7], affirming the approach taken by the High Court in Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of 
TAFE v Barclay [2012] HCA 32.  However, notwithstanding this narrow interpretation a number of 
maternity related decisions have provided positive outcomes for maternity related complaints. See for 
example: Fair Work Ombudsman v Wongtas Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 30, which was the first 
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Finally, perhaps as worryingly as the attitude of the Appeal Panel to the application of 
Part 4B, the Correy saga also demonstrates how a respondent will use the process to 
wage a war of attrition against a complaint. This reflects what Gaze and Hunter have 
noted, that some respondents will follow a strategy and have the capacity to continue to 
fight cases aggressively and in order to avoid the setting of a precedent that would be 
adverse to their interests so that consequently, over time a jurisprudence will develop 
that is skewed in favour of respondents.
 139
 They note that the ability of a complainant to 
continue until they receive a favourable decision is limited by their personal stamina, 
and either their own financial resources or the limits of available legal aid assistance; 
while in contrast the risks and stresses for well-resourced respondents ‘are essentially 
financial and not personal, for the individuals involved on the other side, the stress is 
personal as well as financial, and may be extreme’. 140 The long-running sagas of cases 
such as Amery, Purvis, Schou and Correy are all illustrative of this respondent strategy, 
and also illustrate the resultant acceptance by the discrimination courts and tribunals of 
increasingly higher levels of managerial prerogative, and the privileging in practice of 
the business interests over the discrimination law rights of their workers.
141
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
successful prosecution brought by the Fair Work Ombudsman (‘FWO’) under the General Protections 
provisions. The complainant was awarded $2,207.42 in compensation and each director was fined $3,564.  
In Fair Work Ombudsman v Felix Corporation Pty Ltdthe operators of a chain of Victorian discount retail 
stores were fined a total of $53,592 for discriminating against a pregnant employee. The company was 
fined $40,920, and two owner-managers were fined a further $7,656 and $5,016, respectively. In addition, 
it paid the employee $7,197 for economic and non-economic loss suffered and apologised to her. The 
penalties, imposed in the Federal Circuit Court in Melbourne, were the highest secured by the FWO for a 
legal action relating to discrimination: FWO, ‘Record Penalties Imposed in Pregnancy Discrimination 
Matter’ (Media Release, 8 November 2013). This case is awaiting citation, see  
<http://www.fairwork.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/2013/11/pages/20131108-felix-penalty.aspx>. 
See also Fair Work Ombudsman v A Dalley Holding Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 509, where the operators of a 
Victorian aged-care facility were fined a total of $30,888 for discriminating against an employee when 
she attempted to return from maternity leave. The company was fined $27,720 and the individual owner 
fined a further $3,168. In addition, the complainant was awarded $5,000. The fines and compensation 
order were a result of a prosecution by the FWO: FWO, ‘Fines Imposed over Treatment of Employee 
Seeking to Return from Maternity Leave’ (Media Release, 24 April 2013) 
<http://www.fairwork.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/2013/04/pages/20130424-a-dalley-
penalty.aspx>. 
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 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 18. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174; State of Victoria v Schou [2004] 8 VR 120 (‘Schou’); Purvis (2003) 217 
CLR 92 discussed in Chapter 4, at 4.2.See also, for example, Adams, ‘Defining’, above no 34; 
Charlesworth, ‘Shadow’, above n 3. For a discussion of the Schou saga in Victoria culminating in Schou 
[2004] 8 VR 120, see Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and the Case of 
Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39, above n 55 (‘Schou’). 
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6.3.4 Indirect Discrimination 
 
Ten out of the 12 cases that came before the Tribunal involved allegations of indirect 
discrimination relating to requirements to work full-time, rostering, hours or location of 
work.
142
 Conditions or requirements are often based upon the traditional male-
breadwinner model of an unencumbered full-time worker and represent high levels of 
managerial prerogative.
143
 As outlined in Chapter 1, four elements in s 49T(1)(b)
144
 
must be proved by the complainant: first, the existence of a requirement or condition; 
second, disparate impact; third, an inability to comply with the condition; and finally, 
that the condition or requirement is not reasonable. The Tribunal’s approach to each is 
now outlined.  
 
In practice, the first and third elements caused the least difficulty for complainants. 
Cases such as Gardiner No 1,
145
 Reddy
146
 and Tleyji,
147
 which are discussed below, 
turned on the issue of whether the condition or requirement was reasonable. However, 
in this chapter, it is also argued that the second element of substantial disparate impact 
can be extremely problematic for complainants, and caused difficulties for five out of 
the 12 complaints.
148
 It is noted that failure to prove disparate impact could lead to the 
position whereby, even if a condition or requirement were obviously or egregiously 
unreasonable, it would still fail if the Tribunal was not satisfied that the element of 
disparate impact had been proven. As the case of Spencer, discussed below, illustrates, 
disparate impact may be a threshold issue that can defeat a complaint before the 
reasonableness of a condition or requirement is even considered.
149
 The Tribunal and 
Appeal Panel have readily acknowledged the difficulties for complainants of having to 
                                                 
142
 Only Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 and Merrick [2008] NSWADT 89 were brought on the 
grounds of direct discrimination alone. See Table B, in Appendix B1, which sets out the nature of the 
alleged discriminatory conduct. See also Chapter 1, at 1.7.3. 
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 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.3.3. 
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148
 Five cases considered this element and the difficulties faced by complainants. In the first four, the 
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NSWADT 72 [147]. In all but Spencer, the Tribunal often still went on to consider the other three 
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149
 [2005] NSWADT 138 [60]–[69]. 
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prove disparate impact.
150
  However, the tendency of the Tribunal, to become bogged 
down with the technical ‘minutiae of statutory construction’151 is perhaps demonstrated 
nowhere as clearly as in the interpretation and application of disparate impact in the 
indirect cases of Tleyji, Spencer and ACE No 1, considered below.  
 
 
(i) A Condition or Requirement Exists 
 
While the High Court in Amery took a very narrow view of this element of the test,
152
 
the Tribunal has noted that the condition or requirement must be identified with 
particularity by the complainant,
153
 but has otherwise rejected overly technical 
arguments from respondents.
154
 For example, in Gardiner No 1, the Tribunal rejected 
the employer’s argument that the relocation of the complainant’s place of work was not 
a ‘requirement’ because the location of a business is a matter of ‘managerial 
prerogative’. The Tribunal found that there was no restriction on the kinds of 
requirements covered by the AD Act.
155 
 
 
(ii) Disparate Impact156 
 
The complainant must prove that the condition or requirement results in a ‘substantial’ 
disparate impact, whereby a substantially higher proportion of people without the 
protected attribute do comply, or are able to comply, with the condition. There are three 
potential ways this element could be proven, which were described in Chapter 1.
157
 The 
first involves a statistical approach considering the actual or a hypothetical workplace. 
Basically, the complainant has the burden of identifying and making a comparative 
                                                 
150
 Ibid [64]–[70]; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [77]–[89]; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241]. 
151
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152
 For a discussion of the case and its analysis in the literature, see Chapter 4, at 4.2. 
153
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157
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assessment of two ‘status’ groups or ‘pools’ of those workers with and those without 
caring responsibilities.
158
 Second, a complainant could also adduce non-statistical 
evidence such as historical, psychological or other proof of the effect of a condition or 
requirement on the particular pool or group.
159
 Finally, ‘when a court or tribunal 
considers a matter to be so well-known that it does not require proof of its existence it is 
said to take “judicial notice” of that fact or matter’.160  For example, in Tleyji, the 
Tribunal was willing to apply judicial notice in circumstances that Ms Tleyji was 
otherwise unable to prove disparate impact, and in which her complaint would 
otherwise have failed.
161
 The approach of the Tribunal in the three cases of Tleyji,
162
 
Spencer
163
 and ACE
164
 is now considered to illustrate the difficulties for complainants to 
prove this element. 
 
Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group
165
 
 
The case involved the denial of part-time work after a return from maternity leave.
166
 It 
was accepted that the condition or requirement to work full-time was one with which 
Ms Tleyji was unable to comply.
167
 Therefore, the case turned on the other two elements 
of disparate impact and reasonableness. The Tribunal outlined the steps to show a 
disparate impact: 
First, identify the pool or base group. 
Second, identify the members within that group who do not have carers’ 
responsibilities and can comply with the requirement. 
Third, identify the members of the base group who have carers’ 
responsibilities and who can comply with the requirement. 
                                                 
158
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159
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Finally, compare the proportion of employees without carers’ responsibilities 
who can comply with the requirement with the proportion of employees with 
carers’ responsibilities who can comply. 168 
 
The decision highlights the complexity of the steps to prove disparate impact, not least 
because Ms Tleyji’s legal team appeared to struggle seriously to determine even the 
appropriate base group or pool, let alone disparate impact.
169
 The Tribunal assisted in 
the identification of a base group, but because it consisted of only four employees, it 
then went on to find that applying a ‘mere statistical approach’ was not appropriate 
when the pool was too small.
170
 Although disparate impact could not be proven, the 
Tribunal did overcome the statistical deficiency in evidence, by exercising judicial 
notice, finding that: 
Notwithstanding these problems in our view we are entitled to take judicial 
notice of the fact that a substantially higher proportion of persons without 
responsibilities for infant children can or do comply with the requirement to 
work full time. It is, we think, a truth universally acknowledged that people 
with responsibilities for the care of an infant child find it difficult to balance 
their responsibilities to care for their child and work, and within the Australian 
workforce a lesser proportion of those with such responsibilities are able to 
work full time than those who do not. That is a fact so well publicised in the 
mass media and so widely known that, in our view, it can be regarded for 
evidentiary purposes as a matter of common knowledge.171 
Once the Tribunal had applied judicial notice, the effect was that Ms Tleyji was no 
longer required to prove disparate impact. The Tribunal was then able to go on to the 
next element of reasonableness, finding that the requirement to work full-time was 
unreasonable.
172
 It is crucial to emphasise that, had the Tribunal not exercised judicial 
notice, Ms Tleyji’s complaint would simply have failed because of the application of the 
‘mere statistical approach’, even though the requirement to work full-time was 
unreasonable. As noted below, the Tribunal was less accommodating in the case of 
Spencer.
173
 
 
                                                 
168
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169
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170
 The pool identified consisted of four people including the complainant, three of whom did not have 
caring responsibilities and two of whom could comply: Ibid [88]. The Tribunal cited Bonella & Ors v 
Wollongong City Council [2001] NSWADT 194, 94, in relation to the difficulties caused by a ‘mere 
statistical approach’ in determining whether a different compliance rate is substantial, especially when the 
nominated pool is small. 
171
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [89]. 
172
 Ibid [90]–[108]. 
173
 [2005] NSWADT 138 [60]–[69]. 
271 
 
The Tribunal’s approach to disparate impact in Tleyji,174 indicates an acceptance as a 
matter of common knowledge that people with responsibilities for the care of an infant 
child find it difficult or may not want to work full-time.
175
 This represents an acceptance 
by the Tribunal that, essentially, a certain category of worker–carers—those caring for 
infants—is unable to comply with ideal worker norms relating to full-time work. 
However, the Tribunal has refused to accept as a matter of common knowledge that 
worker–carers, generally, may have difficulty in complying with certain conditions 
relating to where, when and how work is undertaken. For example, where the 
responsibilities involve care for older children or adults as now set out in Spencer and 
ACE.
176
 
 
Spencer v Greater Murray Area Health Service
177
 
 
Ms Spencer had been working full-time hours compressed over four days because of her 
caring responsibilities for elderly parents and adult sister, and was unable to comply 
with a condition to work five days a week after a restructure.
178
 She identified a suitable 
base group at her workplace but did not produce any evidence that those workers did 
not have caring responsibilities. Instead, she submitted that, because none of the other 
workers in the base group had asked for flexible work owing to carers’ responsibilities, 
it could be assumed that they had no such responsibilities. The Tribunal rejected this 
argument, noting that ‘it is not open to her to argue that as there is no evidence to the 
contrary, the evidentiary onus has been discharged. All this proves is that there is no 
evidence on the point … the onus does not shift to the respondent to disprove the 
assertion’.179  The Tribunal will therefore require that a complainant obtain evidence 
about the carer responsibilities of other workers in the workplace. Not only might such 
information be difficult to obtain,
180
 but a complainant may be required to pry into 
personal lives of co-workers to ascertain whether they have caring responsibilities, as 
well as the nature of those responsibilities.
181
 This in itself could have a serious impact 
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on the complainant’s relationship with her co-workers, particularly if reasonable 
accommodation is the aim. The Tribunal did not give any consideration whatsoever as 
to whether there was any principle of common knowledge from which an inference 
could be made. In effect, not proving disparate impact defeated the complaint at that 
stage, and the Tribunal did not go on to consider the fourth element of the test, that is, 
whether the condition or requirement was reasonable.  
 
ACE v State of NSW (TAFE Commission and Department of Education and Training)
182
 
 
The complaint related to a denial of part-time work. It was dismissed because it was 
found that the complainant did not in fact have caring responsibilities.
183
 The decision 
was upheld on appeal.
184
 However, even though the threshold s 49S issue was not met 
the Tribunal at first instance still went on to consider the other elements of indirect 
discrimination. It was found the complainant had not proven any of the four elements.  
 
In relation to disparate impact, the Tribunal acknowledged the serious difficulties 
involved for complainants.
185
 However, as in Spencer, the Tribunal was not satisfied 
that the complainant had even demonstrated that the relevant pool of full-time workers 
did not have carers’ responsibilities,186 let alone whether the base group was large 
enough to allow for a meaningful statistical comparison.
187
 The Tribunal also rejected 
the submission that it should infer as a matter of common knowledge that a greater 
proportion of persons without carers’ responsibilities is able to work full-time, noting: 
In the absence of appropriate statistical proof, the Applicant submits that the 
Tribunal should find as a matter of common knowledge that a greater 
proportion of persons in the community (presumably, the residents of New 
South Wales) without carers’ responsibilities are capable of full-time work 
than those who have carers’ responsibilities. The community generally is not 
the appropriate base group, because it is considerably wider than the group to 
which the alleged requirement for full-time work was directed. Even if it was 
an appropriate base group, the percentage of persons with carers’ 
responsibilities capable of full-time work would depend on the nature and 
                                                 
182
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extent of those responsibilities, as to which there is no evidence. It is not a 
matter in which the Tribunal would be inclined to apply the ‘common 
knowledge’ principle.188 
Spencer and ACE therefore indicate that worker–carers with responsibilities for older 
children, adults or people with a disability, must be able to prove a substantial disparate 
impact with persuasive supporting evidence, including evidence of ‘common 
knowledge’ if necessary, or face having their complaints dismissed. 
 
(iii) Inability to Comply  
 
In common with other jurisdictions, the Tribunal has taken a beneficial approach to this 
element, confirming that compliance with a condition is in the practical sense rather 
than a theoretical ability to comply.
189
 In Gardiner
 
No 1, the Tribunal noted that, even if 
it were accepted that Ms Gardiner could theoretically comply with the relocation of her 
place of work, the result would be that she would have less time with her children 
because of increased travel time and that, ‘since the purpose of the indirect 
discrimination provisions is to ensure, as far as possible, that equality of result is 
achieved … it is our view that the applicant is unable to comply with the 
requirement’.190  
 
However, the cases again highlight the adversarial nature of the process, in which 
complainants must justify the minutiae of their work and care decisions.  In Spencer, the 
respondent had argued that the complainant could undertake many of her caring tasks 
by working five days per week and using other forms of leave. However, the Tribunal 
found that the combined burdens of the high level of responsibility she bore at work, her 
family responsibilities and the need for respite meant that, in practical terms, she was 
unable to comply.
191
 It noted that: 
The ability to comply with the disputed requirement should not in our opinion 
be assessed against the hypothetical performance of some notional ‘super 
carer’. Rather, account must be taken of the circumstances in which the 
aggrieved person who complains of discrimination finds themselves.
192
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Although it is of course unfortunate that the Tribunal did not then take a similarly 
beneficial approach to the issue of disparate impact when dismissing Ms Spencer’s 
complaint.   
 
The Tribunal has also made it clear in relation to the ability to comply, the employer 
cannot extend the reach of managerial prerogative to determine how or by whom care is 
provided.  In Reddy the Tribunal noted that when assessing the ability to comply: 
It is not in our view necessary for an applicant to establish there is no one but 
him or herself available who can care for the children in working hours … a 
relevant factor to be taken into account is the beliefs of the carer as to the 
appropriateness or otherwise of leaving their children in the care of another, on 
a full time basis.
193
  
However, the Tribunal has indicated that the availability of other care options may be a 
relevant consideration in relation to an assessment of reasonableness.
194
  
 
(iv) Reasonableness  
 
The disparate impact is only discriminatory if the condition or requirement is not 
reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. Although the complainant has the 
burden to prove that the condition or requirement is not reasonable,
195
 in practice a 
respondent will have to counter this evidence to demonstrate that the condition was 
reasonable.
196
 The test for reasonableness was set out by the Tribunal in Gardiner No 1, 
the first carers’ discrimination case considered,197 and has been followed by the 
Tribunal in subsequent carers’ cases.198 The Tribunal outlined a number of sub-elements 
with the basic aim of balancing the nature and extent of the discriminatory effect of the 
requirement as against three factors:
199
 first, the reasons for the requirement, including 
any commercial considerations; second, whether the requirement is appropriate and 
adapted to its purpose and has a logical and understandable basis; and third, whether 
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there is a less discriminatory option, which can include considering the possibility of 
alternative action that would achieve the object of the condition and be less 
discriminatory.
200 
Providing an accommodation may be one such non-discriminatory 
option.  
 
The application of the test is now considered in three cases: Gardiner No 1,
201
 Reddy
202
 
and Tleyji
203
 all of which turned on the issue of reasonableness. While Reddy and Tleyji 
demonstrate the application of the reasonableness test in favour of the complainants, the 
Tribunal showed in Gardiner No 1, the first carers’ case that the Tribunal heard, that it 
has also been more than ready to accept commercial arguments as to why a condition or 
requirement is reasonable, without properly or fully considering the negative effects of 
the condition or requirement upon the employee and his or her family.
204
  
 
Although it is the reasonableness of the condition or requirement that is in issue under s 
49T(1)(b), these three cases indicate that, in practice, the reasonableness of the 
respondents’ conduct when responding to requests for flexibility will be relevant in 
considering whether there was a less discriminatory option and whether the employer 
gave proper consideration to any such options.
205
 It is this interpretation and application 
of the reasonableness test that may have the effect in practice of implying a duty of 
reasonable accommodation upon employers consistent with the policy aims of the 
legislation.
206
  
                                                 
200
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Gardiner v WorkCover
207
  
 
Ms Gardiner was a senior manager with the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(‘WorkCover’). Her office was relocating from Sydney to Gosford, which is 
approximately 80km away. There was a requirement that all managers be based at the 
new head office and attend there for an average of five days a fortnight.
208
 She argued 
that this would result in significant extra travel time, and that she could not comply, 
because she had carers’ responsibilities for her two children aged six and eight. The 
Tribunal accepted her evidence that these responsibilities included: 
[t]he day-to day care … including the need to be able to prepare them for 
school in a relaxed environment knowing that they have a proper lunch, news 
for the day, their reading book and their hair done properly … meeting the 
physical, emotional and psychological needs of her children. 
Ms Gardiner also argued that her role as a mother was much broader than tasks that can 
be outsourced.
209
 
 
The Tribunal considered what the ‘inherent requirements’ of the job actually were 
according to each party, and found that it was more ‘efficient and effective’ and ‘logical 
and understandable from a management point of view’ for Ms Gardiner to be based in 
Gosford so that all team managers were based there.
210
 It did not accept Ms Gardiner’s 
alternative, less discriminatory proposals that she be based in Sydney and attend 
Gosford to meet and interact with her staff and colleagues. The complaint was 
dismissed because it was found that the requirement was reasonable when balanced 
against Ms Gardiner’s responsibilities as a carer.211 The Tribunal also found that 
WorkCover had made ‘considerable efforts to accommodate’ the complainant.212 
Bourke agrees that WorkCover had acted entirely reasonably and criticises Ms Gardiner 
as being unreasonable in her expectations, noting that: 
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The Tribunal clearly endorsed WorkCover’s flexible and sensitive approach to 
identifying and accommodating an employee’s caring responsibilities when 
deciding to relocate. Critically, WorkCover offered realistic solutions to the 
problem of time and space … Although these changes did not meet Gardiner’s 
high expectations they obviously persuaded the ADT.
213
  
However, Adams noted that when considering the extent of the discriminatory effect on 
the complainant and her children, the Tribunal in fact had given very little consideration 
and, therefore, no real weight to the effect of the time that the complainant would lose 
with her six- and eight-year-old daughters because of extra travelling.
214
 Exploring this 
point further, in practice, given the age of the children, the effect would likely be quite 
significant if one considers that Ms Gardiner may not spend time at all, or very little 
time, with her children five days per fortnight. The extra travel time meant that, on those 
days, she would leave for work before school time and would come home when the 
children were getting ready for or already in bed. However, while the Tribunal 
considered the day-to-day business need, it gave no such consideration to the 
surrounding day-to-day context or the negative effects of the condition on the 
complainant and her children.
215
 This was the case, even though Ms Gardiner had given 
evidence about the importance of her role to provide care and support on a daily basis, 
for example to get her children ready for school, which the Tribunal accepted.
216
 Ms 
Gardiner appealed but the Appeal Panel upheld the decision.
217
 
 
 
Reddy v International Cargo Express
218
 
 
Ms Reddy had worked as a customs manager for five years when she took one year off 
for maternity leave. Prior to her return, she requested a return to part-time work three 
days per week. Reflecting many of the arguments in the literature, the employer 
appeared to view caring responsibilities as an issue of personal choice and 
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‘voluntariness’,219 informing her that the company’s ‘obligations do not include meeting 
your personal circumstances, however praiseworthy those circumstances might be’.220 
The respondent’s reasons for refusing the request included that her position was full-
time and not part-time; the proposal ‘would require an entirely new regime of 
management within the company’ and was unworkable;221 that there was no part-time 
work available; and that all employees were full-time and that a manager needed to be 
there all the time because all days are busy and unpredictable, and customers would not 
be prepared to wait for problems to be sorted out. In summary, the part-time work 
proposal presented operational difficulties and additional costs that amounted to an 
unreasonable burden on the company.
222
 Ms Reddy resigned and found part-time work 
elsewhere. She claimed that she had no option but to resign.
223
 There had been no 
consultation with her about her proposal,
 
no suggestion of trialling it, no proper 
assessment of how her needs might be accommodated and no discussion of any possible 
alternative arrangements.
224
 Ms Reddy was able to demonstrate the other three elements 
of indirect discrimination and the complaint turned on whether the requirement to work 
full-time was reasonable.  
 
The Tribunal found that, although the requirement to work full-time appeared 
appropriate and adapted, ‘it is necessary to go on and ask whether the activity could 
have been performed … without imposing a requirement or condition that is 
discriminatory’.225 It found that ‘no effort at accommodation was made or even 
seriously considered’.226 The respondent had not acted reasonably and had ‘failed to 
give proper and full consideration to whether Ms Reddy could perform her role on a 
part-time basis either under the model she put forward or some variation thereof’.227 
Damages of $15,000 for non-economic loss were awarded for the stress, anxiety and 
humiliation that Ms Reddy felt. In addition, $1,385 was awarded for loss of income 
                                                 
219
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covering the period until she commenced other employment. Ms Reddy had also 
claimed aggravated damages in relation to the respondent’s response to her complaints, 
after it aggressively threatened to sue her for personal damages. The Tribunal refused to 
make such an order but, unusually for cases under the AD Act, did award some costs 
against the respondent.
228
 
 
 
Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group
229
  
 
Ms Tleyji worked full-time as a senior travel consultant for five years. On returning 
from maternity leave, her request to work three days per week was denied.
230
 The 
Tribunal found that the requirement to work full-time was unreasonable because the 
evidence indicated the respondent had not given ‘full and proper consideration’231 as to 
whether an activity could be performed without imposing a requirement or condition 
that is discriminatory. It noted that ‘it is not necessary for the Tribunal to satisfy itself 
that no stone had been left unturned by a respondent in an evaluation of alternatives. 
Reasonable efforts do however need to be shown’.232 The Tribunal also gave some 
examples of steps that the respondent could have taken, for example, considering job-
sharing or structuring an arrangement that would have allowed Ms Tleyji to return to 
her old job part-time.
233
 Although the Tribunal found that Ms Tleyji had been 
discriminated against on the basis of her caring responsibilities at work, disappointingly, 
no claim was apparently made by her for either general damages or for economic loss, 
and therefore, no compensation was awarded for carers’ responsibility discrimination.234 
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was not allowed to speak Arabic at work. It may be that the legal advisers could not substantiate any loss 
arising from the carers’ complaint; nevertheless, it is surprising that no amount at all was claimed. 
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6.3.5 An Implied Duty: The Potential and the Inherent Uncertainty
235
 
 
Both Reddy and Tleyji demonstrate the potential of Part 4B to meet the policy aims of 
the legislation in relation to reasonable accommodation,
236
 even if the Tribunal stopped 
well short of acknowledging the policy objectives of Part 4B in this regard. Together, 
they indicate that employers must demonstrate that they have given serious 
consideration to any proposal from the worker and have also proactively taken steps to 
examine their workplace, workforce, job design and work organisation for any potential 
non-discriminatory alternative options, including but not limited to those suggested by 
the employee. It will not be enough for an employer simply to argue that no part-time 
role exists or that it would cause hardship to the organisation, because it is implicitly 
recognised that most accommodations will, in practice, always cause at least some 
degree of disruption or cost to an employer, the issue is one of reasonableness.
237
 Both 
cases also demonstrate a broad and beneficial reading of the legislation in relation to all 
four elements of indirect discrimination.
238
  
 
The Tribunal’s focus on employers and employees negotiating a workplace resolution 
of a request for flexibility has had educative and precedential value by helping to 
provide at least a level of ‘structured guidance’239 to employees and employers about 
the implementation in practice of their rights and obligations at work. For example, it is 
also worth noting that, prior to and after Reddy and Tleyji, the ADB had since 2000
240
 
consistently interpreted the indirect discrimination provisions in Part 4B as operating to 
imply a duty of reasonable accommodation.
241
 Therefore, the Tribunal decisions 
confirmed and validated the interpretation applied by the ADB, in its statutory 
complaint-handling and educative functions.
242
 The decisions also reflect Sturm’s 
‘problem-solving’ approach to workplace discrimination, emphasising local-context-
                                                 
235
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294. 
236
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [89]; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [105]. 
237
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 66, 26–7. See also Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 141, 41. 
238
 Compare the Tribunal’s approach outlined above in relation to Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 or ACE 
[2010] NSWADT 180.  
239
 Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Right to Request Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 116, 118–19, 135. 
240
 See ADB, Guidelines for Employers, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (2000) published in 
anticipation of Part 4B coming into effect. 
241
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.5. Part V outlines the operation of the ADB’s education and complaint handling 
functions. 
242
 See the ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, Preventing Discrimination and Harassment 
(2009) 11, noting the application of Reddy and Tleyji. 
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based resolution of requests for flexibility in which employees and employers are 
problem-solving actors, trying to work out viable alternatives, thereby enabling the 
employment relationship to continue, but in which the courts may still have a role in 
shaping internal problem-solving processes at that level.
243
  
 
However, the operation of any implied duty of accommodation arising from the 
application of Reddy and Tleyji is far from certain.
244
 Relying on the interpretation of 
‘reasonableness’ to imply a duty of accommodation is obviously inherently uncertain245 
and this is especially so in the context of a discrimination law model in which: the 
legislation is complex and the evidentiary burdens on a complainant are arduous;
246
 the 
complainant has to prove not just reasonableness but also the other three elements of 
discrimination, which have been shown to be problematic, especially disparate impact; 
and the contemporary trends towards judicial conservatism have led to courts and 
tribunals increasingly taking a restrictive and narrow approach of the interpretation and 
application of anti-discrimination laws. This approach can be characterised generally as 
showing little regard for the equality and human rights objectives of the laws and 
privileging managerial prerogative over equality.
247
 In addition, as Chapman has noted, 
the ‘use of a reasonableness concept in a legal rule never permits a high level of 
confidence in the likely outcome of the rule’s application’ and, in cases of indirect 
discrimination, has tended to be interpreted by judges in ways that reinforce the status 
quo.
248
 The discrimination work and family cases—both under the NSW AD Act, such 
as Gardiner No 1, and in other jurisdictions, such as the Schou saga,
249—demonstrate 
that, when considering the reasonableness of a condition or requirement, managerial 
prerogative, operational requirements and efficiency will often trump the rights of 
workers under discrimination legislation.  
 
6.4 Interpretation, Application and Policy Objectives: Concluding 
Comments 
                                                 
243
 Sturm, above n 37, 475–6, 521, 567. 
244
 See generally, Chapter 1, at 1.7.5, and Chapter 5, at 5.3.2 outlining and critiquing possible legal bases 
from which to imply a duty of accommodation under Part 4B. 
245
 Smith, ‘Fair and Equal’, above n 33, 203–7. 
246
 Chapman, Working Paper, above n 66; Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 141; Allen, ‘Burden’, above n 29.  
247
 Most notably, the High Court in Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174 and Schou [2004] 8 VR 120. See 
discussion in Chapter 4, at 4.2. 
248
 Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 141, 58; Schou [2004] 8 VR 120. 
249
 Culminating in Schou [2004] 8 VR 120; see also Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 141. 
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The Tribunal and Appeal Panel’s approach to its adjudicative function and Part 4B can 
generally be characterised as very often relying upon a ‘law in books’ approach.250 It 
has shown a strict adherence to the technicalities of the legislation, following a 
hierarchical and precedential common law system and in an effective policy vacuum. 
While paying lip service to the human rights and equality objectives of the AD Act and 
Part 4B,
251
 there is little evidence that the Tribunal had regard to or genuine engagement 
with them. It appears committed to overseeing an adversarial process and has been 
unwilling to make inferences or look beyond the evidence presented by the 
complainant.  
 
Notwithstanding the precedential value of Reddy and Tleyji,
252
 the Tribunal missed a 
valuable opportunity in those early years after Part 4B was enacted to provide clear and 
unequivocal guidance to employers and employees about their rights and obligations 
under the new carers’ provisions.  It is also important not to lose sight of the fact that 
both women had been forced to leave jobs that they had held for around five years. In 
this light, Ms Reddy received inadequate compensation and Ms Tleyji received none. 
Therefore, these two ‘victories’ also demonstrate the overwhelming inadequacy of the 
traditional direct/indirect discrimination law model under Part 4B, to provide an 
adequate remedy to compensate worker–carers for their loss, let alone to tackle broader 
social policy objectives of Part 4B. It is also significant that, since Reddy and Tleyji,
253
 
in 2004 and 2005 respectively, no carers’ complaints heard at the Tribunal have resulted 
in a decision in favour of the complainant. Instead, the manifest unfairness of the 
Correy saga and the Appeal Panel decision in Correy No 4 in 2009 dominates the end of 
the decade.
254
  
 
                                                 
250
 See Chapter 2, at 2.4.2, explaining this realist legal approach. The phrase ‘law in action’ is usually 
attributed to Pound’s distinction between what he called law in books and law in action: Roscoe Pound, 
‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12. 
251
 See Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [19], noting that the AD Act should be construed broadly. See also 
Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184 [39], noting that the legislation should be given a broad 
interpretation, in keeping with the human rights purpose of the provision, citing Waters 173 CLR 349, 
359 (Mason CJ and Gaudron J). 
252
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294. 
253
 Ibid . 
254
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294, 9; Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104; 
Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4, Correy No 3 [2009] NSWADT 40; Correy No 4 [2009] 
NSWADTAP 58. 
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Of all the carers’ cases heard by the Tribunal, the Correy saga illustrates quite starkly 
the negative effects of the increasingly adversarial litigation process, the complexity of 
provisions and the effect of judicial conservatism in terms of poor outcomes and the 
poor normative value of the decision.
255
  Correy No 2 and Correy No 4
256
 led to a 
decision at odds and entirely inconsistent with the policy objectives of the AD Act and 
Part 4B. Their effect was to ignore the recognised statutory right of a woman to return 
to her position after maternity leave. Ms Correy endured four hearings and had awards 
of damages overturned twice by the Appeal Panel. More than four years after the 
discriminatory conduct occurred, the proceedings ended with a finding that the 
employer had discriminated against Ms Correy. However, notwithstanding her 
representation by a barrister at all four hearings, she received nothing because of a legal 
technicality whereby her loss had not been pleaded correctly.
257
  
 
The discussion of the cases in this chapter has demonstrated that rather than trying to 
halt this adversarialism the Tribunal has contributed to and fostered it, notwithstanding 
that its adjudicative powers are based on an express commitment to informalism.
258
  
 
 
                                                 
255
 See also Chapter 4, at 4.1–4.3. 
256
 St Joseph’s Hospital v Correy (EOD) [2008] NSWADTAP 4 (‘Correy No 2’); St Joseph’s Hospital 
Ltd v Correy [2009] NSWADTAP 58 (‘Correy No 4’). 
257
 Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [53]–[54]. 
258
 See above at 6.2. 
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Chapter 7: Process, Outcomes and Normative Impact  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The discussion of the cases in Chapter 6 illustrates that, far from providing a relatively 
informal and timely process, a complainant proceeding from the ADB to a hearing at 
the Tribunal is likely to become embroiled in adversarial, complex and perhaps lengthy 
litigation against a well-resourced employer. As a result, the complainant is likely to 
need legal representation that may be costly, which in turn is likely to make the process 
even more adversarial and legalistic because employers are generally legally 
represented.
1
 This process has become increasingly hostile for complainants and has 
also provided generally very poor outcomes for those worker–carers who persevered to 
a hearing, both quantitatively in terms of the low number of decisions made in favour of 
the complainant and qualitatively in terms of the inadequacy of the remedies achieved.
2
 
Such a process is obviously not conducive to maintaining an accommodation or the 
employment relationship. In practice, by the stage at which a complaint reaches the 
Tribunal, most complainants have left their employment and are not seeking 
reinstatement.
 3
  Even taking into account Reddy and Tleyji,
4
 in which the complaints 
were substantiated, the carers’ cases are likely to discourage worker–carers from 
exercising and enforcing their rights. The likely outcome after years of sometimes 
complex litigation is the slim possibility of inadequate compensation that probably will 
not even cover legal costs.
5
  
 
A key argument throughout this thesis is that in order for worker–carers to be 
accommodated and keep their jobs, the enforcement process under the legislation must 
be conducive to maintaining and continuing the employment relationship once a 
                                                 
1
 See Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime 
(Themis, 2010), xxvii, 9 (‘Enforcing’).  In relation to the carers’ complaints at the Tribunal see n 16 
below. 
2
 See Table of Carers’ Cases in Appendix B.  Gaze and Hunter have noted how the intended aim that such 
tribunals should provide access to justice in a less formal setting than the courts has been increasingly 
eroded in the past two decades: Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 9, 20, 22–3. 
3
 See for example: Correy v St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd [2007] NSWADT 104 (‘Correy No 1’). 
4
 Reddy v International Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218 (‘Reddy’); Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group 
[2005] NSWADT 294 (‘Tleyji’). 
5
 See generally Gaze and Hunter Enforcing, above n 1. 
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workplace dispute has arisen. The process must provide access to justice and, 
importantly, enable and encourage worker–carers to enforce their rights. It must 
therefore be accessible, timely, free or not costly, and must be capable of providing a 
worker–carer with the remedy he or she wants, including when relevant an 
accommodation. In Chapter 2, it was suggested that effectiveness of the Tribunal’s 
process for complainants can be measured against three criteria: first, whether the 
Tribunal enforcement process provides access to justice (how accessible the formal 
adversarial process is for complainants, by examining factors such as timeliness, legal 
representation and cost); second, whether it provides ‘good’ outcomes for worker–
carers (quantitatively, in terms of success rates with reference to the number of 
decisions made in favour of the complainants and, qualitatively, in terms of the nature 
of the remedies that may be achieved); and third, in terms of the broader normative, 
precedential or deterrent value of the decisions.
6
 The latter considers how the law is 
given meaning and how it is understood ‘in action’ by the key ‘actors’: employers, 
worker–carers, and their lawyers and representatives, who are involved in the rights and 
obligations of day-to-day interactions under Part 4B,
7
 as well as the ADB.   
 
Section 7.2 applies each of three criteria to the Tribunal decisions and concludes that the 
litigated process can be long, adversarial and potentially costly. The likelihood of a 
successful outcome for an individual complainant, in terms of the Tribunal making a 
finding of discrimination and ordering an adequate or appropriate remedy, is likely to 
be limited.  Further the normative impact of the decisions is also limited and 
ambiguous.  Notwithstanding this generally negative assessment, Sections 7.3 goes on 
to consider how the implementation and enforcement of Part 4B and the Tribunal’s role 
may be rendered more effective. Substantive and procedural law reform and also non-
legislative options are recommended based upon a better integration of policy objectives 
into Tribunal decision-making. Section 7.4 concludes that the application of Part 4B by 
the Tribunal through its adjudicative enforcement functions between 2001 and 2011 has 
been disappointing, and is unlikely to provide an effective enforcement mechanism for 
worker–carers. It does, however, suggest that with statutory reform, and commitment 
                                                 
6
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5.4. 
7
 See, for example, George, Tracey E, G. Mitu Gulati and Anne McGinley, ‘The New Old Legal Realism’ 
105 (2011) Northwestern University Law Review 689, discussed in Chapter 2, at 2.4.2.  The focus of 
their research was to understand how lawyers and judges operate in practice and how this is then 
understood ‘by local actors’: 692–3. 
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from the Tribunal to a purposive interpretation and application of Part 4B, the Tribunal 
could become more ‘capable’ to ‘deliver’ its policy objectives.8  
 
Finally, Section 7.5 considers briefly the new NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(‘NCAT’) regime. It is noted that in spite of the NSW government’s stated commitment 
to ‘simple, quick and effective justice for NSW’,9 there are some indications that the 
NCAT regime may be more concerned with cost cutting and a rationalisation of access 
to justice, which may have negative consequences for complainants. 
 
7.2 Assessing Effectiveness: Process, Outcomes and Normative Value 
7.2.1 Process 
Issues including timelines, cost and legal representation are now considered with 
reference to the complaints at the Tribunal. 
 
Timeliness  
Even if a complainant is still employed during the two-stage complaints process, by the 
time a complainant has gone through the processes of ADB conciliation, as well as the 
adversarial Tribunal hearing, the scope to achieve a workplace accommodation has 
almost certainly passed. In practice, it will probably take years to reach the Tribunal.
10
 
The reasons why a complaint takes so long to reach a hearing, and who or what are 
responsible for the delays, are not always clear. It is not clear whether the Tribunal was 
under resourced, whether it was attempting mediation, or whether the formalities of the 
process caused delays.  This is an issue which requires further research together with 
other aspects of the Tribunal process relating to complaints which do not reach a 
hearing.  Although amending the AD Act to enable an employee to make a complaint 
directly to the Tribunal might help in terms of timeliness, an adversarial litigated 
                                                 
8
 Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University 
Law Review 325, 329–30 (‘Context’). See Chapter 3. 
9
 See Greg Smith, Attorney-General NSW, ‘Simple, Quick and Effective Justice for NSW’ (Media 
Release, 26 October 2012). 
10
 Adams has noted that the time involved in discrimination cases is a cause for alarm, particularly when 
there are repeated appeals, and that ‘[r]esolving these claims is beginning to resemble the case of 
Jarndyce v Jarndyce from Charles Dickens’ Bleak House’: K Lee Adams, ‘Indirect Discrimination and 
the Worker-Carer: It’s Just Not Working’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 18, 31 (‘Indirect Discrimination’). 
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approach would obviously not be conducive to maintaining the employment 
relationship.11  
 
The following examples illustrate that more often than not, the carers’ complaint only 
reached a hearing at the Tribunal years after the alleged discriminatory conduct 
occurred. Further, some complaints appeared to involve lengthy hearings, often over 
multiple days, again indicating the adversarial nature of the process and the financial 
and emotional burdens for complainants in pursuing a complaint in this environment: 
 Ms Gardiner lodged her discrimination complaint in February 2002. After a 
three-day hearing in July 2003, the first decision was handed down in August 
2003. The Appeal Panel decision followed in April 2004, more than two years 
after the complaint was lodged. 
 Ms Reddy had left work in June 2002. A three-day hearing took place almost 
two years later, in May 2004, with judgment being given in September 2004, 
more than two years after the discriminatory conduct. In contrast, Ms Tleyji 
managed to have her case heard within 13 months of leaving work. 
 Ms Spencer alleged that the discriminatory conduct occurred in 2001. The 
matter was heard over four days in late 2004 and early 2005, and a decision 
handed down in June 2005. 
 Ms Stokes’s complaint was lodged in June 2002, the three-day hearing took 
place four years later and the decision was handed down in October 2006. 
 Ms Correy left work in July 2005 and lodged a complaint around that time with 
the ADB. A two-day hearing took place just over a year later, in September 
2006, but the decision was not handed down until May 2007. A further two days 
of hearing were held by the time of the final appeal in July 2009. The final 
second Appeal Panel decision was handed down in October 2009, more than 
four years after the discriminatory conduct occurred.  
 In ACE, a complaint was lodged with the ADB in January 2006. The matter 
involved an eight-day hearing between August and December 2009. The 
Tribunal gave its first decision in July 2010. A one-day hearing took place in 
                                                 
11
 It is recommended in Section 7.3.1 that the AD Act be amended in this way. See, for example, the 
provision under s 122 of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (‘EO Act’); Dominique Allen, ‘Behind the 
Conciliation Doors: Settling Discrimination Complaints in Victoria’ (2009) 18(3) Griffith Law Review 
778.  
288 
 
December of that year, and the final decision from the Appeal Panel was handed 
down in May 2011, more than five years after the complaint was lodged. 
 Ms Chacon left work in October 2008, reaching a four-day hearing as a self-
represented litigant two years later, in September 2010. The decision was not 
handed down until April 2011. 
 
Costs and Legal Representation 
The complaint process at the ADB is free, and there is no lodgement or other fee at the 
Tribunal.12 In contrast to the federal jurisdiction, the AD Act is generally a no-costs 
jurisdiction, which is intended to ensure that a complainant can access justice13 without 
the possibility of facing a costs order to pay the employer’s costs if she or he loses the 
case.14 Although there is no requirement for parties to be legally represented at the 
Tribunal proceedings, given the legal complexity of the AD Act and the adversarial 
process of the Tribunal, it can be assumed that employers with ‘deep pockets for 
litigation’15 will usually have legal representation. Eleven out of the 12 respondents in 
the carers’ cases before the Tribunal were legally represented.16 In an adversarial 
environment, presenting the best case is crucial. It will come down to whom the 
Tribunal believes, or whose evidence it prefers.
17
 Therefore, how the facts and the 
                                                 
12
 Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 760–1. According to the website of the NCAT, since January 
2014, fees in applications brought under the NSW AD Act are waived. See NCAT, Fees (2 January 2014) 
<http://www.ncat.nsw.gov.au/ncat/administrative_equal_opp/aed_fees.html>. 
13
 Under s 110(1) of the AD Act, the general rule is that each party is to pay his or her own costs. 
However, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the circumstances justify it doing so, it may order costs as 
it sees fit, although in practice costs will rarely be awarded. A proportion of costs were awarded in Reddy 
v International Cargo Express [2005] NSWADT 3 (‘Reddy No 2’), in which the complainant was 
awarded a proportion of costs because of the delays caused by the respondent’s conduct. See also Borg v 
Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [2003] NSWADT 35, in which the Tribunal awarded 
costs of $77,000 against the respondent, again a public sector respondent ‘repeat player’ because its 
defence lacked any real prospects of success.  
14
 The potential for such a cost order can obviously be a major disincentive for an individual employee to 
pursue a complaint against a well-resourced employer. See Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 222–
30, considering the effect of changes to Commonwealth laws, one of which was that discrimination cases 
were heard in a cost jurisdiction. 
15
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, xxvii. 
16
 In five complaints, Stokes v Serco Sodexho Defence Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWADT 295 (‘Stokes’), 
Merrick v Wallace Bishop Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADT 89 (‘Merrick’), Dubow v Attorney-General’s 
Department [2005] NSWADT 231 (‘Dubow’), Chacon v Rondo Building Services Pty Ltd [2011] 
NSWADT 72 (‘Chacon’) and Harms v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 183, 
the complainants did not have legal representation. In contrast, in 11 out of the 12 cases, the respondent 
had legal representation. Only in Monroe v Moore [2010] NSWADT 179 was the employer respondent 
self-represented. 
17
 See, for example, Chacon [2011] NSWADT 72, and ACE v State of NSW (TAFE Commission and 
Department of Education and Training) [2010] NSWADT 180 (‘ACE No 1’), in which the credit of the 
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evidence are presented by complainants, and whether they have legal representation to 
assist in this, will be absolutely crucial to the outcome of the case, particularly when 
respondents have specialist legal representation.
18
 The sheer complexity of Part 4B also 
means that, in practice, complainants may require legal representation at the Tribunal. 
Seven complainants out of 12 were legally represented by a solicitor or barrister or 
both.19 Chris Ronalds, a senior barrister practising in this area, has noted that it is not 
unusual for the legal costs associated with a case to exceed greatly any award of 
damages.20 For example, in both Reddy and Tleyji, the complainants had legal 
representation that appeared to include both a solicitor and a barrister, which means that 
from an access-to-justice perspective, it is possible that any compensation awarded for 
carers’ discrimination would be significantly eroded by legal costs.21 Although legal aid 
may be available and some law firms offer pro bono schemes for discrimination 
complaints, in practice, access to free or low legal assistance is extremely limited in 
NSW.22  
 
The extent of the difficulties involved in discharging the burden of proof is highlighted 
by the fact that, in the carers’ cases heard at the Tribunal, even when the complainants 
had legal representation, they still obviously struggled to discharge the burden of 
proof.
23
 Complainants who are self-represented are likely to find it even more difficult 
to come to grips with these difficult legal concepts.24 The case of Stokes v Serco 
Sodexho Defence Services Pty Ltd suggests that any assistance offered by the Tribunal 
to a self-represented complainant to navigate the evidentiary burdens will in practice be 
                                                                                                                                               
complainants and the weight of their evidence when compared with that of the respondents were crucial 
factors in the Tribunal determining that discrimination had not occurred. 
18
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 20–3; Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, ‘Access to Justice for 
Discrimination Complainants: Courts and Legal Representation’ (2009) 32(3) UNSW Law Journal 699 
(‘Access’). 
19
 Complainants were legally represented often by both solicitors and barristers in Gardiner v New South 
Wales WorkCover Authority [2003] NSWADT 184 (‘Gardiner No 1’); Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218; 
Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Spencer v Greater Murray Area Health Service [2005] NSWADT 138 
(‘Spencer’); Correy v St Joseph’s Hospital Ltd [2007] NSWADT 104 (‘Correy No 1’); Monroe [2010] 
NSWADT 179; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180.  
20
 She notes that ‘legal costs of $80,000 for a damages award of $15,000 are not unusual’: Chris Ronalds, 
Discrimination Law and Practice (Federation Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2008) 220.  
21
 It is not clear from the Tribunal decisions what funding or cost arrangements existed between the 
parties and their legal representatives, it may be that conditional fee arrangements were in place. See 
Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 201–20, for an overview of the options for and availability, or 
lack of funding options, for legal representation for complainants, including legal aid, pro bono schemes, 
community legal centres and conditional fees. 
22
 See Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 201–20.  
23
 See, for example, Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [77]–[89]; Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [52]–[69]. 
24
 See Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 20–3. 
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minimal and of limited effect.
25
 In this case, the Tribunal was sympathetic to the plight 
of an unrepresented litigant, acknowledging that the AD Act should be construed 
broadly; and that when a complainant was unrepresented, it is generally not desirable to 
take an overly legalistic approach to the complainant’s case.26 However, the Tribunal 
then proceeded to insist that the complainant must systematically discharge the burden 
of proof, and appeared unwilling to make any inferences to assist.
27
  
 
7.2.2 Outcomes and Remedies 
 
The nature and inadequacy of the outcomes and remedies achieved, demonstrated in the 
Tribunal decisions is now considered.  
 
Reasonable Accommodation an Unlikely Remedy 
Obviously, if 10 out of 12 carers’ cases were dismissed and only one complainant 
received compensation at the Tribunal for carers’ discrimination, the odds of a ‘good’ 
outcome in terms of winning the case and receiving a suitable or adequate remedy are 
not good for a complainant. Further, a key aim and strategy of Part 4B is reasonable 
accommodation, but a hearing at the Tribunal is unlikely to be an appropriate forum to 
achieve this outcome. It is important to note that, in theory, the Tribunal does have an 
important weapon at its disposal to tackle head on workplace practices or procedures 
that discriminate against worker–carers. Under s 108(3) of the AD Act, the Tribunal can 
make orders ‘which extend to conduct of the respondent that affects persons other than 
the complainant’. In complaints of carers’ discrimination, which in practice often relate 
to entrenched workplace practices and policies arising from gendered ‘ideal worker’ 
norms, s 108(3) could in theory have great potential. It suggests that a Tribunal could 
make orders for an employer to remove, or change, discriminatory workplace practices, 
conditions or policies affecting other workers at the workplace, or conceivably across an 
industry or profession. Such an order could proactively require employers to take steps 
                                                 
25
 [2006] NSWADT 295. 
26
 See ibid [7], [19]. See also the comments of the Tribunal in Merrick [2008] NSWADT 89 [2].  
27
 In particular, Ms Stokes had not given any evidence of disparate impact, one of the elements in the test 
for indirect discrimination. The Tribunal made it clear some statistical evidence on the point was required, 
yet it did not appear even to try to assist the complainant in this context to seek or to help her produce 
evidence as to her particular workplace, a hypothetical workplace or any other evidence. The complaint 
was dismissed because the complainant had not adduced statistical evidence in relation to disparate 
impact: at [76]. It was also found the employer had acted reasonably. The Tribunal declined to exercise 
judicial notice as it had done in Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294.  
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to comply with the law. For a Tribunal that was so minded, this provision provides a 
powerful tool to pursue the policy objectives of Part 4B actively and to consider the 
broader substantive equality goals for worker–carers as a group. However, it has still 
not done so in the carers’ cases that have come before it, or in any other discrimination 
cases that have come before it to date. 
 
In conclusion, the Tribunal has never made an order that a worker’s caring 
responsibilities should be accommodated—largely because it dismissed 10 out of 12 
complaints and it appears that, other than in the case of Gardiner No 1, it was never 
sought as an option by a complainant because the complainants had generally left 
employment and were not seeking reinstatement.28 Further, as noted in relation to 
timeliness above, by the time a complaint reaches a hearing, the employment 
relationship will probably already be irreparably damaged, and therefore, 
accommodation is probably unlikely to be either desired by the complainant or a 
realistic option. 
 
Low Quantum and the Burden of Proving and Quantifying Loss 
In both Reddy and Tleyji, the complainants had been forced to leave apparently secure 
jobs that they had held for five years. Ms Reddy received $15,000 for general damages 
for stress and humiliation and $1,385 for lost income for the period until she obtained a 
new job. Her stress was exacerbated when the employer, in response to her 
discrimination complaint, aggressively threatened legal action against her for damage 
allegedly caused to the employer. Although the Tribunal declined to award aggravated 
damages, it did at least reject the respondent’s contention that Ms Reddy’s anxiety and 
sleeplessness had arisen because she was a new mother.29 In contrast, Ms Tleyji 
received nothing for carers’ discrimination even though the complaint was upheld. For 
reasons not clear, her legal team made no claim for damages or any other remedy; 
therefore, she did not even receive a nominal amount to acknowledge that she had been 
discriminated against on the ground of her carers’ discrimination.  
 
                                                 
28
 The majority of complainants, nine out of 12, were former employees, who were not seeking 
reinstatement. Of the other three, it appears that in Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184, the complainant 
was still employed at the time of the proceedings and was seeking an accommodation. It was not clear 
whether the complainants in Dubow [2005] NSWADT 231 and Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 were still 
employed by the time of the hearing or whether they were seeking accommodation.  
29
 Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [94]–[101]. 
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It is also important to note that other complainants who had complaints of carers’ 
discrimination dismissed, did have complaints of victimisation upheld, and were 
awarded damages. This indicates that a complaint under s 50 can be an important 
alternative ground of complaint for many carers’ complaints.30  
 
Generally, quantum in cases brought under the AD Act is traditionally low, and 
therefore, the carers’ cases followed this general position.31  The analysis of the carers’ 
cases over the decade also demonstrates that there are two particular aspects of loss for 
worker–carers that may be problematic because they are difficult to quantify and assess: 
first, future economic loss and, second, general damages which are now considered.  
 
Claiming and Assessing Future Economic Loss  
In recent years, the Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) has highlighted 
and articulated the serious longer-term economic detriments that arise for women during 
their working life because women and carers move in and out of the paid workforce.32 
Owens has noted that ‘[w]omen who have lost their jobs may recover compensation for 
the harms suffered, but they may find that … their chances of gaining another secure job 
with the flexibility they require are virtually non-existent’.33  As noted above, Ms Reddy 
and Ms Tleyji had each worked in their jobs for five years. In Correy No 1 and Correy 
No 2, the Tribunal and the Appeal Panel acknowledged the detriment to Ms Correy of 
not being returned to her pre-maternity position she had held for 10 years included a 
loss of job satisfaction, collegiality and the loss of specialist skills that disadvantaged 
her as a matter of substance as distinct from a trivial matter.34  
 
                                                 
30
 See Chapter 6, and Table B, in Appendix B for a summary of the cases. In Spencer [2005] NSWADT 
138, $10,000 was awarded; in Monroe [2010] NSWADT 179, $4,650 was awarded. The empirical study 
of complaints outlined in Part V noted that 10% of all complaints made also involved an additional 
complaint or allegation of victimisation. See also Chapter 1, at 1.7 
31
 In 2009, the compensation limit was increased to $100,000. For more than 20 years prior to that, the 
compensation limit had been just $40,000. Therefore, if quantum is awarded in carers’ cases, it is likely to 
be low, given the compensation limits under the AD Act.  
32
 AHRC, Accumulating Poverty? Women’s Experiences of Inequality over the Life Cycle (2009) 
(‘Poverty’) notes, in particular, a significant gender gap in retirement incomes. See also AHRC, Investing 
in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who Care (2013) 3–4 (‘Investing’). 
33
 See, for example, Rosemary Owens, ‘Engendering Flexibility in a World of Precarious Work’ in Judy 
Fudge and Rosemary Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Hart, 2006) 329, 
343 (‘Engendering’). 
34
 Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104 [87]; Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4 [37]. 
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However, the Tribunal’s approach to damages demonstrates that there was no 
acknowledgment that women are forced to interrupt their career paths, often multiple 
times, because of workplace discrimination, with the consequent loss of opportunity, 
promotion or other benefits not purely of a tangible or easily quantifiable or financial 
nature. A major problem is that, even when a complainant has specialist legal advice 
and representation, such detriments and consequent losses may be very difficult to 
quantify for worker–carers. For example, when it came to the possibility of future or 
longer-term economic loss, neither the complainants nor their legal advisers nor the 
Tribunal considered this aspect of loss. It is argued below that complainants and their 
legal representatives must become more adept at properly pleading, quantifying and 
supporting claims for damages with persuasive evidence. Only then will complainants 
be properly compensated for their future economic loss and damage, thereby also 
making the operation of the law more effective in practice. 
 
Claiming and Assessing General Damages  
The Tribunal acknowledged in Spencer that ‘the task of determining the appropriate 
level of damages for non-economic loss in cases of unlawful discrimination is 
notoriously difficult’ but it went on to award $10,000 for victimisation with little 
explanation as to how this was calculated.
35
 The Tribunal and Appeal Panel’s approach 
to the assessment of quantum in other cases indicates a very legal and technical 
approach. The complainant will be required to plead loss and the precise nature of the 
general damages claimed expressly, and to support it with appropriate evidence.
36
 The 
Tribunal has demonstrated that it is also unlikely to make inferences or to assist 
complainants proactively to quantify their loss. 
 
In Correy No 1, although the Tribunal had no problem accepting the quantification of 
damages for past economic loss, the complainant had also claimed $30,000 for general 
damages for injury to feeling, embarrassment, humiliation, stress, loss of confidence, 
and loss of enjoyment to life. The Tribunal found that since ‘no evidence was led to 
support that claim … it would not be appropriate for us to award damages for that 
alleged loss’.37  Objectively, even if no evidence was formally led, it would be expected 
                                                 
35
 [2005] NSWADT 138 [137]. 
36
 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [54]. 
37
 [2007] NSWADT 104 [174]–[175]. 
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that a mother with an accepted right to return to her job after maternity leave 
(apparently to a highly skilled job that she enjoyed, was good at and had held for 10 
years)—who then lost that job and was relegated to a ‘floater’ position, and then 
victimised by being rostered in the very ward where she was unable to work for health 
reasons—would certainly have suffered at least some stress and injury to feeling as a 
result of the experience. Yet, the Tribunal was unwilling to make any inferences in this 
regard and did not award even a nominal amount of damages in acknowledgement of 
this loss, because no evidence was led. Similarly, although discrimination was found to 
have occurred in Tleyji on the ground of carers’ discrimination and Correy No 4 for 
victimisation, neither complainant received a dollar for any loss incurred. This would 
suggest that, in particular, where a complainant has legal representation, the Tribunal 
will expect that evidence should be led and supported. In both of those cases, it appears 
that the legal representatives may not have properly pleaded or quantified their client’s 
loss, nor supported those claims adequately.
38
 This again reinforces that unrepresented 
complainants will face an onerous burden of proof in this regard, as well as in relation 
to the substantive elements of discrimination. 
 
Pleading and Quantifying Loss More Effectively: Lessons from the Decisions 
The decisions indicate that given the adversarialism of the process, particularly when 
both parties are legally represented, complainants are expected to plead their claim for 
loss and damages with some particularity and to support it, with persuasive evidence. It 
is clear that complainants and their legal representatives must recognise this and must 
take steps to ensure that they are prepared. Three recommendations are made: first, they 
should understand that the adversarial formality of the process applies not just to 
proving the substantive complaint, but also to the assessment and quantification of 
damages; second, they should accept that the Tribunal is unlikely to give them any 
leeway and will not make inferences to assist in this regard;
39
 and third, they must 
become better at demonstrating and proving loss.  
 
                                                 
38
 See Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [109]; Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [53]–[54]. Compare this 
with the more relaxed approach of the Tribunal in Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 and Monroe [2010] 
NSWADT 179, in which damages were awarded for victimisation. 
39
 But note Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [137]–[138], in which the Tribunal noted the difficulties but 
awarded $10,000 for general damages. 
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Complainants and their representatives must expect to be challenged and, therefore, be 
properly prepared to quantify each head of their loss and to support that claim with 
appropriate evidence (whether oral evidence from the complainant about the effect of 
the discrimination or from other relevant medical or actuarial or expert evidence) that 
will both withstand challenge by the respondent and satisfy the Tribunal. This is 
particularly the case in relation to less tangible general damages, for example, for hurt, 
stress or humiliation and for future economic loss or loss of opportunity, which are 
obviously more difficult to quantify than, for example, lost wages incurred over a set 
period. Some suggestions as to how the complainant might use alternative 
contemporary sources of evidence to demonstrate loss are made in Section 7.3.2 below. 
 
In conclusion, the difficulties involved in quantification of damages should not deter 
complainants from at least attempting to be compensated more adequately.  The nature 
of longer-term or less tangible loss must be acknowledged as the serious issue that it is, 
and must be pro-actively addressed by complainants and the Tribunal in future work 
and family jurisprudence. In this regard, the recent Federal Court appeal decision in the 
sexual harassment case of Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd
40
 is an 
important precedent. In this sexual harassment case an initial award was increased from 
$18,000 to $130,000 including $100,000 for general damages on the basis that 
discrimination awards ‘may be manifestly inadequate as compensation for the damage 
suffered by the victim, judged by reference to prevailing community standards’. The 
increased damages were awarded to reflect awards made for similar loss occasioned in 
other areas such as personal injury or negligence.
41
 As noted below, as a first step in 
NSW the AD Act compensation limit must be increased or removed. The current cap of 
                                                 
40
 [2014] FCAFC 82 [81] (Kenny J):  
[w]hether or not the award of damages in the sum of $18,000 is manifestly inadequate is not to be 
determined here by reference to some previously accepted ‘range’ in sexual harassment cases. For 
the reasons stated below, I consider that, having regard to the nature and extent of Ms Richardson’s 
injuries and prevailing community standards, the low level of the damages awarded by the trial 
judge itself bespeaks error. 
And at [109]:  
Even this cursory overview of the quantum of awards historically awarded in these other fields 
[such as personal injury] to successful claimants in situations not wholly unlike Ms Richardson’s 
reveals a substantial disparity between the level of those awards and the typical compensatory 
damages provided to victims of sexual discrimination and harassment. Such disparity bespeaks the 
fact that today an award for sexual harassment, though within the accepted range for such cases, 
may be manifestly inadequate as compensation for the damage suffered by the victim, judged by 
reference to prevailing community standards. 
41
 Ibid [109]–[115]. 
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$100,000 which would presumably only be awarded for the most egregious breaches, is 
quite clearly not capable of reflecting ‘prevailing community standards’.   
 
Proceedings and Outcomes: The Employer Perspective   
From the employer perspective, having to defend a case at the Tribunal can be costly 
and inconvenient (for example, in terms of legal costs
42
 but also in terms of the internal 
costs of having to investigate the allegations of the complaint, and respond to and take 
part in the two-stage enforcement process), and may lead to negative publicity. 
However, the deterrent effect of litigation for employers arising from AD Act 
proceedings would appear to be very low. At worst, the only official sanction against 
the employer is likely to be low-level compensation. The maximum (and only) damages 
awarded in a carers’ case to date was just $16,385.43 Some employers may see that and 
their legal costs which may then be written off as a business expense, as a small price to 
fix the ‘problem’ because the ‘troublemaker’ wanting flexibility will have left.44 The 
offending gendered, discriminatory workplace structures based around ideal worker 
norms are likely to continue untouched, that is, unless the employer decides to learn a 
lesson from the complaint and take steps to remedy it.
45
  
 
By way of example, in Reddy, the unrepentant and aggressive conduct of the employer 
towards the complainant in relation to her request for part-time work and also during the 
complaint process, where it threatened to sue Ms Reddy, reflected the hostile dominant 
workplace culture. This would suggest that it would be extremely unlikely for that 
employer to have voluntarily audited or changed their workplace practices, without an 
element of compulsion. One would also expect that other co-workers would probably 
not have been encouraged to ask for an accommodation after Ms Reddy’s experience.  
 
                                                 
42
 Similarly, Gaze and Hunter note in relation to the federal jurisdiction that ‘many respondents have deep 
pockets for litigation and are able to claim legal costs as a tax deduction, and/or employ their own in 
house lawyers, and/or have access to free representation provided by employer organisations’: Gaze and 
Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, xxvii. 
43
 Above n 31. 
44
 Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Work and Family Conflict and What to Do About It (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 101. 
45
 Owens, ‘Engendering’, above n 33, 344. See Susan Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach’ (2001) 101(1) Columbia Law Review 459, 479, 489–90, arguing 
that employers must therefore be encouraged to have the capacity to expose and deal with second-
generation discrimination, to develop the capacity necessary to understand the nature of the problem and 
the aims of the legislation, and then to respond at the appropriate organisational level to remedy it, and 
learn from previous problem-solving efforts.  
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7.2.3 Precedential, Educative and Deterrent Value: The Normative Message to the 
Community 
 
For Part 4B to be effective in practice and to operate to meet its policy objectives, it is 
crucial that both worker–carers and employers understand the legislation, their 
respective rights and obligations, and how to implement them. Employees must know 
how and where to enforce their rights, and the enforcement mechanism must be timely, 
informal, accessible, free and capable of providing a ‘good’ outcome in terms of 
providing an adequate remedy, including reasonable accommodation if that is what the 
worker wants. Employers must understand that there are consequences for non-
compliance.  
 
What then—in non-legal, layperson’s terms—are the key normative messages that the 
Tribunal decisions send to the ADB and to worker–carers, and employers in the 
community about the operation and effectiveness of Part 4B in its first decade? How is 
the law given meaning in the broader community? The overall message from the 
Tribunal during the decade is quite clearly not an unequivocal statement that 
discrimination against all worker–carers is unlawful and should not be tolerated; nor 
that as an employer you must try to accommodate the needs of your workers, consistent 
with and furthering the policy objectives of Part 4B. Rather, the message from the case 
law to employees about their workplace rights, and to employers about their obligations, 
is extremely ambiguous. For example:  
 Although the need to provide flexibility to workers caring for babies and young 
children generally has apparently been recognised as a matter of common 
knowledge,
46
 in contrast, the need to provide flexibility for worker–carers of 
older children, adults or the elderly and to recognise the difficulties they face in 
balancing work and care is not acknowledged.
47
  
 The Tribunal has not found that Part 4B provides for a duty of reasonable 
accommodation. Instead, the possibility of an implied duty may be inferred, but 
only in cases of indirect discrimination. In practice, the Tribunal has found in 
                                                 
46
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218. 
47
 See generally Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295; ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180; Spencer [2005] 
NSWADT 138. 
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Reddy and Tleyji that when considering whether a non-discriminatory option 
exists (within the complex web of the elements and sub-elements prescribed by 
the Tribunal) under s 49T(1)(b) an employer should properly consider a request 
for accommodation.  
 However, if a worker is thinking about enforcing his or her rights at the 
Tribunal, the message is both clearer and less positive: 
o If the matter proceeds to a hearing, the complainant will be more than 
likely to lose. 
o Even if the complainant is legally represented, the evidentiary burdens of 
proving every element of Part 4B, in conjunction with, the Tribunal’s 
unwillingness to make inferences to assist the complainant and its 
legalistic approach, mean that in practice, it is more likely than not that 
an employer will get away with discriminating against worker–carers 
because the complainant cannot prove it.
48
 
o Litigation, which can be lengthy and adversarial, has both a personal and 
a financial cost in terms of stress caused to an individual complainant. 
Self-represented litigants are likely to struggle against legally 
represented employers. Legal representation is likely to be required, 
which may be costly in the absence of legal aid or other free services for 
complainants. 
o Even if a complainant can prove his or her case, the employer will have a 
good chance of defending its position by arguing that it could not 
reasonably accommodate the complainant for business reasons, as long 
as it has shown that the request was properly considered.
49
 
o Even if a complainant wins his or her case and the employer has to pay 
some compensation, it would probably be very low, and any legal costs 
will more than likely erode any settlement.
50
 
o For the individual, an accommodation will be an unlikely remedy, given 
the time that has elapsed, the detrimental effect that adversarial litigation 
                                                 
48
 However, note that the Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 was finally rejected in 2009 in 
Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58 [31]–[41].   
49
 Gardiner No 1 [2003] NSWADT 184; Gardiner v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2004] 
NSWADTAP 1 (‘Gardiner No 2’); Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295; Chacon [2011] NSWADT 72. 
50
 See generally Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 and Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294. 
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has on the employment relationship, and the fact that the complainant 
has often left work and does not in practice want to return. 
o More broadly, it is unlikely that an employer will be ordered to remedy 
or improve systemic discriminatory workplace practices or policies, 
given that the Tribunal has never made such an order on any ground of 
discrimination under s 108(3). 
o There is little impetus for an employer to acknowledge that its conduct or 
workplace practices are discriminatory or to meet its obligations outlined 
by Attorney General Shaw when he introduced Part 4B, to ‘proactively 
consider whether existing or new workplace policies have a 
discriminatory impact on employees with caring responsibilities’.51 
 
7.3 Improving Effectiveness: Law Reform and Integrating Policy into 
Tribunal Decision-Making 
 
When assessing effectiveness Gaze has noted that ‘it may also be necessary to assess 
how capable the legislative scheme is of delivering’the aims of the legislation.52 It is 
now suggested that, as well as the law reform options, it is open to the Tribunal within 
the operation of its statutory adjudicative powers to move beyond the policy vacuum. 
This will require the Tribunal to identify and integrate the policy objectives of Part 4B 
in its decision-making more proactively than it did during the first decade of the carers’ 
provisions. 
 
7.3.1 Law Reform and Process Recommendations 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, it has been widely argued in the literature that the traditional 
discrimination law model, such as that found under the NSW AD Act, requires a 
substantial overhaul and that it can only be fixed with extensive substantive and 
procedural law reform.
53
 The discussion here considers five specific recommendations 
                                                 
51
 The second reading of the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Carers’ Responsibilities) Bill: New South 
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw).  
52
 Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 8, 329–30.  See Chapter 2, at 2.5. 
53
 See Chapter 1, at 1.2 and n 3, and Chapter 2, at 2.5.7. This pressure for reform has been reflected in the 
significant debate in Australia in recent years in relation to proposals to consolidate the Commonwealth 
discrimination laws. 
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for reforms or improvements that may make the operation of Part 4B in the context of 
the Tribunal’s function more effective. 
 
(i) An Express Duty of Reasonable Accommodation 
It is clear that substantive law reform is required to make the legislation more ‘capable’ 
to ‘deliver’54 the policy objectives of the carers’ discrimination under the AD Act. In 
Chapter 5, an express duty of reasonable accommodation was a key recommendation
55
 
as an important mechanism that would help to remove the uncertainties of an implied 
obligation and provide a clear statement of legislative intent, enabling the Tribunal to 
address the policy objectives in its decision-making more directly,
56
 thus making Part 
4B more ‘capable’ of ‘delivering’ and being responsive to the policy aims of the 
legislation.
57
 This would provide, at a minimum, a greater degree of clarity and certainty 
for employers and worker–carers as to their rights and obligations, and would also 
enable the Tribunal to meet the policy objectives of the legislation better.
58
 The removal 
of the family nexus in s 49S would also enable the Tribunal to provide a broader 
interpretation to all worker–carers with responsibilities to provide care or support.59 
 
(ii) Increase the Compensation Limit 
The current limit of $100,000 suggests that policy and lawmakers do not consider that 
discrimination law wrongs qualify for substantial financial damages. This limit is 
significantly out of step with the limits in the federal discrimination jurisdiction as well 
as complaints made under the general protection provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 
(Cth), where the compensation limits are uncapped.
60
 It is recommended that the cap 
                                                 
54
 Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 8, 329–30. See Chapter 3. 
55
 See Chapter 5, at 5.3.2, explaining the rationale for an express duty of accommodation. 
56
 Adams has noted that if courts and tribunals continue to shy away from their important social policy 
objectives of discrimination laws, Parliament must step in to change the law:‘[t]he bench must recognise 
the transforming character of indirect discrimination legislation, which can deconstruct old notions of 
management prerogative. Where judicial decisions impede the achievement of a gender-equal society, 
parliaments must be willing to amend anti-discrimination legislation (perhaps repeatedly)’: Adams, 
‘Indirect Discrimination’, above n 10, 36. See also Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 8, 353.  See also the 
discussion of the High Court’s response in Purvis v NSW (2003) 217 CLR 92, to the issue of a duty of 
accommodation under the DD Act at 1.7.5 and the text accompanying n 173. 
57Gaze, ‘Context’, above n 8, 329–30. See also Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse 
Action and the Case of Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39, 52 (‘Schou’); and Anna 
Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre 
for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 2012) 
5, 26–7. Chapman’s work in this context is outlined in more detail in Chapter 4, at 4.4.3. 
58
 Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 57. 
59
 See generally Chapter 5, at 5.3.2. 
60
.See Chapter 1, at 1.5 and in particular at n 142.  
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under s 108 of the AD Act should either be removed or substantially increased to ensure 
that complainants can be adequately compensated so that discrimination awards can be 
made in accordance with, and better reflect, ‘prevailing community standards’.61  
 
(iii) Alternative Statutory Enforcement Provisions 
It is also clear that, procedurally, it is time to consider other enforcement options or 
solutions, to provide for a more effective enforcement mechanism. For example, it has 
been suggested that statutory complaint-handling agencies such as the ADB should be 
given additional powers to take a more proactive enforcement role.
62
 Such powers may 
be similar to those vested in the Fair Work Ombudsman, such as initiating 
investigations and legal actions or issuing fines.
63
 It is also recommended that the ADB 
should be able to initiate a complaint to the Tribunal, which could help to relieve the 
burden upon the individual complainants and be useful for targeting broader systemic 
discrimination within an organisation, or across a sector or industry.
64
 Finally, following 
the Victorian legislation, amending the legislation to provide for a complainant to make 
a complaint directly to the Tribunal may be useful when an accommodation is sought 
and it is important to act quickly to maintain the employment relationship, or when a 
broader or more systemic issue arises that is not suitable for investigation and 
conciliation and requires instead a more timely adjudication.
65
  
 
(iv) Access to Justice, Legal Aid and Funding for Complainant’s Litigation 
As a related issue, Gaze and Hunter have argued in relation to the federal jurisdiction 
that, given the nature of the formal adversarial enforcement process, there is now a 
‘much greater need for free, expert legal representation for complainants in the 
                                                 
61
 See Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 82 [81]. 
62
 Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal in the World of Work: Two Significant Developments in Australian 
Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of Labour Law 199, 217. 
63
 See ss 87–94 of the AD Act for the complaint-handling function of the ADB with powers vested in the 
President of the board. The ADB in NSW has no power to initiate a complaint in spite of calls for such 
powers to be provided, and as recommended by the Law Reform Commission (‘LRC’) in 1999. See 
Recommendations 125 and 126 in LRC of NSW, Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), 
Report No 92 (1999) 672 (‘LRC Report’). 
64
 See also Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 218–20, for an overview of other Australian 
jurisdictions that provide for representation by an agency. 
65
 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 12, 8.  The Victorian EO Act 2010 marks a significant departure from 
the standard two-stage complaint-handling model employed in Australia. For example, s 122, provides 
that it is not compulsory for individuals to have brought their complaint to the relevant commission 
before proceeding to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.  
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Australian human rights system’.66 This observation is equally applicable to the NSW 
jurisdiction. They suggest increased funding and greater availability of ‘free, expert 
legal representation for complainants … would mean that complainants unable to afford 
a lawyer would not be faced with a choice to settle, withdraw or appear unrepresented 
with all the attendant disadvantages of doing so’.67 However, in the current political and 
economic climate in NSW, it is unlikely that extra funding will be available for worker–
carer litigants in NSW. 
 
(v) Data Collection and Publication 
In the first decade of operation of Part 4B, 67 carers’ complaints were referred to the 
Tribunal but only 12 reached a hearing during that time; however, there is generally no 
publicly available explanation about what happened to complaints that do not reach a 
hearing. The new NCAT should do more to collect and publish data consistently and 
systematically about the nature of the complaints referred to it, the outcomes of those 
complaints and the methods by which the complaints were resolved. Without this data, 
it is difficult to gain the full picture to assess how effective the law has been in terms of 
enforcement. 
 
7.3.2 Beyond the Policy Vacuum: Integrating Policy into Decision-Making 
 
The Statutory Bases for a Purposive Approach  
However, even without substantive or procedural reforms, and within the current Part 
4B legislative framework it is argued in this section that in the future the Tribunal 
could, and must, make greater efforts to move beyond the policy vacuum. It must do 
more to integrate the policy objectives of Part 4B into its decision-making, to provide a 
less adversarial process, better outcomes for complainants at the Tribunal, and a clear 
and unequivocal normative message about rights and obligations under Part 4B. It is 
suggested that to discharge its statutory adjudicative function properly, the Tribunal 
must refute the technicality and rigidity of its approach to statutory interpretation 
evident in its decisions from the first decade of Part 4B. It must take on a more 
                                                 
66
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, xxvii, 201–20, 247–8. It is recommended that free expert legal 
representation is made available through, for example, increased funding to legal aid or specialist 
community legal centres. See also Gaze and Hunter, ‘Access’, above n 18, 716–22. 
67
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, xxx; although in the context of the federal discrimination 
jurisdiction, the comments are also relevant to the NSW jurisdiction. 
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proactive engagement with the policy objectives of the legislation as they were outlined 
in Chapter 5. The Tribunal should use its powers to take a much more investigative and 
possibly inquisitorial role in the adjudication process.
68
 This is not a radical proposal 
because a purposive approach to the interpretation and application of Part 4B and the 
AD Act generally has express statutory recognition in two ways: 
 
First, as outlined in Chapter 5, s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) expressly 
provides that laws should be interpreted purposively to give effect to the purpose or 
objects of the legislation. Section 34 provides that ‘extrinsic’ material may be 
considered in the interpretation of Acts if it is capable of assisting in the ascertainment 
of the meaning of the provision, if the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the 
provision leads to a result that is ‘manifestly absurd or is unreasonable’; or to determine 
the meaning of the provision if the provision is ‘ambiguous or obscure’, taking into 
account its context in the Act and the ‘purpose or object’ underlying the Act. The 
material that may be considered includes but is not limited to Law Reform Commission 
reports, international treaties and Ministers’ speeches introducing the Bill. It is fortunate 
that all of these potential sources exist to clarify the objectives of Part 4B.
69
 The 
Tribunal should more proactively and expressly refer to, and make use of these policy 
sources outlined in Chapter 5 to better meet the policy objectives of Part 4B.  
 
Tleyji and Reddy
70
 were decided without explicit reference to these policy objectives. 
Yet, without doubt, the Tribunal decisions would have avoided the inherent uncertainty 
noted above, if it had referred to and framed its decision directly based on the policy 
objectives. Instead, as a result, the Tribunal acknowledged the burdens for worker–
carers with responsibilities of infants but missed an opportunity to articulate expressly 
that the intention of Parliament was to ‘impose an obligation on employers to 
accommodate employees’ caring responsibilities.71 The Tribunal thus missed the 
opportunity to provide clear guidance to employers and employees about their rights 
and obligations in a way that expressly gave effect to and furthered the policy objectives 
of Part 4B.  
                                                 
68
 Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 173–4 (‘Promise’).  Discussed in Chapter 6, at 6.2. 
69
 See generally Chapter 5, at 5.2, for an analysis of the key policy sources.  
70
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Reddy NSWADT 218. 
71
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw). See 
also the discussion of recommendations the LRC Report, above n 63, discussed in Chapter 5, at 5.2.4. 
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Second, as noted above, s 38 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) 
(‘CAT Act’) provides that ‘[t]he Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may 
inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the 
rules of natural justice’ and is to act with ‘as little formality as the circumstances of the 
case permit and according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the 
case without regard to technicalities’.72 This suggests the possibility of a fact-finding 
and inquisitorial role for the Tribunal in hearing complaints of discrimination.
73
  
 
Further, s 36(5) of the CAT Act also provides that the Tribunal is not required or 
permitted ‘to exercise any functions that are conferred or imposed on it under enabling 
legislation in a manner that is inconsistent with the objects or principles for which that 
legislation provides in relation to the exercise of those functions’. This requires the 
Tribunal to have regard to the objects of the AD Act in relation to all aspects of its 
practice and procedure, including pre-hearing attempts at resolution as well as at the 
hearing. However, using the Correy saga
74
 as an example, it would be difficult to 
conclude that the two Appeal Panel decisions in Correy No 2 and Correy No 4
75
 were 
decided ‘according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case 
without regard to technicalities’76 or that the Appeal Panel decisions were consistent 
‘with the objects or principles for which that legislation provides’.77 
 
Ensuring Informed, as well as ‘Informal Specialist Decision Making’78 
Discrimination law enforcement processes were intended to offer ‘informal specialist 
decision making’,79 and the Tribunal must ensure that it is capable of providing this 
‘specialist’ service. Sections 33 and 34 of the Interpretation Act and ss 36(5) and 38 of 
the CAT Act can provide justification and support for the Tribunal to integrate policy 
                                                 
72
 As noted in Chapter 6, for the decade 2001–2011, s 73 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 
1997 (NSW) (‘ADT Act’) was the relevant provision, which was repealed after the Tribunal’s functions 
moved to NCAT from January 2014.  
73
 Thornton, Promise, above n 68, 173–5. 
74
 Correy No 1 [2007] NSWADT 104; Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4; Correy v St Joseph’s 
Hospital Ltd [2009] NSWADT 40 (‘Correy No 3’); Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58. Table B, in 
Appendix B, provides a summary of the four decisions in the Correy saga in chronological order. 
75
 Correy No 2 [2008] NSWADTAP 4; Correy No 4 [2009] NSWADTAP 58. 
76
 ADT Act s 73. 
77
 CAT Act s 36(5). 
78
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 9. 
79
 Ibid. 
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sources more proactively. However, if the Tribunal does not have both a fundamental 
understanding of the nature, causes and effects of carers’ discrimination, and an 
understanding of, and commitment to, the policy objects of the law in the first place, it 
cannot properly interpret the law in a way that furthers the human rights and equality 
objectives.  
 
It is argued in this chapter that, as the statutory body with powers to adjudicate 
complaints made under the AD Act, which has as its key goal important social policy 
changes, the Tribunal has an implicit obligation to ‘inquire’ and ‘inform’ itself about the 
nature and extent of carers’ discrimination in society. Once it has acquired this 
understanding, the Tribunal must ensure that it then goes on to interpret and apply the 
law to give effect to the policy objectives of the legislation. Therefore, the Tribunal will 
be required to take a more inquisitorial approach to its adjudicative function
80
 to enquire 
into and inform itself about contemporary sources relating to work and care, and then 
integrate them into its decision-making. As well as the policy sources identified in 
Chapter 5 relating to the enactment of Part 4B, the literature review in Chapters 3 and 4 
has indicated that there is a plethora of contemporary sources relating to policy, and 
work and family data. There are a number of studies and reports from respected 
academics and agencies that could assist the Tribunal to utilise a more inquisitorial 
approach. These sources could provide valid contemporary evidence from which to 
make inferences, for example, about: the ability or otherwise of workers to comply with 
workplace conditions or requirements; the pressures on worker–carers and the need for 
increased workplace flexibility; the disparate impact of ideal worker norms; or the 
nature and extent of the detriment suffered by worker–carers in terms of economic and 
other loss.  
 
In particular, the Australian Bureau of Statistics,
81
 the Centre for Work + Life at the 
University of South Australia
82
 and the AHRC
83
 have all published important reports in 
                                                 
80
 Thornton, Promise, above n 68, 173–4. 
81
 See generally, the literature review in Chapter 3. For example, see Australian Bureau of Statistics, The 
Measure of Australia’s Progress (Catalogue No 1370, 2010).  
82
 See the annual Australian Work and Life Index, for example, Natalie Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and 
Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Work, Life and Care in 2012—The Australian Work and Life Index 
(Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2012). 
83
 See, for example, three reports from the AHRC: AHRC, Poverty, above n 32; AHRC, Investing, above 
n 32; AHRC, Supporting Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report 
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recent years that provide both qualitative and quantitative data about work and care in 
contemporary Australia. For example, they are important sources of contemporary 
evidence that may be used by the Tribunal to take judicial notice and make findings 
about disparate impact based on common knowledge, extending beyond care for babies 
and infants. This may assist complainants of older children or adults such as Ms 
Spencer struggling to prove disparate impact in complaints of indirect discrimination.
84
 
Skinner, Hutchison and Pocock have described the ‘struggle to juggle’ the competing 
demands, of work and care of the ‘sandwich generation’—often women who combine 
two forms of care for children and adult family members or friends who are elderly or 
disabled.
85
  
 
These sources of information and data could also help to quantify and support the 
claims for damages to help ensure that complainants are properly and adequately 
compensated. For example, in particular, the AHRC has highlighted the nature and 
extent of the long- and short-term economic and other detriments that worker–carers 
and especially women suffer through their working life cycle.
86
  
 
It is also recommended that complainants and their legal representatives could also 
adduce these sources of reliable contemporary evidence to assist in demonstrating the 
substantial workplace disadvantages faced by worker–carers, as well as the resultant 
loss or damage that they cause, including future or less tangible loss. 
 
In conclusion, as Adams has noted, ‘we must sensitise judges to the burdens faced by 
worker–carers’.87  It is argued here that it is open to the Tribunal to take a more fact-
finding and inquisitorial and information-seeking role. It has an express statutory power 
to ‘inquire’ and ‘inform’ on any matter it sees fit to integrate policy into its decision-
making better.
88
 In order to take a more responsive approach, the Tribunal must ensure 
                                                                                                                                               
(2014).  See also an earlier report of the AHRC’s predecessor, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission, Striking the Balance: Women, Men, Work and Family (2005). 
84
 Such an approach may have assisted the complainants, for example, in relation to the inability to prove 
disparate impact in: ACE No 1 [2010] NSWADT 180 [233]–[241]; Stokes [2006] NSWADT 295 [75]–
[77]; Spencer [2005] NSWADT 138 [60]–[69]. 
85
 Skinner, Hutchison and Pocock, above n 82, 8–9, 43–4. 
86
 AHRC, Investing, above n 32; AHRC, Poverty, above n 32. 
87
 K Lee Adams, ‘Defining Away Discrimination’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 263, 36.  
88
 See also Dominique Allen, ‘Reducing the Burden of Proof in Australia’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 
579, 602–3, considering alternative methods to reduce the complainant’s burden of proof. 
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that it  seeks out and informs itself as to contemporary valid sources of evidence about 
work and care. This may ensure that the Tribunal is able to interpret the law more 
purposively, consistently and beneficially, and in a way that furthers, rather than 
undermines, the policy objectives of Part 4B.   
 
Crucially, this will require the Tribunal to modify its role as the adjudicator of a purely 
adversarial litigious process. To this end, it is argued that the Tribunal must not simply 
wait and see what evidence a complainant adduces and then look solely to this to make 
its decisions.  Rather, it has an obligation, in order to properly discharge its adjudicative 
functions, not just to rely on the evidence which the parties bring before it. Instead is 
must proactively seek out, and engage with evidence that supports our contemporary 
understandings of work and care, in the public and private worlds.
89
 This includes a 
thorough understanding of: who has these caring responsibilities; what workplace 
disadvantage they suffer; and importantly, what can be done about it. The Tribunal must 
then integrate this understanding into its decision-making to meet the policy objectives 
of the law better. Understanding and keeping abreast of important contemporary sources 
of evidence would enable the Tribunal to infer matters of common knowledge properly 
and to help alleviate the complainants’ onerous burden of proof.  
 
7.4 Concluding Comments to Part IV 
 
In conclusion to Part IV, it is argued that, even taking into account the decisions in 
Reddy and Tleyji,
90
 the Tribunal has largely operated in a policy vacuum. These two 
decisions were far from resounding victories for the complainants, nor do they provide a 
comprehensive blueprint for good work/family policy and practice. The Tribunal missed 
the opportunity to provide a purposive and unequivocal interpretation of the law which 
could have provided clear guidance to employers and worker–carers about their rights 
and obligations under Part 4B. It has also failed to provide an accessible enforcement 
process capable of delivering ‘good’ outcomes.  
 
Overall, the analysis of the carers’ decisions above leads to the conclusion that the 
likelihood of the Tribunal making a finding of discrimination and ordering an adequate 
                                                 
89
 See Chapter 3, at 3.2, discussing the public–private divide in relation to paid work and care work. 
90
 Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294; Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218. 
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or appropriate remedy is very limited. As a result, rather than deterring the employer 
from discriminating against worker–carers and encouraging compliance and reasonable 
accommodation of caring responsibilities and thereby meeting the objectives of the 
legislation, the Tribunal decisions emphasise the nature of a hostile adversarial litigated 
process. Perversely, therefore, the decisions are more likely to act as a deterrent to 
worker–carers by discouraging them from enforcing their rights under Part 4B.91 In 
addition, not only is litigation at the Tribunal often lengthy, costly and stressful for the 
complainant, but even if the complainant wins, the result is likely to be limited to 
compensation for the individual worker with no ongoing obligation for the employer to 
correct institutional ideal worker norms and structures that give rise to discrimination.
92
 
The message to employers is that any obligation upon them to accommodate their 
worker–carers is equivocal, and that even if they do discriminate, it is unlikely that the 
worker–carer will be able to prove it.  
 
However, the analysis of the Tribunal’s statutory powers in this chapter does suggest 
that the Tribunal in NSW under the AD Act has potential to: build a strong jurisprudence 
around work and care, as one important tool to help prevent carers’ discrimination at 
work; send a message to the employers and the community that discrimination will not 
be tolerated; and to change attitudes and challenge ideal worker norms about how, 
where and when work is done. Properly utilising this potential depends upon two 
prerequisites. First, it depends on the Tribunal interpreting and applying the legislation 
in a beneficial purposive way to further the policy aims and objects of the legislation, 
rather than narrowly and technically. Second, it also depends upon the Tribunal being 
able and willing to keep in check the increasing formality and legal technicality of 
discrimination proceedings
93
 so that it does not disadvantage those worker–carers who 
cannot afford the personal and financial costs of lengthy legal proceedings,
94
 and so that 
it does not serve to discourage worker–carers from enforcing their rights, and achieving 
‘good’ outcomes.  
 
                                                 
91
 Gaze and Hunter make a similar observation in the context of the federal discrimination jurisdiction: 
Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, xxv–xxvii. 
92
 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 190. 
93
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 18. 
94
 See generally Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1. 
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A number of law reform options were suggested. In addition, suggestions were made for 
the Tribunal to take on an inquisitorial role, and to integrate better the policy objectives 
of Part 4B into its statutory interpretation and decision-making process. It is argued that 
this is not a radical proposal, because the Tribunal, with power to determine complaints 
made under the AD Act (that has as its objectives important social policy objectives) 
should exercise those powers in accordance with, and to further, those objectives. This 
is entirely in keeping with the existing discrimination complaints statutory framework in 
NSW, including the new NCAT regime in NSW. 
 
It is time for the Tribunal to renew its commitment to the policy and human rights 
objectives of the AD Act and Part 4B and to the informalism of the process through its 
adjudicative decision-making powers. It must then make decisions that are consistent 
with and further those policy objectives, rather than making decisions in a policy 
vacuum. Ultimately, however, this will require a much more radical redirection of the 
Tribunal’s approach to Part 4B than was demonstrated between 2001 and 2011. 
 
7.5 Postscript: The New NCAT Regime—Providing Access to Justice 
or a Cost-Cutting Rationalisation of the Administration of Justice? 
 
The objects of the CAT Act are purportedly to increase access to justice and promote a 
more informal approach, by providing a ‘single point of access’ to various tribunals, to 
ensure that the NCAT is accessible, responsive to the needs of users, informal, timely 
and leads to high-quality decisions.
95
 The ‘guiding principle’ to be applied by the 
NCAT in its practice and procedure is ‘to facilitate the just, quick, and cheap resolution 
of the real issues’.96 In addition, the parties to the proceeding and any legal practitioners 
are under a duty to cooperate with the NCAT to give effect to the ‘guiding principle’.97  
 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether moving the discrimination jurisdiction to 
this ‘mega’ tribunal, even if it is contained within its own Administrative and Equal 
Opportunity Division,
98
 will have the effect of eroding specialisation and encourage a 
                                                 
95
 CAT Act s 3. 
96
 Ibid s 36. 
97
 Ibid s 36(3). See also s 36(5). 
98
 See CAT Act s 16(1) sch 3.  
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one-size-fits-all approach.
99
 In spite of the government’s assurances that the aim is to 
simplify and improve access to justice,
100
 there is a concern that the new NCAT may be 
more concerned with rationalising and containing the costs of the administration of 
justice.
101
 For example, prior to 2014, the Tribunal could refer a matter to mediation that 
was entirely ‘voluntary’ meaning that it was not compulsory for the parties to take part, 
and discrimination cases were heard by at least three Tribunal members, one of whom 
was a legally qualified judicial member.
102
 In comparison, under the CAT Act, there is 
an element of compulsion whereby the NCAT may, ‘where it considers it appropriate, 
use (or require parties to proceedings to use) any one or more resolution processes’ in 
which a resolution process is defined broadly as ‘(including, for example, alternative 
dispute resolution) in which parties to proceedings are assisted to resolve or narrow the 
issues between them in the proceedings’.103 Cases can also be heard by just a single 
division member who is a lawyer, or by two or more members, one of whom must be a 
lawyer.
104
 Gaze and Hunter have noted that ‘multi-member tribunal panels are now a 
rarity … and as a result, non-legal input into decision-making has been effectively 
removed.’105 Allowing cases to be heard by a single lawyer reflects the underlying 
legalism of the proceedings. It also has the effect of removing a method by which lay 
members of the broader community could potentially hear and decide discrimination 
complaints, thereby potentially bringing a broader community perspective to the 
proceedings - based on more diverse life experiences and understandings of 
discrimination.
106
   
 
Further, the CAT Act also expressly provides that practice and procedures should be 
implemented so as to facilitate the resolution of the issues between the parties in such a 
                                                 
99
 Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 18–22.  
100
 Section 36(4). See also Greg Smith, Attorney-General of NSW, ‘Simple Quick and Effective Justice 
for NSW’ (Media Release, 26 October 2012).  See Gaze and Hunter generally noting the neo-liberal 
emphasis on a smaller, less costly more efficient public sector in recent decades, including in relation to 
the administration of justice.  
101
 Gaze and Hunter point out that the aspirations of universal access to justice, since the mid-1980s, have 
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Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 9. 
102
 See ADT Act s 102–3 sch 2 pt 2.  Note that Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 1, 9.  
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 CAT Act s 37. 
104
 Ibid sch 3 pt 4. 
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106
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way that ‘the cost to the parties and the Tribunal is proportionate to the importance and 
complexity of the subject-matter of the proceedings’.107 It is not clear how these 
provisions will be applied in practice, or who decides what is important or how they 
decide it.  
 
While it is too soon to see how the NCAT will operate, there is a danger that the NCAT 
regime may be more concerned with containing costs, and may therefore use other 
‘resolution processes’ not just to encourage but perhaps also to pressure complainants to 
settle their cases rather than proceed to a hearing. For example, if the subject matter of 
the proceedings, or the ‘real issues’,108 may not be considered ‘important’ enough, by a 
single legal member—however ‘important’ may be defined—to justify the costs of a 
hearing, will the complainant be denied a hearing? This has the obvious potential to 
affect individual complainants negatively in terms of access to justice and denying them 
a hearing.
109
 
 
Indirectly, there is also a danger that the CAT Act, with its emphasis on proportionality 
in terms of cost and informal resolution, may also have a broader detrimental effect by 
denying the development of a precedential jurisprudence around work and care. This 
will lead to the same criticisms that have been levelled against conciliation at agencies 
such as the ADB: that confidential settlement ‘in the shadows’110 leads to ‘privatisation 
of justice’ because it shrouds settlements in secrecy, prevents public scrutiny and does 
not provide an avenue for courts and tribunals to develop jurisprudence to send out a 
public message to the community that discrimination is unlawful and will not be 
tolerated.
111
 This shuts out from public view the very nature of the inequality from 
which the individual and the group suffers,
112
 and ‘neither empowers others to complain 
nor creates precedents for future cases’.113 Which direction the NCAT will take in this 
regard remains to be seen. 
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PART V: THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOARD 
 
Chapter 8: The Education Function 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Part V of this thesis now focuses on the operation of the statutory education and 
complaint-handling function of the ADB between 2001 and 2011.
 1
  In order to answer 
the research questions, which askhow the ADB interpreted and applied Part 4B and 
whether this gives effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B, this chapter examines the 
ADB’s education function.2 The education function encompasses three main aspects in 
practice: a telephone enquiries line;
3
 employer training and community education; and  
ADB publications.
4
  
 
The ADB also considers that an aim of complaint handling is dispute resolution but also 
to ‘educate both sides about their rights and responsibilities under anti-discrimination 
law’ and to ‘advise respondents on how to prevent discrimination in the future’.5 The 
operation of the complaint-handling function, and how the ADB interpreted and applied 
Part 4B and its enforcement powers, is the subject of the following chapters, 9 and 10.  
 
This chapter demonstrates how the ADB gave meaning to Part 4B during the first 
decade of its operation. It also analyses whether its interpretation was consistent with 
and gave effect to its policy objectives, and what the normative impact, if any, has been 
in this regard. It does so with particular reference to its publications which related 
specifically to carers’ discrimination (‘carers’ publications’) during the decade. This 
chapter also locates the ADB’s approach to the interpretation of Part 4B within the 
broader work and family, and discrimination law literature.
6
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 1, at 1.3 for an overview of the ADB functions.  
2
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5. 
3
 Other than the statistical data provided in ADB annual reports, very little is known about enquiries to the 
ADB. See Chapter 2, at 2.2.3 
4 
See Chapter 2, at 2.2.2. 
5
 ADB, Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board ADB Factsheet (Revised June 2009) (2009) 
(‘Complaining Factsheet’). 
6
 See generally Chapters 3 and 4. 
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This chapter is in five sections. In Section 8.2, the scope and objectives of the education 
function are outlined to illustrate the potential reach of the ADB’s normative role. Each 
of the three methods by which the function is exercised is then considered: Section 8.3 
outlines the enquiries service; Section 8.4 outlines training and community education; 
and Section 8.5 articulates the ADB’s interpretation of Part 4B in its relevant 
publications. The chapter concludes at Section 8.6 by considering whether the ADB’s 
education function has given effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B. In conclusion, it 
is argued that the ADB, which is free of the constraints of an adjudicative role and the 
strict rules of statutory interpretation and precedent, has consistently interpreted Part 4B 
broadly and beneficially. It has taken both a less technical and a more holistic policy-
driven approach than the Tribunal. In particular, it is argued throughout this thesis that 
the ADB has consistently advocated that Part 4B operates to provide a general duty of 
reasonable accommodation.
7
 It is argued that, in a decade when the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Part 4B was equivocal, the ADB’s beneficial interpretation is likely to 
have had a strong normative effect in NSW.  
 
 
8.2 The Scope and Application of the Education Function 
8.2.1 The ADB and Its Recognised Norm Creation and Development Function 
 
Premier Wran emphasised the importance of education as well as a complaints 
enforcement mechanism to eradicate discrimination when he introduced the Anti-
Discrimination Bill in 1976: 
It is my firm view that the pervasiveness of discrimination in our society can 
be eradicated only by positive action, particularly in the field of education. 
Eventually, positive programs will be the means by which the intolerance and 
prejudice inherent in our community will be removed. In an ideal world, no 
remedies for discrimination would be required… 
The Government is not under any illusion that this bill is a panacea for all the 
problems relating to discrimination in our community ... The Government will 
concede that this provision for individual remedies is a step-by-step mopping 
up of isolated pockets of discrimination rather than an attack on the cause of 
that discrimination… 
Not only does the bill provide individual remedies where discrimination has 
occurred but also the passage of legislation is recognised as having an 
                                                 
7
 See, Chapter 1, at 1.7.5 comparing the approaches of the ADB and the Tribunal. 
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influence upon the citizen in his social conduct, and it tends to undermine 
societal prejudices.
8
  
Chapter 1 outlined the ADB’s statutory functions9 and what it considers its two ‘core’ 
functions
10
 in administering the AD Act: to deal with complaints of discrimination
11
 and 
to try to prevent discrimination by educating
12
 ‘people about what the anti-
discrimination laws say and why they are important’. 13   
 
The ADB’s functions are to be used ‘for the purpose of eliminating discrimination and 
promoting equality and equal treatment of all human beings’.14  The ADB has very 
broad public policy statutory functions relating to research, educative and advisory 
functions including to ‘acquire and disseminate knowledge on all matters relating to the 
elimination of discrimination and achievement of equal rights’;15 to hold public 
enquiries, consultations conferences and seminars;
16
 to develop human rights policies 
and programmes;
17
 and to ‘consult with governmental, business, industrial and 
community groups and organisations in order to ascertain means of improving services 
and conditions affecting minority groups and other groups which are the subject of 
discrimination and inequality’.18 Section 99 of the AD Act implicitly recognises the 
ADB’s expertise, by providing for the ADB to appear before and assist the Tribunal 
(although it does not provide a right to intervene in proceedings).
19
 
 
In summary, the ADB therefore has a well-established and broadly recognised statutory 
role to interpret and apply the AD Act in order to give effect to the human rights 
objectives of the legislation, and to disseminate this interpretation.
20
 The statutory 
                                                 
8
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 November 1976, 3337–47. 
9
 See Chapter 1, at 1.3.1–1.3.2. 
10
 In recent years, significant funding cuts to the ADB have meant that it has increasingly prioritised these 
two ‘core’ functions to deliver its legislative objectives better. See Chapter 1, at 1.3.2. 
11
 The ADB’s complaint-handling powers are found under pt 9 div 2 ss 87–94C. 
12
 The ADB’s education powers are found under See section 119(1)(b).  
13
 ADB, ADB Factsheet: Discrimination and the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW (2012). 
14 
Section 119(1). 
15
 Section 119(1)(b). 
16
 Section 119(1)(c), (f). 
17
 Section 119(1)(g). 
18
 Section 119(1)(e) 
19
 Section 99 has been in place since 2005. It was not used in any of the carers’ cases that came before the 
Tribunal in the first decade of operation.  
20
 The NSW Law Reform Commission (‘LRC’), to assuage concerns as to the uncertainty surrounding the 
operation of a new ground of carers’ discrimination, highlighted the key role of the ADB in conjunction 
with the Tribunal to ‘develop principles and guidelines which will give rise to increasing levels of 
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functions quite clearly emphasise the ADB’s role as an advocate for, and guardian of, 
the AD Act, and its broad human rights and equality objectives.
21
 It is likely that its 
recommendations as to how the legislation should be implemented in practice will carry 
some weight
 
with relevant stakeholders identified under s 119, which include: the 
government, as well as employers and employees, business and industry groups, trade 
unions and the community more generally, the Tribunal, and the LRC in NSW. 
Therefore, the AD Act establishes the ADB as an agency to develop and promote its 
underlying goals. It has a recognised and important norm creation and development role 
alongside that of the Tribunal in terms of how the carers’ responsibility legislation is 
understood by worker-carers and employers, and at the workplace level. 
 
8.2.2 The Objectives of the Education Function and Part 4B 
 
The ADB has explained the purpose of its education function as: 
We try to prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place. We inform 
the people of NSW about their rights and responsibilities under anti-
discrimination laws, and explain how they can prevent and deal with 
discrimination. We do this through education programs, seminars, talks, the 
media, participation in community functions and the production and 
distribution of written information.
22
 
The aims are therefore to educate (to raise awareness of rights, obligations and the 
enforcement mechanism under the AD Act) and to prevent discrimination and encourage 
compliance (by providing advice and recommendations about how to apply the law in 
practice).
23
 There has been recognition in the literature of the need to provide greater 
‘structured guidance’24 to ensure that employers and workers have the capacity to 
engage properly and adequately with the legislation and with each other.
25
 First, 
                                                                                                                                               
certainty and understanding’: LRC, Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Report No 92 
(1999) 306–7 [5.213]–[5.215] (‘LRC Report’).  
21
 See generally Anna Chapman, ‘Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The Paradox of Informal 
Dispute Resolution’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 321. 
22
 ADB, Annual Report 2001–2002, 9, which covered the first year of the operation of Part 4B. 
23
 See Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’ (2006) 28(4) Sydney Law Review 689, 716–21, in 
relation to the education function in the federal discrimination jurisdiction. 
24
 Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Right to Request Regulation: Two New Models’ (2008) 21(2) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 116, 135, 118–19. A recent example of this sort of employer guidance 
approach can be found in the Fair Work Ombudsman, Best Practice Guide Work and Family (Fair Work 
Australia, 2013) (‘Best Practice’).  See generally Chapter 4, at 4.5.3 highlighting the need to provide 
material that explains the law and how to comply with it. 
25
 See generally the literature review in Chapters 3 and 4 outlining many of the issues raised in the 
literature about strategies to ensure greater compliance with anti-discrimination legislation. For example, 
Chapter 3, at 3.5, outlines many of the issues in relation to employer hostility to engage with strategies to 
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employers need to understand what their obligations are
26
 and how they can best be 
implemented.
27
 Second, employees must be fully aware of their rights and how to 
exercise them, and from an access-to-justice perspective, must understand how to 
enforce those rights.
28
 As Sturm has argued, this requires a focus on capacity building to 
ensure effective implementation at the workplace level.
29
 It requires an explanation not 
just of what the law means, but also directions about how to implement it.  In the 
literature review in Chapter 4, at 4.5.3, it was argued that given the sometimes 
confusing multiplicity of legislative and policy approaches to work–life balance, it is 
clear that employees and employers will require clear and accessible guidance on what 
their rights and obligations are, and how to navigate them.  Smith has noted that ‘we 
need more sophisticated regulation that acts to both prompt commitment to the goal of 
gender equality and work–life integration, and also enable achievement of that goal. 
Guidance materials can enhance the regulatory framework of discrimination laws.’30 
The AHRC also recently made a number of key recommendations including that the 
AHRC, state and territory anti-discrimination authorities, and Fair Work agencies 
‘collaborate to produce … information and guidance material, and disseminate it 
through their agencies’, providing ‘clear, comprehensive and consistent information 
about employer obligations, employee rights and leading practices and strategies’.31 
 
From the employer perspective it is suggested in this chapter that building capacity in 
this regard involves providing both proactive and reactive guidance. Proactive guidance 
focuses on how to identify and address existing discriminatory practices and how to 
prevent discrimination in the future. The aim is to help employers build their capacity to 
                                                                                                                                               
provide greater flexibility and eradicate carers’ discrimination; and Chapter 4, at 4.4 and 4.5, considers 
how discrimination laws can more effectively address issues relating to compliance, and awareness 
raising. 
26
 See for example Smith, Belinda ‘How Might Information Bolster Anti-Discrimination Laws to 
Promote More Family-Friendly Workplaces?’ (2014), 56(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 547 
(‘Bolster’).  
27
 See Chapter 4, at 4.5.3 
28
 For example, Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have indicated that relatively few employees are aware 
of, let alone using, the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) right to request (‘RTR’) provisions: Natalie 
Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Work, Life and Care in 2012—The 
Australian Work and Life Index (Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2012) 10; at 61 it 
is noted that greater publicity is required to raise awareness of the RTR.   
29
 Susan Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach’ (2001) 101(1) 
Columbia Law Review 459. See Chapter 4, at 4.4.2.  
30 Smith, ‘Bolster’ above n 26, 562. 
31
 AHRC, Supporting Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report (2014) 
10 (‘Supporting’). See also Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 28, 61.  
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change not just workplace policies and practices but also cultures and attitudes at the 
organisational and line manager level to implement the legislation effectively.
32
  
Reactive guidance focuses on how an employer should react to individual requests for 
accommodation, what steps to take, and that processes are in place to ensure that 
individual requests for accommodation are properly considered. It also requires 
guidance about what practical ways work can be organised so that accommodation can 
be provided.
33
 
 
From the worker–carer perspective, the aim is to ensure that workers understand their 
legislative rights and protections at work. In particular, they must also be empowered to 
use those rights to negotiate a workplace accommodation. Where maintenance of the 
employment relationship and achieving accommodation may be crucial, workers must 
also know how to enforce those rights quickly. This includes being aware of the ADB’s 
enforcement role and its complaints function if internal work processes are unable to 
provide a resolution.  
 
 
8.2.3 Assessing the Effectiveness of the Education Function: Limitations 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, in the absence of broad qualitative studies across different 
groups in society or at the workplace or organisational level,
 34
 it can be difficult to 
assess how the law is understood and what normative effect it has had in practice in the 
community. For example, without these studies, it is not clear that worker–carers across 
NSW have been encouraged to seek or employers encouraged to provide greater 
flexibility or accommodation of caring responsibilities specifically as a result of the 
                                                 
32
 See Chapter 3, at 3.5.  
33
 See Rosemary Hunter and Alice Leonard, ‘The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases’ 
(Working Paper No 8, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, 
University of Melbourne, 1995) 29–30, noting the important role that conciliation can have as a 
respondent education tool.  
34
 See, Chapter 2, at 2.4.3, outlining the methodological difficulties in making such an assessment in the 
absence of broader qualitative data. See for example, the empirical research that has been undertaken in 
relation to the operation of the RTR under s 65 of the FW Act in two reports: Fair Work Ombudsman, 
Requests for Flexible Working Arrangements and the National Employment Standards (Fair Work 
Australia, 2013); Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 28. Both suggest a lack of awareness among 
employers and employees. 
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ADB’s education function in relation to Part 4B.35 Nor is it clear that Part 4B, in 
particular, has had any effect in terms of either fundamentally changing the attitudes and 
assumptions of employers about work and care, or tackling hostile workplace cultures. 
Further research is required in relation to these aspects of how Part 4B is understood 
and applied ‘in action’ more broadly at that ‘ground’ level by workers and employers, 
and what role the ADB has in giving meaning to the law at that level.  
 
In the meantime, the discussion of the education function below, and the analysis of the 
complaints function in Chapters 9 and 10 provides us with an insight into how the ADB 
has applied Part 4B through its education and complaints function. 
 
8.3 Enquiries 
 
The ADB telephone enquiries line, or in recent years the ADB website, is likely to be 
one of the first points of reference to find information about rights, obligations and 
enforcement under the AD Act. As outlined in Chapter 2, in the first decade of the 
carers’ legislation under Part 4B, it is reported that 5,175 telephone enquiries were made 
about carers’ responsibility discrimination.36 On average over the decade, 5% of all 
enquiries related to carers’ discrimination, and after grounds of sex, race and disability, 
it was often the next most common ground enquired about.
37
 In the writer’s experience 
working at the ADB, the enquiries line was usually staffed by enquiry officers as well 
as complaint handlers, who were also rostered to undertake regular shifts. The advice 
provided typically included explaining what the law says, what ‘self-help’ steps an 
employee or employer could take to try to resolve the situation, and providing 
information about lodging a complaint. Callers are often sent or referred to specific 
ADB publications on a particular issue. Although it is difficult to assess whether the 
                                                 
35
 For example, Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock above n 28, 61–2 demonstrated that workers in Australia 
are routinely requesting flexibility at work and having it granted. This suggests that a new norm of 
providing flexible work or reasonable accommodation exists or is developing in at least some workplaces. 
However, there is nothing to indicate that this is as a result of discrimination laws such as the operation of 
Part 4B. 
36
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.3, providing a summary of enquiries data as reported in ADB annual reports. The 
enquiries service handled 871 calls about carers’ discrimination in 2001–2002 compared with 228 in 
2010–2011. According to ADB, Annual Report 2010–11, 12, the decline in numbers of telephone 
enquiries reflects greater use of the ADB website to access information.   
37 
See Chapter 2, at 2.2.3. 
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advice provided on the enquiries line does assist callers to exercise their rights and 
obligations, the ADB notes that: 
Many complaints about discrimination are resolved at the initial enquiry stage, 
as the Enquiry and Liaison Officers inform callers about their rights and 
suggest strategies for dealing with their situation. In many instances this 
prevents the need for a formal complaint, which reduces the number of 
complaints the Board receives.
38
 
 
In addition, there is evidence that the enquiries line played an important role in raising 
awareness about the complaints mechanism at the ADB.  The empirical review of the 
carers’ complaint files indicates that in 81, or 16% of all carers’ complaints lodged, it 
was noted, usually by the complainants in their written complaint to the ADB, that they 
had received prior advice from the enquiries line before lodgement.  
 
Providing practical and early advice to worker–carers and employers via a telephone 
enquiries line may therefore help with an early resolution of a workplace issue, which 
can be critical in ensuring that the employment relationship can be maintained. It is also 
likely that the enquiries line did play an important role to raise awareness of rights and 
obligations, and how they can be enforced through the ADB’s complaints mechanism.   
 
 
8.4 Employer Training Sessions and Community Education 
 
The ADB can also play an important role in providing specific training or community 
education sessions. Specifically, in preparation for the introduction of Part 4B, the ADB 
reported in 2000–2001 that it provided training sessions and attended industry 
conferences and seminars to provide information about the new legislation and how to 
implement it.
39
 In general, the ADB also provides, for a fee, training sessions for 
employers and organisations across public, private and not-for-profit sectors, often 
aimed at management and supervisory levels. For example, in 2010–2011, the ADB 
reported that almost 600 workplace training sessions and seminars were held reaching 
9,000 participants.
40
 That service also included a review of company equal employment 
                                                 
38
 ADB, Annual Report 2010–11, 12, 
39 
ADB, Annual Report 2001–01, 47. 
40
 Ibid 19–21.  
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opportunity (‘EEO’) and grievance policies by ADB workplace consultants tailored to 
the organisation.
41
 This training and policy review service therefore provides an 
important opportunity for the ADB to provide input into how the organisation 
implements the AD Act and to provide advice about, for example, best practice, and how 
to improve compliance. The popularity of for-fee training is also further recognition of 
the ADB’s authority to both interpret the law and suggest effective implementation, 
which is recognised by business and organisations across all sectors. ADB education 
and training is also obviously an important practical risk-management strategy for 
employers to be able to demonstrate that they have taken all reasonable steps to educate 
their workforce and ensure that the workplace is discrimination free.
42
 
 
In addition, even though funding constraints resulted in the ADB having only one part-
time community education officer since 2003, it is reported that 29 community training 
sessions were held in the period 2010–2011, including training for Carers NSW—the 
peak body supporting and advocating for carers in NSW.
43
 Reaching such peak non-
government organisations can be a crucial way to raise, and spread, grassroots 
awareness among worker–carers of their rights under Part 4B.  
 
8.5 Carers’ Discrimination and Publications 2000–2011 
 
ADB publications are produced in plain English and translated into many culturally and 
linguistically diverse community languages. They are usually available in hard copy and 
also on the ADB’s website.44 In common with other statutory discrimination agencies, 
when dealing with workplace discrimination, the ADB tailors its approach to two 
different audiences: employees, to explain their rights and how to enforce those rights, 
and employers, to explain their obligations and provide compliance advice, in other 
words, to help build their capacity to comply with the law. A small fee is often charged 
                                                 
41
 Ibid.  
42
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.6.2, explaining the operation of the vicarious liability provisions under the AD 
Act. Under s 53, employers and principals will be vicariously liable for acts undertaken by their 
employees or agents in the course of their employment unless it can be shown that the employer or 
principal took all ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent the contravention. 
43
 ADB, Annual Report 2010–11, 19–21, records that the training generated fees of $547,977.  
44
 It should be emphasised that the ADB website appears to have been very well used by the people of 
NSW as a source of information and advice in recent years. See, for example, ADB, Annual Report 2010–
11, 23, reviewing the operation of the education function, noting that 838,148 hits were received 
averaging almost 70,000 hits per month that year. 
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for publications aimed at employers, but factsheets aimed employees and those 
individuals suffering discrimination are available online or in hard copy free of charge.  
 
The ADB has published four key carers’ publications relating to carers’ discrimination45  
that deal with rights and obligations under Part 4B.
46
 First, the Carer’s Factsheet is 
aimed at workers with caring responsibilities to enable them to understand their rights at 
work and how to enforce those rights.
47
 In particular, it focuses on a right to request 
‘special arrangements’ and what those special arrangements might be.48 It has been 
updated regularly since 2000. Second, the more extensive Carers’ Employer Guidelines 
was published in 2000 to explain employers’ obligations and to provide compliance 
advice.
49
 These guidelines were in from 2000 but were never revised and updated 
during that time. They have not been publicly available since 2010. They explain the 
policy objectives and rationale of Part 4B and the legal provisions, and also, 
importantly, suggest ways for employers to meet those obligations in the workplace.
50
 
Third, a special edition of the ADB’s newsletter, Equal Time, issued in 2011, marking 
the 10th anniversary of Part 4B, provides a contemporary summary of the rights and 
obligations arising under Part 4B, to bookend the decade.
51
  Finally, the Guidelines for 
Managers and Supervisors explain employer’s obligations under the different grounds 
under the AD Act and contain a specific section on Part 4B that summarises succinctly 
the provisions as well as the ADB’s and Tribunal’s approaches to them.52 Targeting 
                                                 
45
 Chapter 2, at 2.2.2. 
46
 ADB, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (Revised March 2011) (2011) (‘Carer’s Factsheet’); 
ADB, Guidelines for Employers, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (2000) 8 (‘Carers’ Employer 
Guidelines’); ADB, Equal Time Newsletter of the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW Number 82 (2011) 
(‘Equal Time’); ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, Preventing Discrimination and 
Harassment (2009) (‘Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors’). In addition, the ADB has published 
various guidelines aimed at either complainants or particular respondent groups or sectors that will often 
also contain a section on workplace carers’ responsibility discrimination. The various guidelines are 
aimed at, for example, trade unions, community groups, local government, managers and supervisors, 
small business, or particular types of service providers such as real estate agents or hoteliers. See ADB 
website: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/adb/ll_adb.nsf/pages/adb_guidelines. 
47
 Advice about enforcement is supplemented by a number of publications relating specifically to the 
complaints process. See, for example, ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 5; ADB, How to Deal With 
Discrimination, Unfair Treatment and Harassment—Self Help Strategies (Revised June 2004) (2004) 
(‘Strategies’). 
48 
ADB, Carer’s Factsheet, above n 46.  
49
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46; ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, 
above n 46; ADB, Equal Time, above n 46. 
50 
ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 9–21.  
51
 ADB, Equal Time, above n 46, 4. 
52
 ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisor, above n 46, 11–12, which includes an explanation of 
the Tribunal’s findings in Reddy v International Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218 (‘Reddy’) and 
Tleyji v The Travelspirit Group [2005] NSWADT 294 (‘Tleyji’). 
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guidelines specifically at managers and supervisors recognises that, as highlighted in the 
literature, in practice, it is these individuals who are responsible for the day-to-day 
implementation of the AD Act at the workplace level. For example, they make decision 
about whether to provide flexibility.
53
 
 
Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, the ADB website also contains a page entitled 
‘Conciliation Cases Handled by the Board’ that provides very short ad hoc summaries 
of a limited selection of conciliated carers’ complaints, added over the years. This could 
become a valuable resource for workers and employers, to understand how the law 
works if it were presented in a more systematic and user-friendly format.
54
 
 
Carers’ publications can play an important normative role in terms of how law is 
understood and given meaning in the community, and in helping to demystify the 
complexity of the legislation. From an access-to-justice perspective, this is extremely 
important because the provisions under Part 4B are legalistic, complex and likely to be 
very confusing for both employees and employers. These publications also provide an 
important documentary record about how the ADB interprets Part 4B. In the same way 
that Tribunal decisions illustrate the Tribunal’s approach to the statutory interpretation 
and application, publications provide an insight into how ADB staff are likely to 
interpret and apply Part 4B in the day-to-day operation of their statutory functions, 
including handling complaints or answering enquiries, and in the provision of training. 
 
Further, in a decade during which Tribunal decisions applying Part 4B were few, the 
carers’ publications provided an important source of information for worker–carers and 
employers grappling with their respective rights and obligations under the legislation.
55
 
For example, the first carers’ decision, Gardiner No 1, was not handed down until 2003, 
while Reddy and Tleyji (the two cases from which it may be possible to imply a duty of 
reasonable accommodation) were not handed down until 2004 and 2005 respectively.
56
 
It is argued that, in the intervening years, the ADB’s interpretation and application of 
the law, as demonstrated in its publication, is likely to have had a strong normative 
                                                 
53
 See Chapter 3, at 3.5.  
54
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.2, noting the limited scope of ADB’s conciliation register.  
55
 See Part IV of this thesis which outlines the twelve decisions of the Tribunal during the decade. 
56
 Gardiner v New South Wales WorkCover Authority [2003] NSWADT 184 (‘Gardiner No 1’) was 
handed down in August 2003 almost 18 months after Part 4B took effect; Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 in 
September 2004; and Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 in December 2005. 
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effect in relation to how employers and worker–carers have given meaning to Part 4B. 
In particular, since 2000, the ADB has consistently avoided a technical legal approach 
to the interpretation and application of Part 4B, and has advocated that Part 4B operates 
to provide a duty of reasonable accommodation on employers.
57
 
 
The ADB reported that the distribution of its publications put in place for the new 
legislation in 2000–2001was wide-ranging. For example, 10,000 copies of the Carers’ 
Factsheet were distributed to community groups, trade unions and government 
departments. The Carers’ Employer Guidelines were sent to 7,000 employers and 
employer groups across public, private and community sectors. In addition, information 
was accessible on the ADB website.
58
  The Carers’ Employer Guidelines were 
recognised as a key document for public sector employers. For example, they were 
specifically referred to in a NSW Government circular from 2001 that was addressed to 
the NSW public sector outlining employer obligations, which embraced the ADB’s 
interpretation of Part 4B.
59
 It is also noteworthy that the empirical research undertaken 
on the 520 complaints files lodged between 2001 and 2011 demonstrates that entire 
sections of the ADB carers’ publications, especially the Carers’ Employer Guidelines, 
were sometimes incorporated into the respondent’s EEO and discrimination policies, 
which were sometimes cited during the complaints process, especially by major 
employers in the public sector. 
 
8.5.1 Giving Part 4B Meaning: The ADB’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation  
 
The ADB publications relating to carers’ discrimination are mainly aimed at the 
traditional employment relationship, and explain rights and obligations in relation to 
three categories: first, job applicants and those seeking employment; second, workers 
currently employed; and third, former employees and those about to be terminated.
60
 
                                                 
57
 See, for example, Carer’s Employer Guidelines, above n 46; ADB, Equal Time, above n 46, 4; ADB, 
Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 46, 11. 
58 
See ADB, Annual Report 2001–01, 47. 
59
 NSW Premier & Cabinet, C2001-26 Carers’ Responsibilities Amendment Act 2000—Employers 
Responsibilities, issued when the legislation was introduced. This circular outlined employer obligations 
under Part 4B.  The circular is no longer current, see Department of Premiere and Cabinet website  
<http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/announcements/circulars/2001/c2001-26>  
60
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.2, noting that, as with other the discrimination jurisdictions and other grounds in 
the AD Act, Part 4B covers a very broad array of work and employment relationships. See generally Neil 
Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 455–67. 
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The aim of the carers’ publications is to provide a plain English explanation of the 
coverage of Part 4B, for example in relation to: which employment situations, types of 
discriminatory conduct and carers’ responsibilities are covered; how direct and indirect 
discrimination under s 49T might manifest itself in practice; what are an employee’s 
rights, in particular, in relation to flexibility; what are an employer’s obligations; and 
what steps can be taken to prevent discrimination and encourage compliance.  
 
The discussion below demonstrates that the ADB’s overarching central and consistent 
message in its carers’ publications is that, regardless of whether conduct may amount to 
direct or indirect discrimination, s 49T requires that an employer ‘provide any extra or 
special arrangements that are needed’ because being ‘inflexible’ can amount to direct 
and indirect discrimination.
61
  The ADB’s approach to the statutory interpretation and 
implementation of Part 4B through its publications, which span the decade, has 
remained the same since 2000. The section now summarises key aspects of the ADB’s 
approach to the provisions before turning to the employee and employer perspectives 
specifically. 
 
The limits of s 49S and normalising a broad right to flexibility 
 
The ADB has acknowledged the limitations of the family nexus in s 49S and recognises 
that there will be many worker–carers with caring responsibilities not covered by the 
limited relationships covered under the legislation. Reflecting calls in the literature 
outlined in Chapter 4 to normalise flexibility, the ADB recommends to employers that 
‘it would be best practice, easier and perhaps wiser to have flexible arrangements that 
are available to everyone not just those with carers’ responsibilities’.62    
 
Explaining Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
 
The ADB explains that discrimination is broadly understood as being treated unfairly or 
harassed because of actual, presumed, past or future caring responsibilities, or that there 
                                                 
61
 See, for example, ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 13. 
62
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 22. It explains this in the context of avoiding co-
worker hostility and risk management where complaints relating to care not covered under s 49S could be 
made on other grounds.  See, Chapter 4, at 4.4.4 noting the calls in the literature in Australia and Europe 
for a broad right to flexibility for all workers. 
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is a rule or requirement that disproportionately disadvantages workers with caring 
responsibilities.
63
 When explaining the differences between direct and direct 
discrimination the ADB largely avoids any detailed engagement with the technical 
elements of each type of discrimination. Instead, it offers a very simple explanation 
supported by examples as to how the different types of discrimination may manifest 
themselves in practice.
64
  
 
For example, the Carers’ Employer Guidelines explain that direct discrimination can 
happen when someone is treated unfairly, differently or less favourably because of her 
or his actual, past, presumed or future carers’ responsibilities. It notes that it often 
involves or relates to the making of a decision that negatively affects a job applicant or 
employee based upon a negative assumption, stereotyped views or prejudices about the 
person’s actual, past, presumed or future carers’ responsibilities, for example:65  
 A job applicant has four children and is a sole parent. The employer decides not 
to give the applicant the job because it is presumed the person would not be able 
to do the job given the number of children they have.  
 An employer refuses an employee’s request for unpaid leave to care for his sick 
mother, yet employees have been allowed unpaid leave to travel or study. 
 
The ADB explains that indirect discrimination occurs when there is a ‘rule or 
requirement that disadvantages people who have a carer’s responsibility more than 
people who don’t—unless it can be shown that the rule or requirement is “reasonable in 
all the circumstances”’. It notes that, in practice, many complaints of carers’ 
responsibility discrimination will relate to indirect discrimination because: 
[m]any claims are likely to involve the way in which work is organised and/or 
the operational requirements for everyone/whole groups of employees, and 
how this might negatively impact on or disadvantage people with carers’ 
responsibilities as opposed to people who don’t have carers’ responsibilities—
for example, shift lengths, start and finish and break times, part-time versus 
full-time work, whether work can be done from home.
66
  
 
                                                 
63
 See, for example, Carer’s Factsheet, above n 46. 
64
 Ibid.  
65
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 9; ADB, Carer’s Factsheet, above n 46. 
66 
ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 11. 
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The ADB provides the following examples of indirect discrimination, which it suggests 
would be unlawful unless it could be shown that the requirements were reasonable:
67
  
 a requirement for all staff to start work at a specific time, which might indirectly 
discriminate against a person who needs to take his or her child to school; 
 holding training at weekends, or early or late in the day, assuming that everyone 
can attend; 
 insisting that everyone works 12-hour shifts or shifts starting very early in the 
morning, so that workers who have caring responsibilities and, for example, 
need to drop children off at school or day care are unable to comply with the 
requirements. 
 
This informal plain English approach to direct and indirect discrimination is also 
reflected in the complaint-handling process where complaints are usually made without 
reference to the concepts of direct or indirect discrimination, and are then investigated 
and conciliated in this way by the ADB.
68
  
 
Implying a Duty of Accommodation 
 
It was also noted in Chapter 1 that in relation to whether Part 4B takes effect to provide 
for an implied duty of accommodation, the ADB has similarly avoided a technical legal 
approach to the interpretation and application of Part 4B. It does this even though the 
legal bases for its position is sometimes tenuous, equivocal and appears to be based 
upon a conflation of the reasonableness provisions under indirect discrimination with 
the unjustifiable hardship provisions.
69
 Since 2000,
70
 the ADB has consistently 
suggested that the provisions operate together in practice in order to imply a general 
duty of reasonable accommodation, which together would apply across all worker–
carers, suggesting that ‘[in] general an employer must make any reasonable 
arrangements that are necessary for a person who has carers’ responsibilities to enable 
them to do a particular job’ but that ‘[i]f an employer can demonstrate that 
                                                 
67
 Ibid; ADB, Carer’s Factsheet, above n 46. 
68
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.5, comparing the ADB and Tribunal approaches.  See generally Chapter 9 below 
outlining the informality of the ADB approach in practice. 
69
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.5 
70
 See ADB, Carer’s Employer Guidelines, above n 46  
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accommodating the needs of someone with carers’ responsibilities would cause them 
unjustifiable hardship then it may not be unlawful to discriminate against them’.71  
 
The above discussion illustrates that the ADB publications can play an important 
educative and awareness-raising role in providing a plain English explanation of the 
operation of Part 4B in a non-legalistic way, which may enable workers and employers 
to understand their respective rights and obligations better, and which may also provide 
guidance about how to implement them on a day-to-day basis at the workplace level. 
However, it is also crucial to appreciate that, at the same time, this less formal approach 
can also serve to mask the real complexity of the AD Act provisions, and the extent of 
the difficulties that a complainant will face if a complaint does proceed to the Tribunal 
for a hearing—where, as noted in Part IV, the complexity of the provisions under s 49T 
and the burden of proving each and every element of direct or indirect discrimination is 
particularly onerous. 
 
8.5.2 A ‘Right’ to ‘Special Arrangements’: The Employee Focus  
 
The Carers’ Factsheet sets out workers’ rights under the legislation, gives examples of 
discriminatory conduct and explains the types of flexible work options that an employee 
can request. The ADB takes a very strong rights-based capacity building approach to 
Part 4B,
72
 reflecting Sturm’s focus on context-based problem-solving at the workplace 
level.
73
 It also recognises and supports the role of the employee as a problem-solving 
actor ‘in action’ and not just a passive victim of discrimination.74 
 
Under the heading ‘What are my rights?’, the factsheet uses obligatory language 
suggesting an element of compulsion, and the message is unequivocal and simply put: 
the law says that an employer ‘should’ and ‘must’ provide ‘any special arrangements 
you need to do your job at the same time as managing your carers’ responsibilities’ 
unless ‘it would cause them unjustifiable hardship’ in the case of hiring and firing or ‘is 
                                                 
71 
ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 46, 11. See also ADB, Equal Time, above n 
46, 4.  
72
 This is the common approach in the ADB factsheets, which are aimed at individuals who have suffered 
discrimination. 
73
 Sturm, above n 29, 479. See generally the discussion of this problem-solving approach in Chapter 4, at 
4.4.2. See also the discussion of Chapman’s work in relation to a duty of accommodation, at 4.4.3. 
74
 See Chapter 4, at 4.4.4 considering how a duty of accommodation may serve to empower workers. 
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not reasonable in all the circumstances’ in relation to current employees.75 The ADB 
suggests a number of ‘special arrangements’ that could be provided depending on the 
circumstances: 
 allowing you to work from home on some or all days—in this case, they may 
also need to provide you with the facilities to do this, such as a computer, 
software or reimbursement for work phone calls; 
 changing your start or finish times, roster arrangements or break times; 
 allowing you to work your hours over fewer or more days; 
 allowing you to work part-time instead of full-time, or to job-share with 
someone else; or 
 being flexible with the amount of unpaid or paid leave you can take and when 
you can take it. 
 
The Carers’ Factsheet represents a strong statement in support of the objectives of Part 
4B, and a very loose, but broad and beneficial, interpretation of its operation in practice. 
It suggests that the provisions under Part 4B, taken together, will generally require an 
employer to provide reasonable accommodation or ‘special arrangements’ for all 
worker–carers, whether they are job applicants, currently employed or former 
employees. 
 
In Chapter 4,
76
 it was noted that a ‘special arrangements’ model has been heavily 
critiqued in the discrimination law literature. However, the writer has argued that a duty 
of reasonable accommodation based upon this concept is an important statutory 
mechanism that can assist to normalise flexibility. It may also represent an important 
and necessary step in the evolution and development of a new norm of flexibility and 
can represent an acknowledgement that unpaid care work is recognised and valued, and 
should be accommodated, affirmed and integrated, thereby ‘supporting and validating 
this work’.77 
 
                                                 
75
 Note that the ADB avoids an overly technical approach but appears to conflate the application of the 
provisions. For example, it does not clarify that reasonableness only relates to indirect discrimination 
provisions and instead suggests that provisions under Part 4B will in effect require reasonable 
accommodation for all workers, including hiring and firing situations, as well as workers currently 
employed. 
76
 See Chapter 4, at 4.4.4, where the literature critiquing the ‘special arrangement’ approach is discussed. 
77
 Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 23, 702. 
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A major criticism of the Carer’s Factsheet is that it provides very little practical 
guidance by way of capacity building for workers in relation to how to actually go about 
requesting an accommodation procedurally, or what steps to take in negotiating with an 
employer. That is it provided little guidance about how to actually use Part 4B to 
achieve an accommodation at the workplace level. Other than vaguely stating that 
‘[t]here are no set rules’ and that it is up to the employee and employer to ‘negotiate a 
suitable arrangement’, workers are provided with very little information about how to 
negotiate in practice. This is in quite sharp contrast with the specific guidance provided 
to employers in the Carers’ Employer Guidelines about how to implement the law in 
practice at the workplace level, discussed below.
78
 Although the ADB does publish a 
separate guide to what it calls ‘self-help strategies’, the focus of that publication covers 
the AD Act and is far too general.
79
 It will provide limited assistance to a worker–carer 
trying to negotiate an accommodation under Part 4B, which will require a more focused 
and strategic approach to presenting and negotiating their request for flexibility. 
 
Given the important role of ADB carers’ publications as an accessible source of 
community information for both awareness raising and capacity building—and when 
more and more people appear to prefer to access information online rather than phoning 
the enquiries line— it is strongly recommended that more attention should be given to 
explaining more comprehensively how a worker–carer should go about actually 
negotiating an accommodation in practice.
80
 The ADB must provide much greater 
‘structured guidance’,81 for example, about how to prepare for and make a request for an 
accommodation. Such guidance could include what form a request should take; what 
details should be provided in the request; what evidence can be used to support a 
proposal, for example, suggesting proposals and alternative ways that the work can be 
undertaken;
82
 keeping records of any requests, and employer responses; and who to 
contact or what steps to take if a request is refused. The Fair Work Ombudsman, for 
                                                 
78
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 9–21.  
79
 ADB, Strategies, above n 47, provides step-by-step guidance about what action an individual may take 
and provides details of other agencies or organisations that may be able to help.  
80
 See, for example, ADB Annual Report 2010–11, 12, which notes that the Board’s website is a major 
source of information for the community, and as a result, the number of calls to the enquiries line has 
fallen. 
81
 See, for example, Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 24, 135. 
82
 See ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 46, 11. See, for example, the Tribunal 
decision in Reddy [2004] NSWADT 218 [78] and Tleyji [2005] NSWADT 294 [105]. The cases are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6, at 6.3.4. 
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example, provides such guidance about rights under the FW Act, including providing 
templates.
83
 
 
As noted in Chapter 4,
84
 it would also be useful for the ADB, in its employee-focused 
publications, to explain any alternative or overlapping employee rights under 
legislation, such as the FW Act, and, in addition, how and where to seek help to enable 
an informed choice about jurisdiction.
85
 The collaborative multi-agency approach 
suggested by the AHRC would be beneficial in this regard.
86
  
 
8.5.3 Employer Obligations and Encouraging Compliance  
 
For employers, the ADB’s focus upon their obligations is twofold: preventing 
discrimination and encouraging compliance. Many of the arguments that the ADB used 
in its publications aimed at employers also reflect the policy sources, rationale and 
objectives underpinning Part 4B outlined in Chapter 5.
87
 The ADB suggests that 
discrimination legislation and reasonable accommodation have the potential to achieve 
individual remedies and also to change deeply entrenched and gendered discriminatory 
work practices and assumptions about the responsibility for unpaid care.
88
  The ADB’s 
approach outlined in the carers’ publications aimed at employers, discussed below, 
reflects many of the arguments raised in the literature about the capacity and potential of 
discrimination legislation in this regard.  
 
The ADB recognised that, for Part 4B to be effectively implemented at the workplace 
level, employers need to be persuaded that complying with the law would be beneficial 
to them—that compliance is not just an issue of legal risk management but that it should 
                                                 
83
 For example, see Fair Work Ombudsman, Best Practice, above n 24, which provides a guide to using 
the RTR legislation and templates for employees and employers to use: 
https://www.fairwork.gov.au/resources/best-practice-guides/pages/work-and-family.aspx. 
84
 See Chapter 4, at 4.5.3. 
85
 See generally Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and the Case of Deborah 
Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’) applying the different causes of actions to the facts 
of State of Victoria v Schou [2004] 8 VR 120. 
86
 AHRC, Supporting, above n 31, 10, discussed above in Section 8.2.2. 
87
 See especially the discussion in that chapter of the LRC Report, above n 20, and Attorney-General 
Shaw’s second reading speech introducing the Carers’ Responsibilities Bill to Parliament: New South 
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw). 
88
 The literature outlining both the deficiencies and the potential of discrimination law approaches was the 
focus of Chapter 4 generally. 
331 
 
be willingly embraced by employers on the basis of mutual benefit.
 89
 The Carers’ 
Employer Guidelines state that Part 4B is intended to provide a ‘good guide to creating 
equitable and consistent policies that benefit all employers and employees’90 because 
‘almost everyone at some time in their life has to care for someone at the same time as 
managing their work … [Part 4B] recognises this reality and provides legal guidelines 
for how to manage this’.91 In reality, Part 4B, following the traditional discrimination 
law model of direct and indirect discrimination, in fact articulates no such clear ‘legal 
guidelines’. Rather, it was left to the ADB in 2000 to articulate these goals in practice.   
 
In articulating these goals, the ADB appears to have been heavily influenced by the 
LRC’s rationale in recommending a new ground of carers’ discrimination.92 It referred 
to the key social policy goals of Part 4B as trying to ensure work–life balance, and 
addressing the gendered conception of work and care, and the subsequent disadvantage 
that this causes. The ADB highlighted a number of demographic changes, such as the 
ageing population, more women in the workforce and changes to family structures.
93
 It 
also argued that the carers’ legislation had strong economic efficiency benefits,94 such 
as keeping business competitive because meeting employee demand for flexibility 
provides good people management, which ensures productivity.
95
  
 
Consistent with the message in the Carer’s Factsheet, a duty of reasonable 
accommodation is highlighted by the ADB in the Carers’ Employer Guidelines as both 
a key objective and a key strategy to achieve substantive equality for worker–carers.96 
Essentially, the ADB argues that ‘the central feature of the new carers’ responsibilities 
                                                 
89
 See Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 23, 697–701, where she suggested that there are several explanations 
for corporate responses to work and family conflict in terms of providing family-friendly workplaces or 
flexibility, other than in terms of risk management and avoiding legal claims of discrimination, and points 
to a business case in terms of efficiency, and a ‘moral’ case of doing, and being seen to be doing, the right 
thing. 
90
 ADB, Equal Time, above n 46, 6. 
91
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 6. 
92
 See Chapter 5, at 5.2.4, outlining the LRC Report, above n 20.  
93
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 5. 
94
 See Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 23, 690; Hugh Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ 
(2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16, 20–2. 
95
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 8, 13, 22. At 5–6 it was argued that: 
in fact many employers have already recognised that it makes excellent people management sense 
to do their best to accommodate their employees’ carers’ responsibilities. These employers (both 
large and small, and from all sectors) have already put in place all sorts of sensible and creative 
flexible work arrangements. 
96
 See generally LRC Report, above n 20, and New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, 3 May 2000, 5019 (J W Shaw), discussed in Chapter 5. 
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discrimination law is that your work arrangements need to be as flexible as possible’.97 
Employers are told that the law requires that they ‘must’ provide ‘any special’ or 
‘reasonable arrangements’ wherever possible.98 At the end of the decade the 
fundamental message was unchanged. The Equal Time special edition explained that 
employees have the ‘right to request special arrangements’ and that ‘the law requires’ 
employers to ‘seriously consider’ requests for flexible work arrangements ‘and to 
provide these wherever possible’.99 Although an employer is not obliged to grant all or 
any requests for flexible work arrangements, generally it should do so unless it would 
cause ‘extreme financial or operational difficulties or impediments.’100 This is clearly a 
much stronger statement than the unjustifiable hardship provisions under s 49U provide 
for.  
 
The ADB also provided detailed ‘structured’ guidance101 to employers about what 
practical steps they should take to prevent discrimination and comply with Part 4B. It 
suggested that employers take proactive steps and undertake a discrimination audit of 
their workplaces.
102
  The Carers’ Employer Guidelines reflect Fredman’s ‘unified’ 
approach to equality based on both duties of restraint and positive obligations to address 
discrimination, Sturm’s problem-solving context-based strategies and Chapman’s 
support for an express duty of reasonable accommodation, noted in the literature review 
in Chapter 4.
103
 The ADB also focussed on practical capacity building and the need to 
tackle workplace culture, and the hostility of managers and supervisors.  This also 
reflects the contemporary literature which has recognised that laws and policies will 
have little impact if they are not effectively implemented at the workplace level.
104
 For 
example, the AHRC has also noted the ‘leadership lottery’ whereby the decision or 
attitude of direct or line managers often determined how effectively a policy was 
                                                 
97
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 13. 
98
 Ibid 13; also, at 3. See also ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 46, 11–12. 
99
 ADB, Equal Time, above n 46, 4. Note that the use of the term right to request probably reflects the 
language used under the FW Act RTR. 
100
 ADB, Equal Time, above n 46, 4. 
101
 Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 24, 135.  
102 
ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, and ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, 
above n 46, and Equal Time, above 46. 
103
 This reflects Fredman’s, Sturm’s and Chapman’s works as outlined in Chapter 4, at 4.4: Sandra 
Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 
2008), 175; Sturm, above n 29; Anna Chapman ‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and 
Family’ (Working Paper No 51, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law 
School, The University of Melbourne, 2012); Chapman, ‘Schou’, above n 85. 
104
 Chapter 3, at 3.5.3.  
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implemented.
105
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock also report that workplace culture and 
first-line supervision have been shown to affect work–life conflict significantly.106 
Reflecting these issues, the Carers’ Employer Guidelines focus expressly on practical 
capacity building, and tackling workplace culture, and the hostility of managers and 
supervisors.
107
  
 
A number of clearly defined steps to eradicate carers’ discrimination in the workplace 
are recommended by the ADB including:  
(i) Remove any direct and indirect discriminatory policies or practices, including 
those based on the ‘same rules for everyone’, and including both ‘written and 
unwritten operational and work requirements, conditions and rules’, and 
industrial agreements.
108
  
 
(ii) Be as flexible as possible. The ADB suggests a number of ways that carers’ 
responsibilities could be accommodated such as working from home, job 
sharing, part-time work, compressed working hours, flexibility with leave, and 
giving adequate notice of changes to regular days and hours.
109
 It suggests that 
employers:  
Be prepared to think outside the square—things do not always have 
to be done in the way they have always been done [and you should] 
provide flexible work arrangements wherever possible… In effect 
the law says that you must do your best to provide whatever extra or 
special arrangements a job applicant or employee with caring 
responsibilities needs in order to manage their caring responsibilities 
alongside their work … there are no set rules about what sorts of 
extra or special arrangements you may need to provide in order to 
enable a job applicant or employee to manage their carers’ 
responsibilities … it is up to you what you negotiate with any 
particular job applicant or employee whose carers’ responsibilities 
need accommodating in some way.
110
 
(iii) Procedurally, the ADB recommends that employers develop written work 
policies to inform employees of the flexibility options available
111
 and also 
                                                 
105
 AHRC, Supporting, above n 31, 85. 
106
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 28, 13, 60.  
107
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 9–21.  
108
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 12, 20. 
109
 Ibid 14. 
110
 Ibid 12–13. 
111
 Ibid 14; ADB, Equal Time, above n 46, 4.  
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develop a grievance policy to try to resolve issues at the workplace level.
112
 It 
notes that such policies must be consistently applied,
113
 and crucially 
recommends that supervisors, managers and staff are all aware of these policies 
and are trained to implement these policies properly and consistently.
114
 The 
ADB suggested that: 
[d]eveloping such written policies will help reduce the need for one 
off decision-making ensuring that every manager/supervisor works 
to the same rules about assessing how and when to accommodate 
any particular employees’ carers’ responsibilities. 
 
(iv) Consult with and inform employees of these options for flexible work. The 
ADB recommends that ‘first and foremost you should always ask the particular 
employee for any ideas that they might have about how they think their work 
can be best managed alongside their carers’ responsibilities’.115 Again, this 
recognition of the worker–carer as an agent for change and not a passive 
workplace participant reflects Sturm’s problem-solving approach to workplace 
discrimination.
116
 Such measures include consultation, keeping employees 
informed of policies and putting in place a grievance process. Such measures 
have the potential to empower employees and build capacity in two ways: first, 
by enabling them to know what their workplace rights are; and second, by 
helping to create a workplace environment where the employee can exercise 
those rights without fear of being stigmatised.
117
 
 
(v) Put in place practical and administrative ways to deal with applications for 
flexibility, such as: asking for appropriate proof of a caring responsibility 
without breaching privacy; and addressing concerns about how to practically 
manage working from home; and how to deal with any discontent of co-workers 
without caring responsibilities for example, by providing flexible work to all 
employees.
118
  
 
                                                 
112
 ADB, Guidelines for Managers and Supervisors, above n 46. 
113
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 17. 
114 
Ibid 17–18.  
115
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46.  
116
 Sturm, above n 29. 
117
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 28, 60. 
118
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 22.  
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(vi) Normalising flexibility119 where as noted above, the ADB argued that broadly 
employers would benefit because flexibility would provide all employees with a 
more positive work–life balance120 and would also avoid discontent from other 
employees who do not have carers’ responsibilities.121 
 
In conclusion, the Carers’ Guidelines clearly envisage that the carers’ legislation under 
Part 4B would have more systemic and broader effects within an organisation or across 
the workforce. This is reflected in its recommendations to employers to carry out 
proactively a discrimination audit of their workplaces, involving a review of work 
organisation and practices, as well as trying to build a supportive workplace culture to 
ensure a consistent and broad approach to providing flexibility and the genuine 
implementation of Part 4B. The systemic focus is also reflected in the ADB’s 
suggestion of providing broad flexibility for all workers, not dependent upon their 
carers’ responsibilities, in order to achieve better work–life balance for all workers.122   
 
However, the Carers’ Employer Guidelines are no longer publicly available. It is 
strongly recommended that they are updated and published again as they provide a 
valuable and targeted resource for employers. They aim to further the social policy 
objectives of Part 4B by building the capacity of employers to genuinely engage with 
their obligations at the context based workplace level. As Smith has noted, such targeted 
guidance materials can ‘prompt greater commitment to the regulatory goals; explain the 
diverse and insidious ways in which discrimination can manifest; and provide clear and 
useful examples of alternative, more inclusive ways to operate.’ 123   
                                                 
119
 Ibid 8, 13.  See above n 62. The issue of ‘normalising’ flexibility is discussed in the literature review 
in Chapter 4, at 4.4.4. In particular, note Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 28, 14; Charlesworth 
and Campbell, above n 24, 129, 134–5; Hugh Collins, ‘The Right to Flexibility’ in Joanne Conaghan and 
Kerry Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work and Family: Critical and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 99, 108–9. See also s 65 of the FW Act, in which the RTR was extended 
significantly in 2013 in relation to the eligibility of workers to request flexibility, as outlined at Chapter 5, 
at 5.3.2. 
120
 The guidelines do not discuss employee well-being resulting from better work–life balance, but see 
generally Barbara Pocock, The Work/Life Collision: What Work is Doing to Australians and What to Do 
about It (Federation Press, 2003) and Smith, ‘Bathwater’, above n 23, 696, setting out the negative effects 
on employee well-being arising from the work–life conflict. 
121
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 46, 22. Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 24, 129, 
also make this point. 
122
See Chapter 4, at 4.4.4. In particular, note Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 28, 14; 
Charlesworth and Campbell, above n 24, 129, 134–5; Collins, ‘Flexibility’, above n 119, 108–9. See also 
s 65 of the FW Act, in which the RTR was extended significantly in 2013 as outlined at Chapter 5, at 
5.3.1. at n 139 and accompanying text. 
123 Smith ‘Bolster’ above n 26, 556. 
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8.6 Concluding Comments: The Normative Role of the Education 
Function 
 
As noted above, although it is obviously difficult to measure the effects of the ADB’s 
education function more broadly in society, it is clear that – through its publications 
aimed at workers and employers, its telephone advice line and its website, as well as 
through the provision of training, all of which are very well used by the people and 
organisations in NSW – the ADB is likely to have been influential in disseminating its 
broad and beneficial interpretation of Part 4B aimed at meeting its policy objectives.  Its 
normative role, to interpret and apply the AD Act, is well recognised throughout NSW, 
where its functions under s 119 include consulting ‘with governmental, business, 
industrial and community groups and organisations in order to ascertain means of 
improving services and conditions affecting minority groups and other groups which are 
the subject of discrimination and inequality’. Free of the constraints of an adjudicative 
function, the ADB has used its education function to interpret and apply Part 4B 
purposively and consistently with its policy objectives by advocating for: a general duty 
of accommodation, greater substantive equality for worker–carers, gender equality, and 
structural changes to challenge ideal worker norms thereby normalising flexibility.  
 
Importantly, since 2000,
124
 the ADB has consistently suggested that the provisions 
under Part 4B operate together in practice in order to imply a general duty of reasonable 
accommodation, which together would apply for all worker–carers. Therefore, the ADB 
has consistently avoided a technical legal approach to the interpretation and application 
of Part 4B and instead takes a broadly beneficial and more holistic approach. It does this 
even though the legal basis for its position is sometimes tenuous, equivocal and appears 
to be based upon a conflation of the reasonableness provisions under indirect 
discrimination with the unjustifiable hardship provisions.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that the ADB’s approach to Part 4B is likely to have 
had an important normative impact in terms of how worker–carers and employers 
                                                 
124
 ADB, Carer’s Employer Guidelines, above n 46.  
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understand, implement and engage with their rights and obligations at the day-to-day 
workplace level. It has a strong normative potential to contribute to the capacity of 
employers and employees to change workplace attitudes, cultures and behaviours. The 
ADB’s interpretation, if this is also disseminated through its complaint-handling 
function is also likely to have contributed to the successful resolution of carers’ 
complaints involving an accommodation. In these ways, the ADB has interpreted and 
applied Part 4B purposively in order to give effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B. 
Chapters 9 and 10 now turn to the operation of the complaint handling process and the 
outcomes of the complaints. 
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Chapter 9: Complaints at the ADB: Process, Outcomes and 
Remedies 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter now focuses on the complaint-handling function of the Anti-
Discrimination Board (‘ADB’) and the 520 complaints that were lodged at the ADB 
between 2001 and 2011.
 1
  Chapter 2 set out the basis for the complaints data set of 520 
complaints in accordance with the Human Research Ethics Committee (‘HREC’) 
protocol.
2
 Other than the limited aggregate complaints data provided in the ADB annual 
reports, very little is known about the complaints or the role that the ADB played 
through its complaint-handling function.
3
  
 
Although the complaints made under Part 4B have not been considered in the 
literature,
4
 the deficiencies in the first stage of the discrimination complaint process 
generally in Australia, including in NSW, have been well canvassed.
5
 In particular, 
there are concerns that the process and outcomes of conciliation amount to a 
privatisation of justice because they are confidential and are not open to public 
scrutiny,
6
 and that ‘consequently conciliation neither empowers others to complain nor 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5. 
2
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.4. 
3
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.3 
4 See Chapter 1 which provides an overview of the two- stage statutory enforcement process found under 
Australian discrimination laws.  In particular, section 1.2.5 and accompanying footnotes provide an 
overview of the two stage enforcement model and the contemporary academic literature relating to its 
deficiencies and potential law reform options.  Section 1.4 deals with the ADB and the first stage of the 
process:  1.4.1 outlines the statutory provisions;  1.4.2 the investigation and conciliation process at the 
ADB; and 1.4.3 deals in detail with the deficiencies but also the potential to improve the operation of that 
stage. See also Chapters 3 and 4, especially at 4.3.1, which provide a detailed literature review. In 
particular, the Introduction to Part II of this thesis,and the accompanying footnotes  provide a summary of 
those works in which Part 4B has been considered, and in which the operation and critique of the two 
stage complaints process generally in Australia has been considered. 
5
 See Chapter 4, at 4.3.1 See especially Rosemary Hunter and Alice Leonard, ‘The Outcomes of 
Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases’ (Working Paper No 8, Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, 1995) 1 (‘Working Paper’), and Anna 
Chapman, ‘Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The Paradox of Informal Dispute Resolution’ 
(2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 321, 323 (‘Complaint-Handling’), for a succinct summary of the main 
critiques of the first stage of the enforcement process in discrimination jurisdictions in Australia.  
6
 See generally Hunter and Leonard, ‘Working Paper’, above n 5, 1; Margaret Thornton, The Liberal 
Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1990) ch 5 (‘Promise’). 
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creates precedents for future cases. In this context agencies’ claims that conciliation is 
successful in dealing with conciliation cases are open to question’.7 There are also 
concerns that the complaint-handling and conciliation processes, which were intended 
to provide informal, low-cost and quick access to justice, have become increasingly 
legalistic, adversarial and formal, and amount to second-rate justice for complainants.
8
 
Discrimination agencies have been criticised for doing little to address unequal 
bargaining positions of the parties, for staying neutral and impartial, and for providing 
little substantive assistance to the complainant.
9
 
 
The first research question asks how the ADB interpreted and applied the law, and 
whether this has given effect in practice to the policy objectives of Part 4B. Chapter 8 
considered the ADB’s education function in this regard. The review and analysis of the 
complaints in this and Chapter 10 also provide some insight into how the ADB has 
applied Part 4B through its complaint function.  
 
The second question asks how effective the complaints process has been.
10
 In this 
chapter, it will be argued that the first stage of the enforcement process offers an 
important ‘problem-solving’ mechanism11 for carers’ complainants, providing access to 
a relatively informal, free and timely enforcement process, especially when compared 
with the Tribunal process. It will be shown that, out of a total of 520 complaints that 
were reviewed for this project, 281 (54%) settled and received some remedy, such as 
accommodation of their responsibilities, compensation, an apology or a 
reference/certificate of service. Although compensation tended to be an inadequate 
remedy in practice, because payments were generally very low, it is also noted that 160 
complaints (31%) settled with some form of accommodation, so that the complainant 
remained in work. Further, 56 complaints (11%) resulted in a specific outcome with 
potentially systemic effects within a workplace, for example, in relation to a policy 
change or provision of training. Therefore, the ADB process was capable of providing 
                                                 
7
 Hunter and Leonard, ‘Working Paper’, above n 5, 1. 
8
 Ibid; Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 5, 345; Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing 
Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime (Themis, 2010) 9 (‘Enforcing’); Thornton, Promise, 
above n 6, 175. 
9
 Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 5, 345; Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 175. 
10
 See Chapter 2, at 2.5.4. 
11
 See Sturm’s problem-solving approach to discrimination as discussed in Chapter 4, at 4.4.2. 
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‘good’ outcomes for individual complainants, with potentially broader systemic effects, 
thereby giving effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B.  
 
This chapter is in four sections: The first, Section 9.2, explains the context of the 
complaints and provides a primarily quantitative and descriptive summary of the key 
characteristics of three aspects of the complaints.  First, the complainant (gender, nature 
of caring responsibility and employment status); second, the work and the workplace 
context (occupation, industry and sector classification); and third the discriminatory 
conduct complained of. Appendix D provides tables of the complaints data upon which 
the summary is based at Tables D1-15.
12
  
 
The next two sections focus specifically on answering the research questions. Section 
9.3 considers the process and the application of the ‘triage’ approach, the timeliness, 
informality and flexibility of the process, and whether legal representation was required 
or allowed. Section 9.4 then turns to the outcomes and the nature of the individual and 
systemic remedies that were achieved.  
 
The chapter concludes at Section 9.5 by evaluating whether the complaints process did 
provide ‘good’ outcomes for worker–carers, and whether the process is likely to have 
provided broader normative outcomes.  
 
The analysis of complaints data in this chapter is based largely on quantitative data and 
is supplemented by, and should be read in conjunction with, Chapter 10, which presents 
qualitative complaint summaries. This will provide a more complete and holistic 
understanding of the operation of the process in practice, the interaction and roles of the 
key actors (the ADB, complainants and respondents) and the outcomes and remedies 
(both individual and systemic) that were achieved as a result.  
 
Presentation of the Data: Rounding and Confidentiality 
Two points should be noted in relation to the presentation of the data in this chapter and 
in Chapter 10. The first relates to the rounding of complaints statistics to make the data 
easier to understand and readily comparable. As a result, small discrepancies may occur 
                                                 
12
 See also Appendix C, which appends the Data Collection Criteria and Coding Sheet used to collect and 
analyse the complaints data.  
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between sums of the component items and totals in the tables and figures presented 
below and in Appendix D. Second, it should be reiterated that the HREC protocol and a 
confidentiality agreement that the writer entered into with the ADB together provided 
that the identity of the parties to the complaints must remain confidential.
13
 
Accordingly, the writer has endeavoured to ensure that the parties to a complaint cannot 
be identified in relation to any individual complaint. In particular, 
employers/respondents are referred to in the context of industry and occupation groups, 
and general categories within these groups. Complaints are referred to by the research 
number (‘RN#’) which was allocated in sequence in chronological order of when the 
complaint was lodged, at the point of data collection as per the HREC protocol.
14
  
Where complaint summaries are referred to the names of the complainant have been 
changed, and random names have been chosen.  
 
9.2 Complaints Overview: Complainants, Respondent and Conduct 
 
This section provides a descriptive summary of key aspects of the complaints data about 
the parties and the conduct complained of. Appendix D contains complaints data tables 
that summarise in greater detail the number and proportion of complaints made in 
relation to each aspect of the complaint, often by reference to the gender and caring 
responsibility of the complainant. This section should be read in conjunction with these 
tables. Data in relation to the process and outcomes are not contained here but are 
provided below in Sections 9.3 and 9.4. 
 
9.2.1 The Complainant 
 
Demographics: Age, Race, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and Indigenous 
complainants, and complainants from Culturaly and Linguistically Diverse 
Backgrounds     
In common with other anti-discrimination and human rights complaint-handling 
agencies, generally, very little demographic information about complainants is recorded 
                                                 
13
 See Chapter 2, at 2.6, which outline the privacy, confidentiality and ethics considerations involved in 
the research process. 
14
 See Table 9.1, which sets out the number of complaints lodged in each year in the context of this 
research project and the allocated RN# by date of lodgement.  It is therefore possible to identify the year 
in which a complaint was lodged. 
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by the ADB, and nor can it easily be inferred from the complaint files.
15
 Data about 
complainant characteristics such as age of the complainant or whether the complainants 
were indigenous, or from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds were largely 
unavailable and could not be reliably inferred from files.
16
 
 
 
Individual, Group or Representative Complainants 
The AD Act allows for complaints by individuals, by a group of individuals or by a 
representative body on behalf of one or more persons.
17
 However, 517 out of 520 
complaints were made by individuals and just three complaints (<1%) came from non-
individual complainants.
18
 While it is envisaged that the AD Act will provide for group 
and representative complaints that could be used to challenge systemic or broader 
discrimination in a workplace, it is clear that these provisions were not well used.
19
 
 
 
The Gender of the Complainants and Rate of Complaints 
Table 9.1 sets out the number of complaints in each year by gender as reviewed during 
the research project. The final column notes the number of carers’ complaints for the 
corresponding year as recorded in the ADB annual reports. Generally, no breakdown of 
the gender of complainants was provided by the ADB in its reports.
20
  
 
The empirical review of the 520 complaints reflects the fact that women are still 
primarily responsible for providing unpaid care in the family even as they have entered 
                                                 
15
 See Sara Charlesworth et al, Formal Complaints of Workplace Sexual Harassment Lodged with the 
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commissions 1 July 2009–31 December 2009 (Centre 
for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2012) 3, 35, reporting similar findings. 
16
 Only one complainant identified as indigenous during the decade.  See also Table D8, in Appendix D 
where ten complaints involved race discrimination which may possibly indicate that the complainant was 
from a CALD background. 
17
 See AD Act ss 87, 87A–87C.  
18
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.4, for an explanation of the data set of 520 complaints. The three non-individual 
complaints were brought by a trade union on behalf of six women; a trade union on behalf of a female; 
and a married couple.  
19
 See, for example, two cases related to group complaints under the sex discrimination provisions under 
the AD Act: Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165; New South Wales v Amery 
(2006) 20 CLR 174.  
20
 See generally Chapter 2, at 2.2.3, for a summary of the data contained in the annual reports and its 
limitations.  
343 
 
the paid workforce in greater numbers.
21
  The majority of complaints, 382 (73%), were 
lodged by women, and 135 (26%) were lodged by men. Women are therefore more 
likely to face workplace discrimination than men and/or may also be more likely to 
complain about it.  However, men have consistently made on average more than a 
quarter of all carers’ complaints over the decade, the majority of which were from 
fathers, who made 93 out of 135 complaints. In three years—2003–2004, 2006–2007 
and 2007–2008—men made more than 30% of all complaints.22 Many of these 
complainants were seeking some form of flexibility at work.
23
 The consistent 
representation of male complainants over the decade supports the findings in the 
literature that many men would like to work more flexibly, to enable them to share more 
of the burden for caring work at home.
24
 In earlier chapters, it was noted that a key 
policy objective underpinning the enactment of Part 4B was gender equality in paid and 
unpaid care work.
25
 Although women made most complaints, the steady proportion of 
male complainants over the decade suggests that the gender-equality objectives of Part 
4B, in relation to a more equitable sharing of the burden of unpaid care work, and 
greater equality for worker–carers in paid work, particularly in relation to fathers 
providing care for children, may be meeting with at least some level of success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 See Chapter 3, at 3.3, which outlines the literature relating to the contemporary demographics of work 
and care in Australia. 
22
 In 2007–2008, men made 37% of all carers’ complaints under Part 4B. There is no explanation for this 
higher-than-expected rate of male complainants in that year.  
23
 See Section 9.2.6, which outlines the conduct complained about. See also Table D15 in Appendix D, 
which sets out the conduct about which male complainants complained.  
24
 See Chapter 3, at 3.4.2, outlining the literature and contemporary reports indicating that men would like 
more flexibility.  
25
 See Chapter 1, at 1.6, and see Chapter 5 generally, which outlines the policy objectives of Part4B and 
the key policy sources.  
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Table 9.1: Carers’ Complainants Received by the ADB 2001–2011 by Gender and 
Non-Individual Complaints Compared with ADB Annual Reports Statistics 
Year * 
  
Number  
Per 
Research 
Project  
 
Allocated 
Research 
No 
(RN#)**  
Female  
(as % per 
year)  
Male  
(as % per 
year ) 
Other  
(as % per 
year) 
Number 
Per   
ADB 
Annual 
Report  
 
2000/01***   22 1-22 16 (73) 6 (27) 0 20  
2001/02 64 23-86 49 (77) 13 (20) 2 (3) 67 
2002/03 84 87-170 62 (74) 21 (25) 1 (1) 88 
2003/04 44 171-214 31 (70) 13 (30) 0 43 
2004/05 39 215-253 30 (77) 9 (23) 0 39 
2005/06 41 254-294 29 (71) 12 (29) 0 40 
2006/07 28 295-322 19 (68) 9 (32) 0 29 
2007/08 46 328-368 29 (63) 17 (37) 0 46 
2008/09 66 369-434 52 (78) 14 (22) 0 66 
2009/10 51 435-485 38 (75) 13 (25) 0 55 
2010/11**** 35   486-520 27 (77) 8 (23) 0 61 
Total  520 520 382 (73) 135 (26) 3 (<1) 555 
* ADB annual reports provide a review of the ADB’s operations in a financial year from 1 July to 
June. To enable easier comparison of data, the ADB carers’ complaints files were also reviewed by 
financial year not calendar.  
** Research No allocated as per HREC Protocol 13083 issued 28 September 2010. 
*** Part 4B commenced 1 March 2001; these 22 complaints were therefore lodged in the four-
month period up to 30 June 2001. 
**** Only complaints that had been finalised could be accessed for research purposes. Therefore, 
only complaints finalised at 30 June 2010, marking the first decade of the operation of Part 4B, 
were reviewed. 
 
 
9.2.2 The Nature of the Caring Responsibilities 
 
The caring relationship could be ascertained in 514 out of the 520 complaints lodged.
26
  
This information was readily available on the file in either the written complaint, or 
included in an ADB file note of a telephone conversation with the complainant.  Section 
49S lists the caring relationships covered under Part 4B, and as noted below at 9.3.2, 
procedurally as a jurisdictional issue for the ADB a complaints officer must satisfy his 
or herself that a relationship existed that would fall under s49S.  Only one complaint 
was declined because it related to a relative who was not covered under s 49S.
27
   
                                                 
26
 In six complaints, all from men, the relationship could not be identified from the limited detail 
provided.  
27
 See s 49S(1). This complaint came from a man who alleged that he was not granted bereavement leave 
on the death of an aunt. The complaint was declined on the grounds that it did not disclose a 
contravention of the AD Act.  Note that this does not mean that complaints were not made relating to 
discrimination against workers with caring responsibilities for relatives other than those provided for 
under s 49S. Such complaints may have been dealt with on other grounds. See Chapter 1, at 1.7.1, which 
outlines the relevant provisions under Part 4B, and the potential alternative grounds of complaint. 
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The complaints were coded into nine groups by gender and the nature of the caring 
relationship, depending upon whether the care was provided for children or for adults, 
rather than by any broader definition or detail about the precise nature of care provided. 
It is explained below that 460 complaints related to care for children.  In order to 
interrogate whether different categories of carer were subject to different types of 
discriminatory conduct the writer decided to code the complaints involving care for 
children with reference to whether the complainant was a parent, by gender of the 
parent, and whether the conduct complained of related to the time around the birth of a 
baby.  
 
It should be noted that common accepted terms such as ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are used, 
as they were most recently by the Australian Human Rights Commission in the 2014 
Supporting Working Parents Report.
27a 
  It is noteworthy that this Report also finds, 
mothers in particular do suffer from discrimination which is diretly related to pregnancy 
and/or around the birth of a baby, and/or around the return to work.  The empirical 
review of the carers’ complaints also supports these findings and it was therefore it was 
therefore crucial that the category of mothers with responsibilities to care for a baby, at 
or around the time of the birth, was coded specifically in the contextof the 520 
complaints, to take this type of discriminatory conduct into account. 
 
It must be emphasised that the following coding categories are not intended to exclude 
same sex parents, foster parents or adoptive parents rather the catgory of ‘mother’ 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27a  
Australian Human Rights Commission, Supporting Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work 
National Review Report (2014).  See for example Chapter 2, 23  where it is noted that the data for the 
report came from a ‘Mother’s Survey’ and a ‘Father and Partner’s Survey’.  
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represents a female parent, and the category ‘father’ respresents a male parent.  It will 
also be noted that neither were complaints coded on the basis of whether the 
complainant was the birth mother, or primary care giver in the household.  
1. Mothers—maternity related, involved complaints from female parents related to 
issues that occurred during pregnancy, and/or around the time of the birth of a 
baby, and/or or involving a return to work after the birth of a baby, which 
occasionally stretched to up to two years post birth, but after that date was no 
longer coded as maternity related.  It is important to note that while many 
complainants explained, or it was clear from the file that they were the birth 
mother, this is not to suggest that complainants in this category were birth 
mothers only, or indeed the primamry carer; 
2. Mothers—not maternity related (‘mothers/NMR’), covering all other complaints 
from female parents not maternity related; 
3. Female carer for children—other parental type responsibilities, where it was 
specified by the complainant that the care was provided to child relatives of the 
family by a grandparent, or a guardian.  These complaints did not state that they 
were foster or adopted parents;   
4. Female carer for adult family members; 
5. Fathers covering all complaints male parents; 
6. Male carer for children—other parental type responsibilities (defined as for 
female carer above); 
7. Male carer for adult family members; 
8. Male carer—relationship not identified; 
9. Other—non-individual complainant. 
 
Figure 9.1 provides a summary of the complaints made to the ADB by caring 
relationship. Tables D1–D4 provide more detailed complaints data. 
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Figure 9.1: Carers’ Complaints by % of Caring Relationship 
 
* Only two complaints were received, equating to 0.4%. 
 
Care for Children 
In 460 complaints (88% of all complainants), the caring responsibilities were for babies 
and children, the vast majority of whom were minors.
28
  One complaint specifically 
identified that the complaint related to an adopted child and one complaint specifically 
related to a foster child, both of whom were minors not babies.  This is not to say that 
other complaints did not relate to foster or adopted children but just that the 
complainant did not identify this as such. Complaints from mothers (both maternity and 
mothers/NMR) accounted for 354 complaints (68%), and these were coded into 
maternity related, with 153 complaints (29%), and NMR with 201 complaints (39%). 
Fathers made 93 complaints (18%). Ten parental-type carers’ complaints came from 
complainants who were not the parents of the children but whose responsibilities 
involved what can be termed parental-type responsibilities. Seven of these were from 
grandparents (six grandmothers and one grandfather). The other three came from an 
aunt, who was also appointed as guardian to her niece/nephew; the other two involved 
one male complainant and one female complainant, who appeared to have parental 
responsibilities for children in the family, but the precise nature of the relationship was 
not well defined in their complaints. The three non-individual complaints also all related 
to parents caring for children: the first related to six mothers and maternity issues 
around job share and/or part-time work; the second related to a mother with 
                                                 
28
 It appeared that a small number of complaints (<10) related to care provided for the complainant’s adult 
child.   
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1 
1 
7 
18 
2 
4 
29 
39 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Male Carer - other parental*
Non-individual
Male Carer - Relationship not identified
Male Carer for Adult
Fathers
Female Carer - other parental
Female Carer for Adult
Mothers - Maternity related
Mothers - Non Maternity Related
As % 520 Complaints  
348 
 
responsibilities for a school-age child; and the third related to a married couple with 
responsibilities for their teenage child. 
 
Same Sex Parents 
None of the 520 complainants raised that they were in a same–sex relationship.  That 
may be because their same same–sex was not relevant as s49S covered their caring 
relationship as a parent (whether mother or father) in any event, or alternaively that 
same sex parents are not using the legislation.  It is also noted in Table D8 in Appendix 
C that only one male carers’ complainant, caring for an adult, also lodged a complaint 
of homosexuality discrimination. Whether same sex carers are using the carers’ 
responsibilities legislation, and with what success, is an issue which will require further 
empricial research over and above an analysis of written complaints only.   
 
Sole and Co-parent Responsibilities: Reflecting ‘Non-standard’ Family Units 
Out of 520 complaints, 67 (13%) came from either sole parents or individuals who were 
co-parents. The term co-parent is used here to include parents who were divorced, or 
had separated, and had commitments to care for their child(ren) as agreed, either 
formally through the courts or through other informal arrangements. The representation 
of these ‘non-standard’ family units in the carers’ complaints data reflects the 
significant changes to family structures in society and the pressures they place on 
working parents, mothers and fathers noted in the literature.
29
 Forty-one complaints (8% 
of all complaints lodged) came from mothers who were sole parents or had co-parenting 
issues. Only two were maternity-related complainants and the other 39 came from 
mothers of older children. Twenty-six (5%) came from fathers, who were sole parents 
or had some form of co-parenting arrangement in place with a former partner. 
Proportionally, more father complainants, at 31% (26 complaints out of 93), identified 
that they were either sole parents or had co-parenting arrangements in place, compared 
with 12% of all mother complaints (41 complaints out of 354). These men were in 
effect primary carers for their children for all or part of the time as sole parents or 
                                                 
29
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock have noted that ‘around one in 5 households with a child aged 15 or 
under are now headed by a sole parent’ and that such parents, in particular, sole mothers, face high levels 
of work life pressure and stress: Natalie Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: 
Work, Life and Care in 2012—The Australian Work and Life Index (Centre for Work + Life, University 
of South Australia, 2012) 42, citing Australian Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’), Australian Labour Market 
Statistics (Catalogue No 6105.0, 2012). 
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through some other parenting agreements, and many found that as a result they 
struggled to comply with the male ideal worker norms.    
 
Parental Responsibilities Related to the Birth of a Child 
It has been well recognised in the literature that parents of babies and young children 
face significant discrimination.
30
 This is supported by the data. Out of 520 complaints 
153 complaints (29%) came from mothers and were related to maternity and return to 
work issues. In contrast, only 15 fathers during the decade complained to the ADB (3% 
of all complaints) regarding issues around parental leave or arrangements for flexibility 
at work in either the short or longer term.
31
 Proportionally, 43% of all mother 
complaints related to maternity, while 16% of father complaints related to 
discrimination arising around the birth of a baby. 
 
Care for Adults and ‘Sandwich’ Carers 
Fifty-four complaints (10%) related solely to care for adult relatives who were 
temporarily unwell, had a longer-term disability or were elderly. In addition, some 
complainants who had caring responsibilities for children noted that they had some 
form of caring responsibility for an adult family member (who was not also their child) 
such as a partner or spouse, or an elderly parent. In these circumstances, the complaint 
was coded as relating to care for a child. However, the caring relationship for the adult 
was additionally coded as a ‘sandwich’ carer, a term used by Skinner, Hutchinson and 
Pocock to describe those worker–carers with concurrent caring responsibilities for 
children and adults.
32
 In 31 complaints (6%), concurrent and sometimes multiple 
responsibilities to adults in the family were reported, in addition to the care they 
provided for children. Therefore, in total, 85 complaints (16%) involved care for an 
adult family member. In relation to both adult care categories (adult only and sandwich 
care), more men than women made complaints, with 51 men (38% of all male 
                                                 
30
 For a contemporary overview of workplace discrimination faced by men and women, around and after 
the birth of a child, see generally Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’), Supporting Working 
Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report (2014) 26, 48, 56 (‘Supporting’). 
31
 In none of the complaints did the father identify that he was the primary carer of the baby. These 
paternity/parental complaints related to the following issues: four complainants related to a denial of a 
request for part-time work; three related to requests for flexible rostering; three related to access to or the 
terms of parental leave; three reported that they had suffered a detriment (after they moved to part-time 
work, had taken parental leave or because they were unable to work extra shifts); one was denied a 
transfer to work closer to home; and one was dismissed after he had taken parental leave.  
32
 Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 29, 8–9, 43–4. 
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complainants) having responsibilities for an adult compared with 34 (9% of all female 
complainants). Tables D2–D4 in Appendix D summarise the complaints data and the 
nature of the responsibilities in relation to care for adults. 
 
9.2.3 The Employment Context 
 
Information about the complainants’ employment status could often be ascertained from 
either narrative-based accounts or correspondence contained in the complaint files 
provided by the complainant or the respondent where the contract status and other 
employment information was often expressly provided.
33
  Where this information was 
expressly reported this was coded accordingly. It is however, important to note that 
what the parties to a complaint reported may not accccurately reflect the employment 
context, since it depends upon either the workers or employers to categorise their 
employment status accurately.  It is important to note in particular, that the parties to a 
complaint may not report the status accurately when they are in non-ongoing positions 
for eg. casual, fixed term, non-ongoing or idependent contractor positions. On some 
occasions the information could be inferred for eg. if a complainant stated that they 
worked 15 hours per week for a respondent then clearly their part-time status could be 
inferred.  
 
Details of the coding methodology are outlined below, and as noted caution should be 
exercised when interpreting employment contract data as reported by the parties, or as 
inferred. 
 
Data was collected in relation to three aspects: first, their employment status and 
whether the complaints worked in permanent or non-ongoing positions; second, whether 
they worked full or part-time; and third, whether they were still employed at the time of 
lodgement.   
 
In summary, the majority of carers’ complainants worked in permanent employment 
(398 complaints, 77%), in full-time positions (320 complaints, 62%) and were still 
                                                 
33
 See Charlesworth et al, above n 15, 4, noting similarly that, in relation to sexual harassment complaints 
reviewed across different Australian jurisdictions, employment-related data were not routinely collected 
by the relevant agency, and were often also only evident in narrative-based accounts in the complaint 
files.  
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employed with the respondent at the time of lodgement of the complaint (316, 61%). 
Key variances by gender and care are noted below, and Tables D5–D7 in Appendix D 
provide more detailed complaints data.  
 
The Employment Contract  
Details of the employment/work contract between the complainant and respondent were 
noted from information either provided by the complainant in their written complaint, 
by a respondent confirming the complainant’s employment status or from an ADB file 
note.  These details were available on the file in 472 complaints and were not available 
in 48. Figure 9.2 below summarises the employment status.  Table D5 in Appendix D 
sets out the complaints data. Complaints were coded as:  
1. Permanent ongoing – as reported by a party to the complaint 
2. Non-ongoing—including casual employees34 (long or short term), or fixed-term 
employment contracts – as reported by a party to the complaint 
3. Job applicant 
4. Trainee/qualifying 
5. Not Clear 
6. Other 
 
While Part 4B covers a broad array of working relationships,
35
 in practice, at least 463 
complaints (89%) came directly under s 49V of the AD Act, which relates to 
‘discrimination against applicants and employees’. Only nine complaints could be 
identified as relating to other workplace relationships provided for under Part 4B: three 
involved employers and/or employment or labour hire agencies,
36
 five related to trainees 
or workers required to undergo on-the-job training to qualify
37
 and one complaint came 
                                                 
34
 Note that the ABS defines casuals as ‘employees (excluding owner managers of incorporated 
enterprises) who are not entitled to paid sick or holiday leave’: ABS, Forms of Employment, Australia, 
November 2011 (Catalogue No 6359.0, 2012) (‘Forms of Employment Nov 2011’). For the purposes of 
this project, a complainant was coded as a casual or fixed term worker if this was specifically noted 
somewhere on the file. No attempt was made by the researcher to assess the complainant’s entitlement to 
paid sick or holiday leave.  
35
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.2, which outlines the broad working relationships covered under Part 4B, and 
generally all other areas of discrimination under the AD Act. 
36
 Complaints relating to employment involving employment agencies or labour hire companies were 
brought under ss 49V and 49ZC, as well as the aid and abet provisions under s 52. 
37
 These complaints were all brought under s 49V relating to standard employment involving a period of 
training or qualification in medicine or law, and some of these also appeared to have been brought in the 
alternative under the qualifying body provision under s 49ZB of the AD Act. 
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from a partner in a firm.
38
 In addition, in two complaints, the relationship was a 
commercial one and was not covered under Part 4B. From the information provided on 
the complaint files, it does not appear that complaints were made in relation to any other 
workplace arrangements covered under Part 4B.
39
 However, it should be noted that in 
48 complaints, equating to 9% of complaints, details about the nature of the working 
relationship were coded as ‘not clear’. It may be that some of those related to these 
alternative work relationships, including for example independent contractors although 
this was not apparent on the files.  
 
Therefore, given this imprecision caution must also be exercised in interpreting the 
employment contract status data of the complainant at lodgement.  
 
Figure 9.2: Employment Status by Gender and as a % of all Carers’ Complaints 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Brought under the partnership provision under s 49ZY. 
39
 See ss 49W–49ZC. 
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When the status could be ascertained from the complaint file, a similar proportion of 
male and female complainants were found to be permanent employees (80% v. 76%). 
Among parents caring for children, there were some divergences in the contract status. 
Proportionally, father complainants had a very high rate of permanent employment at 
86% with only 4% non-ongoing. Similarly, maternity-related complainants had very 
high rates of permanent employment at 90% with only 5% working in non-ongoing 
positions. In contrast, complaints from mothers/NMR had a lower rate of permanent 
employment at 64% and a higher rate of non-ongoing employment at 17%.  
 
The ABS has reported that during the period of this study, 2001–2011, the proportion of 
casual employees in the workforce across Australia has been between 18% and 22%.
40
 
When the contract status could be ascertained, the proportion of carers’ complainants 
employed in casual and non-ongoing positions, at 9%, was shown to be lower than the 
rate of casual employment across Australia. Even taking into account the fact that those 
complaints coded as ‘not clear’ may include casual or non-ongoing employees, 
nevertheless, generally, the data suggest that those worker–carers working in casual or 
fixed-term jobs which by their nature are often more precarious are not using the 
complaints mechanisms at the ADB. In Chapter 1, at 1.7.2 it was highlighted that 
discrimination laws such as the AD Act are specifically intended to provide protection 
for a broad array of working relationships, covering workers in non-standard jobs, and 
without the strict eligibility or qualifying requirements found in industrial laws. 
However, it does appear that in spite of this, worker–carers employed in casual and non-
permanent positions, or working as independent contractors or in other non-standard 
work relationship covered by Part 4B, are much less likely to exercise their 
discrimination law rights to complain than workers in standard permanent employment.  
 
When considering the research questions in relation to the effectiveness of Part 4B, it 
may be necessary to acknowledged that in practice the carers’ protections under the AD 
Act may therefore offer little protection for these workers. It may be that they are 
unaware that the AD Act applies to them, and it may be necessary to consider ways to 
                                                 
40
 ABS, Forms of Employment Nov 2011, above n 34, has reported that for the period of this research 
project the number of casual workers has generally increased, reaching 19% of all employed persons in 
2011.  
354 
 
raise awareness of the protections and rights afforded under Part 4B.  Alternatively it 
may be that given the often precarious nature of non-ongoing employment these 
worker–carers may see little point in pursuing a complaint to the ADB. For workers 
accustomed to short term and/or precarious work it might be easier and quicker to find a 
new casual job, than to pursue a discrimination complaint.  
 
 
Full or Part-Time  
Data about whether the complainant was working full or part-time with the respondent 
at the time of the alleged discrimination was available in 484 complaints and not 
available in 36 complaints.  It should be noted that there is also a certain amount of 
imprecision about what ‘full-time’ or ‘part-time’ means.40a For the purposes of the 
coding of the 520 complaints, if a party reported that they were employed with the 
respondent on a full–or part–time basis this was coded accordingly.  Where details of 
the hours worked was available the researcher made an inference that, in the absence of 
express information from the parties, that complainants who appeared to usually 
working 35 hours per week or more with the respondent were coded as full-time 
employees, and less than that were coded as part-time employees with that respondent.  
Table D6 in Appendix D sets out the complaints data. The majority of complainants, 
320 (62%), worked in full-time positions; 144 complainants (28%) worked part-time; 
and 18 (4%) were job applicants. However, when considered from both a gender 
perspective, there were large variances in rates of full- and part-time employment. Out 
of 382 female complainants, 204 female complainants (53%) worked full-time and 142 
(37%) worked part-time. In comparison, out of 135 male complainants, 113 (84%) 
worked full-time and only two male complainants (1.5%) in the entire decade were 
identified as working part-time at the time of lodgement of the complaint.  
 
Figure 9.3 also shows that there were also significant variances in the rates of part- and 
full-time employment between workers with different caring responsibilities. For 
example, the rate of full-time work for fathers and maternity-related complaints is 
particularly high. Out of 93 father complainants, 84 (90%) worked full-time, and out of 
153 maternity-related complainants, 100 (65%) worked full-time. In contrast, 
mother/NMR complainants were split evenly: 86 complainants (43%) worked part-time 
and exactly the same number worked full-time.  
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40a See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia December 2013 (2014, Catalogue No 
6202.0), 6 which noted that in its Labour Force Surveys (LFS) the ABS defines part-time employed 
persons as those who usually work less than 35 hours per week, and actually worked less than 35 hours in 
the survey reference week in all of their jobs. Full-time employed persons are defined as those who 
usually work 35 hours or more per week, regardless of how many hours they actually worked, or those 
who actually worked 35 hours or more in the reference week despite usually working less than 35 hours 
per week.   
 
 
Figure 9.3: Employment Status: Job Applicants, Full- and Part-Time Employment 
as % of Each Carer Relationship 
 
 
 
 
The complaints data in relation to employment contract and full- or part-time 
employment status generally support some of the findings and hypotheses noted in the 
literature review in Chapter 3 in relation to gender, work and care. First, in spite of the 
decline of male-breadwinner households, male complainants were generally firmly 
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anchored to ‘ideal worker’41 full-time work, which suggests that the ‘ideal’ full-time 
worker is indeed ‘alive and well’ in workplaces across NSW.42 Second, female 
complainants were generally more likely to be working part-time or in casual and often 
precarious employment than male complainants.
43
 Therefore, the complaints data 
generally reflect the gender-segregated nature of the Australian labour market, in which 
the majority of part-time workers are women.
44
  
 
The employment status data clearly reflects the demographic changes arising from the 
‘feminisation of labour’: women are still the primary carers once they have children, but 
have entered the workforce in increasing numbers, predominately in casual and/or part-
time work. Mothers often return to work in part-time and casual employment because it 
provides a degree of flexibility to enable them to combine work and care in the longer 
term while their children are young.
45
  However, it has also been noted in the literature 
that these jobs that are compatible with carers’ responsibilities are very often poor-
quality jobs that offer low pay, low job security and low satisfaction.
46
 As noted above, 
very few complaints came from workers in casual or non-ongoing positions suggesting 
that discrimination law protections may be of little use in practice to these workers, 
which is an issue requiring further investigation.  
 
Current, Former or Potential Employees 
Whether the complainant was still employed or had left employment at the time of 
lodgement of the complaint could be ascertained in 513 complaints. Table D7 in 
Appendix D sets out the complaints data. Out of 520 complaints, the majority of 
complainants, 316 (61%), were currently employed at the time of lodgement and 179 
(34%) were former employees. It is argued that the data demonstrates that employment 
                                                 
41
 See Chapter 3, at 3.2.2.  
42 
Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, above n 29, 8. 
43
 See Chapter 3, and overview of the relevant literature at 3.3.1–3.3.2 
44
 The ABS noted that for the period 2002–2012, the majority of the period of this PhD project: 
There has been a gradual, long-term trend away from ‘standard’ full-time jobs to part-time 
work. The increase in participation of females in employment is strongly associated with an 
increase in part-time work ... While the proportion of employed females who were working 
part time has remained relatively stable at 42% or 43% between 2002-03 and 2011-12, it 
increased by around 2 percentage points for males (from 12% to 14%). 
ABS, Gender Indicators, Australia, January 2013 (Catalogue Number 4125.0. 2013).  
45
 See literature review, Chapter 3, at 3.3, explaining what Pocock has referred to as the ‘feminisation of 
labour’, with many women working in casual and contingent jobs: Barbara Pocock, The Labour Market 
Ate My Babies (Federation Press, 2006), ch 3, 46–77. See generally Skinner, Hutchinson and Pocock, 
above n 29.  
46
 See Chapter 3, at 3.3.2.  
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status is important because it is an indicator of whether accommodation will be a likely 
outcome for a complaint. Former employees rarely seek reinstatement and 
accommodation. Indeed  only three former employees sought reinstatement and 
accommodation. Further, none of the job applicants were seeking appointment to the 
position as a remedy to their complaint.
47
  
 
There were significant variances by gender and care, for example, 69% of male 
complainants (93 complaints) were still employed at lodgement compared with 58% of 
female complainants (221 complaints). As set out in Figure 9.4, proportionally, 73% of 
fathers (68 complainants) were still employed at the time of making a complaint. In 
contrast, 59% (90) of maternity-related complainants and only 55% (110) mother /NMR 
complainants were still employed at lodgement. This means that female complainants 
who were mothers were much more likely to have left their jobs than fathers at the time 
of lodgement and they were also more likely to make a formal complaint to the ADB 
against a former employee than fathers who had lost their jobs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 See Section 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4: Employment Status at Time of Lodgement as % by Gender and Caring 
Relationship 
 
 
9.2.4 Complaints on Other Grounds of Discrimination 
 
The complaints data indicate that many complainants lodged additional formal 
complaints with the ADB, reflecting the ‘intersectional’ experiences of discrimination 
noted by Chapman.
48
 Table D8 in Appendix D summarises the data. Sex was the most 
common additional ground, with 93 complainants (18% of all complainants) making an 
additional complaint. Three came from men claiming less favourable treatment than 
female co-worker, and women made 90 sex- and/or pregnancy-related complaints.
49
   
                                                 
48
 See also Anna Chapman, ‘Australian Anti-Discrimination Law, Work, Care and Family’ (Working 
Paper No 51, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, The University 
of Melbourne, 2012) 31–33, discussing the intersectional experiences of discrimination on other grounds.  
49
 See s 24 of the AD Act, which covers sex discrimination including on the ground of pregnancy and 
breastfeeding. There is no separate ground of pregnancy or breastfeeding discrimination under the AD 
Act. In practice, while some complainants identified the ground of sex, some complaint handlers at the 
ADB routinely opened a second complaint of sex discrimination, particularly if the complaint also related 
to pregnancy or maternity, especially in the early years after Part 4B was enacted.   
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Complaints of victimisation under s 50 of the AD Act
50
 were also particularly prevalent 
and were reported as an additional ground of complaint by 54 complainants (10% of all 
carers’ complainants), with some complainants making multiple victimisation 
complaints.
51
 Complainants typically reported that they were subject to harassment 
and/or a hostile work environment and/or a detriment after they had raised a carers’ 
discrimination issue at work and/or after a complaint was made to the ADB; for 
example, they were rostered onto unpopular shifts or subject to extra scrutiny of denied 
leave or benefits. Proportionally, men made more victimisation complaints than women, 
with 24 male complainants making one or more complaints (18% of male complainants) 
compared with 30 female complainants (8% of female complainants). Victimisation can 
be an important ground of complaint independent of carers’ discrimination, and 
complainants at the Tribunal have received compensation for it even when the carers’ 
complaint was dismissed.
52
 
 
 
9.2.5 The Workplace: Occupation, Industry and Sector 
 
No one occupation or industry group was dominant in terms of the number of 
complaints received, and no complaints were brought under the AD Act against 
individual co-workers or any other individual person.
53
 Although the majority of 
complainants worked in the private sector, the complaints data also revealed that certain 
public sector organisations and agencies in particular were ‘repeat players’54 and were 
respondents in multiple complaints over the decade.  
 
                                                 
50
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.6 which outlines the victimisation provisions under s 50 of the AD Act and those 
complaints heard at the Tribunal. See Table of Complaints heard by the Tribunal in Appendix B 
51
 For example, one complainant, Jeremy, RN# 37 and RN# 142, also discussed in Chapter 10, at 10.3, 
made seven separate complaints of victimisation. Victimisation complaints and complaints made on other 
grounds were not counted in the 520 carers’ complaints. 
52
 See above n 50. 
53
 Unlike the sexual harassment provisions under s 22B(6) of the AD Act, which covers ‘workplace 
participants’, under Part 4B, a perpetrator against whom a complaint may be made is limited to employers 
and principals and other specified entities but not ‘workplace participants’. Although the aid and abet 
provisions under s 52 would potentially enable a complaint to be brought against a co-worker, no carers’ 
discrimination complaints were brought against co-workers or any individual person.  
54
 See Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 16–18; Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 146–7. 
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However, before considering the data, there are two points to note about the occupation 
and workplace classifications that were used to code and analyse the data. First, for the 
purposes of coding, the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of 
Occupations (‘ANZSCO’) and Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry 
Classification Codes (‘ANZSIC’) were used.55 These provide a uniform method to code 
the occupations of complainants and the industry groups in which they worked, and 
have been used in other empirical studies of discrimination complaints.56 However, as 
noted in the Data Collection and Coding Sheet in Appendix C, these classifications are 
based on fairly broad umbrella groupings of industries and occupation, and examples of 
different occupation and industry groups are provided in this Sheet to illustrate this 
further.
57
 The sectors in which the respondents were based were coded according to the 
ABS definition of public and private sectors.
58
 In addition, when a respondent was 
clearly in the not-for-profit or charity sector, it was also coded accordingly.  
 
Second, in terms of identifying the relevant occupation and workplace information, the 
ADB complaint form did not require complainants to specify their occupation. 
However, in 505 complaints it was possible to establish the complainant’s occupation 
because it was either stated by the complainant or it could be inferred from the file. In 
relation to industry and sector, the complainant is asked to identify the respondent when 
making a complaint. From this information, it was possible to identify the industry and 
sector in all 520 complaints. This did sometimes require further internet searches to 
clarify the employer identity, industry group and/or sector.  
 
 
The Complainants’ Occupations 
                                                 
55 
ABS, Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (Catalogue No 1220.0, 
Version 1.2, 2013); ABS, Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (Catalogue No 
1292.0, Revision 2.0, 2006). 
56
 See, for example, the following two studies which used earlier versions: Hunter and Leonard, Working 
Paper, above n 5; Sara Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-
Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law in Context 88; Sara Charlesworth, Claiming Discrimination: 
Complaints of Sex and Gender Discrimination in Employment under the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 
1995 (The Centre for Applied Social Research, RMIT University, 2008); Charlesworth et al, above n 15.  
57
 This contains examples of the type of occupations in each group to illustrate the breadth of the 
classifications in practical terms.  
58
 ABS, Employee Earnings and Hours Australia, May 2012 (Catalogue No 6306.0, 2012) defines the 
public sector as including local, state and Commonwealth government agencies, departments and 
corporations. All other employment is in the private sector. The ABS did not differentiate the not-for-
profit or community sector.  Work related complaints under the AD Act cannot generally be made against 
Commonwealth public sector employers. See Chapter 1, at 1.7.2.   
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Tables D9–D10 in Appendix D set out the complainant occupations data. There was no 
one dominant occupation group among complainants, but as Figure 9.5 shows, more 
complainants worked in clerical and administration (135, 26%) and community and 
personal service jobs (118, 23%)
59
 than in any other occupation groups. Numerically, 
women made more complaints than men in all occupation groups except machine 
operators and drivers and labourers. Proportionally, the complaints tend to reflect the 
gender segregation of the Australian labour market: Women complainants working in 
three traditionally female-dominated occupations—clerical and administrative, 
community and personal service, and sales occupations—accounted for 248 complaints 
or 48% of all carers’ complaints lodged in the decade.60 Men made very few complaints 
when compared with women in two of these three traditionally female-dominated 
occupation groups: clerical and administrative (7% male v. 33% female) and sales 
occupations (4% male v. 12% female). However, a higher proportion of male 
complainants than females (28% male v. 21% female) worked in the community and 
personal service occupation group,
61
 which was the most common occupation group for 
male complainants followed by labourer, professional and machine operator groups.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 Under the ANZSCO, community and personal service workers include hospitality workers, protective 
service workers, personal service workers, and health and welfare support workers (health professionals 
such as doctors and nurses professionals are classified as professionals). So, in practice, this category 
covered carers’ complaints from such diverse occupations as police officers, paramedics, security 
officers, corrections workers, care workers, security guards, flight attendants and ground staff, beauty 
therapists, travel agents and food and beverage workers such as bar, café and club service providers. 
60
 For example, although not necessarily indicative of the entire decade, according to recent ABS data in 
2014 women comprise over 60% of the Australian workforce in three groups: clerical and administrative 
(76% female v. 21% male), community and personal service (68% female v. 32% male) and sales 
occupations (61% female v. 39% male): Workplace Gender Equality Agency, Gender Composition of 
Workforce: By Occupation (2014).  
61
 See n 59 above for an explanation of the occupations under this group and the Data Collection and 
Coding Sheet in Appendix C; and ibid.  
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Figure 9.5: Carers’ Complaints as by ANZSCO and Gender 
 
 
 
 
The Respondents’ Industry Groups 
Tables D9–D10 in Appendix D set out the respondent industry data, including by 
gender and sector. Figure 9.6 indicates that while no one industry group received more 
complaints than others, employers in public administration and safety (87, 17%)
62
 and 
                                                 
62
Under ANZSIC, the public administration and safety group covers a very broad array of employees in 
the public sector in NSW, in various government departments, at the state or local government level, 
including general clerical and support work, but it also includes the administration of justice, and public 
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health and social assistance (86 complaints, 17%) together received the most 
complaints. Out of 382 female complaints, only three industry groups each received 
more than 10% of all female complaints: healthcare and social assistance, which 
accounted for 18% (67 complaints) of all female complaints, followed by public 
administration and safety at 15% (56) and retail at 10% (37). The remaining complaints 
from females were spread out across the remaining industry groups except for mining, 
which received no complaints.  
 
Out of 135 male complaints, only four industry groups received more than 10% of all 
male complaints each. Public administration and safety received the most complaints 
with 24% of male complaints (31 complaints), followed by healthcare and social 
assistance with 14% (19); transport, postal and warehousing 13% (17) and 
manufacturing 12% (16). No complaints were received from men in mining, rental/real 
estate or wholesale trade. Generally, therefore, the representation of complainants 
across those industry groups does tend to reflect the gender segregation of the 
Australian labour force.
63
 One exception was that healthcare and social assistance was 
the second most popular respondent group for men, which is traditionally highly 
dominated by women workers.
64
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
safety services such as police, corrections service, and fire and emergency services. It also covers private 
sector providers of these services.  
63
 By way of illustration, recent data from the ABS reports that healthcare and social assistance has 78% 
female v. 22% male rate of employment; public administration and safety, 47% female v. 53% male; 
transport, postal and warehousing, 23% female v. 77% male; retail, 56% female v. 44% male; and 
manufacturing, 27% female v. 73% male. Public administration and safety is more evenly distributed with 
53% male v. 47% female: cited in Workplace Gender Equality Agency, Gender Composition of 
Workforce: By Industry (2014) 2 (‘Gender Composition: Industry’).  
64
 78% female v. 22% male: Ibid. 
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Figure 9.6: Carers’ Complaints as % by ANZSIC and Gender 
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Figure 9.7 provides a breakdown of the respondents by sector and gender of the 
complainantsand also illustrates the data as a percentage of the total complaints by 
gender.  Tables D10 and D12 set out the complaints data with reference to occupation 
and industry groups, and gender of complainants, respectively. In summary the data 
indicates that the vast majority, 339 (65% of all complaints), were made against private 
sector respondents, compared with 166 (32%) made against the public sector. In 15 
(3%), it was also possible to identify that the respondent was from the not-for-profit 
sector. However, there were significant gender differences as to which sector male and 
female complainants worked in. Out of 520 complaints, women made 264 (51% of all 
complaints) against private sector respondents and 103 complaints (20%) against public 
sector respondents. Women also made all 15 complaints (3% of all complaints) that 
were against the not-for-profit sector. In contrast, male complainants were spread fairly 
evenly between the private and public sector, with 72 complaints (14% of all 
complaints) from men in the private sector and 63 complaints (12%) in the public 
sector.  
 
Figure 9.7: Respondents as % by Sector and Gender of Complainants 
 
 
The NSW Public Sector and the ‘Repeat Player’ Phenomenon 
The complaints data revealed that certain public sector departments and agencies were 
regular respondents during the decade. Out of 520 carers’ complaints, 23% (121 
complaints) were made against public sector respondents in just two industry groups: 
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public administration and safety and health and social assistance.
65
 The education 
industry group was also dominated by public sector respondents in schools, universities 
and colleges, with 25 complaints made (14 from women and 11 from men).
66
 If these 25 
complaints made by worker–carers employed in public education are included with the 
complaints made in relation to public administration and safety and healthcare and 
social assistance, in total, 28% of all carers’ complaints (146 complaints) were made by 
employees in the public sector in these three industry groups. Women made 95 of these 
complaints (18% of all carers’ complaints) and men made the other 51 (10%). 
 
The concentration of carers’ complaints working for government agencies and 
departments in these industry groups in the public sector reflects the concerns noted in 
the academic literature that some public sector respondents are consistently ‘repeat 
players’ and ‘habitual offenders’.67 Three public sector respondents, in particular, who 
cannot be identified for ethics reasons, received between 10 and 20 carers’ complaints 
each over the decade, and often many additional victimisation complaints. These three 
are the subject of case studies in Chapter 10.
68
  
 
In contrast, in the private sector, no one industry group dominated the carers’ 
complaints made, and the ‘repeat players’ phenomenon was uncommon in terms of 
multiple complaints being made against a particular organisation. Only one respondent 
received five or more complaints during the decade. This respondent was a major 
national employer, which received 14 complaints, between 2001 and 2005, all regarding 
similar issues related to flexible work and rostering policies. 
 
9.2.6 The Discriminatory Conduct 
 
In Chapter 1, it was explained that s 49V of the AD Act
69
 very broadly defines 
discriminatory conduct as denying a person access to a benefit or subjecting a person to 
a detriment. Information was collected about the particular type of alleged 
                                                 
65
 It should be noted again that the respondents to the complaints cannot be identified; therefore, only 
general descriptors are used. 
66
 See Workplace Gender Equality Agency, Gender Composition: Industry, above n 63, 2, reporting that 
education is a female-dominated industry (70% female v. 30% male). 
67
 See Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 16–18; Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 146–7. 
68
 See Chapter 10, at 10.2.2. 
69
 See Chapter 1, at 1.7.2.  
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discriminatory conduct reported by worker–carers in their complaints. Fourteen 
categories of reported conduct were identified and the complaints were coded 
accordingly. Given the large amounts of information and data contained on some files, 
it was not possible to identify every allegation on every file. The data collected 
represent the main or primary allegations about which the complainant complained. It 
was possible to identify the conduct complained of in 510 complaints out of 520. In 
addition, complaints often indicated that they were subjected to multiple and often 
overlapping types of discriminatory conduct during their employment. Typical 
examples reported in the complaints are noted in brackets to help illustrate the nature of 
each category: 
1. Part-time work/job share is denied. (This does not include situations in which 
part-time work was allowed but then the complainant suffered a detriment such 
as demotion or poor job quality; this is counted in Category 5 below.) 
2. Rostering, shifts, start/finish times or other flexibility issue relating to hours of 
work. (For example, the complainant’s request for flexibility was denied, or the 
respondent put in place conditions that the complainant could not comply with, 
such as changes to rosters or hours of work.) 
3. Location/transfer/telework. (This category of conduct related to flexibility in 
relation to the physical location where work was carried out rather than the 
hours of work. It included requests for telework from home and requests for 
transfers, for example, to be closer to family or support, or to reduce travel time. 
It also related to situations in which the respondent relocated the place of work 
or sought to transfer a worker to another location.) 
4. Leave issue. (For example, access to leave was denied, or the proposed method 
of taking leave was not approved; or the complainant was placed under extra 
scrutiny or certain conditions in order to take leave that other co-workers were 
not; or general directives were made applying to all staff, for example, that leave 
could not be taken over the Christmas holiday period.) 
5. Hostile work environment/other detriment. (This category very broadly covered 
a wide array of discriminatory conduct that caused a detriment to the 
complainant and is not otherwise coded or covered under the other categories, 
for example, situations in which the complainant faced verbal harassment or 
intimidation from the employer or co-workers; or suffered a particular detriment 
in relation to a demotion, or a downgrading of duties, and the quality of work he 
368 
 
or she was given. It was frequently reported that this was because the 
complainant was part-time or had returned from maternity leave. Others reported 
being transferred to another job or position, being left off a roster, or being given 
the worst shifts or duties, or being threatened with termination.) 
6. Job selection. (Examples include inappropriate questions on an application form, 
or asked at interview; or workers not allowed to apply for jobs because, for 
example, they worked part-time.) 
7. Training. (Examples include training being denied or that the conditions around 
the provision of training such as location, or time it was offered, are such that 
the complainant cannot take part.) 
8. Benefits. (Examples include access to a bonus, use of a car, or overtime denied 
or restricted because, for example, the complainant was on leave, or was part-
time.) 
9. Promotion denied. 
10. Restructure. (Complainants specifically identified that a formal restructure had 
occurred prior to them being subject to a detriment such as a demotion, or prior 
to the termination of the employment relationship.) 
11. Redundancy. 
12. Dismissal/actual termination. 
13. Resignation/constructive dismissal. (For example, complainants reported feeling 
that they ‘had no choice’ but to resign or had to ‘choose’ between work and 
family.)
70
  
14. Not Clear.  
 
Figure 9.8 summarises the most commonly reported categories of alleged 
discriminatory conduct. Tables D13–D15 provide detailed complaints data by gender 
and care. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 See Chapter 3, at 3.4, outlining the literature in relation to worker–carers’ ‘choices’. 
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Figure 9.8: Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as a % of All Carers’ Complaints 
 
 
* Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
 
Categorising Complaints as Direct or Indirect Discrimination 
It is explained below, in Section 9.3.2, that the ADB did not usually categorise 
complaints as relating to either direct or indirect discrimination. Nor was it possible for 
the writer to code complaints quantitatively or qualitatively in a reliable way. In the 
writer’s opinion, the conduct reported could very often, because of the facts of the case, 
potentially be classified as amounting to direct discrimination if less favourable 
treatment was involved and/or indirect discrimination if the conduct complained of 
amounted to a condition or requirement with which the complainant could not comply. 
Because the factual evidence was often limited, it was not possible to make this 
assessment and code complaints in a rigorous and reliable way. 
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Key Gender and Care Divergences 
Figures 9.9–9.12 summarise some of the key findings in relation to the conduct 
complained of by gender and also by four main categories of complainant: maternity 
related, mothers/NMR, fathers and carers for adults. In order to demonstrate how the 
conduct reported by complainants was more prevalent depending on the gender and 
caring relationship of the complainant, some differences are noted by way of illustration 
in relation to two aspects of the different categories of the conduct complained of: first, 
categories relating to flexibility in relation to hours of work; and second, categories 
relating to a termination of the employment relationship. A detailed breakdown of the 
complaints data in relation to all 14 categories of conduct by gender and all carer 
responsibilities is also found in Tables D13–D15, in Appendix D.  
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Figure 9.9: Type of Alleged Discriminatory Conduct by % of Gender and All 
Carers’ Complaints 
 
* Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
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Figure 9.10: Maternity Complaints as % of Type of Discriminatory Conduct 
 
* Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
 
Figure 9.11: Mothers/NMR as % of Type of Discriminatory Conduct 
 
* Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
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Figure 9.12: Father as % of Type of Discriminatory Conduct 
 
*Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
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Figure 9.13: Care for Adults by Gender and as % of Type of Discriminatory 
Conduct 
 
*Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
 
(i) Flexibility Relating to Hours of Work 
Flexibility relating to hours of work was a key issue in 49% of all complaints lodged 
with the ADB, with 143 (28%) relating to flexible work issues such as shifts, rosters or 
start and finish times and a further 108 complaints (21%) relating specifically to a 
denial of part-time work/job share. These two categories were significant for both 
female and male complainants, with 50% of female complainants (191 complaints) and 
43% of male complaints (58 complaints) reporting discrimination in this context. 
However, there was a significant gender variance in relation to complainants requesting 
part-time work: only 11% of all male complaints (15) complained about a denial of 
0 
0 
5 
10 
10 
15 
5 
10 
20 
35 
3 
6 
0 
12 
6 
0 
15 
18 
24 
68 
2 
3 
2 
11 
7 
6 
11 
15 
22 
56 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Job selection
Resignation/constructive dismissal
Hostile Environment/other detriment
PT work/ Job share
Rostering, shifts, other flexibility
Redundancy
Termination - type not clear
Dismissal – actual 
Location/transfer/tele-work
Leave
As % 54 As % 34 Male Carer for Adults As % 20 Female Carer for Adult
375 
 
part-time work in contrast to 24% of all female complainants (92). There were also 
some divergences across different categories of carer, for example: 
 Out of 93 fathers, 84 (90%) worked full-time and only 11 (12% of fathers) were 
seeking part-time work. However, 37 (40%) were seeking flexibility in terms of 
rostering, shifts or start and finish time.  
 Out of 153 maternity-related complainants, 100 (65%) worked full-time and 66 
(43%) were seeking part-time work. Only 11 (7%) related to other forms of 
flexibility in relation to hours.  
 Out of 201 mothers/NMR, 86 (43%) already worked part-time and the same 
proportion worked full-time. They complained more about rostering, shiftwork, 
hours of work and start and finish time (63 complaints, 31%) than a denial of 
part-time/job share (22 complaints, 11%).  
 Generally, complaints about care for adults only (not ‘sandwich carers’) were 
less concerned with part-time work or flexibility in terms of hours worked. Out 
of 54 complaints, 19% (10 complaints: 4 female, 6 male), related to flexibility or 
part-time work/job share. Access to various forms of leave was the most 
frequently reported conduct accounting for 56% (30 complaints: 7 female, 23 
male).  
 
 
(ii) Termination of the Employment Relationship 
In more than a third of all complaints (34%, 179 complaints), the employment 
relationship was terminated and the complainants had lost their jobs by the time a 
complaint was lodged. As noted, only three of those were seeking reinstatement and 
accommodation (all three achieved it).
71
 Therefore, the data strongly suggest that 
reinstatement and accommodation is an unlikely remedy for complainants who have left 
employment. Complaints involving a termination of the employment relationship were 
coded to reflect the three separate methods by which an employment relationship was 
terminated: first, involving an actual termination via a dismissal; second, a redundancy 
situation; and third, a resignation or constructive dismissal whereby the complainant left 
work or resigned because of the employer’s discriminatory conduct. Seventy-one 
complaints (14% of all complaints) related to actual dismissal, 68 (13%) related to 
                                                 
71
 See Table 9.9 recording that the three complainants were reinstated and accommodated: one mother, 
one father and one male carer for adult. 
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resignation or constructive dismissal, and 16 (3%) related to redundancy. In an 
additional 24 complaints (5%), the complainant appeared to be no longer employed but 
it was not clear how the employment relationship had been terminated. Proportionally, 
women complainants were significantly more likely to have had their employment 
terminated than men: 145 female complainants (38% of female complaints) compared 
with 33 male complainants (24% of male complainants). 
 
In the context of assessing whether the ADB process can provide ‘good’ outcomes 
discussed below, it is obviously deeply concerning that more than a third of all 
complainants had lost their jobs by the time they lodged a complaint, with potentially 
serious long-term negative economic and social consequences.
72
 The maternity-related 
complaints illustrate these negative effects perhaps the most clearly. The time around 
the birth of a child is often the first time that women have been faced with 
discrimination because of their gender and child-rearing role, and is also often just the 
start of a lifetime of economic and workplace disadvantage.
73
 The data show that 136 
maternity complainants (90% of maternity complainants) were working in permanent 
ongoing positions at the time they were subject to discrimination.
74
 However, 62 
complainants (41% of maternity complainants) had already lost these permanent jobs by 
the time they lodged their complaint with the ADB.
75
 None of these complainants were 
seeking reinstatement or accommodation at the ADB. While the complainant was 
dismissed or made redundant by an employer in 24 maternity complaints (16% of 
maternity complaints), it is noteworthy that in 33 complaints (22%), the complainant 
ended the relationship. Common themes that could be identified from the maternity 
complaints included that complainants felt that they had no choice but to resign, and 
they were often clearly very surprised and distressed by their employers’ reaction to 
their requests for flexibility after they had provided often years of service. Others had 
taken leave on the basis that they would be allowed to return to work part-time as 
agreed, but the respondent reneged as the end of maternity leave approached. The 
unwillingness of the respondent to accommodate them was viewed as a breach of trust. 
                                                 
72
 See Chapter 3, at 3.3.2, for an overview of the literature. See, for example, the three reports from the 
AHRC documenting this disadvantage: AHRC, Accumulating Poverty: Women’s Experiences of 
Inequality over the Life Cycle (2009); AHRC, Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing Those Who 
Care (2013); AHRC, Supporting, above n 30.  
73
 See above n 72. 
74
 See Appendix D, Table D7. 
75
 See Appendix D, Tables D5–D7. 
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As a result, complainants indicated that they could not return to the former workplace, 
and they sought remedies other than reinstatement and accommodation as a result.  
 
9.3 The Process 
9.3.1 A Triage Approach 
 
The statutory provisions relating to the ADB’s complaint-handling functions were set 
out in Chapter 1.
76
 From the ADB perspective, the complaint process has a clear access-
to-justice aim: it is free and is intended as an informal and confidential way ‘to sort the 
matter out as quickly and cheaply as possible instead of having to go to the 
[Tribunal]’.77 Although the ADB does not refer to it as such, the complaints 
demonstrate that it uses a ‘triage’ system at lodgement.78 In practice, the manager of the 
complaints resolution branch typically reviewed every file at lodgement and completed 
an intake sheet, which included advice about what steps should be taken next by the 
complaint handler. As a result, carers’ complaints were usually allocated for 
investigation very quickly after lodgement if a complainant appeared to be threatened 
with a dismissal, was trying to return to work after a period of leave such as maternity 
leave, or was otherwise seeking an urgent accommodation. Even in the early years of 
the decade when because of funding constraints the ADB had a ‘backlog’ of complaints, 
such carers’ complaints were always given priority allocation and avoided the 
backlog.
79
  
 
Triage ensures prompt attention and early intervention, which can be important to 
maintaining the working relationship. In practice, one of the first steps that the 
complaint handler usually took after making contact with a complainant was to try to 
                                                 
76
 See Chapter 1, at 1.4. 
77
 ADB, Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW (Revised June 2009) (2009) 
(‘Complaining Factsheet’). 
78
 Charlesworth et al, above n 15, 2, which notes that many of the complaint-handling bodies in Australia 
had moved to this faster ‘triage’ system of complaint handling. 
79
 When the writer joined the ADB in 2000, the ADB had what it referred to as a ‘backlog’ of complaints, 
where due to funding constraints complaint files were unable to be allocated for investigation.  Generally, 
if the complainant was no longer employed, and was seeking a remedy such as compensation, it was not 
deemed to require priority allocation and could then be placed in the backlog to await allocation. In total, 
23 carers’ complaints went into the backlog on lodgement between 2001 and 2003. All of these were no 
longer employed at lodgement. These complaints waited between six and 18 months before the complaint 
was allocated for investigation. In 2001–2002, a backlog team was set up to tackle the backlog, see, for 
example, ADB, Annual Report 2002–2003, 21, and Annual Report 2003–2004, 16, noting that 
approximately 40% of complaints took more than 12 months to finalise. 
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ensure that the status quo in relation to employment status was preserved. For example, 
in some complaints, the ADB considered whether to apply to the Tribunal for an interim 
order under s 105 of the AD Act.
80
 Alternatively, the ADB would contact a respondent 
very soon after lodgement to flag that an interim order may be sought and/or would then 
seek an undertaking instead that the employer would not take steps to terminate an 
employee while the complaint was being investigated. A formal interim order was not 
required in any of the carers’ complaints that were reviewed. Although the ADB has no 
powers under the AD Act to enforce such undertaking, in only one complaint lodged 
during the entire decade did a respondent refuse to co-operate and proceed to terminate 
the employment, after speaking with the ADB but, before an interim order could be 
sought. 
 
Complaint handlers would also often attempt to negotiate a resolution of a complaint at 
any stage once the complaint has been formally accepted for investigation.
81
 For 
example, complaint handlers sometimes attempted to resolve a complaint quickly using 
what the ADB referred to as a ‘quick fix’ by phoning the parties within days of a 
complaint to try to negotiate a resolution.
82
 Another tactic used was to call an early 
conciliation conference in the first correspondence to the respondent, without 
completing the investigation or even receiving a written response from the respondent. 
This often had the effect of encouraging an early settlement. The complaint summaries 
in Chapter 10 illustrate the practical application of this triage approach and how it led to 
the prompt resolution of complaints including an accommodation being achieved.  
 
In order to contrast the ADB conciliation process with that of the Tribunal, three aspects 
of the complaints process are now outlined: first, the informality of the process; second, 
timeliness and flexibility of the conciliation process; and third, avoiding an adversarial 
environment, which considers the ADB’s attitude to legal representation and power 
imbalances between the parties. 
 
 
                                                 
80
 Chapman is critical of the ADB for not having considered or sought an interim order in any of the 
complaints that she reviewed for her study, even when it appeared that ‘dismissal from employment was 
imminent’: Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 5, 336–7. 
81
 Section 89B. 
82
 See ‘quick fix ’complaint summaries in Chapter 10, at 10.2 
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9.3.2 The Informality of the ADB Complaint Process v the Tribunal  
 
As outlined in Part IV, complainants at the Tribunal have struggled to satisfy the burden 
of proof in relation to the elements of Part 4B, in particular, direct and indirect 
discrimination.
83
 In contrast, at the ADB there is no obligation upon the complainant to 
even ‘demonstrate a prima facie case’84 let alone identify whether the alleged conduct 
amounts to discrimination under Part 4B. A complaint is not required to prove anything 
or to adduce any evidence. The informality of the ADB process when compared with 
the onerous evidentiary burdens on complainants at the Tribunal is now illustrated in 
relation to three aspects of Part 4B: first, caring responsibilities under s 49S; second, the 
elements of direct and indirect discrimination under s 49T; and third, in relation to the 
ADB’s approach to requests from a respondent to decline a complaint.  
 
As noted in Chapter 6, in cases other than care for babies and infants, the Tribunal will 
usually require complainants to prove in some detail the nature of the care or support 
provided pursuant to s 49S.
85
 In contrast, at the ADB, once a relevant family 
relationship was identified, the ADB did not generally require a complainant to provide 
precise details of the nature of the ‘care or support’ provided. Respondents also very 
rarely required precise details of this and the existence of a relevant caring 
responsibility during the complaint process was very rarely challenged.
86
 In one case, a 
respondent claimed that a father did not have caring responsibilities for his daughter 
because she was in intensive care and the care and support was provided by the 
hospital.
87
 In another, a respondent claimed that it was aware that the complainant had 
earlier suffered domestic violence at the hands of a former spouse and could not 
therefore have responsibilities for him.
88
 In both cases, the ADB refused the 
                                                 
83
 See Chapter 6, at 6.3. 
84
 A complaint as made need not demonstrate a prima facie case: s 89(2). 
85
See for example,  Gardiner v New South Wales WorkCover [2003] NSWADT 184, [34]–[39]. See 
Chapter 6, at 6.3, for a discussion of the Tribunal’s approach to s 49S. See also Spencer v Greater Murray 
Area Health Service [2005] NSWADT 138 [32]–[34]; ACE No 1 v State of NSW (TAFE Commission and 
Department of Education and Training) [2010] NSWADT 180 [205]–[207]. 
86
 As a related issue, however, employers did sometimes query the nature of the care and support 
provided, and whose responsibility it was to provide it: for example, as to the availability of another 
person to provide care such as a family member or the availability of paid care, in effect, challenging the 
worker–carers’ ‘choices’ about how they balanced work and care. 
87
 RN# 128.  The complaint eventually resolved at conciliation with the complainant receiving 
compensation. 
88
 RN# 355. The complaint could not be conciliated and was referred to the Tribunal at the complainant’s 
request. 
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respondent’s request to decline the complaint on this basis and the complaints 
proceeded to a conciliation conference. 
 
Most carers’ discrimination complaints made under the AD Act are usually made 
without reference by the complainants to the concepts of direct or indirect 
discrimination, and are then investigated and conciliated in this way by the ADB, 
particularly when the parties are not legally represented. The file notes indicated that the 
ADB complaint handler did often explain the meaning of direct and indirect 
discrimination to the parties during the process, and how it might apply to the particular 
factual circumstances of the complaint or for example, whether a respondent’s conduct 
is reasonable. However, it was very rare for the ADB to categorise a complaint as direct 
or indirect discrimination in any formal way in its correspondence with the complainant, 
respondent or the Tribunal.
89
 For example, the standard proforma letter first sent to a 
respondent notifying it of a complaint usually simply provided a copy of the written 
complaint and an excerpt of the relevant statutory provisions under Part 4B. The 
allegations were not usually particularised with reference to direct or indirect 
discrimination. Respondents, particularly when they were legally represented, would 
sometimes communicate with reference to s 49T(1)(a) and (b) and relevant case law. In 
particular, ‘repeat players’90 at a number of public sector agencies would routinely 
respond in a legalistic manner as the complaints were handled by a central in house 
legal team. However, complaints were not required to respond in kind.  Further, if a 
complaint was referred to the Tribunal, the ADB would not generally particularise the 
complaint with reference to direct or indirect discrimination in the formal 
documentation referring the complaint to it. 
  
Respondents would also sometimes ask that the ADB decline a complaint because, for 
example, it lacked substance,
91
 or because the respondent raised a defence, or relied on 
an exception under the AD Act.
92
 As noted above, in both complaints in which the 
respondent questioned the existence of a caring responsibility, the ADB refused to 
                                                 
89
 The ADB provides a summary of the complaint, identifies the relevant statutory grounds and provides 
relevant documents such as a copy of the original the complaint and any correspondence between the 
parties. File notes and details of any attempts at conciliation are not provided to the Tribunal.  
90
 See the literature review in Chapter 4, at 4.2.3, for a discussion of the literature in relation to ‘repeat 
players’ and ‘habitual offenders’ in the public sector. See Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 16–18. 
91
 Section 92 outlines the circumstances in which a complaint can be declined. 
92
 Chapter 1, at 1.7.6, outlines the relevant expectations and defences.  
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decline.
93
 The complaint files indicate that the ADB would usually only decline a 
complaint at the request of a respondent if a relevant exception or defence very clearly 
applied on the facts of the case, for example, if the number of employees did not exceed 
five.
94
 The writer’s experience working at the ADB also supports this interpretation of 
the ADB’s action during the decade. 
 
9.3.3 Timeliness and the Flexibility of the Conciliation and Settlement Process 
 
Data were collected from all 520 files in relation to duration of the complaint and the 
time it took from lodgement until a final outcome was reached. Although the ADB 
recorded a finalisation date, this was not used by the writer, because on many occasions 
it sometimes took many months before a complaint file was administratively finalised 
and closed. To calculate a more accurate duration rate, time was calculated from the 
date a complaint was lodged, up until one of four events occurred:  
1. A decision was made by the ADB either to not accept a complaint for 
investigation or to decline a complaint.  
2. It was recorded that an agreement had been reached between the parties or that a 
complaint was settled.  
3. It was recorded that a complaint was withdrawn by the complainant or was 
abandoned. 
4. The complaint was referred to the Tribunal for hearing.  
 
The shortest duration time was one day and the longest was 37 months. Out of 520 
complaints, only 14 took 18 months or longer to finalise. Five of these were in the 
‘backlog’ for between six and 18 months awaiting allocation for investigation.  
Complaint files were sometimes kept open for lengthy periods because the complaint 
process was ongoing (because a matter was still being investigated, or conciliation and 
negotiations were continuing). In addition, as outlined in the complaint summaries in 
Chapter 10, complaints were also sometimes kept open by the ADB after a settlement 
had been reached with the aim of trying to ensure that the terms agreed were being acted 
upon before closing the file. Complaints were sometimes kept open for months 
particularly when the employment relationship was continuing, for example, after a 
                                                 
93
 See s 92 (1)(a)(i)–(ii). 
94
 Section 49V(3). 
382 
 
return from maternity leave. In those complaints, the duration date was coded as the 
date agreement was reached, not the later file closure date.  
 
Duration: Comparing the ADB and Tribunal 
Table 9.2 shows the duration of complaints in terms of whether they were settled, and 
with or without an accommodation.  Table D16, in Appendix D, also sets out the 
complaints data by the outcome and caring responsibility. It is argued that the 
complaints process at the ADB can be significantly timelier than litigation at the 
Tribunal.
95
 Complaint duration times at the ADB are much shorter. Out of 520 
complaints, 45 (9%) were resolved in less than one month; 220 (42%) were resolved in 
three months or less; 363 (70%) were resolved in six months or less and 475 complaints 
(91%) were finalised within 12 months of lodgement.
96
  
 
Table 9.2: Duration of Complaints 
Duration  Settled with 
Accommodation 
Settled without 
Accommodation 
Not settled  Total  
 
N  % 
160 
N % 
121 
N % 
239 
N % 
520 
<1 month 26 16.6 7 5.8 12 5.0 45 8.7 
1-3 65 40.6 31 25.6 79 33.1 175 33.7 
4-6 45 28.1 38 31.4 60 25.1 143 27.5 
7-12 19 11.9 32 26.4 61 25.5 112 21.5 
13-17 1 0.6 9 7.4 21 8.8 31 6.0 
18+ 4 2.5 4 3.3 6 2.5 14 2.7 
Total  160 100 121 100 239 100 520 100 
 
 
Timeliness and Accommodated Complaints 
Complaints that settled with an accommodation had shorter duration times than 
complaints settled without accommodation, or complaints that were not settled. The 
data support a key argument of this thesis, that a timely complaint process will be more 
likely to deliver an accommodation. Out of 160 complaints that settled with an 
accommodation, 136 (85%) were finalised at six months, compared with 76 (62%) of 
                                                 
95
 See generally Chapter 7, at 7.2.1, summarising the duration time of complaints that were heard at the 
Tribunal. It was noted that a hearing and a decision does not often occur until many years after the 
discriminatory conduct. In particular, by this time an accommodation is neither desired by the parties, nor 
a realistic option in any event. 
96
 This corresponds generally with finalisation rates noted in the annual reports. See, for example, the 
ADB, Annual Report 2010–2011, 16, noting that 88% of all complaints lodged on all grounds were 
finalised within 12 months that year. File finalisation rates are a key performance indicator of the ADB’s 
complaint-handling function measured in the ADB annual reports.  
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complaints settled without an accommodation and 151 (63%) that were not settled. In 
addition, 26 complaints resulting in accommodation (17%) were resolved in less than 
one month and 91 (57%) in less than three months.  
 
Only four complaints that were accommodated took longer than 18 months to resolve, 
and in these complaints, the files were kept open while often complex negotiations were 
ongoing. For example, in one, Martha, who worked for one of the public sector ‘repeat 
players’, complained that she was refused permission to leave work to pick up her 
children even though her shift had ended. She then alleged subsequent ongoing 
harassment. The file was open for 30 months because the complainant had taken a long 
period as a result of a workers’ compensation claim arising from the discriminatory 
conduct. On her return to work, she had lodged a subsequent carers’ complaint relating 
to access to leave, and she had also lodged three separate victimisation complaints.
97
 
The complainant did not want to attend a conciliation conference, and negotiated a 
resolution privately with the help of her union. However, she regularly sought advice 
from the ADB throughout the period. The employer was also in correspondence with 
the ADB about the complaints. That the ADB was willing to keep complaint files open 
in this way and to provide support to the complainant also indicates a flexibility and 
responsiveness on the part of the ADB in meeting the needs of the complainant and in 
providing support as the complainant returned to work. Martha went on to achieve one 
of the best outcomes of the decade involving accommodation and compensation, which 
is discussed in Section 9.4.5 below. 
 
Flexibility with the Conciliation Process and the Formalities of Settlement 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that a complaint can be settled at any stage after it has been 
accepted at lodgement.
98
 A number of aspects of the operation of the complaint process, 
in particular illustrate the flexibility of the ADB’s process.99  For example: investigation 
and conciliation are not mutually exclusive stages and frequently overlap; the same 
complaint handler usually has conduct of the complaint throughout, which facilitates 
                                                 
97
 RN# 65 and RN# 153. As noted, the victimisation complaints are not included in the data set of the 520 
complaints reviewed. 
98
 See generally Chapter 1, at 1.4.  
99
 Ibid. 
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this flexible approach; and finally, a conciliation conference is not necessary.
100
 
Conciliation involves any attempt, at any stage, to negotiate a resolution of the 
complaint. In practice, it can be undertaken by telephone, by correspondence or at a 
conference. The conciliation process can start the same day that a complaint is lodged, 
without an investigation being started, or it can run concurrently with an investigation. 
For example, the ‘quick fix’ complaint summaries provided in Chapter 10 illustrate the 
way complaint handlers resolved complaints, often with very little or no actual 
investigation taking place. A complaint can also be resolved with different degrees of 
intervention from the ADB. This can range from a single phone call to one or both 
parties to overseeing a more lengthy complex process that may involve an investigation 
(based on an exchange of information between the parties), negotiations between the 
parties or holding a conference and/or overseeing post-conference negotiations.  
 
The ADB does have power to call a compulsory conference under s 91A subject to civil 
penalties for non-attendance.
101
 A conciliation conference took place in 224 complaints 
(43%),
102
 but in the majority of complaints (296, 57%), no compulsory conference was 
held.  Table 9.3 demonstrates that out of the 281 complaints that resolved at the ADB, 
145 (52%) were settled at or after a conference was held. A similar number 136 (48%) 
were settled without a conference, where the ADB facilitated a resolution of the 
complaint by phone or correspondence.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100
 Thornton has noted that the conciliator’s role is to ‘assist parties to achieve a settlement which is 
mutually acceptable by whatever means likely to be efficacious; a conference, whether it be voluntary or 
compulsory is simply one strategy’: Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 144. 
101
 Section 91A(3). 
102
 In a small number of complaints (<10), more than one conciliation conference was held. For example 
see above n 51 noting that Jeremy lodged two complaints of carers’ discrimination, and seven complaints 
of victimisation over a two-year period. Three conferences were held before the complaint was referred to 
the Tribunal. RN# 37 and RN# 142.  See also Chapter 10, at 10.3, 
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Table 9.3: Methods of Settlement 
Settlement Method Settled Complaints  % 281 settled 
complaints 
 
% 520 complaints 
Complaint Settled without a conciliation conference  
Minimal Telephone 
Advice to one or both 
parties. 
37 13.2 7.1 
Facilitating minimal 
negotiation and resolution 
with parties by phone.  
33 11.7 6.3 
Facilitating intensive 
negotiation and 
resolutions with parties 
by phone.  
37 13.2 7.1 
Facilitating private 
settlement between the 
parties, during 
investigation/conciliation  
29 9.3 5.6 
Total  136 48.4 26.1 
Complaint Settled at or after a conciliation conference held 
Settled at conference or 
shortly after  
75 26.7 14.4 
Settled after Conference  43 15.3 8.3 
Not clear whether settled 
at or after  
27 9.6 5.2 
Total  145 51.6 27.9 
Total Settled 
Complaints  
 
281 
 
100 
 
54 
 
 
The Conciliation Conference
103
 
As noted in Chapter 2, complaint files, particularly in relation to conferences, are often 
very brief and in the writer’s experiences do not properly record the negotiations and 
steps in the conference.
 104
  This section draws upon her personal insights. When the 
writer worked in the complaint-handling role, the usual practice was to have two 
complaint handlers run a conference, and the writer had experience co-conciliating with 
many others at conference. There was often a divergence of approaches in terms of level 
and type of intervention used by different complaint handlers. Some took a very 
proactive, facilitative approach explaining the law, for example, helping the parties to 
narrow down the issues and/or suggesting proposals for resolution. Others would leave 
the parties to shape the conference.  
 
                                                 
103
 See Chapter 1, Figure 1.2, outlining the ADB’s approach to a conciliation conference found in ADB, 
Complaining Factsheet, above n 77. 
104
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.4. 
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Although it is acknowledged that it is very difficult to generalise about the conciliation 
conference, the same basic steps were taken in practice at every conference in which the 
writer was involved, which highlights the informality of the process when compared 
with a hearing at the Tribunal. If a conference is held, the entire process is free. The 
typical conference lasted around three hours. The conference process would begin by 
the complaint handler meeting briefly with both parties before the conference to discuss 
the issues and proposals for settlement. The complaint handler would then open the 
conference with both parties, advise about the aims to facilitate a resolution of the 
complaints and reiterate the confidentiality of the process, including reference to 
s 91A(4), whereby anything said or done at the conference is not admissible in 
subsequent proceedings relating to the complaint. In the writer’s experience, the 
confidentiality of the process in practice can provide an important inducement for the 
parties—both complainants105 and respondents—to settle without the stresses and 
negative publicity that might surround a public hearing.  
 
The complainant would then present the complaint in a non-legalistic way. The 
respondent would be given the opportunity to respond. Similar amounts of time were 
allocated to each. A discussion of the issues and settlement proposals would follow. At 
some point in the conference, the complaint handler(s) would meet separately with each 
party for a ‘private’ session to review the process. Some complaint handlers would also 
advise the parties about the outcomes of other conciliations, and/or about the outcomes 
of cases at the Tribunal or in other jurisdictions, and/or sometimes provide advice about 
the complainant’s settlement proposal.106 Advice might also be provided to a respondent 
about what steps it could take to resolve the individual complaint and how to prevent 
discrimination and ensure compliance in the future. Advice might also be given to a 
complainant about the process and prospects of success at the Tribunal. However, very 
often, the details of these conversations are not recorded on the file. 
 
                                                 
105
 See Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 169, noting some complainants would be unwilling to proceed to a 
public hearing. See generally Chapter 4, at 4.3. 
106
 Note that in the ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 77, the ADB advises complainants that it is 
impartial in the complaint process and cannot ‘help you decide on a settlement proposal’. This ‘hands-off’ 
approach of the ADB was also noted by Chapman: Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 5, 321–2. 
However, in the writer’s experience, the complaint handler may in practice provide advice about the 
settlement proposals presented at the conference in these private sessions. 
387 
 
If an agreement is reached during a conference, the ADB can draw up a conciliation 
agreement based on its standard proforma (see Figure A2 in Appendix A), in which any 
other specific terms are then inserted into the agreement.
 107
  Utilising the proforma has 
several benefits for complainants. It enables a plain English approach to the terms, 
which the parties can then review and sign as part of the conference, thereby avoiding a 
legal and technical approach to the terms of settlement. In contrast, the complaint files 
demonstrate that if a deed or the agreement was drafted by a respondent, they were 
usually drawn up by lawyers and were usually much more expansive and complex.
108
 
This could hinder and delay a final resolution, sometimes by many months as the parties 
then embark upon negotiations about the terms. The case of Jeremy noted in Chapter 10 
indicates how the failure to negotiate a single term can prevent a resolution of the 
complaint, even when a substantive agreement had been reached otherwise.
109
 
 
The complaint files also demonstrate that if a complaint was not settled at the 
conference, the ADB would sometimes keep the file open to continue to assist the 
parties with negotiation of final terms after the conference, sometimes acting as a 
conduit and/or postbox between the parties, sometimes for many months. This also 
reflects another aspect of the ADB’s informal and flexible approach to conciliation and 
complaint resolution.  
 
The discrimination law literature has suggested that conciliation amounts to the 
privatisation of justice and that the process is increasingly adversarial and does very 
little to address the unequal bargaining positions and power imbalances between 
employers and employees.
110
 While these critiques are acknowledged, the data 
demonstrates that, unlike litigation at the Tribunal, the ADB’s complaint-handling 
function can provide an important space for complainants who would be unwilling to go 
                                                 
107
 Section 91A(5).AD Act provides that if an agreement is reached at the conference, it may be put in 
writing and signed by the parties at the request of either party, within 28 days of the conference. Since 
2005, there has been scope to have an agreement registered and enforced at the Tribunal, but there was no 
evidence on any of the files that a party had applied to the Tribunal in this way.  
108
 Note that if the respondent prepared the agreement or deed of release, the terms were much more 
complex, frequently involving a very broad bar to future proceedings, restraining the complainant from 
working elsewhere, non-disparagement and reputation, and much more detailed confidentiality clauses. 
109
 See Jeremy’s complaint, RN# 37 and RN# 142 discussed above at n 102 and in Chapter 10  at 10.3. 
After multiple complaints and three conferences the respondent agreed to accommodate a request for a 
transfer but insisted on a term of settlement involving a very broad bar to any future proceedings arising 
as a result of the employment, beyond the discrimination complaint. Jeremy refused to agree and the 
complaint was referred to the Tribunal. It never reached a hearing. 
110
 See Chapter 4, at 4.3.2. 
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to the Tribunal to make a complaint.
111
 The ADB’s approach can be both timely and 
responsive to the facts and circumstances of the complaint and the parties’ needs. This 
is important if the intention is for the employment relationship to continue through an 
accommodation. How the ADB tries to address adversarialism and the unequal 
bargaining position of the parties during the process is now considered.
112
 
 
9.3.4 Legal Representation and the ADB’s Approach to Section 91B 
 
Under the AD Act, there is nothing to prevent a party from having representation during 
the complaint process; however, if a compulsory conciliation conference is called, s 91B 
provides that there is ‘no right to representation’ and ‘a complainant or respondent in 
conciliation proceedings before the President cannot be represented by any other person, 
except by leave of the President’. These two aspects of representation are now 
considered, followed by a case study that illustrates how the ADB approached a 
respondent’s request for legal representation at a conference.  
 
Advice and Assistance during the Complaints Process 
Representation, advice or assistance was sometimes provided by different agents, not 
just solicitors and barristers.
.113
 Complainants sought assistance from solicitors in 
private practice, legal aid, community legal centres, pro bono schemes,
114
 or non-legal 
agents such as trade unions. Respondents were represented by in-house legal counsel, 
external solicitors and employers’ associations or industry groups. In particular, some 
public sector respondents who were major employers in public administration and 
safety, education and health were more likely to utilise in-house legal representation. 
However, Table 9.4 shows that the vast majority of the parties had no representation at 
any stage during the first stage of the complaint process at the ADB: 103 complainants 
(20%) were represented and only 62 complainants (12%) were legally represented by a 
solicitor in private practice in which a cost may have been involved.
115
 The other 417 
                                                 
111
 See Thornton, a critic of conciliation acknowledging this point: Thornton, Promise, above n 6, 169. 
112
 See above n 110 and Chapter 1, at 1.4. 
113
 See Chapter 7, at 7.2.1 outlining the representation that the parties had at the Tribunal. 
114
 In the writer’s experience, in practice, a number of major law firms in Sydney will take applications 
for pro bono assistance, but the applicants must pass a merits test on the facts of their case as well as a 
means test before assistance will be provided. ADB complaint handlers would sometimes refer 
complaints to the relevant pro bono schemes. See generally Gaze and Hunter, Enforcing, above n 8, 201–
32, discussing different options for representation for complainants.  
115
 It is not known whether these services were provided for a fee.  
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complainants (80%) appeared to be self-represented. The representation rate was only 
slightly higher for respondents: 128 respondents (25%) were legally represented and 
395 (75%) appeared to be self-represented during the complaints process. 
 
Table 9.4: Advice, Assistance and Representation during the Complaints Process 
Type of Representation  N  % 520 complaints 
Complainants 
Solicitor private practice 62 11.9 
Community legal centre 5 1.0 
Pro bono  7 1.3 
Legal Aid 2 0.4 
Trade Union 27 5.2 
Total Represented at some stage 103 19.8 
Self-represented throughout  417 80.2 
Total 520 100 
Respondents 
Legal in house or external representation 121 24 
Employer Association or Industry Group  7 1 
Total Represented  128 24.6 
Self-represented throughout  392 75.4 
Total 520 100 
 
Section 91B Applications for Leave for Legal Representation  
There are no statutory requirements about the form of an application under s 91B. The 
complaint files indicate that there was considerable variance in the approaches of the 
complaint handlers.
116
 For example, in deciding whether to allow legal representation, 
some complaint handlers would record that they had asked the other party for their view 
verbally or in writing, had considered whether the conciliation process would be 
assisted by representation and had considered the power differential between the 
parties.
117
 Others would record no details as to whether an application had been received 
or of their reasoning for any decision made. 
 
Table 9.5 sets out that in the 224 complaints in which a conference was held, it could be 
ascertained that the ADB received an application for leave from either or both parties in 
70 of those complaints, representing 31% of complaints in which a conciliation 
conference was held. In the other 154 complaints (69%), the parties may have had legal 
representation but it was not always clear from the file whether an application for leave 
                                                 
116
 This is also the writer’s experience of working at the ADB. 
117
 See s 91B, which states that a party in ‘conciliation proceedings cannot be represented by any other 
person except by leave of the President’. There is no uniform formal leave process; often, the parties 
request leave in writing, but it is also routinely done over the phone. In practice, often, but not always, the 
complaint handler may seek the views of the parties. See Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 5, 
328–9. 
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had been made.  However, the data that are available do indicate that the ADB does not 
simply ‘rubberstamp’ s 91B applications. It does therefore make attempts to prevent an 
overly adversarial approach at a conference. Out of the 70 complaints in which an 
application under s 91B was made, leave was granted to one or both parties in 38 
complaints (54%). It was denied to both parties so that neither had representation in 32 
(46%) complaints. Leave was most often granted when both parties were represented, 
occurring in 31 complaints (44%), but in five complaints leave was denied even though 
both parties had requested it. The complainant alone was granted leave in seven 
complaints in which the respondent was not represented (10%), but was also denied 
leave in seven (10%). Importantly, none of the respondent applications for leave were 
granted when the complainant was not also represented, with 20 (29%) respondent 
applications denied. This indicates that the ADB does recognise the unequal bargaining 
power of the parties and does take steps to protect the complainant at a conference via 
s 91B.  If an application was refused, the legal representative could attend and wait 
outside the conference or the party could confer during the process by phone. 
 
Table 9.5: Legal Representation at a Conciliation Conference and Formal 
Application for Leave under s 91B 
Applications under s 91B Number of Complaints   % of 70 complaints where 
leave sought 
Leave granted 
Both granted 31 44.3 
Respondent alone granted 0 0.0 
Complainant alone granted 7 10 
Total  38 54.3 
Leave denied 
Both denied 5 7.2 
Respondent denied 20 28.6 
Complainant denied 7 10.0 
Total  32 45.7 
Total  70 100 
 
There is one potential loophole to the application of s 91B in practice, in relation to the 
use by some respondents of in-house legal counsel.  It was sometimes unclear whether 
the respondent representative was a lawyer, and if the representative was a lawyer, 
whether leave was actually applied for.  There was evidence that the use of in-house 
legal representatives could circumvent the intention of s 91B because in house lawyers 
handling complaints did not apply for leave. The result of this could be to exacerbate 
any tendency towards adversarialism in the process. However, in the writer’s 
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experience, the complaint handler would usually keep a tight rein on conference 
proceedings. Adversarial and overly legalistic arguments were actively discouraged at 
the conference, common litigation practices such as cross-examining a witness were not 
allowed and the parties were required to be courteous or a halt would be called to the 
conference. In addition, when there was a perceived power imbalance, the ADB would 
often specifically recommend that a support person such as a friend or family member 
also attend the conference with an unrepresented complainant, as outlined in the 
following case study. 
 
Legal Representation: A Case Study
118
 
Josie was denied access to leave over the upcoming school holidays and had also been 
harassed by her manager. Given the urgency of the situation, the ADB called an early 
conciliation conference to take place three weeks post lodgement of the complaint and 
prior to the holidays. The respondent agreed that it would provide its response to the 
complaint at the conference. Its solicitor applied for leave under s 91B but was denied. 
The ADB did not ask the complainant for her view, but wrote: 
The complainant does not seek to be represented and I consider that she will 
be disadvantaged if [the Respondent] has representation. Allowing one party 
may cause an actual or perceived power imbalance which may disadvantage 
the party who is not represented and jeopardise the possibility of resolution. 
[The respondent] is welcome to arrange for you to be available by phone so 
that they can seek legal advice during breaks in the conciliation conference.  
The ADB did advise Josie to bring a support person to the conference. On the day of the 
conference, the individual manager who had harassed the complainant was also to be 
present. The complainant did not feel comfortable about facing him, and the conference 
was then dealt with by ‘shuttle’ negotiation. The conciliator relayed information 
between the parties, thus also illustrating the flexible nature of conciliation. The 
complaint was resolved and access to leave was granted. In addition, training was to be 
provided to the individual harasser and all staff within six weeks, and this was included 
in a standard conciliation agreement drawn up by the ADB and signed by the parties on 
the day.  
 
In summary, although 20% of complainants and 25% of respondents had some form of 
formal representation during the complaint process, this is much lower than the rates of 
                                                 
118
 RN# 454. 
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representation at the Tribunal, where 11 out of 12 respondents and seven out of 12 
complainants were legally represented.
119
 Further, if a conciliation conference is held, 
the ADB is only likely to allow representation for a respondent if the complainant is 
also represented. Legal representation obviously has the potential to increase the 
complainant’s costs as well as the adversarialism of the complaint process. However, 
when compared with the Tribunal, the first stage of the complaint process at the ADB 
does provide a cheaper, quicker and much less litigious adversarial process. 
 
9.3.5 The Effectiveness of the Process: Concluding Comments 
 
In conclusion, the first stage of the complaint-handling process can offer the opportunity 
for a responsive, free, relatively informal and timely mechanism to provide access to an 
alternative dispute-resolution forum which is overseen by an impartial complaint 
handler. Legal representation is not required; moreover, it is only allowed at a 
conciliation conference with leave of the ADB.
120
 During the complaint process, both 
sides have access to ADB staff for advice and assistance about the operation of the 
legislation and the implementation of their rights and obligations. Lodging a complaint 
with the ADB can provide a lacuna of time when the parties pause and possibly attempt 
to negotiate a resolution under the ADB process, rather than allowing a dispute to 
proceed inexorably to the termination of the employment relationship.  A key argument 
throughout this thesis, which is supported by the complaint data, is that the process can 
therefore be particularly useful for those complainants who want to maintain the 
employment relationship and have their responsibilities accommodated.  The outcomes 
of the complaints are now considered.  
 
9.4 Outcomes and Remedies at the ADB 
 
In practice, there are four possible outcomes for a complaint made to the ADB:
 121 
  
1. Not accepted or declined: The complaint is either not accepted for investigation 
at lodgement
122
 or declined by the ADB at any stage after lodgement.
123
  
                                                 
119
 See Chapter 7, at 7.2.1.  
120
 Section 91B. 
121
 See Chapter 1, at 1.4.2, and see Figure A1 in Appendix A, which sets out the complaint-handling 
powers of the ADB under the AD Act.  
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2. The complainant does not proceed: There are three main reasons: the complaint 
is not conciliated and the complainant does not wish to proceed to the Tribunal, 
it is formally withdrawn by the complainant at any stage
124
 or the complaint is 
abandoned by the complainant.
125
  
3. Settled: In practice, ‘settled’ usually means that the complainant receives some 
form of remedy in consideration of which the complaint is discontinued. Once a 
complaint is settled between the parties, regardless of whether a deed or 
agreement is signed, the ADB often formally terminated the complaint under 
s92A, by writing to the parties. This ensures that the complaint cannot then be 
referred at a later stage to the Tribunal for a hearing. However, ADB staff did 
sometimes record that a complainant did not proceed even though the 
complainant in fact did achieve a remedy or outcome that they were happy with 
as a result of the complaint. For the purposes of this research these files were 
coded as ‘settled’.126   
4. Referred to the Tribunal for a hearing in certain circumstances: In practice, 
complaints will most often be referred if a complaint cannot be conciliated or if 
a complaint is declined by the ADB and the complainant asks for the matter to 
be referred.
127
 The file is closed at the ADB but proceeds to the second stage at 
the Tribunal. 
 
The remedies which a complainant can seek, at the first stage of the complaint process 
at the ADB, is not restricted in any way by the AD Act.
128
 In its publications, the ADB 
advises complainants that it is impartial in the complaint process and cannot ‘help you 
decide on a settlement proposal’,129 but it does inform complainants that ‘you can ask 
for any reasonable solution to resolve the unfair treatment you received.’ It also informs 
                                                                                                                                               
122
 Section 89B. Basically, this will occur if the complaint does not disclose a contravention or is lodged 
outside the 12-month time limit. 
123
 See generally s 92(1) and Figure A1 in Appendix A. 
124
 Section 92B.  
125
 Section 92C. 
126
 Section 92A.   Twenty six complaints were finalised in this way by ADB complaint handlers.  
127
 See ss 92(1), 93A(1)–(2), 93B, 93C. 
128
 Chapter 1, at 1.4. Compare with the power of the Tribunal to order a remedy, which is limited to those 
powers set out under s 108. Those powers are very broad but, in practice, the Tribunal has only ever 
awarded compensation in the carers’ complaints that came before it.  
129
 See for example, ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 77. 
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complainants, not just about individual remedies, but also about potentially systemic 
remedies such as policy changes or education programmes.
130
 
 
 
9.4.1 An Overview of Key Findings in Relation to the Outcomes of Carers’ 
Complaints at the ADB 
 
Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 sets out that the ADB annual reports during the decade 2000–
2001 to 2010–2011 indicated that the settlement rate for complaints made on all 
grounds of discrimination under the AD Act, including carers’ discrimination, was 30%. 
In comparison, the data for carers’ complaints over the same period that were reviewed 
for this project indicate an average settlement rate of 54%.
131
 It was suggested that the 
higher settlement rate may be explained by the fact that carers’ complaints had a higher 
rate of accommodation than other grounds, because, for example, accommodation may 
not be an appropriate outcome for other grounds. For example, where the discriminatory 
conduct relates to bias or prejudice because of a protected characteristic, rather than the 
impact of any underlying discriminatory structures, accommodation may not be 
relevant.
132
 The discussion below supports this hypothesis.  
 
Tables 9.6–9.8 provide the outcomes for the 520 complaints finalised at the ADB.  
 
Table 9.6: Summary of Complaint Outcomes by Gender 
Outcomes  Female  Male  Other  Total  
 
As %  
520  
Settled Settled with accommodation 110 48 2 160 30.7 
Settled other remedy 105 16 0 121 23.2 
Settled Total  215 64 2 281 54.0 
Not  
Setttled 
Referred to Tribunal  46 20 1 67 12.9 
Not accepted on lodgement  4 7 0 11 2.1 
Declined after accepted for 
investigation 
17 8 0 25 4.8 
Not proceeded with 100 36 0 136 26.1 
Not Settled Total  167 71 1  239 46.0 
Total  382 135 3 520 100 
 
                                                 
130 
Ibid. 
131
 See generally Chapter 2, at 2.2.3, outlining the nature and limited nature of the complaints data 
provided in ADB annual reports.  
132
 See Chapter 1, at 1.2.3, explaining that in Australia duties of accommodation in discrimination law 
have related to disability and carers’/family relationships discrimination.  
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In summary, the key findings are that, out of a total of 520 complaints: 
 509 (98%) were accepted at lodgement for investigation. Eleven complaints 
were not accepted, 10 were found to be lodged out of time and one complaint 
was found to be out of jurisdiction at that stage.
133
 
 453 (87 %) were finalised at the ADB. They did not proceed any further at the 
ADB and were not referred to the Tribunal. 
 281 (54%) settled and received some form of remedy/remedies, such as an 
accommodation of their responsibilities, financial compensation, an apology or a 
reference.  
 160 (31%) settled with some form of accommodation, so that the employee 
remained in work. In some cases, complainants also received other remedies, 
including compensation or an apology: 
o 276 (53%) were seeking an accommodation, as identified either at the time 
the complaint was lodged or during the conciliation and negotiation 
process.
134
 Out of these 276, 160 complainants achieved some form of 
accommodation to stay in their job. Therefore, 58% of all complainants who 
wanted an accommodation achieved some form of accommodation that 
enabled them to remain in employment.  
o Complainants who had left employment at the time of lodgement generally 
did not seek reinstatement and accommodation: 179 complainants (34% of 
complainants) had left employment at the time of lodgement and only three 
of those were seeking (and achieved) reinstatement and accommodation.
135
 
 121 (23%) settled with some other form of remedy/remedies that did not involve 
an accommodation of their caring responsibilities. 
 110 (21%) involved the complainant receiving financial compensation ranging 
from $500 to $76,000, with an average compensation amount of $8,722 per 
complainant, and a median compensation amount of $5,000. 
                                                 
133
 RN# 234. The complainant was a woman who had just had a baby and was concerned generally that 
she may be discriminated against in the future. There was no discriminatory or potentially discriminatory 
conduct identified.  
134
 A common sense approach was taken to this aspect of coding because complainants sometimes listed 
many remedies in their complaint that they did not appear to really want. On other occasions, 
complainants did genuinely want an accommodation at the outset but then changed their minds as to what 
they wanted to resolve the complaint as the complaint process progressed. If by the time of a conciliation 
conference or final settlement negotiation, the complainant clearly no longer wished to be accommodated, 
this was coded accordingly, that the complainant was not seeking an accommodation.  
135
 See the discussion of the employment status of complainants and how this related to requests for 
accommodation above at 9.2.3 and at 9.2.6; See also Table 9.9 below.   
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 56 (11 %) resulted in a specific outcome with potentially systemic effects within 
a workplace, for example, in relation to a policy change or provision of training. 
 239 (46%) did not settle: 
o 67 (13%) were referred to the Tribunal.  
o 172 (33%) were finalised at the ADB and no further action was taken. 
o 36 (7%) were either not accepted at lodgement or were later declined and 
were finalised at the ADB. 
o 136 (26%) did not proceed (were withdrawn or abandoned).  
 
The discussion of the outcomes and remedies is presented through a gender and care 
lens. However, for some carer categories, the data set was very small and it can be 
difficult to make meaningful conclusions. When illustrating any key variances in 
relation to the different carer categories, the focus below is therefore on those three 
carer categories that made the most complaints: maternity, mothers/NMR and fathers, 
who together made 447, or 86% of all complaints.   
 
Those complaints that were not resolved are noted briefly before turning to the 
complaints that were settled, and the remedies that were achieved to evaluate whether 
they represent ‘good’ outcomes. 
 
The main purpose of this chapter, and Chapter 10, is to answer the second research 
question about whether the complaints process has provided a ‘good’ outcome for 
complainants, quantitatively, in terms of the number of complaints settled and, 
qualitatively, in terms of the nature of the settlement. In particular, whether the 
complainant was able to achieve an accommodation and whether the ADB’s approach 
to complaint handling had a broader normative impact to further the objectives of Part 
4B are the key focus. In this context, the reasons why complaints do not settle are only 
briefly considered in this chapter, and in Chapter 10.
136
   
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 See especially Chapter 10, at 10.3, which outlines several case summaries in relation to complaints in 
which the complaints were discontinued even though the allegations indicated strongly that 
discrimination had occurred. 
397 
 
9.4.2 Complaints That Were Not Settled at the ADB 
 
Table 9.7 sets out the outcomes for complaints that were not settled at the ADB by 
gender and caring responsibility. In summary, 239 complaints (46%) did not settle. 
Female complainants were more likely to achieve a settlement than male complainants: 
44% of female complaints were not resolved, compared with 53% of male complaints. 
A similar proportion were referred to the Tribunal (12% female v. 15% male) and also 
did not proceed (26% female v. 27% male). Women were less likely to have their 
complaint declined or not accepted by the ADB than men (6% v. 11%).  
 
Table 9.7: Complaints That Were Not Settled at the ADB by Outcome and Caring 
Relationship 
Number of 
complaints by  
Caring 
Relationships (CR)  
  
Referred to 
Tribunal and 
as % per CR  
Declined or not 
accepted and as 
% per CR  
Not Proceeded with 
and as % per CR 
Total not 
settled and as 
% per CR 
N  %  N  %  N  %
  
N % 
Maternity  153 16 9.4 8 5.2 36 23.5 60 39.2 
Mothers (NMR) 201 27 13.4 12 6.0 60 29.9 99 49.3 
Female carer - 
other parental 
8 1 12.5 1 12.5 1 12.5 3 37.5 
Female carer – 
adult 
20 2 9.0 0 0.0 3 15.0 5 25.0 
Female Totals  382 46 12.0 21 5.5 100 26.2 167 43.7 
Fathers  93 14 15.1 8 8.6 24 25.8 46 49.5 
Male carer - 
other parental 
2 1 50.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 50.0 
Male carer – 
adult 
34 5 14.7 7 20.6 6 17.6 18 53.0 
Male carer - 
relationship not 
identified 
6 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 100 6 100.0 
Male Totals 135 20 14.8 15 11.1 36 26.7 71 52.6 
Non individual 3 1 33.3 0 0.0 0 0 1 33.3 
Total and as % 
of 520 
520 67 12.9 36 6.9 136 26 239 46.0 
 
It is acknowledged that some complaints that did not settle appeared to have very little 
merit, or it was unclear from the information provided how the conduct complained of 
could amount to a breach of the AD Act. However, it was also apparent that many other 
complainants had very clearly suffered discrimination but their complaints did not 
proceed to an outcome involving a resolution of their complaint. It is particularly 
concerning that over a quarter of all complaints made to the ADB (136 complaints, 
26%) were finalised because the complainants no longer wished to proceed or had 
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abandoned their complaint. The reasons why complainants discontinue a complaint are 
not always clear. However, some complaints did provide important insights into the 
motivation of the complainants to discontinue.
137
 Complainants reported that they were 
afraid to carry on with their complaints for fear that it would harm their working 
relationship or prospects, or that they did not have the energy or emotional strength to 
carry on their complaint to the Tribunal. In other complaints the respondents simply 
refused to take part in any meaningful negotiations.
138
 In these complaints, the ADB 
was powerless under the legislation to take any action against the respondent no matter 
how egregious the breaches of the AD Act appeared to be. If a complaint cannot be 
resolved at the ADB, and if a complainant is unwilling to take the next step to the 
adversarial process at the Tribunal, the discriminator will escape any sanction. The 
alleged discriminatory conduct and/or the underlying policies, practice and structures 
that were complained about may continue unchallenged at the respondent’s 
workplace.
139
  
 
Therefore, the data also reflect one of the key criticisms in the literature about the 
current discrimination law framework, which depends upon individuals ‘to identify 
breaches, press claims, and enforce outcomes without any public assistance [and thus] 
represents a fundamental regulatory weakness even when the initial dispute-resolution 
system is relatively informal and accessible’.140 Under the AD Act, if an individual does 
not complain or does not wish to proceed, the ADB has very little regulatory power to 
enforce discrimination laws.
141
 This is a major deficiency in the current regulatory 
framework that seriously hinders the capacity of the ADB to utilise its statutory 
functions to further the policy objectives of Part 4B.  
 
Qualitative summaries are reported in Chapter 10 to provide insights into the reasons 
why complainants did not proceed with their complaints.
 142
  However, why so many 
complainants withdraw or abandoned their complaints is an issue that requires further 
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 Ibid. 
138
 Ibid. 
139
 See Chapter 4, at 4.1 – 4.3highlighting the key deficiencies in the standard discrimination law model 
in Australia and its individual enforcement processes.  
140
 Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal in the World of Work: Two Significant Developments in Australian 
Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of Labour Law 199.  See also Chapter 1, at 1.4, and 
Chapter 4, at 4.3.1. 
141
Ibid  
142
 See Chapter 10, at 10.3. 
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qualitative research in order to provide a more complete understanding of the operation 
and effectiveness of the legislation. Such research may provide some insights into how 
the process at the ADB can be made more accessible and effective, so that complainants 
can be encouraged to continue with their complaints.  It may also suggest the 
development of alternative enforcement mechanisms. 
 
 
9.4.3 Settled Complaints 
 
Table 9.8 shows that 281 complaints (54%) were resolved and 160 (31%) settled with 
an accommodation. 
 
Table 9.8: Complaints Settled with Accommodation or Other Remedy by Gender 
and Caring Responsibility 
Number of 
complaints 
by  
Caring 
Relationships 
(CR)  
 
Seeking 
accommodation  
and as % per 
CR  
Accommodation sought and 
achieved as a proportion  
% per CR  
  
Other 
remedy 
and as % 
per CR 
Total 
Settled and 
as % per 
CR 
N % N 
Achieved  
 
% 
Achieved 
% 
Proportion 
N  % N  % 
Maternity  153 79 51.6 48 31.4 60.8 45 29.4 93 60.8 
Mothers 
(NMR) 
201 101 50.2  51 25.4 50.5 51 25.4 102 50.7 
Female 
parental 
8 7 87.5 4 50.0 57.1 1 12.5 5 62.5 
Female 
carer – 
adult 
20 8 40.0 7 35.0 87.5 8 40.0 15 75.0 
Female 
Totals  
382 195 51.04 110 28.8 56.4 105 27.5 215  56.3 
Fathers  93 64 68.8 35 37.6 54.7 12 12.9 47 50.5 
Male 
parental 
2 2 100.0 1 50 50.0 0 0.0 1 50.0 
Male 
carer - 
adult 
34 13 38.2 12 35.3 92.3 4 11.7 16 47.0 
Male 
carer 
unclear  
6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Male 
Totals 
135 79 58.5 48 35.6 60.8 16 11.9 64 47.4 
Non 
individual  
3 2 66.7 2 66.7 100 0 0.0 2 66.7 
Total  520 276 53.07 160 30.8 58.0 121 23.2 281 54.0 
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Proportionally, women achieved a higher rate of settlement than men. Out of 382 
complaints from women, 215 (57%) settled, and out of 135 complaints from men, 64 
(48%) settled. In terms of accommodation rates, however, the rate was higher for men, 
at 36% v women at 29%. In particular, there were some variances across complaints 
from mothers and fathers that explain this. Mothers/NMR had an accommodation rate 
of only 25% compared with 31% for maternity complaints and 38% for fathers. These 
differences can partially be explained by the fact that 59% of male complainants were 
seeking an accommodation as compared with 51% of female complainants: a high 
proportion of father complainants, just over 69%, were seeking an accommodation of 
some sort compared with 52% of maternity complainants and 50% of mothers/NMR.  
  
9.4.4 Remedies Achieved 
 
Table 9.9 sets out the remedies that were achieved in the 281 settled complaints. It was 
possible to ascertain the nature of the remedy achieved in all of them, even if the precise 
terms of settlement were not always clearly articulated on the file. Therefore, Table 9.9 
may not represent all of the actual terms of settlement that were agreed. In addition, the 
ADB does not generally follow up the complainant once a file is closed at the ADB. 
The data do not therefore generally indicate whether the remedies and terms that were 
agreed were actually carried out by the parties. Unless the ADB keeps the file open for a 
period after settlement or unless a complainant makes a further complaint,
143
 it is 
generally not known what happened, for example, when a complainant returned to work 
after maternity leave, or when an accommodation was put in practice at the workplace 
level. 
 
  
                                                 
143
 See Chapter 2, at 2.2.4. Only 16 complainants made two carers’ complaints which related to different 
allegations or different respondents.  
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Table 9.9: Remedies by Caring Responsibility and Gender 
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Remedy involving accommodation 
Rostering/ 
Shifts/start/ 
finish   
10 27 2 2 41 10.7 24 1 1 26 19.3 1 68 24.2 13.1 
Part-time/ 
job share  
33 14 2 0 49 12.8 4 0 2 6 4.4 1 56 19.9 10.8 
Leave 2 9 0 3 14 3.7 8 0 7 15 11.0 0 29 9.3 5.6 
Transfer or 
location 
1 5 0 2 8 2.1 2 0 2 4 3.0 0 12 4.3 2.3 
Tele-work 7 2 0 2 11 2.9 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 11 3.9 2.1 
Training  5 5 0 0 10 2.6 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 11 3.2 1.7 
HR 
facilitator 
appointed  
2 1 0 0 3 1.0 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 4 1.4 0.8 
Promotion 0 1 0 1 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 2 0.7 0.4 
Overtime  1 1 0 0 2 0.5 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 3 1.1 0.6 
Car 3 0 0 0 3 1.0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 3 1.1 0.6 
Credit leave 0 2 0 0 2 0.5 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 3 1.1 0.6 
Reinstated  0 1 0 0 1 0.3 1 0 1 2 1.5 0 3 1.1 0.6 
Financial Remedy 
Financial 49 41 1 5 96 25.1 13 0 4 17 12.6 0 113 40.2 21.7 
Other Remedies 
Apology 15 15 0 0 30 5.8. 0 0 1 1 0.7 0 31 11.0 6.0 
Reference 5 11 0 0 16 4.2 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 17 6.0 3.3 
Record 
amended/ 
removed 
0 3 0 2 5 1.3 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 6 2.1 1.2 
Supervisor/ 
manager 
disciplined 
1 1 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 2 0.7 0.4 
Satisfied 
with 
explanation  
0 1 0 1 2 0.5 1 0 0 1 0.7 0 3 1.1 0.6 
ADB writes 
to advise as 
to law  
0 3 0 0 3 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 3 1.1 0.6 
Potentially Systemic 
Systemic 
Outcome  
19 22 1 3 45 11.8 9 0 1 10 7.4 1 56 20.0 10.8 
Notes 
 Multiple remedies achieved by some complainants in the data set. 
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Types of Accommodation Achieved 
As noted, 160 complaints were accommodated, and some complainants achieved more 
than one remedy. The most common types of accommodation achieved corresponded 
with the most common types of conduct reported, as summarised in Figure 9.8 above.
144
 
The three most common accommodations achieved were all concerned with flexibility 
in relation to hours of work: 
 Rostering, shifts or start/finish was achieved in 68 complaints (13% of all 
complaints lodged and 24% of all settled complaints).  
 Part-time work/job share was achieved in 56 complaints (11% of all complaints 
lodged and 20% of all settled complaints).  
 Access to leave was achieved in 29 complaints (6% of all complaints lodged, 
and 10% of all settled complaints).  
 
Proportionally, the rate of accommodations and any gender and care variances in the 
rates of accommodation achieved also broadly corresponds with the most common 
types of conduct reported by different carers, as noted in Figure 9.9.
145
 For example:  
 More women than men achieved an accommodation relating to part-time work 
with 49 individual female complainants (13% of all female complainants) 
achieving part-time work or job share. The vast majority of these 33 complaints 
(9% of all female complainants) related to maternity-related issues. Only six 
male complainants (four fathers and two carers for adults, 4% of male 
complainants) achieved part-time work. 
 Proportionally, more male complainants (26, 19%) achieved flexibility in 
relation to shifts, rostering or start/finish times compared with female 
complainants (41, 11%). 
 Access to leave was achieved by more male complainants, 15 (15%), compared 
with female complainants 14 (4%). 
 
The Likelihood of Accommodation as a ‘Good’ Outcome 
When assessing how effective Part 4B and the complaint process has been in achieving 
accommodations for complainants, it is important to acknowledge that not all 
                                                 
144
 See also Tables D13–D15 in Appendix D. 
145
 Ibid. 
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complainants sought an accommodation as a remedy. How effective the legislation has 
been can also be gauged by comparing the proportion of complainants who sought an 
accommodation with the proportion of those who then went on and achieved some form 
of accommodation that then enabled them to remain in their job (although not 
necessarily the same sort of accommodation that they sought). As Table 9.8 
demonstrates, the rates were similar across the genders:  
 Out of 382 female complaints, 195 sought an accommodation, and of these, 110 
achieved some form of accommodation so that 57% of women who wanted an 
accommodation achieved one.  
 Out of 135 male complaints, 79 sought an accommodation and 48 achieved one, 
equating to 61%.  
 
Therefore, the data suggest that for those complainants who are seeking an 
accommodation to stay in work, a complaint to the ADB is a viable dispute-resolution 
option that may enable the maintenance of the employment relationship. Complaint 
summaries in Chapter 10 illustrate how the process worked in practice, and also indicate 
that it is imperative that once a workplace dispute arises over a refusal to accommodate, 
complainants must act quickly to resolve the issue actively and, if necessary, take steps 
to make a complaint to the ADB before the relationship has broken down to have the 
best chance of accommodation. 
 
In contrast, the data show that very few carers’ complainants who were not employed 
with the respondent at the time of lodgement ever sought, or achieved, accommodation. 
Complainants who had left employment at the time of lodgement generally did not seek 
reinstatement and accommodation. As noted above, 179 complaints, or 34% of all 
carers’ complainants, had left employment at the time of lodgement and only three of 
those were seeking reinstatement and accommodation, and none of the job applicants 
were seeking appointment to a job.
146
 For example, fathers and maternity-related 
complainants in particular had high rates of accommodation at 38% and 31% 
respectively, while mothers achieved an accommodation rate of only 25%. 
Correspondingly, where data were available 73% of fathers, 59% of maternity-related 
                                                 
146
 See above Section 9.2.3; and see Table D7 in Appendix D. 
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complainants and 55% of mothers were still currently employed at the time of 
lodgement.
147
  
 
Other Non-financial Remedies 
The most common remedies achieved were in relation to apologies/statements of regret 
(31 complainants, 6% of all complainants) and references/statements of service (17 
complainants, 3% of all complainants). Interestingly, very few men sought or achieved 
these remedies, only one male complainant achieved an apology and only one a 
reference.  
 
Financial Compensation 
In summary, as set out in Table 9.10 out of of 520 complaints the respondent made 
some sort of financial payment in 113. One respondent made a $500 donation to a 
charity,
148
 and two other respondents paid for retraining costs ($1,500 and $2,500 
respectively) after the employment ceased. In the other 110, the financial compensation 
was paid to the complainant to compensate for loss occasioned by the discrimination.  
Women were more likely to receive compensation than men: 96 female complainants 
(25% of female complainants) received compensation compared with 17 male 
complainants (13% of male complainants). In 13 complaints, the amount was not 
specified. In the remaining 97, the amount of compensation ranged from $500 to 
$76,000. In these 97 complaints, a total of $850,900 was paid to the complainants, 
equating to an average payment of $8,722 per complainant, and a median compensation 
amount of $5,000. If the top three payments (which were all in excess of $42,000) are 
excluded, the average drops to just $7,180, and the median stays the same.  
 
It was often difficult to establish what particular loss the payment made was intended to 
compensate for. In contrast to the Tribunal’s legalistic approach to the quantification of 
loss noted in Chapter 7,
149
 the complainant was not required to provide a breakdown 
with any particularity of the heads of loss in relation to either his or her ‘general’ 
damages or economic loss.  Although a complainant was often asked by the ADB to 
prepare a settlement proposal, particularly before a conciliation conference, many 
                                                 
147
 See Section 9.2.3, Figure 9.4; Table D7 in Appendix D.  
148 
ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 77, informs complainants that such a donation is a potential 
remedy. 
149
 See Chapter 7, at 7.2.2. 
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complainants did not provide a written proposal. In practice, compensation was often 
claimed by complainants in relation to economic loss such as lost wages, lost overtime 
or childcare fees. It is also important to note that, rather than representing a payment to 
compensate the complainant for losses incurred as a result of the discrimination, in fact, 
it appears that very often any payment represented no more than a paying out of the 
complainant’s statutory entitlements. For example, complainants often received 
payment for their leave entitlements, unpaid wages, redundancy or termination 
payments once the employment ended.  Complainants did also sometimes claim less 
tangible loss such as for distress, pain, hurt and suffering. However, complaint file notes 
often contained only brief details of negotiations in relation to heads of damage 
claimed; similarly, any written deed or conciliation agreement between the parties very 
often did not particularise the compensation payment. Instead, a global figure was often 
arrived at in the negotiations, and payments were often referred to in the deed or 
agreement as an ‘ex gratia’ payment. 
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Table 9.10: Financial Compensation by Gender and Care 
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Compensation paid to complainant – amount specified 
$0-2,5000 2 10 0 1 13 3.4 2 0 1 3 2.2 16 16.5 5.7 3.1 
$2,501-  
 5000 
12 17 0 3 32 8.4 4 0 1 5 3.7 37 38.1 13.2 7.1 
$5,001- 
$10,000 
12 5 1 0 18 4.7 5 0 2 7 5.2 25 25.8 8.9 4.8 
$10,001-
15,000 
6 2 0 0 8 2.1 1 0 0 1 0.7 9 24.3 3.2 1.7 
$15,001-
20,000 
2 1 0 0 3 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.0 3 3.1 1.1 0.6 
$20,001-
30,000 
1 1 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0 2 2.1 0.7 0.4 
$30,001-
40,000 
1 0 0 1 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0 2 2.1 0.7 0.4 
$40,001-
50,000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.7 1 1.0 0.4 0.2 
$50,000+  1 1 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0 2 2.1 0.7 0.4 
Total  37 37 1 5 80 20.9 13 0 4 17 12.6 97 100 34.5 18.7 
Compensation paid to complainant – amount not specified 
Not 
specified 
11 2 0 0 13 3.4 0 0 0 0 0.0 13 0.0 4.6 2.5 
Other financial payments 
Donation to 
charity  
0 1 0 0 1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.0 1 0.0 0.4 0.2 
Retraining 
costs  
1 1 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0 2 0.0 0.7 0.4 
Total Complaints involving financial payment  
Total  49 41 1 5 96 25.1 13 0 4 17 12.6 113 100 40.2 21.7 
Notes  
None of the three non-individual complainants received compensation. 
 
Even though there is no statutory limit on the amount of compensation that a 
complainant can ask for at the ADB, the amounts achieved were quite clearly generally 
very low, and indicate that in complaints involving compensation the outcomes 
achieved are generally poor. In particular, as noted above, in a third of all complaints, 
by the time they lodged a complaint, the complainants had already lost their jobs, which 
they had sometimes held for many years. As with the complaints heard at the Tribunal, 
the small amounts received are unlikely to compensate complainants adequately for 
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their resultant loss.
150
 For example, out of the 97 complainants, 78 (80%) received less 
than $10,000, 53 (55%) received less than $5,000 and only seven (7%) involved 
payments in excess of $20,000. Only three complainants received more than $40,000. 
The first, a father, was a professional who was terminated after he required flexibility, 
who received $42,000. The second was Martha, discussed above,
151
 who was still 
employed at settlement and who received almost $60,000.  More than $50,000 related to 
lost earnings including overtime after the discriminatory conduct caused her to be away 
from work for a substantial period. In addition, all of her sick and other leave that she 
had taken was reinstated.  She signed a deed drafted by the respondent which 
discontinued the discrimination complaint and any other claims including her workers’ 
compensation complaint. This was a significant compensation payment, considering 
that the Tribunal compensation limit at the time was $40,000. The last of the three was a 
maternity-related complainant, who received $76,000, but this appeared to be a payment 
of her entitlements after the dissolution of a partnership. In conclusion, therefore, the 
data reflect the general trends for inadequate compensation, or poor outcomes, in 
discrimination jurisdictions generally, including in NSW.
152
  
 
Potentially Systemic Outcomes 
Fifty-six complaints (11%) resulted in an outcome that had the potential to effect a 
broader change at the respondent’s workplace or organisation. In these complaints, a 
specific term was agreed between the parties, usually in relation to a policy (relating to, 
for example, introducing, reviewing or amending a policy in relation to flexible work, 
leave, discrimination or equal employment opportunity), or training for co-workers, or 
supervisors and managers. The terms often, but not always, formed part of a written 
agreement. Chapter 10, at 10.2, provides summaries of complaints in which systemic 
remedies were achieved.  
 
In its publications, the ADB actively encouraged complainants to seek systemic 
remedies such as policy changes and education, and considered that complaints should 
                                                 
150
 See generally Chapter 7, at 7.2.2 discussing the low quantum at the Tribunal, and in discrimination 
jurisdictions generally. 
151
 RN# 65 and RN# 153. See above at 9.3.3. 
152
 See, for example, Chapter 1, at 1.5, explaining the compensation limit under s 108 of the AD Act. The 
inadequacy of compensatory remedies for carers’ cases at the Tribunal is outlined in Chapter 7.2.2. The 
maximum (and only) damages awarded in a carers’ case to date was just $16,385 in Reddy v International 
Cargo Express [2004] NSWADT 218. 
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have this broader normative role to produce change at the workplace level.
153
 Hunter 
and Leonard, in their 1995 study of sex discrimination complaints, also argued that 
complaints can be a ‘potential source of far-reaching change’154 and that ‘policy 
changes may be agreed in conciliation which could not or would not be ordered by a 
tribunal in upholding a complaint’.155  
 
Table 9.11: Complaints Involving Potentially Systemic Remedies 
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Policy 7 9 1 3 20 5.2 4 0 0 4 3.0 0 24 4.6 
Policy and Training 6 3 0 0 9 2.4 0 0 0 3 2.2 1 12 0.6 
Training  6 6 0 0 12 4.6 2 0 1 3 2.2 0 15 2.3 
Change to application 
form  
0 1 0 0 1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 1 0.2 
Single respondent 
agrees not to 
implement change 
across organisation * 
0 3 0 0 3 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 3 0.6 
Total  19 22 1 3 45 11.8 9 0 1 10 7.4 1 56 10.8 
*Three separate complaints were lodged against one respondent (RN# 158, RN# 161, RN# 168). The 
complaints resulted in the same systemic outcome (planned roster changes were not implemented 
organisation wide, and an undertaking was provided in relation to future consultation) and have 
therefore been counted once only. See ‘quick fix ’complaint summaries in Chapter 10, at 10.2. 
 
In addition, as well as achieving a specific agreed outcome as part of the conciliation, it 
is possible that an individual complaint may have a broader normative ripple effect in a 
number of other ways.
156
 From the employee perspective, if a single individual worker 
achieves an accommodation, it can mean that a precedent has been set in that workplace 
and it may then be easier for other employees coming after to attain flexibility, so that 
                                                 
153
 See ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 77, explaining the remedies that can be sought.  
154
 Hunter and Leonard, ‘Working Paper’, above n 5, 28. 
155
 Ibid 29. They noted that, in particular, conciliation may also result in better systemic outcomes than 
hearings in courts and tribunals, ‘which tend to focus on providing redress to the individual complaint. 
Policy changes may be agreed in conciliation which could not or would not be ordered by a tribunal in 
upholding a complaint’.’ 
156
 See Chapter 4, at 4.4.4, which considers the literature explaining how a duty of reasonable 
accommodation may help to develop a new norm of flexibility.  
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‘more workers may be emboldened to make the request and push for satisfactory 
answers. The result might be cultural change in the perceived barriers to flexible 
work’.157 From the employer perspective, a single discrimination complaint may lead to 
an organisation introducing, reviewing or making policy changes, for example, about 
access to flexible types of work, removing discriminatory practices, and/or the employer 
undertaking educative and awareness-raising measures such as providing training to 
staff. Such actions may have important benefits for the worker–carers in the 
workforce.
158
 Having to deal with complaints about flexible work may challenge long-
held assumptions as to how work should be done and may, as the ADB suggested, cause 
employers to think ‘outside the square’ and accept that ‘things do not always have to be 
done in the way they have always been done’.159 It may challenge the employer’s 
perceptions about the ideal worker and assumptions about what is or is not possible.
160
  
 
9.5 Concluding Comment: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Process 
and the Outcomes 
 
In summary, returning to the second research question, the data demonstrate that the 
ADB enforcement process can provide an important dispute-resolution strategy for 
carers’ complainants. When compared with the process at the Tribunal, the ADB 
provides access to a substantially less formal and timelier enforcement process, which 
may assist in providing an accommodation and/or an outcome with potentially systemic 
and broader normative effects within a workplace. Therefore, the ADB process is 
capable of providing ‘good’ outcomes for individual complainants, with potentially 
systemic effects, thereby giving effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B.  
 
However, when complainants were no longer employed at the time they lodged their 
complaints, accommodation was an unlikely remedy.
161
 Compensation was likely to be 
the main or primary remedy available, and this is likely to provide an inadequate 
                                                 
157
 Jill Murray, ‘The AIRC’s Test Case on Work and Family Provisions: The End of the Dynamic 
Regulatory Change at the Federal Level’ (2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 325, 335–6.  
158
 See, for example, Elizabeth Emmens, ‘Integrating Accommodation’ (2008) 156(4) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 839, 841–2.  
159
 ADB, Guidelines for Employers, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (2000) 12–13. 
160
 See, for example, Emmens, above n 158, 842. 
161
 See Section 9.2.3, Figure 9.4; Table D7 in Appendix D.  
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remedy in practice because payments at the ADB, like at the Tribunal, were generally 
very low. Further research is required into why quantum is so low at the ADB.  As with 
complaints at the Tribunal, it is also necessary to examine what can be done to assist 
complainants to quantify and claim loss that properly reflects all aspects of the loss and 
damage occasioned as a result of the discrimination. In particular, in the absence of 
accessible legal aid, or affordable legal advice for complainants, it is necessary to 
consider what role the ADB should play to assist complainants in this regard.  
 
Moreover, 46% of complaints did not resolve. Further qualitative research is required 
first, to explain why complaints do not resolve; second whether any steps can be taken 
to make the law more accessible for these complainants; and third, what legislative 
reforms or other non-legislative steps might enable the ADB to use its education and 
complaint-handling functions to take a more active enforcement role that is not 
dependent upon individual complainants pursuing their complaints personally. Chapter 
10 concludes by briefly noting a number of ways in which the ADB complaint process 
could be more effective in this regard. 
 
. 
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Chapter 10: Qualitative Insights and Normative Impact 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides qualitative insights into the complaints process and outcomes that 
were analysed and described in Chapter 9. First, Section 10.2 presents complaint 
summaries to demonstrate how the Anti-Discrimination Board (‘ADB’) complaint 
process helped to achieve ‘good’ outcomes, including individual accommodations 
and/or potentially systemic remedies with a broader normative impact for the 
respondent’s organisation. In contrast, Section 10.3 then considers several complaints in 
which the outcomes for the complainant were ‘poor’, in circumstances in which 
complainants withdrew or abandoned complaints that appeared to have merit, and in 
which the ADB’s response to the discrimination brought to its attention by the 
complaint was to close the complaint files.  
 
Section 10.4 then concludes the discussion of the ADB’s complaint-handling function 
by suggesting ways in which the process, and the ADB’s role in it, could be improved. 
The need for statutory reform to provide sharper enforcement powers, which has been 
well canvassed in the literature, is noted.
1
 A number of specific law reform and non-
legislative recommendations are also made for ways in which the ADB could more 
effectively discharge its statutory complaint-handling functions, within the current 
statutory framework. In particular, it is recommended that the ADB re-engage with its 
role as a proactive advocate and guardian of the AD Act on behalf of the state of NSW
2
 
through its statutory functions. It is argued that it is possible to do this by removing 
some of the constraints that the ADB has placed on itself, in relation to its overly—and, 
it is argued below, unnecessarily—strict adherence to impartiality during the complaint 
process. It is argued that by looking to its broader education and consultation functions 
under s 119 of the AD Act, it can address more effectively discrimination, and 
particularly systemic discrimination, brought to its attention during the complaint 
process. 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 1, at 1.4.1. For a more detailed discussion of the literature, see also Chapter 4, at 4.3.1. 
2
 See Chapter 1, at 1.3.1, which provides an overview of the ADB’s functions under s 119 of the AD Act.  
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10.2 ‘Good’ Outcomes: Early Resolution and Systemic Remedies 
 
Complaint summaries from two categories of complaints are now considered: first, at 
10.2.1 complaints that involved early resolution without a conciliation conference 
resulting in an accommodation; and second, at 10.2.2 complaints in which the remedy 
achieved involved a potentially systemic outcome.  An indication of when during the 
decade a complaint was lodged can be gained by cross referencing the relevant research 
number (RN#) to Table 9.1 in Chapter 9.  
 
The complaint summaries below have been selected to illustrate a number of different 
ways in which the operation of the ADB education and complaints functions together 
can offer a ‘problem-solving’3 complaints mechanism that can provide a timely and 
informal option for complainants (female and male, and working in different 
occupations, across industries and sectors), to act promptly to achieve an 
accommodation to stay in work and/or to achieve a potentially systemic outcome with 
broader implications at the workplace.   
 
First, some of the summaries involved what can be termed ‘self help’ resolutions where 
the complainants asked the ADB not to contact the employer. Instead, the ADB 
provided advice, publications, information and/or suggested strategies tailored to the 
complainant’s situation in order to negotiate a self-help remedy with the employer. 
These complaints may therefore be illustrative of how the ADB enquiries service may 
operate in practice to provide self-help strategies so that worker–carers can successfully 
negotiate a resolution themselves at their workplace.
4
  
 
Second, the complaint summaries illustrate how the ADB publications discussed in 
Chapter 8 may also play an important educative role to raise awareness of rights and 
obligations under Part 4B.
5
 As noted, publications were sometimes provided to 
                                                 
3
 Susan Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach’ (2001) 101(1) 
Columbia Law Review 459. See Chapter 4, at 4.4.2, which outlines Sturm’s problem-solving approach. 
4
 See Chapter 8, at 8.3.  The term ‘self–help’ is used by the ADB in its publication How to Deal With 
Discrimination, Unfair Treatment and Harassment—Self Help Strategies (2004), noted in Chapter 8, at 
8.5. 
5
 See Chapter 8, at 8.5. 
413 
 
complainants to prepare for their negotiations. In this way, complainants were not just 
active problem-solving actors achieving an individual remedy but also potentially 
taking on an educative role themselves as they negotiated from an informed position. 
The complaints process can therefore be an empowering experience for some 
complainants, as an agent of ‘cultural change’.6 Respondent-focused publications, 
particularly the Carers’ Employer Guidelines,7 were also frequently provided to 
respondents, and especially in the early years after Part 4B was introduced. This 
indicates that the publications are likely to have had some normative value at the 
workplace level in raising awareness and ensuring compliance amongst both employees 
and employers. 
 
Third, the summaries indicate how the ‘triage’ process described in Chapter 98 operated 
to both prioritise carers’ complaints at lodgement and protect the status quo if there was 
a fear of dismissal. The summaries also show the flexibility of the process, where 
investigation and conciliation are both expedited and blurred. The ADB demonstrated 
responsiveness, providing advice and facilitating a resolution in accordance with the 
circumstances and needs of the parties, particularly the complainant.  
 
Fourth, the summaries indicate that the ADB and its statutory complaint process did 
have a strong degree of recognised authority among respondents, whereby the 
enforcement process under the AD Act and the ADB’s interpretation of the law were 
taken seriously. For example, respondents often undertook not to terminate employment 
while a complaint was ongoing. In some summaries set out below, just a mention by a 
complainant to the employer that a complaint had been lodged, a telephone call from the 
ADB or the calling of a formal conciliation conference was enough to persuade a 
respondent to accommodate the complainant.  How the ADB, and its authority, is 
perceived by complainants and respondents can therefore have a significant influence 
upon how the law is given meaning and applied by the parties ‘in action’ during the 
                                                 
6
 Jill Murray, ‘The AIRC’s Test Case on Work and Family Provisions: The End of the Dynamic 
Regulatory Change at the Federal Level’ (2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 325, 335–6, 
writing in the context of a right to request (‘RTR’) under the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(‘AIRC’) Parental Leave Test Case (2005) 143 IR 245. Her comments as to the role for the individual as 
an ‘agent of cultural change’ are also applicable to complainants under the AD Act. See generally Chapter 
4, at 4.4.43, explaining how the complaint process may empower complainants.  
7
 ADB, Guidelines for Employers, Carer’s Responsibilities Discrimination (2000) (‘Carers’ Employer 
Guidelines’). 
8
 Chapter 9, at 9.3.1.  
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process. Therefore, the data also supports the arguments raised in Chapter 1 that 
adequate funding and political support for complaint-handling agencies is crucial to 
maintain such a position of authority. Such funding and support has been in steady 
decline in NSW in the years since Part 4B was enacted.
9
   
 
Fifth, the case summaries also illustrate the critical role that human resources (‘HR’) 
professionals may (or may not play) as a bridge to broker greater compliance between 
the legislation and line management. They illustrate the effect of the ‘leadership lottery’ 
whereby the attitude of supervisors, line managers and HR staff can play an important 
role in whether a respondent complies with Part 4B, whether a complaint is resolved 
quickly and whether systemic policy changes may also result.
10
 
 
Finally, the summaries indicate that, although the ADB has no powers to enforce 
settlement agreements, it has played an important albeit informal role in trying to ensure 
that the terms of an agreement were acted upon. Far from operating in an environment 
where parties are rushed or pressured into settlements, complaint files were sometimes 
kept open after the complaint was resolved to check that a complainant had returned to 
work without issue, or that the terms of the agreement were being followed. In addition 
the ADB routinely cautioned respondents about victimisation, for example in the ADB 
standard letter sent to a respondent notifying it of a complaint, in an effort to prevent the 
complainants suffering a further detriment at work.  
 
10.2.1 ‘Self-Help’ and ‘Quick Fixes’ 
 
This section provides short qualitative summaries of complaints that were conciliated 
without a conference being held. Many of the complaints resolved within days or 
weeks, but all of the complaints resolved within two months of allocation without a 
conciliation conference being held. 
 
                                                 
9
 As noted in Chapter 1, at 1.3.2, adequate funding and political will are crucial to ensure that the ADB 
maintains this authority. For example, it was noted that after funding cuts in 2003, enquiry and complaint 
numbers dropped significantly.  
10
 See generally the discussion of the literature in Chapter 3, at 3.5.3. For example, the Australian Human 
Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) has referred to a ‘leadership lottery’ whereby the decision or attitude of 
direct or line managers often determined how effectively a policy was implemented: AHRC, Supporting 
Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report (2014) 85. 
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(i) ‘Self-Help’ 
In the following complaints, the complainants feared that their employment would be 
terminated. The complaints were resolved through the ADB providing advice to the 
complainant, without contacting the employer. In all of the complaints, the ADB 
recommended an interim order but the complainants refused because they wanted to try 
to resolve the matter themselves. The ADB typically provided publications and/or gave 
strategic advice about how the complainant should communicate and/or conduct 
negotiations with the employer. Most of the complaints were made in the first years 
after Part 4B came into effect. 
 
Maureen had worked for four years in a senior public relations role in a large private 
sector organisation.
11
 She had just returned part-time after a year’s maternity leave, 
working three days per week, but the respondent was insisting on a return to full-time 
work. She stated that: 
Within two weeks into my return I have been demoted because I am part-time 
and [my manager is] quote ‘unsure and unconvinced’ that someone working 
part-time can do my role … I feel humiliated because he has demoted me … 
he continually intimidates me by insinuating that I no longer have value to the 
company now that my staff have been farmed out to … when I was on 
maternity leave. He has said that ‘I am unconvinced that someone working 
part-time … can effectively supervise and manage a sales team’ [because]‘it 
went against every principle of supervision and management’. 
Management was openly hostile to her in group emails, and at one staff meeting the 
senior manager said:  
I wasn’t expected back because I had become a professional baby-maker and 
that all the other pregnant women did not return from maternity leave so what 
did I expect the other staff and himself to think? [she continued] … I have 
become unwell for almost a week because of the constant stress, dishonesty, 
harassment, and job insecurity … this whole situation is pointing to a hidden 
agenda to completely remove me from the company. 
The ADB strongly recommended that an interim order be sought urgently, and that it 
should write to the respondent calling an early conciliation conference, but Maureen 
was concerned this might inflame the situation and asked the ADB not to contact the 
respondent. Following ADB advice, she wrote to the respondent, stating that she had 
advice from the ADB, and requested that she return to her pre-maternity leave position, 
part-time. She referred the employer to the ADB website, the carers’ legislation, the 
                                                 
11
 RN# 103. 
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Carers’ Employer Guidelines12 and recent case law in other jurisdictions provided by 
the ADB.
13
 Over the next month, the complainant continued to seek advice from the 
ADB and told her employer that she was doing so. Maureen successfully negotiated an 
accommodation of her responsibilities to continue to work on a part-time basis, with 
provision to work from home if needed, and with a view to returning full-time the 
following year, which had always been her plan. The file was kept open for three 
months and the ADB contacted her several times to check that the agreement was 
implemented.  She advised that it was and she was told to return to the ADB if it did not 
work out, but never did so.  
 
Nicola was a driver in the private sector who was due to return from maternity leave, 
but her request for part-time work was denied.
14
 She was referred to the carers’ 
publications on the website, and was given advice about how to approach the 
negotiations. Two days later, the ADB file note recorded that: ‘When R knew that she 
had lodged a complaint they were apologetic, fixed everything and now has suitable 
working hours’.  
 
Bronwyn had worked for three years as a senior manager of a large manufacturing 
organisation when she went on maternity leave.
15
 The employer agreed that she could 
return part-time on a temporary basis for around six months while she settled her child 
into day care, and the complainant was happy to return to full-time duties after that. Just 
before she was due to return to work she was told that HR and senior management had 
decided that she could not return part-time. She would instead be terminated and 
provided with contract project work. In her complaint, Bronwyn noted she wanted part-
time work or, if this could not be achieved, compensation. Reflecting many of the 
concerns raised in the literature about the discrimination against mothers causing 
significant short and long term economic disadvantage,
16
 the complainant noted that: 
I made it clear that I was not really very happy becoming a ‘project worker’ as 
it offered me no job security or continuity, no employment rights (holiday, 
                                                 
12
 ADB, Carers’ Employer Guidelines, above n 7. 
13
 She was referred to the Western Australian case of Bogle v Metropolitan Health Service Board (2000) 
EOC 93-069 and the Commonwealth sex discrimination case of Hickie v Hunt and Hunt [1998] 
HREOCA 8. 
14
 RN# 178. 
15
 RN# 160. 
16
 See Chapter 3, at 3.3.2 and see generally the recent Australian Human Rights Commission, Supporting 
Working Parents: Pregnancy and Return to Work National Review Report (2014).  
417 
 
sick leave etc)—all of which would be required in my capacity of being a 
mother. I also felt extremely disappointed that despite my tenure with the 
company they would not even discuss a part-time arrangement to help me with 
my childcare responsibilities ... I feel I am unfairly being offered a dubious 
position that offers me no job security or job rights because I have a child to 
take care of. I also feel it is unreasonable that they will not consider a part-
time arrangement given that it is only for six months.  
The ADB contacted Bronwyn the same day the complaint was lodged. She stated she 
was ‘nervous’ about the ADB contacting her employer given the ‘autocratic’ culture of 
the organisation because she feared that this ‘could lead to harassment’. It was decided 
that the complainant would approach the employer and would try to resolve the 
complaint herself. Publications and advice were provided. The complainant was allowed 
part-time hours for six months. The ADB kept the file open for two months and checked 
that the complainant was happy for the file to be closed.  
 
Joan had worked for nine years as a hospitality worker in a club, working until 8pm, 
when she went on maternity leave.
17
 On her return, she was presented with a new roster 
involving shifts until after midnight and was told: 
More or less that the roster that is coming into effect is the one I have to abide 
by or in their terms—there’s the door … I am hoping to get some help from 
the ADB as it’s starting to affect me emotionally. 
The ADB advised her to put in writing to the respondent the hours that she could do, to 
advise that she had spoken to the ADB, and to refer to the carers’ responsibility 
legislation. This approach was successful and she negotiated hours that suited her and 
the complaint was resolved.  
 
Wendy had worked for 15 years in a local government administrative role. She worked 
full-time and for the last three years had worked part of the week from home. A new 
manager started work and told Wendy that she must return to work five days in the 
office, immediately. She did not have alternative care for her child. She was meeting 
with her employer the next day. The ADB contacted her within an hour of receiving the 
faxed complaint, and provided advice, and made suggestions about what she should say 
and ask for at the meeting. Wendy wrote to advise that the complaint was resolved, she 
was allowed to continue to work from home for part of the week. She stated, ‘Thank 
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 RN# 30. 
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you for your help in this matter and I do feel that advising the Council of my complaint 
to the ADB has played a part in them coming to a compromise with me’. 
 
Bill was a factory worker with shared care of his child three days a week under a court 
order.
18
 His roster was changed without consultation to work night shifts for operational 
reasons. After discussing his complaint with the ADB it was agreed he would write to 
his employers explaining his responsibilities with reference to Part 4B. A week later the 
file recorded that: ‘the employer had agreed to maintain the shifts to fit in with his 
responsibilities, when he told them about carers’ [legislation]’.  
 
Jonah was a sole parent whose partner had recently left home. He worked in a clerical 
role for a public health authority.
19
 His employer put in place new rosters with no 
consultation. His manager told him that ‘unless my kids were injured or needed a blood 
transfusion I would not receive any time changes and could look for a new job’. The 
ADB provided advice about Part 4B, helped him to prepare suggestions to take to his 
manager, and also recommended taking the matter to HR at the same time. A file note 
recorded that he had met with HR and that ‘rostering was now to his satisfaction’. The 
complaint was kept open for three months afterwards because the complainant feared 
victimisation.  The file notes that he ‘was happy’ for the complaint to be closed. 
 
(ii) ‘Quick Fixes’ 
The following complaints resolved quickly, after the ADB contacted the respondent by 
phone and/or in writing, and/or provided copies of ADB publications, and/or called an 
early conciliation conference to take place just weeks after the complaint was lodged. 
Many of the complainants had worked with the employer for years, and the complaints 
relate to circumstances in which the complainant feared that a termination otherwise 
was very likely to occur. 
 
Dawn had been a senior medical professional in the private sector for 15 years. She was 
due to return from maternity leave in three weeks’ time.20 Before going on leave, she 
had flagged the possibility of part-time work, per the respondent’s part-time policy, but 
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 RN# 287. 
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 RN# 143. 
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 RN# 397. 
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had been told that ‘[i]t would be easier to come back to work part-time if I were not in 
charge’. When she tried to speak with the respondent and then wrote to them requesting 
part-time work three days per week, her communications and correspondence were 
ignored. She received a letter telling her that if she did not return to work full-time she 
would be treated as having resigned, and she would also have to reimburse her 
maternity leave pay.  She argued that she had been constructively dismissed. The ADB 
faxed the respondent on the day of lodgement, informed it about the interim order 
provisions, sought an undertaking not to terminate the complainant, and called a 
conciliation conference for two weeks’ time. The following day Dawn advised that her 
request for part-time hours was granted. The file was kept open for two months until 
after Dawn’s return to work. 
 
Kate was a full-time receptionist in a real estate office.
21
 She had worked there less than 
six months when she went on maternity leave, and although she had no statutory right to 
return, she was promised her job back. She requested a return on a part-time basis, but 
this was denied. She lodged a complaint several days before she was due to return. The 
day after lodgement, the ADB called the employer, who agreed that the complainant 
could be trained up to return to another position part-time, in effect, amounting to a 
promotion.  
 
Samantha had worked for five years as a nurse in the public sector.
22
 Prior to maternity 
leave, she had worked mid-week shifts. After her return she was allocated ‘weekend 
shifts that no-one else wants’ and told if she did not like it to ‘go back to working as a 
casual’. The ADB called HR the day after lodgement, and the complainant was 
allocated mid-week shifts only. 
 
Maxine had a child with a disability and worked full-time as an IT professional. She had 
worked two days from home for a number of years.
23
 She was told that for ‘health and 
safety’ reasons she would need to work full time at the office. The ADB called HR the 
day after lodgement and it was agreed that the complainant could continue to work from 
home.  
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 RN# 146. 
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 RN# 103. 
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Jenny, a single parent worked as a sales assistant for a major national retail chain.
24
 A 
new roster was introduced whereby all staff had to work regular Saturday shift. She had 
already been in contact with the enquiries line, received publications and attempted to 
negotiate with her manager, but had not been able to resolve the matter. The ADB 
telephoned the national HR manager the next day and the matter immediately resolved 
and Jenny did not have to work a weekend. It was noted that the HR manager knew 
little about Part 4B, and the ADB informed her that: 
It is discriminatory to have such a policy as people with children or other CR 
may not be able to comply and given they are big org should be able to work 
out alternative. 
It was also agreed that the company would not implement the new policy and would 
review their policy documents. Publications were provided and the ADB recommended 
urgent training for management and staff, which HR agreed would be organised.  
 
Three mothers with responsibilities for school-aged children had worked in customer 
service for a large multinational company in permanent part-time roles for between five 
and 15 years. Their hours were three days working 8.30am–3.30pm.25 Without 
consultation, they received a notice that part-time work hours would be changed to five 
days 8.30am–12.30pm, and could be changed by the respondent at any time on seven 
days’ notice. The notification stated that this was ‘not negotiable and resignations will 
be accepted’. The three lodged complaints over a number of days and agreed that they 
should be dealt with together. The ADB immediately contacted the respondent, which 
was represented by an employer association. It advised that an interim order would be 
sought. An undertaking was received that the rosters would not be changed until the 
complaints were finalised and the respondent was cautioned about the victimisation. A 
conciliation conference was called for the following month. The respondent was 
provided with a copy of the Carers’ Employer Guidelines. The file records that the 
‘Carers’ [provisions] and reasonableness’ were discussed with the respondent. The 
ADB then received written confirmation that the changes would not go ahead across the 
organisation. In addition, the employer undertook to consult with staff before making 
such changes in the future.  
                                                 
24
 RN# 62.  
25
 RN# 158, RN# 161, RN# 168.  See Table 9.11 in Chapter 9 outlining the systemic nature of the 
outcome achieved in the complaints. 
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Mandy was a bar worker who had worked the same two shifts Sunday and Monday 4–
8.30pm and 6–9.30pm respectively for seven years.26 Without consultation, the 
employer changed the shifts to finish at 2am. The complaint was lodged in the first 
week after Part 4B came into effect. Mandy stated:  
This means I have no one to look after my children till this time as I am a 
single parent. If I am forced to do this I will have to leave my job … My boss 
said that I should be flexible and [he] refuses to listen to how I can’t cause of 
my responsibility to the children. I love my job and I am so stressed over this 
and the children are very concerned and upset to see me upset. 
When she did not attend work and took sick leave she received a warning, and feared 
dismissal. The ADB contacted the club manager by phone on the same day as the 
complaint was received. The Employer Guidelines were sent and the employer agreed to 
hire another person to do the later shifts.  
 
Steve, a father, had worked as a technician in a large public sector organisation for more 
than 10 years.
27
  This complaint was also lodged in the first week after Part 4B came 
into effect.  He had more than 100 days’ annual leave accrued, and applied to use 1.5 
hours per week for the next year, so he could pick up children from school one day per 
week while his partner was studying. The application was refused by his manager. The 
ADB contacted the HR department and advised that ‘the refusal was unreasonable’. The 
request was then granted. The HR manager confirmed it would review its policies, and 
that it would organise training to be provided by the ADB. He advised that he had not 
been aware that the new carers’ legislation had come into effect. 
 
Lachlan had worked in a maintenance role in the private sector for around five years.
28
 
He had shared parental care of his children under a court-ordered custody agreement. 
He worked 20 hours per week at weekend only. Without warning, he was called to a 
meeting and told that he must work 40 hours per week, including mid-week shifts. His 
employer demanded that he sign a contract there and then to start the following week. 
He refused and that afternoon there was a termination notice under his door when he 
arrived home. He lodged an urgent complaint with the ADB the next day. The ADB 
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called the employer within an hour of receiving the faxed complaint. It explained the 
legislation, sent over publications and sought an undertaking that Lachlan would not be 
dismissed or the ADB would apply for an interim order that day. The respondent 
immediately agreed to maintain the roster. The complainant was told to come back to 
the ADB if there was any victimisation. The file was kept open for a month but he did 
not return. 
 
The above summaries demonstrate how complainants who had often worked for many 
years for the respondent found themselves faced with discrimination and sometimes the 
prospect of losing their jobs because of their caring responsibilities. The summaries 
therefore illustrate how the triage system worked in action, and how the ADB has 
shown that it can take a proactive and responsive approach to the complaint handling. 
They also illustrate the education role which the ADB’s complaints function can fulfil 
and the important role of the ADB and the complainant in this regard. The process 
therefore can provide an important free, informal, timely problem-solving mechanism, 
which may enable worker-carers to achieve an accommodation of their responsibilities.   
 
10.2.2 Systemic Outcomes and the Normative Value of Complaints 
 
The following complaint summaries now illustrate how potentially systemic outcomes 
were also achieved in the carers’ complaints resolved at the ADB.  However, as noted in 
Chapter 9, it is generally not known whether the terms agreed to were actually 
implemented or what the effects were in practice.   
 
First, a number of summaries relating to one-off complaints against a respondent which 
resulted in a potentially systemic outcome are provided. This is followed by three case 
studies in relation to systemic outcomes achieved against three ‘repeat players’—major 
public sector employers who received multiple complaints over the decade under Part 
4B.
29
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See Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights: An Evaluation of the New Regime 
(Themis, 2010) 16–18. See generally Chapter 4, at 4.2.3, for a discussion of the ‘repeat player’ 
phenomenon, in particular, in the public sector.  In the writer’s experience, they were also frequent 
respondents in relation to complaints made on other grounds under the AD Act. 
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(i) Systemic Remedies Achieved in One-Off Complaints 
 
Incorporating the carers’ legislation into policies  
Jessica had worked for eight years as a technician with a national medical service 
provider in the private sector.
30
 On her return to part-time work after maternity leave, 
she found that her duties were being performed by other staff. She was offered work in 
other offices involving two hours’ travel and was rostered afternoon shifts, which she 
was unable to do. Her manager said ‘are your babysitting problems our fault or are they 
your problems?’ and ‘well you had no problems when you only had one child. Things 
change and so does the company’. She was accused of lying when her children were 
sick and was made to feel uncomfortable breastfeeding at work. She went on sick leave, 
and in her complaint to the ADB sought a redundancy package. At the conciliation 
conference, the complainant received just $3,000 compensation, an apology and a 
statement of service. In addition, at conciliation the ADB advised the respondent that its 
policies, which it had produced during investigation of the complaint were out of date 
and had no reference to Part 4B even though it was three years since it came into effect. 
The terms of agreement drafted by the ADB included an undertaking: 
To review and update EEO and discrimination policies; to specifically include 
reference to carers responsibilities and breastfeeding. 
To provide appropriate breastfeeding facilities. 
To ensure that staff are informed of entitlements, and to ensure that staff 
understand where they can seek further information and to whom they can 
direct concerns.  
 
 
‘Better off at home on a single mother’s pension’ 
Denise was a sole parent who was a trainee in public transport. It was reported that there 
were very few women trainees or qualified employees at the workplace.  She had 
returned to work after maternity leave
31
 during her two-year traineeship, and had been 
subject to rotating rosters working from 5.30am and until after 8pm. This made it 
difficult to organise childcare. She made numerous requests for alternative shifts which 
                                                 
30
 RN# 233. 
31
 RN# 291. 
424 
 
were all denied, even though there were more than 430 other employees working for the 
respondent. She reported that on one occasion her manager called her at home: 
I explained once again the situation with my kids and the fact that the kids 
were sick. He said to me ‘try and fix it up’. I just said ‘I’m not coping with the 
situation’ and he said ‘I can’t do anything for you’.’ On another occasion he 
said ‘you’d be better off at home on the single mother’s pension’.  
At the end of the traineeship, she was not offered a permanent position because of 
‘attendance issues’. With the help of her trade union, she was offered a permanent part-
time position, but the hours were still unsuitable. The complainant lodged a complaint 
with the ADB. She stated that:  
The members of management who did this to me are still employed ... and I 
am very uncomfortable every time I have an issue at work. Even a request for 
a day off makes me very nervous because I am made to feel like the black 
sheep … [my employer] has never tried to conciliate me with these managers 
and I am given the cold shoulder. 
A conciliation conference was held within a month of lodgement, and the union 
representative was given leave under s 91B to attend the conference with the 
complainant. The respondent acknowledged the discrimination and provided her with a 
permanent part-time position working day shifts. Two managers were also subject to 
disciplinary proceedings and were to attend equal employment opportunity (‘EEO’) 
training programs. The complainant received $12,000 compensation but it was not 
specified what this related to (she had asked for $18,000) and received a written 
apology whereby the employer acknowledged that her complaint: 
[W]as not handled correctly or properly or promptly; we did make mistakes, 
we have now provided suitable hours [to the complainant] and education for 
managers and revamped policies organisation wide. We want to restore a 
harmonious environment and nominate a local support person from Human 
Resources for the complainant. 
In addition, a number of systemic outcomes were achieved, all of which were included 
as specific terms in the conciliation agreement drafted by the ADB: 
Decision making around traineeships and applications for flexible work will 
be undertaken by Human Resources 
The respondent undertakes to review and to revise all discrimination, 
harassment, bullying and victimisation policies, guidelines and flexible work 
policies, and grievance procedures 
All organisational policy documents will contain a commitment to finding 
practical and reasonable solutions to our employees’ family/carer 
responsibilities in line with operational requirements on a case by case basis. 
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Family leave policy and centralising decision-making with HR 
Ben worked full-time in a large manufacturing company.
32
 He was denied two days’ 
annual leave to look after his child while his wife was away. He took sick leave and was 
then accused by his manager of ‘fraudulently using sick leave for family leave when in 
fact no one in his family was sick’ and was disciplined. The complaint resolved when 
the respondent reinstated the sick leave and removed the warning from his record. The 
HR department advised the ADB that, as a result of the complaint, it had implemented a 
family leave policy throughout the organisation; in addition, all applications under the 
policy would be made to and approved via HR, not the line manager.  
 
Training for staff in the tourism sector 
Sylvia worked in a small business with fewer than 15 employees.
33
 She was due to take 
maternity leave in several months. She was denied a training opportunity and was told 
by her employer that her maternity leave ‘was a consideration in the decision’ because 
there was a ‘need for consistency’. On being contacted by the ADB the respondent 
actually requested an early conciliation conference, which was held within a week of 
lodgement. It was agreed that the complainant would be allowed to undertake the 
training. In addition, the respondent requested that the ADB provide a discrimination 
and EEO workshop to all employees, which occurred in the following weeks. 
 
EEO training and grievance handling in local government 
Cath was a sole parent who worked part-time over five days in local government in a 
customer service role.
34
 She applied to vary her hours because her child had a disability 
and needed to be picked up from school each day. Her supervisor made an 
announcement at a staff meeting that there ‘would be a restructure to suit [Cath] and 
you will all suffer’ and she was given a poor performance review. A complaint of 
victimisation was also lodged. At a conference, she received a $10,000 ‘ex gratia’ 
payment, her hours were accommodated ‘for so long as her carer responsibility 
continued’ and terms of the deed were that: 
All customer service staff to undergo discrimination, and EEO training.  
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All supervisors and managers at Council to undergo grievance handling 
training.  
 
The above individual case summaries therefore illustrate how individual complaints can 
potentially achieve broader normative change at an organisation, by challenging hostile 
line management and workplace cultures, in relation to for example, policy changes, 
and training or education.  Further, the following three case studies also demonstrate the 
potential for individual accommodation as well as broader normative policy changes in 
prominent public sector employers in NSW. 
 
(ii) Public Sector ‘Repeat Players’ 
Three case studies involving systemic policy and/or training outcomes are now 
provided. All of the complaints were lodged in the second half of the decade with 
several in the last months of the decade. 
 
Repeat Player A: Policy changes relating to maternity and part-time work  
The two complaints outlined below, resulted in systemic outcomes for women returning 
to work after maternity leave. This public sector department received 10 carers’ 
complaints against it from seven complainants during the decade. It was also the subject 
of numerous additional victimisation complaints. Several other complaints against this 
employer that did not resolve are also noted below in Section 10.3.
35
  
 
Edwina was a full-time employee who had just taken maternity leave. She had worked 
in the organisation for more than 15 years in a support role.
36
 After an earlier period of 
maternity leave, she worked two days per week from home and received approval to 
continue with the arrangement. Prior to her planned return to work, her manager began 
to query how she would be able to work from home, suggesting ‘it will be different with 
two children at home’. Edwina felt pressured into putting her children into long day care 
and she then returned to work. She lodged a complaint with the ADB stating that: 
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 Note that six of the 10 had also lodged often multiple victimisation complaints that generally related to 
allegations of a bullying and a hostile work environment. For example, one complainant, Jeremy, RN# 37 
and RN# 142, discussed in Chapter 9 and below at Section 10.3, lodged two carers’ complaints and seven 
victimisation complaints. Another complainant Martha, RN# 65 and RN# 153, lodged two carers’ 
complaints and three separate victimisation complaints, as discussed in Chapter 9, at 9.3.3.  
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I would like other women employed [here] to know that there is no guarantee 
the return to work arrangements that you make with your manager when 
commencing maternity will be available to you when it comes time to return to 
work.  
She requested a compulsory conference as the only way for her to ‘get a fair hearing for 
[the respondent] to acknowledge me and my concerns’. The respondent argued that: at 
no stage was the work from home plan ever withdrawn, Edwina had in fact been 
accommodated, a conference was unnecessary and the complaint should be declined. 
The ADB called a conference at which Edwina brought a specific written settlement 
proposal ‘in order to help other pregnant employees in future’. She requested that an HR 
professional be nominated within the organisation who would be dedicated to assisting 
pregnant employees across the organisation with their pregnancy and maternity rights 
and return to work plans. In addition, this person would have a role to advise 
management and supervisors about their obligations. After two months of protracted 
post-conference negotiation, facilitated by the ADB, the complainant received an 
apology and an acknowledgment that she could work from home, and a term of the deed 
of settlement drafted by the respondent was that: 
[The respondent] to arrange for a Human Resources employee to be identified 
as a person who may be contacted specifically in relation to maternity leave 
and return to work plans (following maternity leave). This person will also 
provide support to pregnant women and will provide information to managers. 
 
Lucy worked in a different role in another location but with the same respondent and 
was provided with part-time work after maternity leave. She was provided with a part-
time work agreement.
37
 One of the clauses stated that:  
You will not be allocated overtime in the usual manner. In keeping with your 
request to work part-time hours the Department will only offer overtime in 
exceptional circumstances, ie as a last resort after having exhausted all other 
options. 
She refused to sign the agreement but returned to work. She argued that the term was 
discriminatory against carers’ and women because: 
To the best of my knowledge all the part-time workers … are women. This 
procedure financially disadvantages part-time workers, because over-time is 
paid at double pay.
38
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 RN# 243. 
38
 See for example Chapter 3, at 3.3.2 noting the short and longer term economic and other detriments 
which can result for women as a result of moving from full to part-time work. 
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The ADB wrote to the employer cautioning about victimisation and calling a 
conciliation conference for later that month. The matter settled via intensive negotiation 
by the ADB without a conference. The respondent wrote that:  
The rationale behind the part-time work agreement was to ensure that 
[employees] who work part-time to care for others are not constantly disturbed 
by being requested to perform overtime and can therefore better attend to their 
carer’s responsibilities. Secondly, the agreements attempt to ensure that part-
time officers are not able to place themselves in a position where they are able 
to obtain a benefit to the detriment of other staff by being employed nominally 
as a part-time worker but in effect working full time hours with the balance 
being paid at the overtime rate. In future officers whether full-time or part-
time will be offered overtime on a strictly rotational basis 
 
These two complaints demonstrate a number of key issues highlighted in the literature 
review, about the potential of discrimination laws to assist worker-carers.
39
 The first is 
Sturm’s ‘problem-solving’ approach to workplace discrimination,40 which recognised 
the role of the employee as a problem-solving actor working together with the employer 
to achieve local context based solutions. Second, they also reflect the importance of 
tackling hostile workplace cultures and policies and, in particular, raising awareness of 
rights and obligations, and tackling the hostility of line managers and supervisors.
41  
Third, both women were very much empowered by the ADB process to work as agents 
of cultural change, to suggest local context based solutions in an attempt to change the 
day-to-day patterns that ‘produce bias and exclusion’.42  In particular, Edwina’s 
complaint demonstrated how the parties were able to proactively negotiate new 
processes for pregnant employees and those returning from maternity leave to exercise 
their rights, including to achieve flexible work, and to ensure that line managers were 
aware of their obligations and how to implement them.  
 
 
Repeat Player B: Policy changes relating to leave and compassionate transfers  
This department featured as a ‘repeat player’, receiving 20 complaints against it relating 
to carers’ discrimination over the decade. The first two related to location and transfers 
and were resolved within months of each other in the last years of the decade. The third 
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 See generally Chapter 4, at 4.4 and 4.5. 
40
 Susan Sturm, above n 3. See Chapter 4, at 4.4.2, which outlines Sturm’s problem-solving approach. 
41
 See generally Chapter 3, at 3.5.  
42
 Sturm, above n 3, 475.  See generally Chapter 4, at 4.4. 
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related to a policy review relating to access to leave.  The respondent in this complaint 
was usually represented by a central in house legal team, which was generally open to 
resolving the carers’ complaints brought against it during the decade. 
 
Melinda applied for a ‘compassionate transfer’ to be near family because of her 
partner’s medical condition, but was told that ‘it would be unlikely that my application 
would be successful as compassionate transfers are only given for sick children not 
partners’.43 When the complainant asked for a copy of the compassionate transfer 
criteria, she was told that it did not exist. The ADB called an early conference but the 
transfer was approved prior.  It was noted that the ADB also contacted the respondent in 
any event to recommend that a transfer policy and/or guidelines should be drawn up for 
compassionate transfers not limited to children only. The respondent agreed to integrate 
this into their existing policies accordingly.  
 
Colette had been on leave without pay (LWOP) for a number of years.
44
 She had moved 
some distance away and had been working casually for the respondent for several years 
to be closer to her adult child who had a disability. The LWOP policy stated that 
employees could be asked to return to their position, and she was given notice to do so. 
She was told that ‘your desire to be near your [child] is not reasonable grounds for 
refusing an appointment’ and effectively she would be forced to resign. The ADB called 
an early conference but the respondent agreed prior to extend the LWOP. In addition, it 
also offered to review the LWOP policy, which at that time had no reference to carers’ 
responsibilities.  
 
Maddie took carer’s and sick leave to look after her children. The respondent considered 
that this was excessive. She claimed she was denied career opportunities to act in other 
positions and was threatened with termination.
45
 She left her employment during the 
complaint process. At the conciliation conference, she sought and received $12,000. It 
was not specified what loss this was intended to compensate for.  She also received a 
statement of service and $2,500 retraining costs. The respondent volunteered that leave 
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policies would be reviewed, and in addition a term of the settlement drafted by the 
respondent was that:  
Many of … [our] employees have carer’s responsibilities. We acknowledge a 
responsibility to acknowledge those needs wherever possible. The 
[Respondent] shall include this acknowledgment as set out in the preceding 
sentences in all of its leave policies. 
 
These three complaints illustrate that the employer was very responsive to the ADB 
process, not only in relation to providing accommodation in the first two but also in 
relation to its willingness to agree to review policies to enable greater flexibility for 
worker-carers in relation to location/transfers and access to different types of short and 
longer term leave.   
 
Repeat Player C: Part-time work detriments  
The respondent was the subject of 18 separate carers’ complaints, eleven of which 
related to various detriments that the complainants suffered when they moved from full-
time to part-time work (‘part-time work detriments’). The organisation had a 
flexible/part-time work policy, and the complainants were generally allowed part-time 
work.  It was the actual quality of the work that was the problem, as well as the short 
and longer term detriments flowing as a result. The same detriments were identified by 
complainants working in different positions and locations across NSW, by both males 
and females, relating not only to return from maternity leave, but also in relation to part-
time work more broadly. Common allegations reported included that because of their 
part-time status they were refused operational roles; refused career development 
opportunities; left off the main roster and not allowed to work as part of a team; subject 
to a hostile work environment and derogatory comments; given mundane tasks and 
administrative-based, often dead-end support jobs that limited opportunities for career 
advancement.  The complaints illustrate that having policies is not enough and that how 
they are implemented in practice is crucial. 
 
The respondent was also usually represented by a central legal department that generally 
took a fairly legalistic approach to the complaint process. For example, its written 
response to a complaint would often critique in detail the legal basis for the 
complainant’s allegation in relation to direct and indirect discrimination, and defend its 
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position and in many cases request that a complaint should be declined.  This legalistic 
approach was often carried over into conciliation and often appeared to hinder attempts 
at resolution. Four short summaries are now provided which also indicate that the 
outcomes achieved against this respondent were uneven.  
 
Gemma returned part-time after maternity leave. She was given very mundane tasks and 
‘odd jobs’, and was taken off more interesting or ongoing projects. She resigned and 
obtained a job elsewhere. She lodged a complaint seeking only a systemic remedy, 
training for co-workers and management in her division in relation to discrimination 
and EEO. The respondent undertook to organise training and to ensure that ‘managers 
would be made aware of appropriate professional conduct, legislative and policy 
protocol with regards to staff’.46 
 
Jack was a senior team leader with responsibilities for his wife and young children.
47
 
His application for part-time work in his current position was refused because the team 
leader position was full-time. He was offered part-time work in a section known to have 
a high burnout rate with little prospects for career development, but he refused it. He 
was eventually accommodated in a position similar to his current job which he was 
happy to accept, but he had to concede his team leader responsibilities.  
 
Milly was a single parent who was moved out of an operational role and into a support 
role when she moved to part-time work.
48
 She argued that the system for promotion 
depended upon an exam based heavily in favour of operational employees rather than 
support staff, and that it therefore discriminated against women who made up the 
majority of part-time workers in support roles. The respondent’s legal department 
argued strongly that the exams were open to everyone.  All employees ‘could make an 
effort to obtain the knowledge required for them to pass’. It made it clear that it would 
not move its position and when the complaint could not be resolved it was referred to 
the Tribunal, where it did not reach a hearing.  
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Harriet returned to work part-time after maternity leave.
49
 She was referred to as an 
‘extra’ on the roster, was not allocated to a team and was given menial duties, which 
meant that she was also denied opportunities to gain experience in a supervisory role. 
She argued that this caused her financial detriment because she did not receive an 
allowance, and she stated that it would also affect future prospects if she was not able to 
gain such experience. She lodged a complaint with the ADB seeking an immediate 
transfer. Fortunately, the complainant had a very proactive and apologetic new manager 
who wanted her to stay. He attended the conciliation conference personally, and took an 
active primary role in the process rather than leaving it to be managed by the central in 
house legal department, which is what usually occurred in complaints against this 
respondent. At the conference it was noted that he undertook to make changes to the 
part-time work and rostering practices as well as the part-time work policy in the 
division for which he was responsible. Harriet was also paid $6,000 in compensation for 
lost earnings. This complaint also illustrated the effect of ‘leadership lottery’ noted in 
the literature.
50
  Further, this case study also reflects how certain ‘repeat players’ in the 
public sector (in this case represented by a central in house legal team) did take a very 
legalistic and adversarial approach to the complaint and the ADB processes which was 
not conducive to settlement.   
 
These part-time detriment complaints against this organisation illustrate one of the key 
weaknesses of the ADB’s individual complaint enforcement process, namely that it is 
not well suited to tackling systemic issues brought to its attention during a complaint. 
The ADB approached each complaint individually. It took no steps to address the 
obvious systemic issues outside of any of the terms agreed by the individual parties. 
This was the case even where the same issues were raised repeatedly in relation to 
issues of part-time detriments. This regulatory weakness of a complaint process 
dependent upon individual enforcement is considered further below in Section 10.3.  
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10.3 ‘Poor’ Outcomes: Illustrating Regulatory Weaknesses 
 
Under the AD Act, if an individual does not complain or does not wish to proceed, the 
ADB has very little regulatory power to enforce discrimination laws.
51
 This is a major 
deficiency in the current regulatory framework that seriously hinders the capacity of the 
ADB to utilise its statutory functions to further the policy objectives of Part 4B. The 
following summaries have been selected relating to both public and private sector 
respondents to illustrate, first, the common reasons why complainants withdraw their 
complaints, sometimes before the ADB has even had time to contact the employer; and 
second, to illustrate how the ADB, in the absence of alternative express enforcement 
powers will generally close the complaint file if an individual no longer wishes to 
proceed. 
  
The case of the gender-blind $120,000 roster expert 
Tricia was the only female professional in a particular section of a large public sector 
organisation.
52 
She had worked for 13 years, full-time. She applied for part-time work or 
an extension of maternity leave, but both were denied. Without any notice, she 
discovered she had been terminated when she received a separation form without a 
covering explanatory letter that stated that the respondent ‘only has full time positions 
available for your line of roster’. With union help, her full-time position was reinstated, 
but the part-time work was still denied.  Tricia at this stage lodged a complaint with the 
ADB. The ADB wrote to the respondent within two days of lodgement calling an early 
conciliation conference. A file note recorded that the complaint handler also called the 
HR manager: 
R said there are no part-time jobs. Explained that law requires R to look at 
whether the job can be done on a part time basis—what is it about an [that] job 
that requires person to be on a full time roster? … They are not being 
reasonable.  
In the written response, the respondent argued that it had recently undertaken a 12-
month overhaul of rosters at a cost of $120,000 in fees to a rostering expert. It could not 
alter the roster for the complainant because this would involve ‘a very significant 
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amount of work and would involve the payment of fees in the order of $60,000’. It also 
argued that: 
[The respondent] nevertheless encourages job-share arrangements where 
possible ... as I have mentioned all [the complainants co-workers in her 
section] are working full time. All with the exception of [the complainant] are 
male. To date no other ... [employee] has expressed any interest in a job share 
arrangement or indicated a desire to work part-time. As a consequence, in 
order to accommodate … the request to work part time it would be necessary 
to recruit an another person ... in a permanent part-time role ... at the hearing 
of this dispute [the respondent] will adduce expert evidence to the effect that 
its prospects of recruiting a part-time ... [employee] ... are extremely low. 
The complainant went on sick leave, and withdrew her complaint because she hoped to 
negotiate a redundancy and did not want to jeopardise this, because: 
I now envisage a hostile workplace where I to be accommodated. Management 
have already demonstrated their unwillingness to do anything ... There is little 
concept of accommodating familial needs within the [respondent’s] culture. 
Being the only female ... [my co-workers] would think that I had received 
preferential treatment and given the ‘cream of the shifts’ achieving this by 
unfair means. Thus I would be open to harassment from some fellow staff 
members as well as hostility from management who have all made their 
position clear.  
This complaint was made in 2009 eight years after the carers’ legislation was introduced 
and decades after the sex discrimination legislation across Australia. The respondent 
was a large public sector employer that clearly had an almost completely male 
workforce, a deeply entrenched gendered culture and, moreover, a pervasive hostile 
culture. The respondent had spent considerable public funds on a roster review process 
that was clearly based on male ideal worker norms and was completely gender blind in 
its application. Although the ADB received only one complaint against this respondent 
in the decade, the systemic discrimination issues raised in this complaint were 
extremely serious. The ADB’s response was to close the file. 
 
In this complaint, regardless of the fact that Tricia decided to withdraw it, the writer 
argues that it was open to the ADB to have directly addressed this issue with the head of 
the organisation. The ADB could have outlined the nature of the structural 
discrimination at the organisation and provided advice about how to achieve cultural 
and organisational change, for example, by recommending a positive action programme 
to attract and if necessary train more women to work at the organisation to address the 
gender imbalance. For example, public sector organisations at that time could put in 
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place EEO management plans under Part 9A of the AD Act to take positive steps such as 
recruiting more women, to eliminate sex discrimination. In addition, it is also possible 
to apply for an exemption from the AD Act to provide a positive action program.  For 
example, Veolia achieved an exemption from the AD Act in 2008 to run a positive 
action programme to recruit and train women bus drivers.
53
  
 
The ADB could also have advised the respondent that, in its opinion, its rostering 
process would breach the AD Act because of its negative impacts not only for women 
but also for all employees with caring responsibilities in its workforce. It is argued 
below at 10.4 that the ADB has a particular obligation to ensure that the NSW public 
sector complies with its statutory obligations and leads by example.
54
 Ignoring such 
clear discriminatory practices reflects a key regulatory weakness of the legislation and 
the ADB’s powers to take proactive action in relation to entrenched and gendered 
discrimination brought to its attention via a complaint.   
 
A culture of bullying and harassment at Repeat Player B 
In the first years after Part 4B was enacted, several complaints were made against 
Repeat Player B that involved allegations of bullying and a hostile work environment 
from employees working in similar operational roles involving shift work and rostering. 
They appeared to indicate serious issues around a hostile workplace culture based 
heavily on entrenched ideal worker norms. The respondent’s legal department which 
handled carers’ discrimination complaints in these early years of the decade also 
appeared to be very hostile to the ADB complaint process, as evidenced in its written 
communication with the ADB. It sometimes accused the ADB of bias and on one 
occasion made a formal complaint to the relevant minister about this issue.  By the time 
Edwina and Lucy above, made their complaints later on in the decade, the response was 
more overtly conciliatory.  
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 In NSW, Part 9A of the AD Act (which was repealed in 2014 by the Government Sector Employment 
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 See Chapter 4, at 4.2.3, noting the arguments of some commentators that discrimination laws can lose 
legitimacy if the public sector flouts the state’s discrimination laws. 
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Nina, was a sole parent of a pre-schooler working in a large public sector department, 
who took two days ‘Family and Community Services’ leave after her childcare fell 
through.
55
 On her return, she was called into a disciplinary meeting with her manager 
and the HR manager and, she reported that her direct line manager said the following:  
[He] asked me if he should believe the explanation on the report that I had 
submitted. Then he said that if I wanted to keep my career in the Department 
... that my career had to come first and that I would have to come up with a 
Plan B for child-minding for my child, and help the roster clerk by calling and 
rearranging days off etc, and that I probably didn’t care about that ... he then 
said if you have more time off whether it be for your child or your sickness 
your excuse better be that your DEAD, been HUNG, or someone has 
BROKEN BOTH YOUR LEGS, I left the meeting extremely upset 
(complainant’s emphasis). 
After this Nina felt her performance and any leave she took were under constant 
scrutiny. She stated that the management ‘picked on’ female workers.  The file note 
recorded that she was very fearful about proceeding with her complaint. The complaint 
handler was unable to reassure her. Eventually, the ADB closed the complaint without 
ever contacting the respondent, on the basis that it was abandoned when the 
complainant did not respond to ADB communication.  
 
Jeremy who was discussed in Chapter 9 had also lodged two complaints of carers’ 
discrimination in the years preceding Nina’s complaint and he had also lodged an 
additional seven complaints alleging victimisation relating to intimidation from 
management, and unfair rostering or changes to shifts which he alleged occurred 
because he had made a complaint to the ADB. He also alleged intimidation at being 
forced to sign an unfair deed of settlement to discontinue the ADB complaint in 
exchange for a compassionate transfer. The deed included a term that would bar all 
proceedings in the future relating to any matter arising from his employment.
56
 The 
ADB had cautioned Jeremy about accepting this term, and he refused and the complaint 
was referred to the Tribunal.
57
 Martha, whose complaint was also discussed in Chapter 
9, had had to take a year away from work after a worker’s compensation claim resulting 
from the harassment and discrimination and victimisation she had suffered and she 
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 The terms of this deed were a major sticking point and the complainant refused to agree even though 
his requested accommodation was agreed to.  See Chapter 9, at 9.3.3. 
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 RN# 37 and RN# 142. The seven victimisations were reviewed for this project because they were dealt 
with on the carers’ files, but quantitatively are not included in the 520 carers’ complaints.  
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received almost $60,000 compensation for her loss suffered as a result of the 
discrimination.
58
 
 
In this context, it is concerning that when Nina made her complaint the ADB would 
have been aware of the hostile culture at this organisation in the years before. However, 
the ADB took no action to address with the respondent the very serious allegations of 
bullying and harassment that were brought to its attention in a number of complaints, 
which indicated a systemic hostile workplace culture.  As Chapman has noted 
previously, the ADB will not investigate ‘conduct complained of’ more broadly outside 
the individual complaint
59
 and, for example, does not take any action to address 
systemic issues about the workplace and the respondents’ practices that were brought to 
its attention during a complaint, even when such issues indicated serious systemic 
discrimination, and in the public sector.  
 
As noted in the literature, there is a danger that the law can lose its legitimacy when the 
state and its agencies do not comply with its own laws.
60
  It is argued here that that the 
ADB, as the guardian of the AD Act on behalf of the state of NSW, has an implicit 
obligation to ensure that the public sector complies with its obligation in this regard. As 
with Tricia’s complaint above, the ADB must do more to ensure that public sector 
employers, and particularly ‘repeat players’ must comply with the law.  What steps it 
could take are explained at 10.4 below. 
 
The following two complaints concerned women in the private sector, who had worked 
for ten years or more with their employer, returning to work after maternity leave.  They 
both reported that they felt very intimidated by their employers’ actions pressuring them 
to work full-time. The summaries provide an insight into why complainants discontinue 
complaints and how little power the ADB has to take alternative action. 
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‘At the risk of sounding harsh, it is something you have to deal with’  
Beth worked in a sales role in the financial sector with a large national company for 
almost 10 years.
61
 Her regular hours had been part-time three days per week working 
one day from home. One week before she was due to return from maternity leave, she 
was informed that she could no longer work from home, as it was ‘against company 
policy’. Childcare centres in her area had waiting lists of 12–24 months. She then 
received the following email, which she found very intimidating:  
The policy on working from home is that it is subject to manager agreement 
and can change at any time in response to business and team requirements. 
This is the managers’ prerogative … to manage the resources in the most 
efficient manner [We] … would prefer to have full time consultants working 
anywhere we asked without complaint … we are also sympathetic to the 
childcare issue and know many working mothers find this difficult. However, 
at the risk of sounding harsh, it is something you have to deal with. We are 
open to giving you some time, two weeks, to sort out the childcare, but in 
going forward we want three days a week as a minimum with a view to 
returning to work 5 days next year. I hope this doesn’t become a deal breaker, 
we wouldn’t want to lose you! 
Beth decided to withdraw the complaint prior to the ADB contacting the respondent. 
She said she did not want ‘to rock the boat given the GFC [global financial crisis] and 
the economic uncertainty’ and was concerned that if she proceeded she may be at 
‘further risk of being treated unfairly or even forced to quit’. 
 
‘She understood my dilemma but said I needed to “play the game”’62 
Marj had worked in a senior management role with a large national private health care 
provider on a full-time basis for more than a decade. She returned to work full-time 
after maternity leave and felt that her manager began to question her performance. A 
request for a short period of part-time work, because her baby was unsettled in its 
current care arrangements, was denied. She requested four days’ annual leave. She was 
asked to put in writing ‘how she would manage her workload when she returned full 
time’ even though she was only taking four days of her leave entitlements. When the 
complainant was unable to attend a conference being held in another city, her manager 
said: 
[T]hat she understood my dilemma but said I needed to ‘play the game’. She 
also said that she hoped ‘I was prepared to accept the consequences’ of not 
attending the conference which could be ‘dire’.  
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The ADB recommended an interim order and an urgent conciliation conference, but the 
complainant decided to resign. She left, found a part-time job and withdrew her 
complaint, stating that the ‘way I have been treated by my employer since returning 
from maternity leave is extremely distressing. … but I certainly do not want to work for 
a company like this anymore …I think it would be very uncomfortable working for 
them now’. A note on the file records Marj’s motivation in not proceeding:  
Had she not found p/t employment she would have been more prepared to 
follow through but does not believe she is the type of person emotionally to 
take on the respondent ... She is still very upset that they are getting away with 
what they did to her—I said it is still not too late for Board to contact the 
respondent and inform of the complaint. She stated she did not want to 
jeopardise future references. Advised I will keep file open for month for her to 
think about it. 
 
In both of these complaints the employers, who were large national employers, who 
purported to have flexible work policies were effectively able to get away with 
discriminating against their employees because both women were fearful of proceeding 
with their complaint, and the ADB was then powerless to take any action.  
 
10.4 Addressing the Deficiencies 
 
Chapters 9 and 10 have demonstrated how the complaint process can provide ‘good’ 
individual outcomes that can, sometimes, also result in potentially broader systemic 
outcomes across an organisation. However, it is also clear that many complaints did not 
resolve at the ADB, or resulted in ‘poor’ outcomes in terms of the generally very low 
quantum achieved by carers’ complainants.63 In addition, there are a number of serious 
structural statutory deficiencies in terms of the ADB’s enforcement powers, or lack 
thereof, and also in relation to the ADB’s approach to the application of those powers. It 
is argued below that the ADB is sometimes more concerned with being an impartial 
facilitator rather than an advocate for, and guardian of, the AD Act.  A number of law 
reform and other recommendations are made briefly in this section that may assist the 
ADB to meet better the policy objectives of the AD Act and Part 4B. 
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10.4.1 Law Reform  
 
As noted above, a major criticism noted in the literature is that discrimination laws rely 
upon individuals to make and continue with complaints and do not establish an 
enforcement agency that has the task of pursuing or prosecuting people or organisations 
that break the law.
64
 The case summaries have demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
individual enforcement mechanism, which does not give the ADB the power to make a 
complaint or to take action against those employers that breached the legislation.
65
 In 
particular, there have long been calls for the ADB to be given the power to initiate a 
complaint and to have the right to intervene in proceedings at the Tribunal. It is 
recommended that this be remedied and the AD Act amended to provide such powers.
66
 
 
In addition, in recent years, the literature has noted that, when compared with the broad 
enforcement and compliance powers found under the FW Act, discrimination agencies 
such as the ADB have very limited statutory power to take enforcement measures for 
breaches of the AD Act.
67
 For example, as noted they have no powers to initiate 
complaints or issue fines for breaches.
68
 Recent decisions in the Fair Work jurisdiction 
also serve to emphasise the potential of other enforcement strategies and sanctions.
69
 
The statutory powers and sanctions available in this jurisdiction may provide an 
important point of reference in any broader law reform project to address the 
deficiencies in the current discrimination law framework in Australia.  
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 See Chapter 4, at 4.3.2–4.3.3. Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-
Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014) 7–8. 
65
 See, above at 10.3. 
66
 See Law Reform Commission of NSW, Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Report No 
92 (1999) Recommendations 125–26, 672.  
67
 See Chapter 1, at 1.4. Smith, in particular, has provided an expansive regulatory analysis of 
discrimination laws in Australia in relation to the absence of agency enforcement and the lack of a range 
of enforcement tools to promote compliance: Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’ (2006) 
28(4) Sydney Law Review 689, 714. In Belinda Smith, ‘Fair and Equal in the World of Work: Two 
Significant Developments in Australian Discrimination Law’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 199. 
68
 There are limited civil remedies under the AD Act, for example, in relation to non-attendance at a 
conciliation conference called, under s 92.  
69
 See Chapter 6, at 6.3.3, in relation to the discussion of the Correy decisions noting recent maternity-
related complaints in the Fair Work.  
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10.4.2 Reconciling Conflicting Roles: Advocate and Guardian or Impartial 
Facilitator? 
The AD Act does not specifically state that the ADB must remain impartial or neutral in 
the complaint-handling process. However, it is subject to the ordinary principles of 
administrative law, including procedural fairness and bias relating to its statutory 
decision-making role.
70
 The ADB’s factsheet relating to complaint handling and 
conciliation
71
 makes it clear that it views itself as an impartial facilitator but, at the same 
time, an advocate for and guardian
 
of the legislation.
72
 It states that ‘the aims of 
conciliation’ include ‘to educate both sides about their rights and responsibilities under 
anti-discrimination law’ and ‘to advise respondents on how to prevent discrimination in 
the future’.73 Thornton has also noted that Carmel Niland, an early president of the 
ADB, argued that the ADB must take ‘an active rather than a passive role, in protecting 
the rights of the parties … and ensure a resolution which conforms with the 
legislation’.74 However, it is clear from ADB publications and the operation of the 
complaint-handling process in practice that the ADB has long abandoned any such 
approach to ensuring a resolution that ‘conforms’ with the AD Act in every complaint, if 
indeed it ever had such an approach in practice. There are also concerns in the literature 
that complaint handling agencies provide little education of respondents during the 
complaint process.
75
 
 
The carers’ complaint files reviewed for this project indicate that the ADB has quite 
clearly struggled to manage the tension between the apparently inconsistent goals of 
being both an impartial complaints facilitator and also an advocate for and guardian of 
                                                 
70
 See, for example, Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Law in Australia 
(Oxford University Press, 1990), 163–4 (‘Promise’); Rosemary Hunter, Indirect Discrimination in the 
Workplace (Federation, 1992) 263; Chapman, Complaint-Handling’ above n 59; Matthew Groves, 
‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Australian Administrative Law’ (2008) 32(2) Melbourne 
University Law Review 470. The Supreme Court of NSW has the power to judicially review certain 
decisions made by the president of the ADB under the AD Act and has reviewed a number of decisions in 
relation to the discretion to accept a complaint lodged out of time. See, for example, Fraser v President, 
Anti-Discrimination Board and 3 Ors [2000] NSWSC 1083; Shrayer v Anti-Discrimination Board of 
NSW [2008] NSWSC 1036. These cases demonstrate that, notwithstanding the purported informality of 
complaint handling, complaint handling under the legislation will be subject to general administrative law 
principles such as procedural fairness and natural justice and rules against bias. 
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ADB, Complaining to the Anti-Discrimination Board ADB Factsheet (Revised June 2009) (2009) 
(‘Complaining Factsheet’). 
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See generally Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 59. 
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 ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61. 
74
 Thornton, Promise, above n 70, 144. Carmel Nyland was president of the ADB between 1982 and 
1987. 
75
 See Chapter 1 at 1.4.3 and see Chapter 4, at 4.3.1. 
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the legislation under s 119 of the AD Act.
76
  If unresolved, this conflict has serious 
negative consequences for the effective implementation of Part 4B to meet its 
objectives, and these issues are unlikely to be overcome by statutory reform of the 
complaint function alone, since they require a major change in the approach to 
complaint-handling on the part of the ADB.  
 
In terms of engaging in a more proactive educative role with respondents during the 
complaints process in practice, it is argued that there is nothing to prevent the ADB 
from expressly advising the employer that its conduct may amount to discrimination in 
breach of Part 4B, and then what steps it should take to remedy it.  Respondents may 
consider that this is at odds with the ADB’s stated position of neutrality,77 and it may 
lead to concerns that the ADB is biased in favour of the complainant.
78
 However, as the 
complaint summaries above indicated, complaint handlers did regularly provide ADB 
publications to the parties.  In Chapter 8 it was explained that these publications outline 
very clearly the ADB’s concise interpretation of Part 4B, how it interprets rights and 
obligations under it, and how to comply with it.  In addition, the complaint summaries 
above also illustrate situations where the ADB did provide verbal advice to the parties 
about whether conduct is likely to have breached the AD Act, and also how to remedy it 
and/or prevent breaches in the future.  However, the ADB very rarely committed any 
such advice in writing to a respondent. It is argued that the ADB should not shy away 
from providing its informed opinion to respondents about their obligations and from 
providing compliance advice in relation to a complaint. Putting such advice in writing, 
which relies upon the ADB’s consistent and purposive interpretation of Part 4B found in 
its publications, is likely to have more force in practice than an informal undocumented, 
or partially documented, telephone conversation with a respondent.  
 
In addition it is argued, that the ADB can, and should, take on a more pro-active role to 
address discrimination brought to its attention in a complaint by looking to and relying 
upon its broader statutory functions.  It was noted above that the ADB does have a 
                                                 
76
 See Chapter 1, at 1.3, for an overview of the ADB’s statutory functions. 
77
 Chapman, ‘Complaint-Handling’, above n 59, 116, 338–9. 
78
 Ibid 339. Chapman noted that the complaint-handling manual used at that time explicitly warns 
conciliation officers against reaching a conclusion ‘that a respondent has probably breached the 
legislation as this could be perceived as bias’, but leaves the door open for providing such an opinion, 
noting that ‘a complaint handler should not volunteer an opinion … unless an opinion is sought by either 
party’. 
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degree of recognised authority in relation to the interpretation and application of the AD 
Act.  This is underscored by its broad education, and consultation powers recognised 
under s 119 of the AD Act.
79
 Under s 119(e), the ADB is empowered to consult ‘with 
governmental, business, industrial and community groups and organisations in order to 
ascertain means of improving conditions affecting groups which are the subject of 
discrimination and inequality’.  For example, in the complaints relating to the public 
sector ‘repeat players’, it was clearly open to the ADB, independent of the complaint 
process, to contact the appropriate senior person at the relevant organisation to provide 
advice about possible or likely breaches of the AD Act within the organisation.  Putting 
this advice in writing at the senior management level is consistent with the ADB’s 
statutory powers under s 119(e) and would take place outside the complaint function 
which could avoid concerns as to bias in the complaints process.  There is also an 
argument that the ADB is under an implied statutory obligation to address the serious 
structural EEO issues, such as those raised in the ‘gender blind roster’ complaint, 
particularly in relation to the public sector complaints.
80
     
 
Many commentators have also expressed disappointment that the ADB does not provide 
greater substantive assistance to the complainants.
81
 The ADB’s failure to provide 
greater assistance to complainants in relation to settlement proposals and quantum—
because of an apparent preoccupation with being, and being seen to be, impartial in the 
operation of the complaint-handling function—is particularly problematic.  The low 
quantum of compensation typically achieved indicates that, as with complaints heard at 
the Tribunal,
82
 a much more rigorous approach to the quantification of loss is urgently 
required.  
 
It is clear that complainants do require greater assistance to enable them to quantify 
their loss properly so that they receive compensation for all of their loss caused by the 
discriminatory conduct and not just a paying out of their entitlements. Complainants 
should not be in a position in which they have to seek costly legal advice. This would 
                                                 
79
 See Chapter 1, at 1.3.1. 
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 See Chapter 7, at 7.2.2. 
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conflict with the policy aims of conciliation to provide a free informal service.
83
 The 
ADB must consider ways that it could provide greater assistance to those complainants 
who require it in the preparation of settlement proposals to reflect their loss properly. 
 
In conclusion, it is argued that being impartial in the complaint-handling process as well 
as a pro-active educator and advocate for Part 4B need not be mutually exclusive. Any 
perceived conflict between the two roles is entirely reconcilable. Put simply, the ADB 
has no adjudicative power to make a determination or to force a respondent to take on 
board its views let alone act upon them. This does not then mean that the ADB, as an 
advocate for and guardian of the legislation, should not make those views known, in a 
clear and transparent way, directly and preferably in writing, to the respondent when 
potential or actual breaches of the legislation are brought to its attention during the 
complaint process. When more serious systemic issues arise beyond the scope of any 
individual remedy that a complainant is seeking, this could be achieved entirely 
independently of the complaint, for example, through separate communication from the 
President of the ADB to the head of the organisation. It should use all of its powers 
under s119 to try and address allegations of discrimination brought to its attention 
during the complaint process. The aim should be to try and assist the respondent to fix 
the problem and to better comply with the legislation, and especially in relation to 
public sector employers. 
 
There are also a number of other practical recommendations that would assist the ADB 
to meet the policy objectives of Part 4B more effectively through the operation of its 
statutory functions. 
 
10.4.3 Adequate Funding 
 
The ADB is chronically underfunded, and any recommendations that envisage a more 
proactive role for the ADB depend upon an increase in funding and political support for 
the ADB’s role as an advocate and guardian of the AD Act. Without such funding, as 
                                                 
83
 See the ADB, Complaining Factsheet, above n 61, which advises complainants that it is impartial in the 
complaint process and cannot ‘help you decide on a settlement proposal’. This ‘hands-off’ approach of 
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noted above, its authority and standing can be compromised
84
 and it will simply be 
unable to take on a more pro-active role.   
 
10.4.4 Bringing Complaints out of the ‘Shadows’ 
 
The private nature of conciliation is broadly critiqued in the literature.
85
 It has been 
noted throughout Part V of this thesis that very little information is available in the 
public domain about the operation of the complaint function.
86
 Although the annual 
reports provide limited aggregate data, there is no publicly available record of who 
made the complaints, their gender or other socio-demographic data, their caring 
responsibilities, their employment status or where they worked (by sector, industry or 
occupation), what they were complaining about or the outcomes of those complaints. 
Charlesworth et al, who conducted a review of sexual harassment complaints across 
Australian jurisdictions, have also recently noted that:  
Without more detailed socio-demographic and employment data being 
routinely and consistently collected and made available, it is difficult to gain 
an understanding of those who experience sexual harassment and the types of 
interventions which may be effective in preventing and responding to [it].
87
 
It is recommended that the ADB take urgent steps to ensure that such complaints data 
are routinely collected and published. In addition, as noted in Chapter 2, the ADB 
should also consider streamlining its conciliation register which is available on its 
website to provide clear and accessible summaries of complaint outcomes, which may 
be of normative assistance to the parties to complaints.
88
 
 
 
10.5 Concluding Comments: The Effectiveness of the Complaint 
Process to Achieve the Objectives of Part 4B 
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 See Chapter 1, at 1.3.2. 
85
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Chapters 9 and 10 have explored and evaluated the operation of the ADB complaint-
handling function. In conclusion, it is argued that the complaint process at the ADB—
even with its acknowledged structural legislative deficiencies and the ADB’s frequently 
non-interventionist approach to complaint handling—does provide a much less formal, 
timelier and less adversarial process than that of the Tribunal.
89
 The ADB has 
consistently taken a purposive approach to its interpretation of Part 4B, and its 
processes offer complainants the chance to achieve individual and systemic remedies 
both to meet and to further the policy objectives of Part 4B. The ADB process will also 
provide a better opportunity than the Tribunal to negotiate reasonable accommodation if 
that is what the complainant wants. 
 
A number of options not limited to law reform have been suggested that could make the 
operation of Part 4B, and the complaint process, more effective in order to achieve 
greater equality for individual worker–carers, and at a broader systemic level. Within 
the existing regulatory framework, there is scope for the ADB to address discrimination 
that is brought to its attention much more proactively, and to ensure that its 
preoccupation with impartiality does not serve to constrain the full exercise of its 
functions. As an advocate for and guardian
 
of the legislation, the ADB should, and 
must, take a more direct, forceful and proactive role in the complaint-handling process. 
It must address discriminatory practices and conduct that is sometimes beyond the 
scope of any individual remedy sought by a complainant in order to achieve the 
objectives of Part 4B more effectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Workplace discrimination against workers with caring responsibilities is a pervasive 
and a serious barrier to the social and economic equality and well-being of workers and 
their families.  This thesis explains how Part 4B of the AD Act has attempted to address 
discrimination against worker-carers in NSW.  The legislation has received limited 
attention in the literature. This thesis has helped to fill in these gaps and has provided an 
original contribution by explaining and evaluating how effective the legislation has been 
during its first decade, as it has been interpreted and applied by the ADB and the 
Tribunal.   
 
In Part I a detailed overview of the statutory context, the ‘standard’ discrimination 
model in Australia, the AD Act, and the functions and powers of the ADB and Tribunal 
was provided. The theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis was also 
outlined. Part II reviewed the literature first, in relation to the nature, causes and effects 
of carers’ discrimination and second, the inadequacy but also the potential of 
discrimination law responses to carers’ discrimination. In conclusion, it was noted that 
in particular, the literature has called for discrimination laws to move away from a duty 
of restraint model and to instead take a ‘unified approach to equality’,1 providing both 
negative and positive obligations. A discrimination law duty of reasonable 
accommodation,
2
 supported by an accessible ‘problem-solving’3 informal enforcement 
mechanism, was identified in the literature as an important practical legal provision that 
could help to achieve these policy objectives. It was noted that eventually, reasonable 
accommodation and flexibility may be considered the norm for all workers not just 
                                                 
1
 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 175-176 (‘Human Rights’).  Smith, Belinda and Dominique Allen, ‘Whose Fault Is It? 
Asking the Right Questions When Trying to Address Discrimination’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law 
Journal 31. 
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Melbourne, 2012) (‘Working Paper’); Anna Chapman, ‘Reasonable Accommodation, Adverse Action and 
the Case of Deborah Schou’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 39 (‘Schou’); 
3
 Susan Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach’ (2001) 101(1) 
Columbia Law Review 459 
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those with caring responsibilities and thus employers would accept the ‘need for 
flexibility as normal, rather than exceptional’.4  
 
Part III identified the policy objectives of Part 4B from the contemporary sources prior 
to its enactment, as including work life balance, gender equality in paid and unpaid 
work and explained the role of an express duty of reasonable accommodation. The Law 
Reform Commission had noted that the new ground of carers’ responsibility ‘will have 
little effect in practice if it does not include an obligation to make reasonable 
accommodation … to achieve the underlying social policy’.5 However the express duty 
that it recommended was omitted from Part 4B. It was argued that Part 4B does not 
therefore give effect to its objectives on its face. It was recommended that Part 4B 
should be amended to become more ‘capable’6 of delivering its policy objectives, to 
include an express duty of reasonable accommodation. It was argued that an express 
duty under Part 4B could also help to meet the broader policy objectives of 
discrimination laws seeking to eradicate discrimination against worker–carers identified 
in the literature including a better work and family balance, gender equality and 
ensuring better job quality for carers,
7
 access to ‘decent work’,8 and greater ‘social 
inclusion’9 and ‘well-being’,10 as well as encouraging employers to accommodate their 
workers’ caring and family responsibilities.11 It was also recommended that s 49S  be 
amended to remove the family relationship nexus to give Part 4B broader application.   
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Parts IV and V then went on to consider the ADB and Tribunal responses to Part 4B 
through their respective statutory function.  This thesis has looked beyond a purely 
positivist analysis of the operation of the law based on Tribunal jurisprudence alone.  
Instead it uses a realist ‘law in action’ theoretical lens which included empirical 
research of carers’ complaints to explain how Part 4B has been given meaning and been 
applied in practice by other key actors: the ADB, worker–carers and employers.  Two 
research questions have been answered.   
 
The first questions asked how the ADB and the Tribunal have interpreted and applied 
Part 4B and whether this gave effect to its objectives.  The second looked to the 
accessibility and effectiveness of the two stage enforcement process, and asked whether 
it was capable of providing ‘good’ outcomes for complainants, and what the normative 
impacts of the ADB and Tribunal approaches have been.  
 
It is argued that Tribunal decisions provide only a limited insight into how Part 4B is 
interpreted and applied, how the enforcement process works in practice, and what 
outcomes and remedies complainants have achieved. Therefore, it is unwise to base any 
assessment of effectiveness of the enforcement process or of Part 4B more generally on 
Tribunal decisions alone.
12
 To provide a more complete understanding of how the 
complaint process works ‘in action’ and how worker–carers and their employers are 
engaging with their rights and obligations under Part 4B, and with what success on a 
day-to-day basis, it is necessary to also look to education and complaint-handling 
functions of the ADB.   
 
All 12 Tribunal decisions during the decade were considered first in Part IV.
13
  In a time 
of judicial conservatism in Australia it was argued that the Tribunal has interpreted Part 
4B technically and narrowly. Even taking into account the decisions in Reddy and 
Tleyji,
14
 the Tribunal has largely operated in a policy vacuum. These two decisions were 
far from resounding victories for the complainants, and did not provide a 
comprehensive blueprint for good work/family policy and practice. It was argued that 
the Tribunal therefore missed the opportunity to provide a purposive and unequivocal 
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interpretation of the law which could have provided clear guidance to employers and 
worker–carers about their rights and obligations under Part 4B in the early years after 
enactment. The decisions also show that it has failed to provide an accessible 
enforcement process capable of delivering ‘good’ outcomes.  
 
Overall, the analysis of the carers’ decisions leads to the conclusion that the likelihood 
of the Tribunal making a finding of discrimination and ordering an adequate or 
appropriate remedy is very limited. Rather than deterring the employer from 
discriminating against worker–carers and encouraging compliance and reasonable 
accommodation of caring responsibilities and thereby meeting the objectives of the 
legislation, the Tribunal decisions emphasise the nature of a hostile adversarial litigation  
process which is lengthy, costly and stressful for the complainant. Even if the 
complainant wins, the result is likely to be limited to compensation for the individual 
worker with no ongoing obligation for the employer to correct institutional ideal worker 
norms and structures that give rise to discrimination.
15
 The message to employers is that 
any obligation upon them to accommodate their worker–carers is equivocal, and that 
even if they do discriminate, it is unlikely that the worker–carers will be able to prove it. 
The decisions are more likely to act as a deterrent to worker–carers by discouraging 
them from enforcing their rights under Part 4B.  
 
However, it was also suggested that the Tribunal has the potential to build a strong 
jurisprudence as one important tool to help prevent carers’ discrimination at work, and 
to send a message to the employers and the community that discrimination will not be 
tolerated. This jurisprudence would provide guidance to employers and workers to 
change attitudes and challenge ideal worker norms about how, where and when work is 
done.  It was argued that properly utilising this potential depends upon two 
prerequisites. First, it depends on the Tribunal interpreting and applying the legislation 
in a beneficial purposive way to further the policy aims and objects of the legislation, 
rather than narrowly and technically. Second, it also depends upon the Tribunal being 
able and willing to keep in check the increasing formality and legal technicality of 
discrimination proceedings so that it does not disadvantage those worker–carers who 
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cannot afford the personal and financial costs of lengthy legal proceedings,
16
 and so that 
it does not serve to discourage worker–carers from enforcing their rights, and achieving 
‘good’ outcomes.   
 
A number of specific law reform options were also suggested including removing the 
cap on damages under s 108 and changes to the enforcement process under the AD Act.  
In addition, it was suggested that the Tribunal must fundamentally modify its role as the 
adjudicator of an adversarial litigious process. To help the Tribunal interpret and apply 
Part 4B more purposively and therefore more effectively, it was suggested that it could 
take on an inquisitorial role, to better integrate the policy objectives of Part 4B into its 
statutory interpretation and decision-making process. It was argued that this is not a 
radical proposal, because the Tribunal, with power to determine complaints made under 
the AD Act (that has as its objectives important social policy objectives) should exercise 
those powers in accordance with, and to further, those objectives. This is entirely in 
keeping with the existing discrimination complaints statutory framework in NSW, 
including the new NCAT regime in NSW. 
 
Part V then turned to the operation of the ADB’s education and complaint functions. In 
answering the first research question, it was argued that generally free of the constraints 
of an adjudicative role, the ADB has taken a less technical and a more purposive holistic 
policy-driven approach than the Tribunal.  In relation to is education function it was 
argued that through its publications aimed at workers and employers, its telephone 
advice line and its website, as well as through the provision of training, the ADB is 
likely to have been influential in disseminating its broad and beneficial interpretation of 
Part 4B aimed at meeting its policy objectives.  In particular, throughout the decade the 
ADB has consistently advocated that the provisions under Part 4B operate together, in 
practice, in order to imply a duty of reasonable accommodation. It was argued that the 
ADB’s approach to Part 4B through its education function is likely to have had an 
important normative impact in terms of how worker–carers and employers understand, 
implement and engage with their rights and obligations at the day-to-day workplace 
level. It is also likely to have had a strong normative potential to contribute to the 
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Regime (Themis, 2010) 9.  
. 
452 
 
capacity of employers and employees to change workplace attitudes, cultures and 
behaviours.  
 
Turning to the complaint function this thesis reviewed 520 carers’ complaints 
representing more than 99% of all complaints lodged with the ADB and finalised during 
the decade.  An overview was first provided to explain who made the complaints (what 
responsibilities they had, what they complained about and their employment context) 
and who the respondents were.  To answer the second research question, the 
accessibility of the process, the outcomes achieved and the normative impact of the 
complaint function with reference to quantitative and qualitative complaints data were 
evaluated.  In summary, it was concluded that the complaint process at the ADB—even 
with its acknowledged structural legislative deficiencies and the ADB’s frequently non-
interventionist approach to complaint handling—does offer the opportunity for a 
responsive, free, relatively informal and timely mechanism. Legal representation is not 
required; moreover, it is only allowed at a conciliation conference with leave of the 
ADB. In practical terms lodging a complaint with the ADB can provide a lacuna of time 
when the parties pause and possibly attempt to negotiate a resolution under the ADB 
process, rather than allowing a dispute to proceed inexorably to the termination of the 
employment relationship. A key argument throughout this thesis, which is supported by 
the complaint data, is that the process can therefore be particularly useful for those 
complainants who want to maintain the employment relationship and have their 
responsibilities accommodated.  
 
In terms of outcomes, the majority of all 520 carers’ complaints made at the ADB 
during the decade were finalised with a 54% settlement rate, which is much higher than 
the average settlement rate of 30% for complaints lodged with the ADB on all grounds 
over the same period.
 
Thirty one per cent of all complainants achieved some form of 
accommodation (and sometimes another remedy); 23% settled on the basis of some 
other remedy, primarily compensation; 58% who wanted an accommodation achieved 
some form of accommodation to enable them to stay in work; and 11% involved a 
broader potentially systemic outcome such as a policy change or training at work. For 
those complainants seeking an accommodation of their responsibilities, the ADB 
process therefore offers a better option for an early resolution to achieve this outcome, 
than litigation at the Tribunal.   
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To answer the second research question therefore the data demonstrate that the ADB 
process is capable of providing ‘good’ outcomes for individual complainants, with 
potentially systemic effects, thereby giving effect to the policy objectives of Part 4B.  
 
However, when complainants were no longer employed at the time they lodged their 
complaints, the data demonstrated that accommodation was an unlikely remedy. 
Compensation was likely to be the main or primary remedy available, and this is likely 
to provide an inadequate remedy in practice because payments at the ADB, like at the 
Tribunal, were generally very low. Further research is required into why quantum is so 
low at the ADB, and to examine what can be done to assist complainants to quantify 
and claim loss that properly reflects all aspects of the loss and damage occasioned as a 
result of the discrimination. In particular, in the absence of accessible legal aid, or 
affordable legal advice for complainants, it is necessary to consider what role the ADB 
should play to assist complainants in this regard. Moreover, the data also showed that 
46% of complaints did not resolve. Further qualitative research is required first, to 
explain why complaints do not resolve; second whether any steps can be taken to make 
the law more accessible for these complainants; and third, what legislative reforms or 
other non-legislative steps might enable the ADB to use its education and complaint-
handling functions to take a more active enforcement role that is not dependent upon an 
individual complaints mechanism. 
 
It was noted that it is necessary to consider alternative enforcement mechanisms and 
strategies that may sharpen the ADB’s powers and reduce the burdens on individual 
complainants. It was suggested that the Fair Work jurisdiction could provide a point of 
reference in any broader law reform project to address these enforcement deficiencies.   
 
A number of options not limited to law reform were also suggested that could make the 
operation of Part 4B, and the first stage of the complaint process at the ADB, more 
effective.  It was argued that within the existing regulatory framework, there is scope for 
the ADB to address discrimination that is brought to its attention much more 
proactively, and to ensure that its preoccupation with impartiality does not serve to 
constrain the full exercise of its functions. As an advocate for and guardian
 
of the 
legislation, the ADB should, and must, take a more direct, forceful and proactive role in 
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the complaint-handling process. It must address discriminatory practices and conduct 
that is sometimes beyond the scope of any individual remedy sought by a complainant 
in order to achieve the objectives of Part 4B more effectively.  However, it was also 
noted that the ADB has long been chronically underfunded and that without adequate 
funding and political support its capacity to discharge its education and complaint 
handling functions will be seriously limited and restrained. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis makes an original contribution by helping to fill in the 
significant gaps in our knowledge about the operation of Part 4B and how effective the 
ADB and Tribunal responses to it have been in meeting its objectives.  It therefore 
offers a more complete picture of the operation of Part 4B by evaluating not just how it 
was applied by the Tribunal but also how it was applied by the ADB through its 
education and complaint handling functions; and by considering the effect of this for 
complainants, respondents, workers and employers in NSW. It is argued that adequately 
funded discrimination agencies such as the ADB, through their education and complaint 
functions, have a crucial role to encourage employers to comply with the law and to 
prevent discrimination; to empower worker–carers to achieve reasonable 
accommodation; and to provide a relatively informal, accessible ‘problem-solving’ 
complaint mechanism.
17
  All of which may have a broader normative impact in 
preventing carers’ discrimination, challenging ideal worker norms, and normalising 
flexibility at the workplace level, thereby meeting the social policy objectives, and 
contributing to greater social and economic equality and well-being for carers, 
especially women, and their families.  Law reform and other recommendations are also 
suggested in relation to both the Tribunal and the ADB in order to ensure a more 
purposive application of Part 4B and to make the enforcement process more accessible 
for worker–carers.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
17
 Sturm, above  n 3. 
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Appendix A: Complaint-Handling Statutory Provisions and 
Conciliation Agreement 
 
Figure A1: Key Statutory Complaint-Handling Provisions under Part 9 Division 2 
of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) 
Stages in the Complaint Process and Statutory Provisions 
 
Lodgement and Making of Complaints – Formal Requirements  
 
 
Complaints may be lodged by individuals; ‘representative complaints’ (groups of individuals); 
representative bodies’ (a body that represents the interests and welfare of a group); parents or 
guardians; and an agent such as a solicitor to lodge on behalf of the above [S87, s87A-s87C] 
 
A complaint ‘as made, need not demonstrate a prima facie case’ [s89(2)]. It must be in writing, 
but there is no prescribed form [s89(1)], (although in practice the ADB provides a widely used 
standard complaint form) and the ADB may assist a person to make a complaint [s88A]   
 
Acceptance of a Complaint for Investigation  
 
 
The President must first decide whether to accept a complaint for investigation or decline a 
complaint at lodgement [S89B.]  The President can decline a complaint, in whole or in part, if: 
 The conduct complained of could not amount to a contravention of the AD Act.  For 
example, where the conduct relates to a ground not covered by the AD Act 
[S89B(2)(a)]; or  
 The complaint is lodged out of time that is where the conduct complained of occurred 
more than 12 months before the complaint is lodged [S89B(2)(b)]   
 
In practice, although not set out in the AD Act the President has a discretion to accept a 
complaint or part of a complaint out of time, after taking into account the reasons why the 
complaint was lodged late and any prejudice to the parties. (See Shrayer v Anti-Discrimination 
ADB of NSW [2008] NSWSC 1036 [18])  
 
A decision under S89B(2) cannot be reviewed by the Tribunal [s89B(4)] (See Wecker v The 
Delegate (the decision maker) to the President (Mr S Kerkyashrian) of the NSW Anti-
Discrimination Board [2014] NSWSC 386)   
 
Investigation of Complaints 
 
 
Once a complaint is accepted under s89B the President must investigate it and give written 
updates to the parties every 90 days. There is no statutory time limit within which a complaint 
must be investigated or conciliation attempted [s90, s90C].  A complaint can be amended at any 
stage before it is resolved, finalised, terminated or withdrawn [s91(c] 
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The President has power to compel the supply of relevant information and documents from 
parties to a complaint, and third parties.  Failure to comply without reasonable excuse is an 
offence subject to civil penalties and the President may also refer the complaint to the Tribunal 
[s90B]  
 
Conciliation Conferences, Settlement and Enforcement of Conciliation Agreements 
  
 
The President may at any stage after acceptance of a complaint endeavour to resolve it by 
conciliation and may serve a notice requiring parties to attend conciliation for the purposes of 
trying to resolve the complaint.  Conciliation is not defined in the legislation.  There is a penalty 
for non-compliance with a notice [s91A] 
 
There is no right to representation, including legal representation, at the conciliation conference 
except with leave of the President [s91B] 
 
Evidence of anything said or done in the conciliation proceedings is not admissible in any 
subsequent proceedings at the Tribunal [s91A(4)]   
 
If an agreement is reached at the conciliation conference a party may request, within 28 days of 
the conference that a written record is prepared and signed by the parties. [s91A(5)].  (In 
practice the ADB can supply a standard conciliation agreement or can assist the parties to draft 
the agreement)  
 
If a party is of the opinion that the other party has not complied with the terms of the agreement 
it may apply to the Tribunal within 6 months of the date of the agreement to have the agreement 
registered.  The provisions are then taken to be an order of the Tribunal and can be enforced as 
such [s91A (6)-(9)].  If it is in the public interest the President may also enforce an order of the 
Tribunal [s113]   
 
President may apply for Interim Order 
 
 
The President may apply to the Tribunal for an interim order to preserve the status quo, to 
preserve the rights of the parties, or to return the parties to the circumstances they were in, 
pending determination of a complaint.  A complainant or respondent can also apply for an order 
at any time [s105] 
 
Declination of Complaints and Referral to the Tribunal at the Request of the Complainant 
  
 
At any stage of the investigation of a complaint the President may decline a complaint, or part 
of a complaint, under s92(1) if satisfied that one of the following applies:   
 The complaint is frivolous or vexatious or lacking in substance [s92(1)(a)(i)] 
 There is no contravention of the AD Act [s92(1)(a)(ii)] 
 Further action is not warranted [s92(1)(a)(iii)] 
458 
 
 Other more appropriate remedies has been, is being or should be pursued [s92(1)(a)(iv)] 
 The complaint is being, has been or should be dealt with by another person or body 
[s92(1)(a)(v)] 
 The Respondent has taken appropriate steps to remedy the conduct [s92(1)(a)(vi)] 
 It is not in the public interest to take further action [s92(1)(a)(vii)] 
 That for any other reason no further action should be taken [s92(1)(b)] 
 
The President must advise the complainant by written notice of the reasons for the declination 
and their right to the complaint referred to the Tribunal [s92(2)]  
 
The complainant then has 21 days to ask for a referral and the President must then refer it.  
[s93A(1)-(2)]   
 
Once the complaint is referred at the request of the complaint must first seek leave of the 
Tribunal before being allowed to proceed to a hearing. [s96]   
 
Other referrals to the Tribunal by the President 
 
The President may also refer a complaint where:  
 The complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation [s93C(a)] or it has been unsuccessful 
[s93C(b)] 
 The nature of the complaint requires referral [s93C(c)] 
 All parties want the complaint referred [s93C(d)] 
 A person has not provided relevant material under a s90B notice to produce [s90B(5)] 
 A complaint is unresolved after eighteen months, and a party to the complaint requests a 
referral [S93B] 
Termination of complaints: Settlement, Withdrawal and Abandonment  
 
 
Settlement or Resolution  
If at any stage the President is satisfied that the complaint has been resolved or settled by 
agreement between the parties he or she may terminate the complaint and the complainant has 
no right to then have the matter referred to the Tribunal [s92A]. (In practice, if a complaint is 
settled prior to, at or after a conciliation conference, even if a formal agreement is signed 
between the parties the complaint is still usually formally terminated by the President under 
s92A)   
 
Withdrawal of a complaint  
A complainant may withdraw a complaint at any time by giving written notice [s92B] 
 
Abandonment of a complaint  
If a complainant fails to respond to a request for documents or information or fails to give notice 
of an address or new address at which he can be contacted, the President may serve a notice 
giving the complainant 28 days to respond. If no response is received the complaint will be 
taken to be abandoned. In certain circumstances a complainant may be able revive their 
complaint within 12 months [s92C]   
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Figure A2: The ADB’s Pro Forma Conciliation Agreement Standard Terms 
Conciliation Agreement  
  
I 
(the Complainant) 
 
and  
 
(the Respondent)  
 
 
Agree to settle                                          ’s              complaint of carers’ responsibilities 
discrimination under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 as follows: 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. Compliance by both parties with the terms of this Agreement will mean the complaint 
is settled.  This means that no further action will be taken in regard to this complaint by 
either party. 
 
4. Both parties will keep the terms of this Agreement and preceding correspondence and 
negotiations concerning the complaint confidential to the extent that is necessary under 
the law. 
 
5                              Does not admit to unlawfully discriminating against                        . 
 
Signed and dated by the parties  
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Appendix B: Table of Complaints Heard at the Tribunal 2001-2011 
 
Table B: Summary Table of Carers’ Cases Heard by the NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal 2001–2011 in Chronological Order 
Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
Gardiner v 
New South 
Wales 
WorkCover 
Authority 
[2003] 
CR complaint 
dismissed 
 
Mother 
with 
school-
age 
children  
Relocation of 
office and a 
requirement to 
spend a number of 
days at the new 
location 
Indirect: 
 
Requirement to 
work at a particular 
location 
 
Ms Gardiner argued that the relocation of her place of work and 
the requirement that she work at that site for part of the week 
amounted to indirect carers’ responsibility. She was still employed 
and was therefore seeking an accommodation of her 
responsibilities.  
 
The case in effect turned on the issue of whether the respondent’s 
conduct was reasonable. It was found that on the facts the 
respondent had not acted unreasonably and that the relocation was 
more ‘efficient and effective’ ‘logical and understandable from a 
management point of view’ (paras 67–8). It was also noted that 
the respondent had also tried to accommodate the complainant.  
 
Gardiner v 
WorkCover 
No 2 [2004]  
 
Complainant Appealed.  Appeal dismissed.  
Reddy v. 
International 
Cargo 
Express 
[2004]  
CR complaint 
substantiated 
.Damages of 
$15,000 for 
non-economic 
loss for the 
stress and 
humiliation, 
Mother 
return to 
work 
after 
maternity 
leave 
Request for part-
time work after 
maternity leave 
denied 
Indirect:  
 
Requirement to 
work full-time and 
refusal of part-time 
work 
Ms Reddy was a section manager having worked for the 
respondent for five years. She argued that her employer insisted 
that she return to work full-time after maternity leave, refused her 
request for part-time work, and did not consider any of the options 
she put forward. She did not return to work.  
 
The Tribunal found the employer had discriminated against 
Ms Reddy on the ground of her carers’ responsibilities because 
  
 
4
6
2
 
Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
and $1,385 for 
loss of income, 
plus some 
costs. A claim 
for aggravated 
damages was 
denied 
 
the employer had ‘failed to give proper and full consideration to 
whether Ms Reddy could perform her role on a part-time basis 
either under the model she put forward or some variation thereof’ 
(para 89). 
Tleyji v The 
Travelspirit 
Group Pty 
Ltd [2005]  
CR complaint 
substantiated 
(Note: 
Awarded 
$5,000 for non-
economic loss 
but in relation 
to a race 
discrimination 
component of 
the complaint 
There was no 
claim for 
damages by the 
complainant 
for the carers’ 
component) 
Mother 
return to 
work 
after 
maternity 
leave 
Request for part-
time work after 
maternity leave 
denied, and inter 
alia faced a hostile 
work environment 
on return to work 
and terms and 
conditions changed 
Direct and indirect: 
 
Less favourable 
treatment on return 
from maternity 
leave  
 
Requirement to 
work full-
time/refusal of part-
time work 
Ms Tleyji worked as a travel agent and alleged that the employer 
refused to allow her to return to part-time work in her pre-leave 
position. She was offered the option of working three days a week 
in a more distant office and at a lower level. She argued that she 
was also treated less favourably on her return.  
 
The Tribunal found that she was not treated less favourably 
because of her caring responsibilities. However, the Tribunal 
found that the employer had discriminated against Ms Tleyji when 
it failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her request 
for part-time work after maternity leave. It noted ‘it is not 
necessary for the Tribunal to satisfy itself that no stone had been 
left unturned by a respondent in an evaluation of alternatives. 
Reasonable efforts do however need to be shown’ (para 105). 
 
The Tribunal found in favour of the complainant even though Ms 
Tleyji was unable to prove the disparate impact of the condition. It 
took ‘judicial notice of the fact that a substantially higher 
proportion of persons without responsibilities for infant children 
can or do comply with the requirement to work full-time’. (para 
89).  
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Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
Spencer v 
Greater 
Murray Area 
Health 
Service 
[2005] 
CR complaint 
dismissed 
$10,000 
awarded for 
victimisation 
Woman 
caring 
for 
elderly 
parents 
and adult 
sister 
Complainant had 
been working 
compressed hours 
40 hours over four-
day week to care 
for family 
members Changed 
by employer and 
required to work 
five days 
Direct and Indirect:  
 
Requirement to 
work five days 
amounted to less 
favourable 
treatment as other 
workers allowed 
flexibility and  was 
a condition or 
requirement 
 
Victimisation:  
Not allowing her to 
return to work after 
a worker’s 
compensation claim 
Ms Spencer had been working compressed hours over four days 
but was then required to return to work five days. Ms Spencer had 
a nervous breakdown.  
 
It was found that although she had been treated less favourably 
than other co-workers she could not demonstrate causation, that 
the reason for this treatment was her caring responsibilities.  
Her indirect discrimination complaint also failed because she was 
unable to show disparate impact, that a higher proportion of 
people in her workplace without the attribute as a carer could 
work a five-day week. The Tribunal did not therefore even 
consider whether the condition was reasonable. 
 
However, a complaint of victimisation was substantiated because 
it was found that she was not allowed to return to work after a 
worker’s compensation claim following her nervous breakdown 
because she had made a complaint of discrimination. She was 
awarded $10,000 for non-economic loss.  
 
Dubow v 
Attorney-
General’s 
Department 
[2005] 
 
 
 
 
 
CR complaint 
dismissed 
 
Mother 
with 
school-
age child 
Starting time 
changed and not 
allowed to work 
from home  
 
Direct and indirect:  
 
Changes amounted 
to less favourable 
treatment, and a 
condition or 
requirement. 
Ms Dubow had caring responsibilities for her 11-year-old son. 
She claimed direct and indirect discrimination because of the 
hours she was required to work, and because she was no longer 
allowed to work from home. On the facts it was found that all 
relevant staff were subject to the same working conditions, 
including start times, whether they had carers’ responsibilities or 
not, so there was no less favourable treatment. In relation to 
indirect discrimination it was found that the employer had acted 
reasonably and had tried to accommodate her needs by shifting the 
rosters to suit her. 
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Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
Stokes v 
Serco 
Sodexho 
Defence 
Services Pty 
Ltd [2006]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carers’ 
responsibility 
complaint 
dismissed 
 
Single 
parent 
mother 
with 
school-
age child 
Roster changes that 
prevented her from 
taking her child to 
school 
Direct and indirect: 
 
New roster changes 
amounted to less 
favourable 
treatment and a 
condition or 
requirement 
 
Ms Stokes was a single parent with custody of a 10-year-old 
daughter and was employed as a security guard with the 
respondent, where she worked a permanent roster of 12-hour 
shifts, day and night, over seven days, which suited her family 
responsibilities. Ms Stokes claimed that the roster was changed to 
all day shifts Monday to Friday, which meant that she could not 
take her daughter to school. The Tribunal found that the roster 
changes were made not because of her carers’ responsibilities but 
because of performance issues. 
 
The Tribunal found that Ms Stokes had not been able to 
demonstrate disparate impact and it did not exercise judicial 
notice as in Tleyji because of a lack of statistical evidence.  On the 
facts it was found that the respondent had acted reasonably in 
making the roster changes, and was only made aware that the 
roster changes had caused difficulties to Ms Stokes after she had 
lodged a complaint with the ADB. It then immediately took steps 
to accommodate her.  
Correy v St 
Joseph’s 
Hospital Ltd 
[2007] No 1 
 
CR and 
victimisation 
substantiated  
$26,121 
awarded for 
economic loss  
Mother 
return to 
work 
after 
maternity 
leave 
Employer agreed 
to request for 
reduced hours, but 
did not return to 
her pre-maternity 
leave position. She 
was instead 
rostered to work in 
a unit she had 
expressly asked not 
to work in.  
Direct:  
 
The refusal to 
return her to her 
pre-maternity 
position amounted 
to constructive 
dismissal.  
 
Victimisation: 
Rostering  
Ms Correy complained that on her returned from maternity leave 
she was not returned to her pre-maternity leave position where she 
had worked for almost a decade, because the respondent argued 
that her position was not in fact attached to a particular unit. She 
did not return to work. A complaint was lodged on the ground of 
direct discrimination and also victimisation. It was alleged that 
after she complained she was rostered onto the psychiatric unit 
where she had specifically asked not to work for health reasons.  
 
The Tribunal found in favour of the complainant on both grounds 
and she was awarded $26,121.  
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Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
St Joseph’s 
Hospital Ltd 
v Correy 
[2008] No 2  
Respondent appealed.  
The Appeal Panel: 
Set aside the Tribunals findings of carers’ discrimination, and then 
dismissed the complaint.  
Set aside the Tribunal’s finding in relation to victimisation, and then 
matter remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration 
 
The carers’ discrimination complaint was dismissed after the 
Appeal Panel applied a very narrow and conservative 
interpretation of the test for direct discrimination following the 
High Court in Purvis. The award of damages was overturned and 
the victimisation complaint was remitted back for reconsideration. 
Correy v St 
Joseph’s 
Hospital Ltd 
[2009] No 3 
Victimisation complaint substantiated and awarded $23,665 for lost 
income 
The Tribunal found that Ms Correy had been victimised when she 
was rostered to return to the psychiatric unit she had specifically 
asked not to work in for nine out of 10 shifts. She was awarded 
damages of $23,665 for economic loss arising from victimisation. 
St Joseph’s 
Hospital Ltd 
v Correy 
[2009] No 4 
Respondent appealed.  
The Appeal Panel Upheld the Victimisation complaint. 
However, the order to pay compensation was set aside because of a 
legal technicality as to the pleading of damages 
 
The complainant therefore received nothing 
 
The Appeal Panel upheld the finding that she had been victimised 
by being rostered in the psychiatric unit. However, it overturned 
the award of damages, on the grounds of causation, because it was 
found that she had not suffered any economic loss as a result of 
the victimisation. 
 
Although Ms Correy had initially sought damages for non-
economic loss in the first hearing, ‘for the anxiety and disruption 
caused to her life by the acts of victimisation’, when the matter 
was remitted back for the victimisation complaint she had sought 
only damages for economic loss. The Appeal Panel therefore 
found that ‘as no claim was made for any other remedy, no 
remedy has been ordered’. 
 
Ms Correy was found to have been discriminated against on the 
grounds of victimisation, but received nothing because her legal 
team had not pleaded a claim for damages for non-economic loss. 
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Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
Merrick v 
Wallace 
Bishop Pty 
Ltd [2008]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR complaint 
dismissed 
 
Mother 
of adult 
child 
Refused breaks to 
give adult daughter 
medical treatment 
and roster changed 
to prevent her 
doing so in the 
future 
Denial of access to 
carers’ leave 
Direct:  
Denied break, 
access to leave; and 
rosters changed. 
 
Victimisation: 
This also amounted 
to victimisation. 
Ms Merrick had caring responsibilities to provide her adult 
daughter with drug injections at a specific time of the day. She 
alleged she was denied a break to inject her daughter; her rosters 
were then changed, which also amounted to victimisation; and 
then she was denied carers’ leave.  
 
On the facts there was some doubt as to the complainant’s 
credibility. The evidence was that there had been some concerns 
as to Ms Merrick’s work performance and that the discrimination 
complaint had been made to receive compensation or to exert 
pressure on the respondent to maintain her position. It was found 
that the respondent had not treated her less favourably and on the 
contrary was sympathetic, and had tried to accommodate her 
needs by allowing her breaks, and providing her with access to 
carers’ leave.  All of the grounds of complaint were dismissed as 
unsubstantiated.  
 
Monroe v 
Moore [2010]  
CR complaint 
dismissed 
Awarded 
$4,650 for 
victimisation 
Man 
caring 
for his 
same-
sex 
partner 
Not clear Not clear.  
 
Victimisation: 
Not being paid 
amounted to 
victimisation  
Mr Monroe was dismissed following a series of workplace 
conflicts. It was not clear on the facts how the complaint 
amounted to carers’ discrimination and on the facts it was found 
that there had been no carers’ discrimination. The case appears to 
have been mainly a complaint in relation to HIV and disability 
discrimination. Compensation of $4,650 was awarded for 
victimisation in relation to late payment of wages, which had led 
to Mr Monroe being unable to purchase medication for his 
partner.  
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Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
ACE v State 
of NSW 
(TAFE 
Commission 
and DET) 
[2010]  
CR complaint 
dismissed 
 
Woman 
caring 
for 
elderly 
parents 
Refused a request 
to work part-time 
Direct and indirect:  
Refusal of request 
to work part-time 
amounted to less 
favourable 
treatment because 
other workers 
allowed to work 
part-time. 
 
Denial of request 
amounted to a 
condition or 
requirement to work 
full-time.  
The complainant alleged that she was not allowed to work part-
time so that she could look after her elderly parents. In this case, 
the Tribunal was unconvinced by the complainant’s honesty or 
credit, and it was found that she had no carers’ responsibilities. 
Even though the complainant did not meet this threshold issue, the 
Tribunal did consider the application of the direct and indirect 
discrimination tests, and found that she was not able to satisfy any 
element of either. 
 
In particular, she was not treated less favourably than her co-
workers, there was no requirement for her to work full- time, she 
was not able to show a disparate impact and the Tribunal refused 
to exercise judicial notice as in Tleyji. Moreover, it was found that 
the employer had acted reasonably.  
ACE v State 
of NSW 
(TAFE 
Commission 
and DET) 
[2011] No 2  
Complainant appealed: Appeal Dismissed. 
Harms v 
Sydney South 
West Area 
Health 
Service 
[2010] 
 
 
 
CR complaint 
dismissed 
 
Husband 
caring 
for 
former 
wife 
Denial of flexible 
rostering 
Direct and Indirect: 
 
Treated less 
favourably and 
condition or 
requirement to 
comply with rosters 
Mr Harms claimed he was denied rostered shifts that would 
enable him to care for his ex-wife, who had cancer, and that this 
amounted to both direct and indirect discrimination. It was found 
that there was no less favourable treatment on the evidence. In 
relation to indirect discrimination, the respondent had acted 
reasonably and Mr Harms was able to comply with the roster.  
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Case 
Outcome/ 
Remedy 
Nature 
of CR 
Alleged 
Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Direct or Indirect 
as Framed at the 
Tribunal  
Summary of Complaint and Reasons for Decision 
Chacon v 
Rondo 
Building 
Services 
[2011] 
CR complaint 
dismissed 
 
Mother 
caring 
for 
teenage 
son 
Hours of work 
changed from 
6.30am–4pm to 
8.30am–5pm  
Indirect:  
 
Condition or 
requirement to work 
8.30am–5pm  
Ms Chacon was an engineer and was a single parent of a son at 
high school. She alleged that her start and finish times were 
changed. The Tribunal found that on the facts there was no 
‘requirement’ that the complainant start and finish work at a 
certain time. Even if there had been such a requirement it would 
have been a reasonable one because Ms Chacon’s job required her 
to liaise with sales representatives and be on hand to answer 
queries.  The Tribunal also found that there was no evidence of, 
and Ms Chacon had not demonstrated, disparate impact.  
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Appendix C: Data Collection and Coding Sheet 
Figure C: Data Collection and Coding Sheet 
DATA 
 
CODING/EXPLANATION 
 
FILE DETAILS  
Research no RN# 
ADB File no To be deleted per ethics once recorded on secure 
master copy for verification 
ADB Complaint Form used? Yes/No 
Prior telephone enquiry noted Yes/No 
Case study? Yes/No, if yes why  
 
COMPLAINT DETAILS 
Gender or Non-Individual  F/M, if non-individual explain. 
Employment Status  
 
FT or PT  It should be noted that there is also a certain 
amount of imprecision about what full-time or part-
time means.
1
 For the purposes of the coding of the 520 
complaints, if a party reported that they were 
employed with the respondent on a full–or part–time 
basis this was coded accordingly.  Where details of the 
hours worked was available the researcher made an 
inference that, in the absence of express information 
from the parties, that complainants who appeared to 
usually working 35 hours per week or more with the 
respondent were coded as full-time, and less than that 
were coded as part-time. 
 Employee Permanent ongoing – as reported 
by the the parties to a complaint or recorded 
by the ADB 
 Employee non-ongoing – including casual 
employees
2
 (long or short term), or fixed 
term employment contracts.  as reported by 
the the parties to a complaint or recorded by 
the ADB 
 Job applicant  
 Trainee/qualifying  
 Partner  
 Not clear 
 Other  
 
Occupation (ANZSCO) * 
 
 
 Managers (generally across all industry 
groups and sectors) 
 Professional (generally across all industry 
groups and sectors) 
 Technicians and trade workers (incl 
cook/food prep, hairdressers) 
                                                 
1
 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia December 2013 (2014, Catalogue No 6202.0), 
6 which noted that the ABS in its Labour Force Surveys (LFS) defines part-time employed persons as those 
who usually work less than 35 hours per week, and actually worked less than 35 hours in the survey 
reference week in all of their jobs. Full-time employed persons are defined as those who usually work 35 
hours or more per week, regardless of how many hours they actually worked, or those who actually worked 
35 hours or more in the reference week despite usually working less than 35 hours per week 
2
 The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines casuals as ‘employees (excluding owner managers of 
incorporated enterprises) who are not entitled to paid sick or holiday leave’. Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Forms of Employment, Australia, November 2011 (Catalogue No 6359.0, 2012).  
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 Community and personal service (includes 
police/maintaining public order, and 
protective services, health and welfare 
support workers, childcare, welfare, sell and 
serving food, beauty therapist, travel/tourism, 
sports coach) 
 Clerical and admin workers (incl office 
workers, PA, receptionists etc) 
 Sales workers (sales assistants, sales reps, 
sales support workers) 
 Machine operators and drivers (includes 
machine/plant operator, drivers) 
 Labourers (incl cleaners, factory process 
workers, shelf stackers etc) 
 Not Clear 
 
Relationship at time of Complaint  Applicant, current, former 
 
Length of employment 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT DETAILS 
Industry group (ANZSIC)*  Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
 Mining 
 Manufacturing 
 Electricity, Gas, Water, Waste 
 Construction 
 Wholesale Trade 
 Retail Trade 
 Accommodation, and food services  
 Transport, postal and warehousing 
 Information Media and telecommunication 
Services 
 Finance & Insurance 
 Rental, hiring and real estate services  
 Administration and Support Services 
 Professional, scientific and technical 
 Public Administration and safety 
 Education and training 
 Health care and Social Assistance 
 Arts and Recreational Services 
 Other Services 
 Insufficient details on file 
 
The Respondent by Sector*  Public (state, or local government department, agency, 
corporation or other entity) 
Not for profit (charity or not for profit status clear)  
Private  
 
‘Repeat players’ or respondents with multiple 
complaints against them
3
 
Note in de-identified Form 
THE COMPLAINT 
Nature of Responsibility 
 
Family relationship specify  
The complaints were coded into nine groups by 
                                                 
3
 See Beth Gaze and Rosemary Hunter, Enforcing Human Rights and Evaluation of the New Regime 
(Themis 2010) 74, 16–18.  
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gender and the nature of the caring relationship, 
depending upon whether the care was provided for 
children or for adults, rather than by any broader 
definition or detail about the precise nature of care 
provided. 
 
In order to interrogate whether different categories of 
carer were subject to different types of discriminatory 
conduct the writer decided to code the complaints 
involving care for children with reference to whether 
the complainant was a parent, by gender of the parent, 
and whether the conduct complained of related to the 
time around the birth of a baby.  
 
It should be noted that common accepted terms such 
as ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are used, as they were most 
recently by the Australian Human Rights Commission 
in the 2014 Supporting Working Parents Report. As 
this Report also finds, mothers in particular do suffer 
from discrimination which is diretly related to 
pregnancy and/or around the birth of a baby, and/or 
around the return to work.  The empirical review of 
the carers’ complaints also supports these findings and 
it was therefore it was therefore crucial that the 
category of mothers with responsibilities to care for a 
baby at or around the time of the birth was coded 
specifically in the contextof the 520 complaints, to 
take this type of discriminatory conduct into account. 
 
It must be emphasised that the following coding 
categories are not intended to exclude same sex 
parents, foster parents or adoptive parents, rather the 
catgory of ‘mother’ represents a female parent, and 
the category ‘father’ respresents a male parent.  It will 
also be noted that neither were complaints coded on 
the basis of whether the complainant was the birth 
mother, or primary care giver in the household.  
1. Mothers—maternity related, involved 
complaints from female parents related to 
issues that occurred during pregnancy, and/or 
around the time of the birth of a baby, and/or 
or involving a return to work after the birth 
of a baby, which occasionally stretched to up 
to two years post birth, but after that date was 
no longer coded as maternity related.  It is 
important to note that while many 
complainants explained or it was clear from 
the file that they were the birth mother, this is 
not to suggest that complainants inthis 
category were birth mothers only, or indeed 
the primamry carer; 
2. Mothers—not maternity related 
(‘mothers/NMR’), covering all other 
complaints from female parents not maternity 
related; 
3. Female carer for children—other parental 
type responsibilities, where it was specified 
by the complainant that the care was 
provided to child relatives of the family by a 
grandparent, or a guardian.  These complaints 
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did not state that they were foster or adopted 
parents;   
4. Female carer for adult family members; 
5. Fathers covering all complaints male 
parents; 
6. Male carer for children—other parental type 
responsibilities (defined as for female carer 
above); 
7. Male carer for adult family members; 
8. Male carer—relationship not identified; 
9. Other—non-individual complainant. 
 
‘Sandwich’ carer 4 
Concurrent caring responsibilities for children, but in 
addition also responsibility for an adult family 
member, who was not also their child: 
 Coded as relating to care for a child. 
 Additionally coded as a ‘sandwich’ carer 
 
Other Parental Issue 
Eg. sole Parent or custody, residency issue 
 
Current, past, future, presumed 
 
 
  
 
Multiple complaints on ground of CR  
 
 
 
 
May not correspond with ADB ‘counting’ 
* Common sense approach. For the purposes of this 
research, such multiple files opened at lodgement 
were counted as one complaint, unless it was clear 
that they related to separate respondents or separate 
incidents of discrimination.  
 
Summary of complaint 
 
Case Study? Separate Notes 
Other Complaints opened on other grounds 
*If multiple complaints on same ground eg 
victimisation count only once  
 Sex including pregnancy 
 Sexual Harassment 
 Disability  
 Homosexuality 
 Age 
 Race 
 Marital Status  
 Victimisation 
 Other  
 
Discriminatory Conduct  
*Multiple Response Possible  
 Part-time/ job share  
 Rostering, shifts, start/finish or other 
flexibility issue relating to hours of work 
denied? 
 Location - transfer/tele-work 
 Leave  
 Hostile environment/other detriment 
 Job selection 
 Training 
                                                 
4
 The term is used by Natalie Skinner, Clare Hutchinson and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Work, Life 
and Care in 2012—The Australian Work and Life Index (Centre for Work + Life, University of South 
Australia, 2012) 8–9, 43–4. 
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 Benefits 
 Promotion 
 Restructure 
 Redundancy 
 Dismissal 
 Resignation/constructive dismissal 
 Not Clear  
 
Accommodation sought?  
 
Yes/No: Details 
 
*A common sense approach must be taken to this 
aspect of coding because complainants sometimes 
listed many remedies in their complaint that they did 
not appear to really want. On other occasions, 
complainants did genuinely want an accommodation 
at the outset but then changed their minds as to what 
they wanted to resolve the complaint as the complaint 
process progressed. 
 
If by the time of a conciliation conference or final 
settlement negotiation, the complainant clearly no 
longer wished to be accommodated, this was coded 
accordingly, that the complainant was not seeking an 
accommodation.  
 
 
Systemic remedy sought? Yes/No: Details: 
 
REPRESENTATION 
  
Type of Representation  
 
Complainants 
 Solicitor private practice 
 Community legal centre 
 Pro bono  
 Legal Aid 
 Trade Union 
 Self-represented throughout  
Respondents  
 Legal in house or external representation 
 Employer Association or Industry Group  
 Self-represented throughout  
 
 
OUTCOME 
  
Outcome reason 
 
 Not accepted at lodgement s89B 
 Settled s92A 
 Withdrawn s92B 
 Abandoned s92c 
 Declined s92  
 Referred to Tribunal 93A-93C 
 
SETTLEMENT METHOD 
 
Settlement Method/stage s92A 
 
Settled without a conciliation conference  
 Minimal Telephone Advice to one or both 
parties. 
 Facilitating minimal negotiation and 
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resolution with parties by phone.  
 Facilitating intensive negotiation and 
resolutions with parties by phone.  
 Facilitating private settlement between the 
parties, during investigation/conciliation  
 
Settled at or after a conciliation conference 
 Settled at conference or shortly after   
 Settled after Conference  
 Not clear whether settled at or after  
 
 
REMEDY/REMEDIES  
*Multiple Response possible 
 
Remedy involving Accommodation  
 
 
 Rostering/shifts/ Start/finish 
 Part-time/job share  
 Access to leave 
 Transfer or re-location 
 Tele-work 
 Access to training  
 HR contact appointed as facilitator  
 Access to promotion 
 Access to overtime 
 Access to car 
 Credit of leave  
 Reinstatement 
 Other  
 
Financial Compensation  $0-2,5000 
 $2,501-  
  5000 
 $5,001- $10,000 
 $10,001-15,000 
 $15,001-20,000 
 $20,001-30,000 
 $30,001-40,000 
 $40,001-50,000 
 $50,000+  
 Not specified 
 Donation to charity  
 Retraining costs 
 
Other Remedy   Apology 
 Statement of Service/Reference 
 Record amended/ Removed 
 Supervisor, or  line manager removed or 
disciplined 
 Satisfied with Respondent’ explanation  
 Retraining costs 
 ADB writes to advise as to law  
 Other  
Potentially Systemic remedy details 
 
 
 
 
 
 Policy: Introduction, Review or Changes 
 Policy and Training 
 Training  
 Change to application form  
 Other  
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COMPLAINT PROCESS DETAILS 
 
Duration   <1 month 
 1-3 
 4-6 
 7-12 
 13-17 
 18+ 
 
Calculation of Duration  
Time was calculated from the date a complaint was 
lodged, up until date one of four events occurred 
either: 
 Decision made by the ADB to either not 
accept a complaint for investigation or 
decline a complaint 
 Agreement had been reached between/ 
settled; 
 Withdrawn by the complainant or taken to be 
abandoned;  
 Referred to the Tribunal for hearing 
 
Note Backlog 
 
Date lodged  
Last Action  
Processing duration  
OTHER DETAILS  
 
 
 
* Notes for Data Collection and Coding  
 
The Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry Classification Codes (‘ANZSIC’) and the 
Standard Classification of Occupations (‘ANZSCO’) 
For the purposes of coding, by industry and occupation, the Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Industry Classification Codes (‘ANZSIC’) and the Standard Classification of Occupations 
(‘ANZSCO’) were used.5 These provide a uniform method to code the occupations of 
complainants and the industry groups in which they worked, and have also been used in other 
empirical studies of discrimination complaints.
 6
   
                                                 
5
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) 
(Catalogue No 1292.0, 2006 Revision 2.0); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian and New Zealand 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO) (Catalogue No 1220.0, Version 1.2, 2013).  
6
 These standard classifications have also been used in other empirical studies of discrimination complaints 
in Australia. See, for example, the following, which used earlier versions of either or both of the standards in 
relation to empirical studies of sex discrimination or sexual harassment: Rosemary Hunter and Alice 
Leonard, ‘The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases’ (Working Paper No 8, Centre for 
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To fully understand where the carers’ complainants worked, it is worth noting that the ANZSIC 
and ANZSCO classifications provide sometimes very broad umbrella groupings, and sometimes 
encompass very broad and divergent workplaces, occupations and businesses across public, 
private and not for profit sectors.  
 
For example, complaints brought under the Public Administration and Safety ANZSIC group 
cover carers’ complaints across a very broad array of respondents in the public sector in NSW, in 
various government departments, at state or local government level
7
  including general clerical and 
support work but also includes the administration of justice, and public safety services such as 
police, corrections service, and fire and emergency services. It also covers private sector providers 
of these services.  
 
Similarly, the actual type of work carried out by the complainants under each of the ANZSCO 
groups can be extremely divergent. For example complaints from Community and Personal 
Service workers include hospitality workers, protective service workers, personal service workers, 
and health and welfare support workers (health professionals such as doctors and nurses 
professionals are classified as Professionals). So in practice this category covered carers’ 
complaints from such diverse occupations as police officers, paramedics, security officers, 
corrections workers, care workers, security guards, flight attendants and ground staff, beauty 
therapists, travel agents and food and beverage workers such as bar, café and club service 
providers. 
 
Sector: Public, Private and Not For Profit Respondents 
This Codes the sector of the respondent employer not the sector which the complainant worked in. 
For example, in particular, public sector agencies sometimes utilised private sector contractors. 
For example, if the complainant was employed by a private security service provider working at a 
public hospital or other government department, the respondent is coded as a private sector 
respondent. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Employment and Labour Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, 1995); Sara 
Charlesworth, ‘Managing Work and Family in the “Shadow” of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2005) 23(1) Law 
in Context 88; Sara Charlesworth, Claiming Discrimination: Complaints of Sex and Gender Discrimination 
in Employment under the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (The Centre for Applied Social Research, 
RMIT University, 2008); Charlesworth, Sara, Paula McDonald, Anthea Worley, Tina Graham and Alissa 
Lykinna, Formal Complaints of Workplace Sexual Harassment Lodged with the Australian Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunities Commissions 1 July 2009–31 December 2009 (Centre for Work + Life, University 
of South Australia, 2012).  
7
 Commonwealth employees defence forces working in this industry group cannot usually making 
discrimination complaints to state discrimination bodies. None of the carers’ complainants worked for the 
Commonwealth or any of its entities.  
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Australian Bureau of Statistics defines the public sector as including local, state and 
Commonwealth government agencies, departments and corporations. The ABS classifies all other 
employment as the private sector. For the purposes of this project where it is clear that a 
respondent operates in the not for profit or charity sector the complaints is coded ‘Not for Profit’
8
. 
 
Rounding of statistics  
Complaints statistics maybe rounded in order to make the data easier to understand and readily 
comparable.  As a result small discrepancies may occur between sums of the component items and 
totals, in the tables and figures presented.  Generally the figures are used to summarise the data in 
percentage terms, while the tables present a more detailed quantitative breakdown of the numbers 
of complaints lodged in relation to the particular issue.   
 
Confidentiality HREC and de-ientification and Research Numbers (RN#) 
It should also be re-iterated that the Human Research Ethics Protocol and a confidentiality 
agreement with the ADB, together provided that the identity of the parties to the complaints must 
remain confidential
.9
  Accordingly, the writer has endeavoured to ensure that the parties to a 
complaint cannot be identified in relation to any individual complaint. In particular, 
employers/respondents are referred to in the context of industry and occupation groups, and 
general categories within this group.  Complaints were allocated a sequential Research Number 
(RN#) at the time of the data collection and no personal identifying information was collected at 
any stage. Complainants are referred to on the basis of RN# only and for the purposes of 
complaint summaries randomly selected names are used.  
  
                                                 
8
 ABS, Employee Earnings and Hours Australia, May 2012 (2012 Catalogue No 6306.0) 
9
 See Chapter 2, at 2.6, which outlines the privacy, confidentiality and ethics considerations involved in the 
research process. 
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Appendix D: Complaints Data Tables 
 
LIST OF DATA TABLES  
 
Table D1:  Complainants’ Caring Relationships, and Gender as a % of All Complaints 
 
Table D2: Complaints Involving Caring for Adults by % of Gender and All Complaints  
 
Table D3:  Caring for Adult Family Members Only by % of Gender and All Complaints 
 
Table D4:  ‘Sandwich’ Complainants by % of Carer and Additional Adult Caring Relationship 
 
Table D5:  Employment Contract Status as % of Gender, Caring Relationship and All Complaints   
 
Table D6:  Full and Part-time Employment Status of Complainants as % of Gender, Caring 
Relationship and all Complaints   
 
Table D7: Employment Status (Current, Former or Job Applicant) at Time of Lodgement as % by 
Gender, Caring Relationship and all Complaints   
 
Table D8:  Complainants and Multiple Grounds of Discrimination 
 
Table D9:  Complainants by Occupation and as % by Gender  
 
Table D10:  Complainants by Occupation and as % by Gender and Sector 
 
Table D11:  Respondents by Industry and as a % by Gender of Complainants    
 
Table D12:  Complaints by Respondent Industry, Sector and Gender of Complainants  
 
Table D13:  Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as % by Gender  
 
Table D14:  Female Complainants Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as % by Caring Responsibility  
 
Table D15: Male Complainants Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as % by Caring Responsibility 
 
Table D16: Duration of Complaints Settled and Not Settled by Caring Responsibility. 
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Table D1: Complainants’ Caring Relationships, and Gender as a % of All 
Complaints 
Caring relationships N  % 520 complaints   
Mothers - Maternity related  153 29.4 
Mothers  Non-Maternity Related (NMR) 201 38.7 
Female carer - other parental  8 1.5 
Female carer - adult  20 3.8 
Female total   382 73.4 
Fathers  93 17.9 
Male carer -other parental 2 0.3 
Male carer - adult  34 6.5 
Male carer - relationship not identified  6 1.2 
Male Total  135 25.9 
Non individual (all related to maternity or care for children) 3  0.6 
 
 
Table D2: Complainants Involving Care for Adults by % of Gender and All 
Complaints 
Caring 
Relationship  
Female Complainant  Male Complainant   Total 
N % 382  N % 135  N  % 520   
Adult family 
members  
20  5.2 34  25.1 54  10.4 
‘Sandwich’ 
carers  
14 3.7 17 12.6 31 6.0 
Total  34 8.9 51 37.8  85  16.3 
 
 
Table D3: Complainants Caring for Adult Family Members Only by % of Gender 
and All Complaints 
Caring Relationship  Female 
Complainant  
 
Male 
Complainant  
 
Total  
N % 382  
 
N % 135 N % 520  
Spouse or partner caring for spouse  6 1.6 14 10.4 20 3.9 
Caring for parents/parents in law * 11 2.9 18  13.3 29 5.6 
Sibling 2 0.5 0 0.0 2 0.4 
Grandchild caring for grandparent  0 0.0 1 0.7 1 0.2 
Elder care relationship not clear 1 0.3 0 0.0 1 0.2 
Elder care for aunt not covered under 
s49S 
0 0.0 1 0.7 1 0.2 
Total  20  5.2 34  25.2 54 10.4 
Notes 
* 1 of these complainants also reported other additional caring responsibilities for a sibling 
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Table D4: ‘Sandwich’ Complainants by % of Carer and Additional Adult Caring 
Relationship 
Family Member for 
whom care is provided  
Mothers/NMR 
Complainant  
Female  
Parental type 
Complainant   
Father Complainant  
N % 201 N % 8  Fathers  % 93  
Spouse or partner   1 0.5 0 0.0 12 13.0 
Parent/parents in law 
elder care  
8 4.0 0 0.0 5 5.4 
Multiple adult family 
members 
0 0 4 50.0 0 0.0 
Sibling 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total  10 5% 4 50 17 13% 
Notes  
Mothers/NMR, female parental type and father are the only three carer categories which identified 
concurrent sandwich responsibilities. 
 
Table D5: Employment Contract Status as % of Gender, Caring Relationship and 
All Complaints 
Gender/ 
Caring 
Relationship  
Permanent Non-ongoing Applicant Trainee Not Clear/ 
Other* 
Total   
  
N % N % N % N% % N % N 
Gender  
Female  289 75.7 44 11.5 14 3.7 4 1.0 31 8.8 382 
Male  108 11.5 4 3.0 4 3.0 1 0.7 19 14.1 135 
Non- 
individual 
1 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 66.7 3 
Caring Relationship   
Maternity 
related  
136 88.9 8 5.2 1 0.7 0 0.0 8 5.2 153 
Mothers/ 
NMR 
129 64.2 35 17.4 12 6.0 4 2.0 21 10.4 201 
Other female 
carer 
24 85.7 1 3.6 1 3.6 0 0.0 2 7.1 28 
Fathers  80 86.0 4 4.3 3 3.2 0 0.0 6 6.5 93 
Other male 
carer 
28 66.7 0 0.0 1 2.4 1 2.4 12 28.5 42 
Total  
and % of 520 
Complaints  
 
398 76.5 48 9.2 18 3.5 5 1.0 51 9.8 520 
*Other 51 complaints consisted of:  
1 partner of a firm (maternity related); 
2 not covered under Part 4B (mothers/NMR). Both complaints related to commercial arrangements not 
covered under Part 4B. One involved a franchisee and the other a commercial agreement not related to 
employment or work. In the remaining 48 complaint the status was not clear.  
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Table D6: Full and Part-time Employment Status of Complainants as % of Gender, 
Caring Relationship and all Complaints 
Gender/Caring 
Relationship  
Full- Time Part-Time  Not Clear  Applicant  Other Total   
  
N % N % N % N % N % N 
Gender 
Female  204 53.4 142 37.1 20 5.2 14 3.7 2 0.5 382 
Male  113 84.0 2 1.5 16 12.0 4 3.0 0 0.0 135 
Non- individual 3 100 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 
Caring Relationship   
Maternity related  100 65.3 49 32.0 3 2.0 1 0.65 0 0.0 153 
Mothers/NMR  86 43.0 86 43.0 15 7.5 12 6.0 2 1.0 201 
Other female carer 18 64.3 7 25.0 2 7.1 1 3.6 0 0.0 28 
Fathers  84 90.3 1 1.1 5 5.4 3 3.2 0 0.0 93 
Other male carer 29 69.0 1 2.4 11 26.1 1 2.4 0 0.0 42 
Non individual 3 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 
Total  
and % of 520 
Complaints  
 
320 61.5 144 27.7 36 6.9 18 3.5 2 1.0 520 
 
Table D7: Employment Status (Current, Former or Job Applicant) at Time of 
Lodgement as % by Gender, Caring Relationship and all Complaints 
Gender/Caring 
Relationship   
Current  
Employee 
Former  
Employee 
 
Job  
Applicant  
Other/not clear Total  
 
N  %  N  %  N  %  N% %  N 
Gender 
Female  221 57.9 145 38.0 14 3.7 2 0.5 382 
Male  93 69.0 33 24.4 4 3.0 5 3.7 135 
Other  2 67.7 1 33.3 0 0,0 0 0,0 3 
Caring Relationship  
Maternity 
related  
90  58.9 62 40.5 1 0.65 1 0.65 1 
Mothers/NMR  110 54.8 77 38.3 12 6.0 12 6.0 12 
Other female 
carer 
21 75.0 6 21.4 1 3.6 1 3.6 1 
Fathers  68 73.1 20 21.5 3 3.2 3 3.2 3 
Other male 
 Carer 
25 60.0 13 31.0 1 2.4 1 2.4 1 
Other  2 66.7 1 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
Total  
and %of 520  
316  61 179  34.4 18  3.5 1 1.3 520 
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Table D8: Complainants and Multiple Grounds of Discrimination 
Additional Ground of Complaint  Female Complainants 
 
Male Complainants  Total Complaints  
 
N % 382  N % 135  N % 520  
Sex including pregnancy 90 23.6 3 2.2 93 18.0 
Sexual Harassment 6 1.6 0 0.0 6 1.2 
Disability*  27 7.0 11 8.1 38 7.3 
Homosexuality 0 0.0 1 0.75 1 0.2 
Age* 6 1.6 4 1.0 10 1.9 
Race 6 1.6 4 1.0 10 1.9 
Marital Status  8 2.0 0 0.0 8 1.5 
Victimisation 30 7.9 24 17.8 54 10.4 
Notes: 
Some complaints made multiple complaints on one or more of the above grounds. A single complainant may 
therefore have multiple entries for each ground in this Table.  However, if a complainant made multiple 
complaints on the same ground this complainant is only counted once.   
 
*The complaints of disability and age discrimination related to the disability, or age of the complainant 
rather than a complaint by association in relation to the disability or age of the person being cared for 
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Table D9: Complainants by Occupation and as % by Gender  
ANZSCO 
 
Female Male Other  Total Complaints  
N % 382  N % 135  N % 3  N % 520 
Managers 30 7.9 9 6.7 0 0.0 39  7.5 
Professionals 60 15.7 21 15.6 0 0.0 81  15.6 
Technicians 
and Trade 
14 3.7 14 10.4 0 0.0 28  5.4 
Community 
and Personal 
Service 
79 20.7 37 27.4 2  66.7 118 22.7 
Clerical and 
Admin  
125 32.7 10 7.4 0 0.0 135  26 
Sales Workers 44 11.5 5 3.7 1 33.3 50  9.6 
Machine 
Operator and 
Drivers 
7 1.8 13 9.6 0 0.0 20  3.8 
Labourers 13 3.4 21 15.5 0 0.0 34  6.5 
Not clear 10 2.6 5 3.7 0 0.0 15  2.9 
Total  382 100 135 100 3  100 520  100 
 
 
Table D10: Complainants by Occupation and as % by Gender and Sector 
ANZCO  Female by Sector  Male by Sector  
Private  Public  NFP*  Private  Public  
N 
 
% 
382  
N % 
382 
N % 
382 
N 
 
% 135 N   % of 
135 
Managers 22 5.8 7 1.8 1 0.3 4 3.0 5 3.7 
Professionals 33 8.6 25 6.5 2 0.5 10 7.4 11 8.1 
Technicians 
and trade 
10 2.6 3 0.8 1 0.3 9 6.7 5 3.7 
Community 
and Personal 
service 
45 11.8 29 7.6 5 1.3 12 8.9 25 18.5 
Clerical and 
Admin 
89 23.2 30 7.9 6 1.6 4 3.0 6 4.4 
Sales workers 43 11.3 1 0.3 0 0.0 5 3.7 0 0.0 
Machine 
operator and 
drivers 
4 1.0 3 0.8 0 0.0 8 5.9 5 3.7 
Labourers 10 2.6 3 0.8 0 0.0 18 13.3 3 2.2 
Not clear 8 2.0 2 0.5 0 0.0 2 1.5 3 2.2 
Total by 
gender, 
sector and as 
% of 520 
complaints 
264 (51%) 103 (20%) 15 (3%) 72 (14%) 63 (12%) 
*Not for Profit 
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Table D11: Respondents by Industry and as a % by Gender of Complainants 
ANZSIC Industry 
Group  
Female 
Complaints 
Male  
Complaints 
Other 
Complaints   
Total Complaints  
  
N % 382  N % 135  N % 3  N % 520 
Agriculture  2 0.5 2 1.5 0 0.0 4 0.8 
Mining 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Manufacturing 17 4.5 16 11.9 0 0.0 33 6.3 
Electricity gas water 
and waste  
4 1.0 5 3.7 0 0.0 9 1.7 
Construction 10 2.6 2 1.5 0 0.0 12 2.3 
Wholesale trade 5 1.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.0 
Retail trade 37 9.7 6 4.4 1 33.3 44 8.5 
Accommodation and 
food service 
22 5.8 4 3.0 1 33.3 27 5.2 
Transport, postal and 
warehousing 
28 7.3 17 12.6 1 33.3 46 8.8 
IT, Media, and 
telecommunication  
27 7.0 6 4.4 0 0.0 33 6.3 
Finance/insurance 30 7.9 7 5.2 0 0.0 37 7.1 
Rental, hiring and real 
estate 
4 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 0.8 
Professional, scientific 
technical  
17 4.5 1 0.7 0 0.0 18 3.5 
Public Administration 
and Safety 
56 14.7 31 23.0 0 0.0 87 16.7 
Administrative and 
Support Services 
19 5.0 2 1.5 0 0.0 21 4.0 
Education and training 20 5.2 12 8.9 0 0.0 32 6.2 
Health care and social 
assistance 
67 17.5 19 14.0 0 0.0 86 16.5 
Arts and recreation 8 2.0 3 2.2 0 0.0 11 2.1 
Other Services 9 2.4 2 1.5 0 0.0 11 2.1 
Totals 382 100 135 100 3 100 520 100 
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Table D12: Complaints by Respondent Industry, Sector and Gender of 
Complainants 
ANZSIC  
industry  Group  
Number of Complaints Total 
Complaints  Private  Public NFP* 
F M  Other  F  M F M N % 
520 
Agriculture  2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.8 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
Manufacture 17 16 0 0 0 0 0 33 6.3 
Electricity, Gas 
Water, and Waste  
2 3 0 2 2 0 0 9 1.7 
Construction 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 12 2.3 
Wholesale  5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1.0 
Retail  37 6 1 0 0 0 0 44 8.5 
Accommodation 
and food service 
22  4 1 0 0 0 0 27 5.2 
Transport, postal 
and warehousing 
23 9 1 5 8 0 0 46 8.8 
IT, Media, and 
telecommunication  
27 6 0 0 0 0 0 33 6.3 
Finance and 
insurance 
28 7 0 0 0 2 0 37 7.1 
Rental, hiring and 
real estate 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.8 
Professional, 
scientific technical  
16 1 0 0 0 1 0 18 3.5 
Public 
administration and 
safety 
5 5 0 49 26 2 0 87 16.7 
Administrative and 
Support Services 
19 2 0 0 0 0 0 21 4.0 
Education and 
training 
6 1 0 14 11 0 0 32 6.2 
Health/ social 
assistance 
26 5 0 32 14 9 0 86 16.5 
Arts/ recreation 7 1 0 1 2 0 0 11 2.1 
Other Services 8 2 0 0 0 1 0 11 2.1 
Total complaints 
by gender and 
sector (and %of  
520 complaints)) 
264 
(50.8) 
72 
(13.8) 
3 
(0.6) 
103 
(19.8) 
63  
(12.1) 
15 
(2.9) 
0 520 100 
Total by sector  
(and as %520 
complaints)  
339  
(65.2) 
166  
(31.9) 
15  
(2.9) 
520  
(100) 
*Not for Profit 
 
   
 486 
Table D13: Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as % by Gender 
Type of Conduct  Female 
Complainants   
Male 
Complainants   
Other 
Complainants  
Total  
Complainants 
N % 382 N % 135 N % 3 N % 520 
PT work/ job share 92 24.0 15 11.1 1 33.3 108 20.8 
Rostering, shifts, other 
flexibility 
99 25.9 43 31.9 1 33.3 143 27.5 
Location/ transfer/tele-work 40 10.5 19 14.0 0 0.0 59 11.3 
Leave 49 12.8 42 31.1 0 0.0 91 18.0 
Hostile environment/ 
other detriment 
52 13.6 8 5.9 1 33.3 61 11.7 
Job selection 14 3.7 4 3.0 0 0.0 18 3.5 
Training 5 1.3 1 0.7 0 0.0 6 1.2 
Benefits 6 1.6 2 1.5 0 0.0 6 1.2 
Promotion 5 1.3 1 0.7 0 0.0 5 1.0 
Restructure 10 2.6 3 2.2 0 0.0 10 1.9 
Redundancy 15 3.9 1 1.0 0 0.0 16 3.0 
Dismissal – actual 55 14.4 16 11.9 0 0.0 71 13.7 
Resignation/ 
constructive dismissal 
59 15.4 9 6.7 0 0.0 68 13.0 
Termination type not clear  16 4.2 7 5.2 1 33.3 24 4.6 
Not Clear 4 1.0 6 4.4 0 0.0 10 1.9 
Notes  
Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
 
Table D14: Female Complainants Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as % by Caring 
Responsibility 
Type of Conduct  Maternity  Mother/ 
NMR 
Female 
Parental 
Type 
Female 
Adult 
Carer  
Total  
N % 
153 
N %  
201 
N %  
8 
N %  
20 
N %  
382  
 
PT work/ Job share 66 43.1 22 10.9 2 25.0 2 10.0 92 24.0 
Rostering, shifts, other 
flexibility 
11 7.2 63 31.3 2 25.0 2 10.0 99 25.9 
Location/transfer/tele-work 17 11.1 17 8.5 2 25.0 4 20.0 40 10.5 
Leave  5 3.3 35 17.4 2 25.0 7 35.0 49 12.8 
Hostile Environment/other 
detriment 
19 12.4 31 15.4 1 12.5 1 5.0 52 13.6 
Job selection 1 0.7 12 6.0 1 12.5 0 0.0 14 3.7 
Training 2 1.3 2 1.0 1 12.5 0 0.0 5 1.3 
Benefits 3 2.0 3 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 1.6 
Promotion 0 0.0 5 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.3 
Restructure 6 4.0 4 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 10 2.6 
Redundancy 5 3.3 7 3.5 0 0.0 3 15.0 15 3.9 
Dismissal – actual 19 12.4 34 16.9 0 0.0 2 10.0 55 14.4 
Resignation/constructive 
dismissal 
33 21.6 26 12.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 59 15.4 
Termination Type not Clear  5 3.3 10 5.0 0 0.00 1 5.0 16 4.2 
Not Clear 0 0.0 4 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 1.0 
Notes  
Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints. 
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Table D15: Male Complainants Alleged Discriminatory Conduct as % by Caring 
Responsibility 
Type of Conduct  Fathers Male 
Parental 
Type 
Male  
Adult 
Carer  
Male Carer 
Not clear 
Total  
N % 93 N %  
2 
N % 34 N %  
6 
N % 
135 
PT work/Job share 11 11.8 0 0.0 4 11.8 0 0.0 15 11.1 
Rostering, shifts, other 
flexibility 
37 39.8 2 100. 2 5.9 2 33.3 43 31.9 
Location transfer/tele-work 10 10.8 0 0.0 8 23.5 1 16.7 19 14.1 
Leave  19 20.4 0 0.0 23 67.6 0 0.0 42 31.1 
Hostile environment/other 
detriment 
8 8.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 8 5.9 
Job selection 3 3.2 0 0.0 1 2.9 0 0.0 4 3.0 
Training 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.7 
Benefits 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Promotion 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Restructure 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Redundancy 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.7 
Dismissal – actual 10 10.8 0 0.0 6 17.6 0 0.0 16 11.9 
Resignation/constructive 
dismissal 
7 7.5 0 0.0 2 5.8 0 0.0 9 6.7 
Termination type not Clear  2 2.2 0 0.0 5 14.7 0 0.0 7 5.2 
Not Clear 3 3.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 50.0 6 4.4 
Notes 
Multiple types of discriminatory conduct reported in some complaints.  
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Table D16: Duration of Complaints Settled and Not Settled by Caring Responsibility 
 
Duration/CR  
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A
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%
 5
2
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Settled with accommodation  
<1 month 8 9 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 26 16.3 5.0 
1-3 19 24 1 4 12 0 4 0 1 65 40.6 12.5 
4-6 16 8 1 2 13 0 4 0 1 45 28.1 8.7 
7-12 4 7 2 0 4 1 1 0 0 19 11.9 3.7 
13-17 0 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.6 0.2 
18+ 1 2  1 0 0 0 0 0 4 2.5 0.8 
Total  48 51 4 7 35 1 12 0 2 160 100 30.7 
Settled without accommodation 
<1 month 2 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 5.8 1.3 
1-3 15 13 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 31 25.6 6.0 
4-6 9 19 0 3 5 0 2 0 0 38 31.4 7.3 
7-12 14 10 1 3 3 0 1 0 0 32 26.4 6.2 
13-17 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 9 7.4 1.7 
18+ 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 3.3 0.8 
Total  45 51 1 8 12 0 4 0 0 121 100 23.3 
Settled complaints 
Settled with and without  
accommodation 
93 102 5 15 47 1 16 0 2 281 100 54.0 
Not settled 
<1 month 4 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 12 5.0 2.3 
1-3 24 37 0 0 10 0 3 5 0 79 33.1 15.2 
4-6 12 26 1 1 12 0 7 1 0 60 25.1 11.5 
7-12 12 24 2 1 16 0 6 0 0 61 25.5 11.7 
13-17 8 7 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 21 8.8 4.0 
18+ 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 6 2.5 1.15 
Total not settled 60 99 3 5 46 1 18 6 1 239 100 46.0 
Total Complaints  153 201 8 20 93 2 34 6 3 520 100 100 
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